Opinion
No. 1D20-2968
08-10-2022
Kenneth L. REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Osterhaus, J.
Kenneth L. Reynolds was tried and convicted of second-degree murder after killing a man by slashing his throat at a gas station. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison. On appeal, Appellant raises three arguments for reversal of the judgment and sentence. First, he argues that the State failed to prove the requisite intent. Second, he contends that certain photographic evidence was improperly admitted. And third, he argues that prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial. We find no merit in Appellant's arguments and affirm.
I.
The murder in this case arose from a dispute between Appellant and the Victim's girlfriend over a vehicle title. Appellant sold a vehicle days before the crime but apparently didn't get paid as expected. He retrieved the car and sought to get the title back from the Victim's girlfriend. Appellant approached the Victim's girlfriend three different times on the day of the homicide, each time demanding the title. The Victim's girlfriend described Appellant as getting progressively angrier with each encounter when she failed to produce the title.
Matters came to a head when the Victim's girlfriend and the Victim were together at a gas station where Appellant again confronted her. The Victim's girlfriend testified that when she failed to produce the title, Appellant moved toward her and stood over her. The Victim responded by demanding that Appellant leave, while also giving assurances that the title would be returned to him. But the agitated Appellant turned on the Victim. Appellant cursed and aggressively confronted the Victim, maneuvered around the Victim's girlfriend when she tried to get in between the two men, and then swung and slashed the Victim's throat with a knife, killing him.
Appellant was ultimately charged with second degree murder, tried and convicted by a jury, and sentenced to life in prison.
II.
A.
We turn, first, to Appellant's contention that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant asserts that the State failed to prove that he acted with a depraved mind when he struck the Victim as required to convict of second-degree murder. See § 782.04(2) Fla. Stat. (2018). The essential question here is whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence of a depraved mind to support the verdict. In considering whether the evidence was legally sufficient, we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the State. Bush v. State , 295 So. 3d 179, 200–201 (Fla. 2020) ; Nolley v. State , 237 So. 3d 469, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
In Appellant's case, ample evidence exists to support the conclusion that Appellant evinced a depraved mind when he killed the Victim. Proof of a depraved mind may be established by proof that the act was done with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent, without regard to human life. § 782.04(2) Fla. Stat.; see also Peoples v. State , 251 So. 3d 291, 302–03 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). The evidence showed that Appellant confronted the Victim's girlfriend multiple times about receiving a car title and became progressively angrier each time. Initially, the focus of Appellant's ill will wasn't on the Victim himself—a point Appellant emphasizes. But the evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that Appellant ultimately directed his ill will and evil intent at the Victim. In fact, he stepped around the Victim's girlfriend to attack the Victim, directed curses and "bowed up" at the Victim (who had made no threatening gestures), and then fatally slashed the defenseless man's throat. Nothing about these facts establishes that Appellant's actions were free of ill will towards the Victim or amounted only to some momentary misjudgment. Indeed, the deep slash completely through the largest muscle in the Victim's neck and through the internal jugular vein to the point of putting a notch in the bone of his cervical vertebrae near his spine showed a concerted determination and deliberateness that is probative of Appellant's evil intent towards the Victim and indifference to human life. See Peoples , 251 So. 3d at 302 (citing knife-stab evidence as sufficient proof of ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent where the defendant plunged a seven-inch knife blade six inches into the chest of the victim). In short, competent, substantial evidence supports that Appellant acted with a depraved mind. B.
Appellant directs his second argument to the trial court's acceptance of certain photos into evidence, a ruling we review for abuse of discretion. Douglas v. State , 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004). Appellant contends that the photos were not relevant because they were not probative of an issue in dispute. He further argues that, even if they were relevant, the photos were overly gruesome and should have been excluded.
Graphic photographs of a victim's injuries "are admissible if they are relevant and not so shocking in nature as to defeat the value of their relevance." Jackson v. State , 212 So. 3d 505, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (quoting Hertz v. State , 803 So. 2d 629, 641 (Fla. 2001) ). The trial court was tasked with determining "whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the evidence." Id. ; see also Armstrong v. State , 73 So. 3d 155, 166 (Fla. 2011). The court's decision on the admission of photographic evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See id. at 168.
Appellant argues that the photos were not relevant and inadmissible because it was undisputed that Appellant killed the Victim by cutting him. Almeida v. State , 748 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1999) ("To be relevant, a photo of a deceased victim must be probative of an issue that is in dispute .") (emphasis in original). But irrelevance of a photo based on an issue being undisputed only applies where the sole basis for the photo's relevance has already been stipulated to. Armstrong , 73 So. 3d at 167–68. Where a photo adds probative information regarding an issue still in dispute, the photo can retain relevance, even if part of its probative value is undisputed. See id. at 167–69 (holding that a photo showed additional relevant facts in addition to the stipulated fact).
Here, as discussed above, Appellant's mindset in slashing the Victim was an issue in dispute, as to whether he "evinc[ed] a depraved mind regardless of human life." § 782.04(2) Fla. Stat. The photos in this case, particularly to the extent that the autopsy photos can be described as gruesome or graphic, go to the nature of Appellant's action and severity of the wound as described by the medical examiner. They are probative of Appellant's disposition towards the Victim and human life. § 782.04(2) Fla. Stat.; see also McWatters v. State , 36 So. 3d 613, 637 (Fla. 2010) (upholding the admission of photographs when offered to explain a medical examiner's testimony ... the location of wounds, or to demonstrate the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor). Thus, the photos were relevant. Furthermore, we do not agree with Appellant that any of the photos were so shocking as to preclude their use. The jurors were told during jury selection that the case was a homicide and would feature bloody photos. And they were asked if this would keep them from deliberating fairly. Later, they were instructed appropriately to avoid acting out of prejudice, bias, or sympathy, or because they felt sorry for or were angry at anyone. See Jackson , 212 So. 3d at 506. In the end, there was no indication in the record that any juror was disturbed improperly by the photos or swayed adversely from being able to fairly consider the evidence. Although the photos might have been difficult to look at, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing their admission as relevant evidence.
C.
Finally, Appellant challenges multiple individual comments—some preserved, some not—made during the State's closing arguments, claiming there were misstatements of law and fact, witness-credibility bolstering, burden shifting, personal opinions, comments appealing to jurors’ sympathies and emotions, and a Golden Rule violation. But we see nothing warranting reversal, either individually or cumulatively. We recognize that a comment by the prosecutor that he was personally shocked by certain evidence was improper. See Toler v. State , 95 So. 3d 913, 917–18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that "it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to express his or her personal belief about any matter in issue") (quoting Pacifico v. State , 642 So. 2d 1178, 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ). But the isolated comment did not impact the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, preclude the jury from making a reasoned assessment based on the evidence, or deny due process. See F.B. v. State , 852 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that an error is deemed fundamental "when it goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process").
III.
The foregoing considered, the judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.
Rowe, C.J., and B.L. Thomas, J., concur.