Opinion
No. 06 C 0734.
February 7, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Officers John J. Burke and Francisco Gonzalez (collectively referred to as "Defendants" or "Defendant Officers") have moved the Court to grant summary judgment against plaintiff Lisandro Rivera ("Plaintiff"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), on the two counts that remain in Plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons provided below, the Court grants Defendants' motion and enters judgement in favor of Defendants.
I. Background
A. Traffic Stop and ArrestPage 2
Citations to the record are in the following form: Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' LR 56.1(a) Statement is cited as PR ¶ ____; Plaintiff's Amended LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Additional Facts is cited as PSOAF ¶ ___.
PR ¶ 8; PSOAF ¶ 12.
PR ¶ 8.
PSOAF ¶ 7.
Defendants and Officer Grissett (who is not a defendant) then approached his vehicle. One of the officers told Plaintiff to exit his vehicle, which he did. Upon exiting the vehicle, Plaintiff attempted to hand the African American officer his driver's license and registration. He was told by the officer that he did not need that information at that moment. The African American officer then searched Plaintiff's body while Plaintiff placed his hands on the hood of the police squad car. At the same time, Officer Burke began searching Plaintiff's vehicle. Officer Burke ripped out the center console of Plaintiff's vehicle and found one plastic baggy containing four small, knotted baggies, each containing what was later confirmed to be cocaine. Plaintiff was then placed under arrest and asked for his driver's license, which, along with the property from his pockets, was on the hood of the vehicle where he had been told to put his hands. Officer Gonzales ran Plaintiff's driver's license and learned that it was suspended.
PSOAF ¶ 12.
PSOAF ¶ 13.
PSOAF ¶ 13.
PSOAF ¶ 13.
PSOAF ¶ 14.
PSOAF ¶ 19.
PSOAF ¶ 24.
PR ¶ 10 (though Plaintiff's counsel argued in open court that Plaintiff was under arrest prior to this time, upon being stopped by the Defendants, because he was not free to leave).
PR ¶ 11.
B. Resulting Charges
C. Criminal Proceedings
PR ¶ 12.
PR ¶ 20.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, The People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05 MC1 110230 (March 3, 2005).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, The People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05 MC1 110230 (March 3, 2005).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
On July 14, 2005, Plaintiff testified at a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Quash and Suppress Evidence in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Plaintiff testified that he was pulled over and one of the Defendant Officers asked him to step out of his vehicle, at which point he put his hands on the vehicle while one officer searched him and another officer searched his vehicle. The officer that searched the vehicle, according to Plaintiff, ripped out the center console of his car and found drugs in his vehicle. At the time of the search, Plaintiff testified he had not yet shown Defendants his driver's license but, after the search, one of the Defendant Officers ran his driver's license, learned it was suspended, and then arrested him.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, The People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05CR6341 (July 14, 2005).
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-16, People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05CR6341 (July 14, 2005).
Officer Gonzalez and Officer Burke also testified at this hearing. First, Officer Gonzalez testified that the reason for the traffic stop was twofold: no front license plate and obstruction of view. When asked what items were hanging from Plaintiff's rearview mirror, Officer Gonzalez testified that he did not remember. Relating to the arrest, Officer Gonzalez testified that he heard Officer Burke ask Plaintiff for his driver's license, Officer Burke ran his driver's license, found it was suspended, asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle, and Officer Burke then placed him under arrest for having a suspended license. Officer Gonzalez testified that it was after the arrest that a search of Plaintiff's vehicle revealed suspect cocaine. On cross examination Officer Gonzalez testified he did not believe he removed the objects hanging from the rearview mirror before driving Plaintiff's vehicle back to the station and, when asked if he would have driven the vehicle if it was not safe, he answered no, he would not. In contrast, Officer Burke testified that he did not check Plaintiff's driver's license but, rather, Officer Grisset or Officer Gonzalez ran the check of the license. Officer Burke testified that after they checked Plaintiff's driver's license and learned it was suspended, they placed Plaintiff under arrest and then searched the vehicle.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 25-27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38-39.
