Summary
holding that a defendant is not liable for a plaintiffs emotional distress without a showing that the distress inflicted was "extreme or severe"
Summary of this case from Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.COpinion
20372
March 2, 1977.
Claude R. Dunbar, Esq., of Spartanburg, for Appellant, cites: As to the County Court's committing reversible error in affirming the action of the Trial Court in setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment in its favor, notwithstanding the jury's verdict: 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265; Page 159, volume 15, A.L.R.2d; 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265; 178 S.C. 169, 182 S.E. 299; 138 S.C. 354, 136 S.E. 300; 81 S.C. 235, 62 S.E. 244; 17 L.R.A., N.S. 1002; 209 S.C. 198, 39 S.E.2d 360; C.J.S., Vol. 3, page 290; 220 S.C. 198, 66 S.E.2d 816; 36 N.W.2d 761, 240 Iowa 596; 296 P.2d 75, 140 C.A.2d 796; 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391; S.C. Code Section 16-11; Section 16-351 S.C. Code; 159 S.C. 301, 156 S.E. 871; 159 S.C. 301, 156 S.E. 871; 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740; 246 S.C. 429, 144 S.E.2d 151; 255 S.C. 495, 179 S.E.2d 720; 220 S.C. 198, 66 S.E.2d 816; 133 S.C. 23, 130 S.E. 552; Section 101215 of the S.C. Code; 222 S.C. 93, 71 S.E.2d 893; Circuit Court Rule 79; 262 S.C. 413, 205 S.E.2d 170; 244 S.C. 454, 137 S.E.2d 594.
Messrs. T.E. Walsh and Marshall T. Walsh, of Spartanburg, for Respondent, cite: As to the evidence at trial not presenting an issue for jury determination on the question of intentional infliction of mental distress: 239 S.C. 103, 121 S.E.2d 909; Rule 79 of the Rules of Practice for the Circuit Courts; Annot, 46 A.L.R. 3d 772; 38 Am. Jur.2d Fright, Shock, Etc. Section 1; 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350; 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E. 265; 15 A.L.R.2d 108; 242 N.W. 25; 157 So. 265; 81 S.C. 235, 62 S.E. 244; 209 S.C. 198, 39 S.E.2d 360; Sections 70301, 15-806 and 15-1671.29, Code of Laws of S.C. 1962, as amended; 211 S.C. 161, 44 S.E.2d 308; 264 S.C. 382, 215 S.E.2d 436; 257 S.C. 359, 185 S.E.2d 894.
March 2, 1977.
This appeal is from an order of the lower court setting aside a verdict in favor of appellant (plaintiff) for actual and punitive damages and entering judgment for respondent (defendant).
An agent of respondent forged the name of appellant, as maker, to a note in the amount of $196.00 payable to respondent. The forgery was discovered when other agents of respondent attempted in a normal fashion, through private contact of appellant, to collect the note. The appellant, a person easily upset, suffered some emotional distress from the attempt of respondent to collect the note, but there was no loss of time from work or medical consultation because of the incident. Other than the fact that the note was a forgery, there were no unusual or aggravating circumstances surrounding the attempts to collect. When it was found that the note was a forgery, efforts to collect ceased.
The action was subsequently brought by appellant to recover actual and punitive damages for emotional distress allegedly sustained by her from the attempt by respondent to collect on the forged note.
Upon the trial of the case, the lower court refused respondent's timely motion for a directed verdict and submitted the issues to the jury, resulting in a verdict in appellant's favor in the amount of $300.00 actual damages and $700.00 punitive damages. Respondent's subsequent motion, however, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted and judgment entered for respondent (defendant). This appeal is from that order.
The order of the trial judge was based upon the conclusion, among others, that there was no evidence of any severe emotional distress. We agree.
We have recognized the rule that there is no liability for emotional distress without a showing that the distress inflicted is extreme or severe. Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Company, 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265; Turner v. A B C Jalousie Company of North Carolina, 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528.
While there is testimony that appellant was emotionally upset from the attempt to collect the forged note, there is no showing that the attempts by respondent's agents to collect were unreasonable or abusive, nor that appellant's emotional upset was other than transient and trivial.
The trial judge properly held that there was no evidence to sustain recovery by appellant.
The judgment is affirmed.
LITTLEJOHN, NESS, RHODES and GREGORY, JJ., concur.