Opinion
No. CV04-4001783 S
April 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael Reardon, (hereinafter "Reardon") has taken an appeal from the decision of the defendant retirement board of the city of Waterbury (board) which denied his application for a disability pension. He claims that (1) the board improperly applied the collective bargaining agreement in effect on the date of his application rather than the agreement in effect on the date of his injury, (2) the board misconstrued the meaning of the phrase "totally and permanently disabled" as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement that it did apply and (3) the board's conclusion that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled was unsupported by the medical evidence presented to the board. The court disagrees with each of the plaintiff's claims and, accordingly, dismisses the appeal.
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Reardon worked for the city of Waterbury as a refuse collector from March 24, 1999, to May 5, 2004. He was a member of the blue collar unit of the Waterbury City Employees, Local 353 (union), and was subject to the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) negotiated between the city and the union. On April 30, 2004, he filed an application for disability retirement benefits under the provisions of the agreement, citing May 21, 2001, as the date of his disability. The city referred him to two physicians, each of whom conducted an independent medical examination. Each physician submitted a written medical report and completed the city's retirement disability questionnaire form. At its September 9, 2004 meeting, the board voted to deny the application. He was informed of the decision by letter dated September 13, 2004, and subsequently commenced this appeal by service on the board on October 8, 2004. Additional facts will be set forth as may be necessary for resolution of this controversy.
The standard of review in appeals from the decisions of administrative agencies is well established. Judicial review of an agency decision is limited. The court must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion. "Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Callaghan v. Commission of Social Services, 53 Conn.App. 191, 203 (1999). "Where the administrative agency has made a factual determination, the scope of the review ordinarily is expressed in such terms as substantial evidence or sufficient evidence . . . Where, however, the administrative agency has made a legal determination, the scope of review ordinarily is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander v. Retirement Board, 57 Conn.App. 751, 758, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 902 (2000).
Reardon first asserts that the board, in rendering its decision, acted improperly by applying the agreement in effect on the date of his application rather than the agreement in effect on the date of his injury. The court disagrees. At this point the following additional facts become relevant. At the time that he suffered a back injury in May 2001, the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement that became effective on July 1, 1996 (1996 agreement). Subsequently, the union and the city negotiated a new agreement that became effective on December 20, 2001 (2001 agreement). The 2001 agreement was still in effect when the plaintiff submitted his application for a disability pension and when the board denied his application.
The record does not reveal any finding by the board regarding the specific date of any injury suffered by the plaintiff. For purposes of the present claim, the court will assume that his disability was the result, at least in part, of an injury suffered in May 2001, as he claims.
Both the 1996 agreement and the 2001 agreement provide that any employee who "becomes totally and permanently disabled" is eligible for a disability pension. (1996 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7; 2001 agreement, Art. XIX, § 7.) The agreements differ, however, with regard to the definition of "totally and permanently disabled." The 1996 agreement simply provides that an employee "shall be eligible for a disability pension in the event that the employee becomes totally and permanently disabled from continuing to render the service in which he has been employed as an employee . . . of the City." (Emphasis added.) (1996 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7.) The 2001 agreement, on the other hand, provides that the employee "shall be eligible for a disability pension in the event that the employee becomes totally and permanently disabled as defined in Section 2(g) . . ." (2001 agreement, Art. XIX, § 7.) Section 2(g) of the 2001 agreement states that "[t]he term `totally and permanently disabled' shall be defined to mean the inability to perform any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. To qualify under this definition, an employee must have a severe impairment that makes the employee unable to perform his/her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the state economy." (Emphasis added.) (2001 agreement, Art. XIX, § 2(g).)
Thus, while the 1996 agreement made a disability pension available to an employee who could no longer do his or her previous job, the 2001 agreement, as discussed more fully subsequently in this memorandum, made such a pension available only to an employee who could no longer do any job. The essence of the claim is that he was injured in May 2001, while the 1996 agreement was still effective and that the board, in reviewing his application, therefore improperly applied the more stringent standard for "totally and permanently disabled" set forth in the 2001 agreement. In other words, he argues that, under the facts of his case, the definition set forth in the 1996 agreement survived beyond the expiration of that agreement, so that the board was required to apply it in reviewing his application, notwithstanding the fact that he submitted his application in 2004.
In Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 81 (2003), the Supreme Court set forth the law applicable to the determination of whether an obligation under a collective bargaining agreement survives the agreement's expiration. The court recited that it is well settled law that contractual obligations will not, in the ordinary course, survive beyond the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. It is also well settled, however, that exceptions to that rule are determined by contract interpretation. Rights which accrued or vested under the agreement will, as a general rule, survive termination of the agreement. The Poole court declined to recognize a presumption either in favor of or against vesting and instead concluded that the best course is to apply the court's well established principles of contract interpretation.
The Poole court went on to explain the relevant principles of contract interpretation: "Under these well established principles, [a] contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Poole v. Waterbuty, supra, 87-88.
In the present case, Reardon argues that the board should have applied the definition of "totally and permanently disabled" set forth in the 1996 agreement in reviewing his April 30, 2004 application, notwithstanding the fact that the 1996 agreement had expired. Specifically, he asserts that the definition in the 1996 agreement was applicable because his injury occurred while the 1996 agreement was in effect. Under the principles set forth in Poole, however, that argument is correct only if his right to a disability pension vested under the 1996 agreement prior to its expiration. This court therefore must apply the rules of statutory construction to determine whether the plaintiff's right to a disability pension under the 1996 agreement vested when he was injured in May 2001.
Beginning with the language of the disability pension provision itself, the 1996 agreement provides: "Any employee who completes 10 or more years of employment with the City shall be eligible for a disability pension in the event that the employee becomes totally and permanently disabled from continuing to render the service in which he has been employed as an employee . . . of the City." (1996 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7.) This language indicates that an employee's right to a disability pension is contingent upon the occurrence of a particular event, namely, the employee becoming totally and permanently disabled. The 1996 agreement further provides: "In the event that the said two impartial competent medical examiners determine that the employee has sustained a disability which totally and permanently disables him then, the [board], upon appropriate application from the employee shall award an annual disability pension to the disabled employee . . ." (1996 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7.) This language indicates two further contingencies for an employee seeking a disability pension: two medical examiners must determine that the employee is totally and permanently disabled and the employee must make an appropriate application. Finally, the 1996 agreement provides that "no disability pension shall be granted . . . on the basis of any partial disability as determined by the two impartial competent medical examiners . . ." (1996 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7.)
None of the quoted language supports the plaintiff's assertion that the date of injury is the date on which an employee's right to a disability pension vests. Notably absent from § 7 of the 1996 agreement is any mention whatsoever of "injury." On the contrary, the plain language of the provisions indicates that it is the employee's total and permanent disability that is the basis of the right to the disability pension. Furthermore, the absence of any language regarding the cause of the disability suggests that an employee's entitlement is not dependent on the source of the disability; presumably, the disability could be the result of an on-the-job injury, a non-job-related injury, multiple injuries or even no injury at all, as in the case of a debilitating disease. The plaintiff's interpretation of the 1996 agreement as providing that the right to a disability pension vests at the time of injury is incompatible with the broad language of the agreement which would provide a disability pension in circumstances in which no specific injury date could practically be ascertained.
Moreover, the provisions of the 1996 agreement do not set forth any procedures by which the date of injury might be determined. The two medical examiners must determine whether "the employee has sustained a disability which totally and permanently disables him . . ." The focus is on the disability, not an injury resulting in the disability. Accordingly, the court concludes that there is no merit to the plaintiff's assertion that his right to a disability pension vested under the provisions of the 1996 agreement when he was injured in 2001.
Nevertheless, the 1996 agreement is arguably ambiguous regarding whether the right to a disability pension vests on the date that the employee becomes totally and permanently disabled, the date that the employee applies for a disability pension, the date the application is approved, or the date when the employee stops working. Assuming, without deciding, that the 1996 agreement is ambiguous in this respect, the court concludes that the ambiguity is not material to the present appeal. The 1996 agreement obviously was no longer in effect when the plaintiff submitted his application, when the application was approved and when the plaintiff stopped working; all three of those events occurred in 2004. Only the date of his total and permanent disability could have fallen prior to the effective date of the 2001 agreement.