In support of his motion to suppress, Plaintiff's counsel referred the state court judge to the inconsistencies in the Defendant Officers' testimonies ( i.e., whether Plaintiff was initially stopped solely for obstruction of view or whether Plaintiff was stopped for obstruction of view and for missing a front license plate). Plaintiff's counsel also directed the court to testimony by Officer Gonzalez that he drove Plaintiff's vehicle back to the station, without removing the items hanging from the rearview mirror. In concluding his argument, Plaintiff's counsel contended that Defendants not only pulled Plaintiff over illegally, but they searched him and his vehicle illegally, all prior to finding out that his driver's license was suspended.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, The People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05CR6341 (July 14, 2005).
Id.
Id.
The state court agreed that the search was illegal and further stated that the objects, which Plaintiff admitted had been hanging from his rearview mirror at the time of the traffic stop, the baby booty and the rosary, "would not obstruct one's view out the front window." The state court found that because of inconsistencies in the Defendant Officers' testimony, it had "no choice but to side with the version [of facts] given by the [Plaintiff] in terms of what happened when he was stopped; that he was not asked for his driver's license." The state court granted the motion to suppress evidence and ruled there was no basis for the stop of the vehicle. Plaintiff's criminal charge for possession of a controlled substance was then nolle prosequied.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
PR ¶ 21.
D. Section 1983 Action
Following his criminal charge being nolle prosequied, on February 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed a five-count civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state law against both Officers Burke and Gonzalez ("Complaint"). Plaintiff claims the Officers lacked probable cause to stop him while he was driving his car. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (1) a Section 1983 claims for false arrest/unlawful detention; (2) state law claims for malicious prosecution; (3) false imprisonment; (4) assault and battery; and (5) indemnification.
On February 11, 2006, Rivera stipulated to dismiss counts III (false imprisonment), IV (assualt), and V (indemnification) with prejudice. Presently before the Court is Defendants' summary judgment motion with regard to the remaining claims: the Section 1983 false arrest claim (Count I) and Plaintiff's state law malicious prosecution claim (Count II).
E. Hearing on Summary Judgment
On January 16, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. At that hearing Plaintiff's counsel contended that a jury could find that Defendants lacked an objective reasonable belief that there was an obstruction of view and accordingly, there was no probable cause to pull Plaintiff's vehicle over and arrest him. Plaintiff's counsel asserted Plaintiff was placed under arrest "when he was not free to leave, and that was when he was pulled over by the police." Plaintiff's counsel also conceded that the discovery of the cocaine after the traffic stop gave Defendants an independent basis to arrest Plaintiff. In open court Plaintiff's counsel stated as much when he said "damages would be limited to the time [Plaintiff] is forced out of the car, searched, put in the back of a squad car . . . then [Defendants] find or claim to find cocaine . . . at the point the cocaine is found, does that give [Defendants] probable cause, yes." This means Plaintiff's false arrest claim, and damages therefrom, relate only to the brief time beginning when Plaintiff was ordered to pull over, exit his vehicle, and while he was standing outside his vehicle during the search.
II. Legal Standard
III. Analysis
42 U.S.C. § 1983 A. False Arrest (Count I)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 324.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
See Russell v. Harms, 387 F.3d 458, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2005).
In his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff principally argues that the issue of whether the Defendant Officers had probable cause to stop his vehicle necessarily depends on the credibility of the witnesses. According to Plaintiff, at least one of the Defendant Officers told him this was a random traffic stop. He also contends that the Defendant Officers' testimony is inconsistent about the chronology of events that transpired after the traffic stop was made.
i. Probable Cause Standard
ii. Relevant Illinois Law
Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006).
Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 547.
Id. ( citing kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Id.
See Williams v. Rodriguez, 2007 WL 4258679, *4 (C.A. 7 (Ill.)).
Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 9-40-250(B).
625 ILCS 5/12-503(c) (providing that "[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle with any objects placed or suspended between the driver and the front windshield . . . which materially obstructs the driver's view.").
Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 9-76-160(A).
iii. Probable Cause Determination
Here, Plaintiff claims that no probable cause existed for the stop. Plaintiff references the ruling in the underlying state criminal case in which the judge found, after hearing testimony, that the objects hanging from the rearview mirror "would not obstruct one's view out the front window." In making this ruling, the state court found that the Defendant Officers were inconsistent about the chronology of events that occurred following the stop and, accordingly found "no choice but to side with the version given by [Plaintiff] in terms of what happened when he was stopped . . . " The state criminal court then suppressed the evidence: the cocaine found during Defendants' search of Plaintiff's vehicle. Here, Plaintiff contends that the Court should similarly rule that the stop was pretextual and that there was no probable cause for Plaintiff's subsequent detention.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, The People of the State of Illinois v. Rivera, No. 05CR6341 (July 14, 2005).
Id.
Plaintiff's reliance on the state court's ruling is misplaced. First, the state court's findings regarding Plaintiff's arrest are not binding on this Court as to Plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Second, the issue before the state criminal court was whether the exclusionary rule applied. The exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained from, or as a result of, lawless official acts. That doctrine is not applicable here. As explained in Townes v. City of New York, the value of the Fourth Amendment is not served if Plaintiff, who illegally possessed cocaine, is allowed to reap financial benefit from his arrest. Even if Defendants lacked probable cause to stop Plaintiff's vehicle, they certainly had probable cause to arrest him upon discovery of the cocaine. As found in Townes, a "lack of probable cause to stop and search does not vitiate the probable cause to arrest, because (among other reasons) the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not available to assist a § 1983 claimant." Plaintiff's argument, therefore, that his vehicle was searched before Defendants checked his driver's license, in other words that the search was illegal because it took place before his arrest, is irrelevant to Plaintiff's false arrest claim. Whether it was legal for Defendants to search Plaintiff's vehicle when they did, depending on when they actually arrested him, simply has no bearing on a false arrest analysis.
See Schultz v. Thomas, 832 F.2d 108, 111 (1987) (finding that the state criminal court's findings and opinion regarding the plaintiff's arrest and subsequent prosecution were irrelevant to an adjudication of the plaintiff's civil rights claim).
See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961) (defining the `fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine).
176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 149.
Plaintiff, in contrast to arguments presented in state court, is not arguing an illegal search in this case but is, rather, asserting an opposite position to that which he argued in state court. In state court Plaintiff argued he was not arrested until after Defendants checked his driver's license, which was after the search. In the criminal proceedings those facts would warrant the judge's ruling that the search was illegal. In Plaintiff's civil rights action, however, which is before this Court, Plaintiff argues that he was in custody immediately following the traffic stop.
But as noted above, the only question the Court need answer is whether, under the objective standard, there was probable cause to stop Plaintiff for the obstruction of view charge. Plaintiff claims it was unreasonable for Defendants to believe that the rosary and baby bootie hanging from Plaintiff's rearview mirror were an obstruction of view because no reasonable officer could possibly find these objects obstructed Plaintiff's view. Plaintiff also claims Defendants, in fact, did not believe these items obstructed his view because when asked why they were stopping him, one officer told him it was a routine traffic stop and did not say anything about being stopped for obstruction of view. The probable cause analysis, however, does not involve an officer's subjective reason for making the arrest. As explained by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, whether an action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is determined objectively "whereby, `the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" The only issue is whether a reasonable officer with the same information known to Defendants at the time of the traffic stop, would have had probable cause to stop Plaintiff.
PSOAF ¶ 20.
Williams, 2007 WL 4258679, *4.
Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
The fact that one of the officers stated his subjective reasons for stopping the vehicle — that the officers were doing routine stops — does not invalidate the arrest. In United States v. Smith, the court found probable cause for a stop based only on the presence of an air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror, despite the officer's subjective suspicions of the vehicle. The Court found that probable cause existed for the stop based on the presence of the air freshener regardless of what the officer believed because the "Fourth Amendment analysis is objective" in nature. In Williams v. Rodriguez the plaintiff was stopped for a minor traffic violation, parking on the side of the road, and subjected to a full custodial arrest for that violation. The court held the facts known to the officer, when viewed objectively, were sufficient to arrest the plaintiff for the traffic violation without violating the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the officer's "subjective reason for making the arrest was driving under the influence." Also, in Whren, supra, the Supreme Court reiterated its previous finding that "flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification," noting that a traffic violation arrest "would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was `a mere pretext for a narcotics search.'" Finally, in Duncan v. Fapso, the court held it simply did not matter that the officer announced he was arresting the plaintiff "for possession of drug paraphernalia so long as he had probable cause to arrest for any offense." There the court found the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for criminal trespass before the officer initiated the search of the plaintiff and found a crack pipe, so the search was sustained as one incident to an arrest for that offense. In this case, the objects hanging in the rearview mirror, of which there is no dispute that they were in fact present, were sufficient to warrant the Defendant Officers believing an offense had been committed.
See Duncan v. Fapso, 2007 WL 528860, *2 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that because the officer had probable cause to make an arrest for criminal trespass, it did not matter that the officer announced he was arresting the plaintiff for possession of drugs, so long as he had probable cause to arrest for any offense); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004) (noting that while it is good police practice to inform a person of the reason for his or her arrest, it is not constitutionally required).
80 F.3d at 219.
Id. at 219.
Williams, 2007 WL 4258679 at *6.
2007 WL 528860, *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007).
Duncan, 2007 WL 528860 at *2.
Plaintiff's argument that the rosary and baby bootie did not materially obstruct his view, as the Municipal Code of Chicago defines the violation, is also misplaced. For purposes of the probable cause analysis the Court is not concerned with the particular length of the baby bootie or precisely how low it was hanging from the rearview mirror. The propriety of the traffic stop does not depend on whether Plaintiff was actually guilty of committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle with a material obstruction in view of the windshield. The pertinent question is, rather, whether it was reasonable for Defendants to believe that the Plaintiff's view was materially impaired due to the items hanging from the rearview mirror. The Court finds an officer in the position of the Defendant Officers passing or approaching Plaintiff's vehicle could reasonably think the objects hanging, in fact, materially obstructed Plaintiff's view and that Plaintiff was, thus, violating the law by operating his vehicle. This conclusion is objectively reasonable under the precedent set forth by the Seventh Circuit and Illinois state law. Focusing only on whether Defendants had probable cause to stop Plaintiff's vehicle for obstruction of view, as required for purposes of this motion, the Court finds the stop did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Rights and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim.
See United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000).
See Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587 (finding that whether the plaintiff was guilty of a traffic offense because of a cracked windshield does not affect the propriety of the traffic stop).
See Chashman, 216 F.3d at 587.
See Smith, 80 F.3d at 219 (holding there was probable cause to stop the vehicle even if the sole reason for the traffic stop was the presence of an air freshener hanging from the rear-view mirror); see also People v. Alvarez, 243 Ill. App. 3d 933, 939 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993) (holding the initial stop was justified upon the presence of objects hanging from the rearview mirror); People v. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826, 839 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992) (finding that a traffic stop because of fuzzy dice and other items hanging from the rearview mirror was proper).
See Smith, 80 F.3d at 219.
B. Malicious Prosecution (Count II)
Plaintiff contends that after the arrest, Defendants maliciously prosecuted the criminal charges brought against him. Illinois law provides a malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to show: "`(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.'" As addressed above, once the cocaine was found, Defendants had probable cause to charge and arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff's assertions that the Defendant Officers lied, later, about what occurred during the stop simply does not vitiate probable cause. It is well-settled that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim. There is also an absence of evidence that shows that Defendants had any malice towards Plaintiff, which is an additional required element to prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim (Count II).
Joiner v. Benton Comm. Bank, 82 Ill.2d 40, 45 (Ill. 1980) ( quoting Ritchey v. Masksin, 71 Ill.2d 470, 475 (1978).
Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 547.
C. Qualified Immunity
IV. Conclusion
Id. at 548.
Russell, 387 F.3d at 462-63.