Opinion
Case No. 3:02CV7053
May 8, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff Scott M. Riforgiato brings this action against defendant Findlex Corporation alleging violations of federal and state disability discrimination laws and state common law. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pending is defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the following reasons, defendant's motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
Findlex manufactures brake systems and engine mounts for the automotive industry. Findlex hired plaintiff in April, 1996, as a general associate in the casting department. By February, 1998, plaintiff was promoted to a second shift maintenance technician position in the machining department.
Plaintiff suffers from asthma and allergies. In May, 1997, plaintiff began having difficulty breathing at work. After several hospitalizations within a two year period, plaintiff was referred to Dr. Rick Watson, a pulmonary specialist. In a December, 1997, report, Dr. Watson noted: "For the past two years [plaintiff] has been working at Findlex Casting where he is exposed to molten aluminum, fumes and graphite. [Plaintiff] is uncertain whether his occupational exposures are exacerbating his asthma at this point. He was never a smoker, although his fiancee smokes." Watson Dep. Ex. 1. Dr. Watson recommended medication, no secondhand smoke exposure, and that plaintiff stay off work until January 5, 1998. Id.
From February 9, 1998, to March 19, 2001, plaintiff missed numerous days of work because of asthma "flare-ups." On January 30, 2001, plaintiff was hospitalized for seven days, the first two of which were in intensive care, due to an asthma flare-up.
Plaintiff returned to work on March 19, 2001. Dr. Watson ordered that plaintiff work in defendant's "clean room" — a controlled atmosphere section of Findlex's assembly department. Findlex transferred plaintiff to a technician position in the clean room on his return. Plaintiff has worked there ever since.
In January, 2002, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, arguing that while employed by Findlex, he was exposed to "coolant" that exacerbated his asthma and prevented his participation in every day activities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges state common law claims of intentional tort and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is insufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party will be accepted as true, all doubts will be resolved against the moving party, all evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). Summary judgment shall be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION
I. Disability Discrimination
Title I of the ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such an individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged courts to look to the ADA for guidance in interpreting Ohio's prohibition on disability discrimination. City of Columbus Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 573 (1998) ("The federal Americans with Disabilities Act (`ADA') is similar to the Ohio handicap discrimination law. . . . We can look to regulations and cases interpreting the federal Act for guidance in our interpretation of Ohio law."). Because resolution of plaintiff's ADA claim also disposes of his claim under Ohio law, I will analyze the disability discrimination issue under the ADA.
Plaintiff claims that Findlex knew that exposure to the coolant caused plaintiff's asthma flare-ups. Beginning February 15, 1998, defendant rejected plaintiff's "numerous requests to be moved to another department or part of Defendant Findlex Corporation's factory as a reasonable accommodation." Complt. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges, therefore, that defendant discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his alleged disability.
To succeed on a failure to accommodate claim, plaintiff must prove: 1) that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA; 2) that he is "otherwise qualified" to perform the requirements of the job; and 3) that defendant refused to make a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997).
Defendant argues in its motion for summary judgment that plaintiff is not "disabled" for purposes of the ADA.
A disability is "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
A physical impairment is "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
Major life activities include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
A person who is "substantially limited" in a major life activity is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
The determination of whether a particular impairment constitutes a disability must be made on a case-by-case basis. No impairment constitutes a disability per se, but rather an impairment is a disability if it limits the major life activities of the particular individual who is impaired. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. ("The determination of whether an individual has a disability is . . . based . . . on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others. . . .").
Plaintiff argues his asthma and/or allergies substantially limit him in the major life activities of walking, breathing, and working.
A. Breathing and Walking
Plaintiff claims that in the course of his maintenance position, he was exposed to a coolant that triggered severe asthmatic attacks. Once these attacks started, plaintiff claims he could not walk for more than five feet and he could not breath. This occurred at least thirty-seven times within a period of time less than four years. Pl.'s Br. at 5.
Several factors must be considered to determine whether plaintiff is substantially limited in walking and breathing because of his asthma and allergies: "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(2). Plaintiff has failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether he is disabled because his condition is not as severe, long term, or permanent as to substantially limit the major life activities of walking and breathing.
