Opinion
Case No. 20010987-CA.
FILED March 13, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Leon A. Dever.
Attorneys: Robert L. Jeffs, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brent A. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's first claim for relief. The activity in which Plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury was unquestionably a "governmental function" under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (Supp. 2002). Therefore, it was "presumptively cloaked with immunity by [Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997)]."Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Utah 1993).
Plaintiff's reliance on Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), is misplaced. See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Utah 1993).
Although Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2002) waives immunity for cases involving negligence of a government employee committed within the scope of employment, subsection (10) of that section contains an exception to waiver for cases in which "the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any person in any state prison." This exception clearly applies to the present case. According to Plaintiff's own complaint, Plaintiff "was an inmate at the Utah State Prison under the custody . . . of the Utah State Department of Corrections" at the time of his injury, and he sustained the injury while he "was engaged in a training program administered by the Division of Correctional Industries." This division, which is part of the Department of Corrections, see Utah Code Ann. § 64-13a-4 (2000), is charged with the "responsibility for training offenders in general work habits, work skills, and specific training skills that increase their employment prospects when released." Utah Code Ann. § 64-13a-2(1)(d) (2000). In other words, Plaintiff, a prison inmate, sustained his injury while participating in a training program that was administered by the Department of Corrections and was designed to help prison inmates like himself succeed in the outside world when released from prison.
Given these facts, we must conclude that Plaintiff's injury arose out of, or in connection with, his incarceration. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996) ("'[T]he words "arising out of" are very broad, general and comprehensive. They are commonly understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from[.]'") (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff's first claim for relief.
As for Plaintiff's third claim for relief, we recognize that "[t]he sufficiency of [Plaintiff's] pleadings `must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated.'" Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ¶ 26, 21 P.3d 198 (quoting Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974)). For that reason, we disregard Plaintiff's conclusory statements that Defendant acted with "deliberate indifference." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 1996), partially overruled on other grounds by Spackman v. Board of Educ., 2000 UT 87, ¶ 20 n. 5, 16 P.3d 533. Rather, we focus only on the facts alleged.
Plaintiff's factual allegations, which we must assume to be true at this stage of the proceedings, see Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990), amount to a textbook example of simple employer negligence. Because negligence is insufficient to constitute a violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291-92 (1976); Bott, 922 P.2d at 739-41, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's third claim for relief.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, and Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.