Reardon assumes throughout his trial brief that the date of his disability was May 21, 2001, when he suffered a back injury. As previously stated, however, the disability pension is not tied to any particular injury. In fact, as he acknowledges, he suffered at least two injuries that contributed to his disability. It also appears from the record that he was able to work on "light duty" for much of the period from 2001 to the time of his application in 2004. There is also evidence in the record indicating that factors other than his 2001 injuries caused a worsening of his condition following the injuries, including ongoing problems with the plaintiff's weight. Finally, the board was aware that his application for a disability pension was not submitted until April 30, 2004, nearly three years after he claims he became disabled.
Return of Record, Documents (1)(c) and (1)(d).
Return of Record, Document (1)(c).
Reardon would like the court to conclude now that he was totally and permanently disabled in 2001. However, there is substantial evidence supporting the board's implicit finding that he was not yet totally and permanently disabled when the 2001 agreement became effective on December 20, 2001. That substantial evidence includes evidence indicating his ability to work on "light duty" during the years following his 2001 injuries, that his condition deteriorated during that time period, and the fact that he did not apply for a disability pension until April 2004. Accordingly, even if this court were to conclude that his right to a disability pension under the 1996 agreement would have vested when he became totally and permanently disabled, there is substantial evidence to support the board's implicit finding that he did not become totally and permanently disabled before December 20, 2001.
Reardon's next contention is that the board misconstrued the meaning of the phrase "totally and permanently disabled" as set forth in the 2001 agreement. Specifically, he argues that under the 2001 agreement, he was entitled to a disability pension if he demonstrated that he was unable to perform his previous work, but that the board erroneously concluded that he needed to demonstrate that he could perform no substantial gainful activity in the state economy. The board maintains that it correctly held him to the latter standard. The court agrees with that conclusion.
As stated previously, the 2001 agreement provides that "[t]he term `totally and permanently disabled' shall be defined to mean the inability to perform any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. To qualify under this definition, an employee must have a severe impairment that makes that employee unable to perform his/her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the state economy." (2001 agreement, Art. XIX, § 2(g).) Reardon focuses on the word "or" in the phrase "unable to perform his/her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the state economy," and concludes that the agreement presents two alternative situations in which an employee is entitled to a disability pension: (1) when an employee is unable to perform his or her previous work or (2) when an employee is unable to perform any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the state economy. The board, on the other hand, maintains that the phrase indicates a situation in which an employee is unable to perform any work, including his previous work.
In addition to the rules of contract interpretation stated previously herein, the court also notes that a contract "must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cantonbury Heights Condominium Ass'n. v. Local Land Development, LLC, 273 Conn. 724, 735 (2005). Reardon's interpretation would permit an employee to collect a disability pension when the employee is unable to perform his previous work, but is still able to perform other jobs in the state economy. That interpretation is unreasonable, however, in light of the previous sentence of the agreement providing that "[t]he term `totally and permanently disabled' shall be defined to mean the inability to perform any substantial gainful activity . . ." (Emphasis added.) That language is fully consistent with the board's interpretation, and in plain conflict with the plaintiff's interpretation. Accordingly, the court concludes that the board properly applied the definition of "totally and permanently disabled," which is clear and unambiguous when read in its entirety.
Reardon's final claim is that the board's conclusion that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled was unsupported by the medical evidence presented to the board. Specifically, he argues that because of inconsistencies on the questionnaire completed by one physician and the other physician's failure to answer all questions on the questionnaire, the board lacked a sufficient foundation for its conclusion. The court is not persuaded.
Additional facts are once again relevant to this claim. Richard Dyer and Richard Loyer, the two physicians who examined Reardon in connection with his application, each submitted a written medical report and completed the city's retirement disability questionnaire form. In his report, dated June 22, 2004, Dyer reviewed his medical history, including multiple injuries to his back, and recommended that he receive "disability retirement based on [the] combinations of injuries . . ." In response to the question, "Is patient Now Totally and Permanently disabled?" (emphasis in original), Dyer indicated "Yes" for "Patient's Occupation," and "No" for "Any Other Work." In response to the next question, "If Yes when will patient recover based on the following schedule?" Dyer indicated "Never" for "Patient's Occupation," and "3-6 mo." for "Any Other Work." In response to the question "If Not Totally and Permanently disabled is patient partially disabled?" Dyer answered "Yes" and again indicated that Reardon would never recover with regard to his occupation and would recover in three to six months for other work.