As explained in White v. Honda of America, Mfg., Inc., 241 F. Supp.2d 852, 856-57 (S.D.Ohio 2003),
Numerous courts have found that individuals who are able to treat their asthma such that they are able to engage normally in physical exertion without symptoms are not substantially limited in any major life activity. In Ventura v. City of Independence, the Sixth Circuit used an individualized inquiry to determine that a particular individual's asthma did not substantially limit his major life activities because he was able to play sports, perform calisthenics, walk, play the saxophone, run, sing, and water ski. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4102, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1997) (unpublished opinion). In Ventura, the plaintiff's asthma did not constitute a disability despite the fact that he had difficulty breathing when exposed to diesel fumes, high humidity, and extreme temperatures. Id. at *1, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4102. Similarly, in Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2099, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2000), the Sixth Circuit found that a plaintiff's asthmatic breathing problems were not "as severe, long term, or permanent" as to be substantially limiting because in the absence of diesel fumes he was able to breathe normally. Where a plaintiff had suffered symptoms of asthma while on the job, the Second Circuit decided that a plaintiff was not substantially limited in any major life activity because she was able to breathe and work without substantial limitation. See Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994).
The facts of White are similar to this case. The plaintiff claimed she was disabled because she suffered asthma symptoms while exposed to environmental irritants at work. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing because plaintiff's asthma only affected her when she breathed certain irritants. Exposure to these irritants resulted, therefore, in only brief symptoms, not the chronic, month-long symptoms that would substantially limit a major life activity. Id. at 857-58. The plaintiff was able to perform many normal life activities, like driving, pumping her own gas, walking, exercising, smoking cigarettes, and going to restaurants. Id. at 857.
Like the plaintiffs in Ventura, Minnix, and White, Riforgiato's asthma and/or allergies only affect him when he breathes the coolant in Findlex's casting and machining departments. Exposure to the coolant resulted in brief symptoms, not the permanent or long-term conditions implicated by a disability covered by the ADA. According to plaintiff's own deposition testimony, he is able to perform many normal life activities outside of work. Plaintiff admitted he has no problems walking or swimming, and if he does have an asthma attack, he uses his inhaler, and "that takes care of that." Pl.'s Depo. at 7. In fact, plaintiff concedes that he has not had problems with his asthma or allergies since March, 2001, when he was transferred to the clean room. Pl.'s Depo. at 7.
B. Working
With respect to the major life activity of working, the EEOC regulations provide:
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
§ 1630.2(j)(2).
Plaintiff argues that he was not only limited in working in the machining department at Findlex, but in the casting department and any other area of the Findlex plant where he would be exposed to coolant. Pl.'s Br. at 7.
Evidence that plaintiff was unable to work in a department where he was exposed to coolant is not sufficient evidence of a disability for purposes of the ADA.
The Sixth Circuit allows claimants to assert they are substantially limited in the major life activity of working when they can show the impairment bars them from a significant percentage of available jobs. In Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's decision that a plaintiff was disabled under the ADA "because his injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs he was qualified to perform given his education, background and experience." 222 F.3d at 253.
The Burns decision was, moreover, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). In Williams, the Supreme Court emphasized that the term "substantially limits" must be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Id. at 196 ("The word `substantial' thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way. . . .").
This court would be using a less-than-demanding standard were it to find Riforgiato substantially limited in working. Plaintiff has not demonstrated he was "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). Based on the evidence in the record, Riforgiato is still qualified to perform any job that does not use the coolant in the casting and machining departments of Findlex.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his asthma and/or allergies impaired his ability to walk, breathe, or work. Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim shall be, therefore, granted.
II. State Law Claims
Having disposed of plaintiff's federal claim, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to address plaintiff's state tort law claims.
It is within the trial court's discretion to dismiss a cause without prejudice once the federal claims are resolved. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). Absent a question of federal policy, it is wiser to allow state courts to resolve state law claims. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore,
Ordered that
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, granted as to plaintiff's federal and state disability discrimination claims.
2. Defendant's state common law claims for intentional tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages, are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
So Ordered.