Return of Record, Document (1)(c).
Loyer, after examining him and reviewing his medical history, concluded in his report that "[a]t the present time, he is certainly disabled from his normal duties as a refuse worker." (Emphasis in original.) On the questionnaire, in response to the question, "Is patient Now Totally and Permanently disabled?" (emphasis in original), Loyer indicated "Yes" for "Patient's Occupation," and provided no answer for "Any Other Work." In response to the next question, "If Yes when will patient recover based on the following schedule?" Loyer indicated "Never" for "Patient's Occupation," and wrote in the word "Undetermined" for "Any Other Work."
Return of Record, Document (1)(d).
The board rendered its decision at its September 9, 2004 meeting by voting on a motion made by Patrick Jones, the board's secretary. Jones moved to deny the application and stated that "the motion was based on the fact his disability pension application, immediate medical examinations, stated that he was not disabled for employment in any field which would be the requirement under the relevant collective bargaining agreement." The board voted unanimously to deny the application.
Return of Record, Document (3)(a).
Return of Record, Document (2)(a).
With regard to Dyer's questionnaire, Reardon focuses on the fact that, in answering questions related to his disability to perform "other work," Dyer answered "No" to the first question regarding whether he was totally and permanently disabled, but nevertheless answered the second question regarding when he would recover, despite the fact that he was instructed to answer the second question only if he answered "Yes" to the first question. Reardon asserts that by answering the second question, Dyer indicated that he was totally and permanently disabled.
Although Reardon appears to be correct that Dyer did not need to answer the second question with regard to his recovery in terms of other work, Dyer's actual answers to the questions are consistent throughout the questionnaire and leave little doubt as to his conclusions. Dyer indicated that Reardon was totally disabled and could not perform his previous occupation but not totally disabled for other work. He then went on to indicate twice on the questionnaire that recovery would occur within three to six months to the point that he could perform other work, but that he would never recover with regard to his previous occupation. Given those answers, the board was fully justified in concluding that Dyer's questionnaire indicated that he was not totally and permanently disabled; Dyer's opinion that he would be able to perform other work in three to six months amply supports the board's conclusion that he was not permanently "unable to perform [his] previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the state economy" as required by the 2001 agreement.
Reardon's argument regarding Loyer's questionnaire is based on a highly literal reading of Jones' statement at the board meeting that he was moving to deny the application because the "medical examinations, stated that [the applicant] was not disabled for employment in any field . . ." Essentially, he is arguing that Jones' statement suggests that both of the medical examiners concluded that Reardon was not totally and permanently disabled; Loyer made no such finding because of the questions he left blank on the questionnaire; and therefore the board's conclusion, as reflected in Jones' statement, is not supported by substantial evidence.
His argument overlooks the important fact that the 2001 agreement, does not require unanimity of the two medical examiners to support the denial of an employee's application for a disability pension; it permits the awarding of a disability pension only "[i]n the event that the said two impartial competent medical examiners determine that the employee has sustained a disability which totally and permanently disables him" (Emphasis added.) (2001 agreement, Art. XVIII, § 7.) Thus, under the plain language of the agreement, an employee's application for a disability pension fails if either of the two physicians finds that the employee has not sustained a disability which totally and permanently disables him. As discussed above, that is precisely what Dyer found. Consequently, even if Loyer had completed the entire questionnaire and concluded that Reardon would never be able to work in any field, the board properly would have denied his application.
While the literal wording of Jones' oral statement implies that both physicians affirmatively concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled for employment in any field, our Supreme Court has previously noted that the members of local administrative bodies "may well be laymen and cannot be expected to set forth the reasons for their action in language which would satisfy the meticulous criticism of a legal expert." DeMars v. Zoning Commission, 142 Conn. 580, 584 (1955); see also Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Commission, 212 Conn. 710, 723 (1989); Couch v. Zoning Commission, 141 Conn. 349, 358 (1954). This court therefore will not conclude that Jones' slight imprecision in stating the reasons for denying the application renders the decision invalid, where the evidence before the board fully supports the board's decision under the proper standard set forth in the collective bargaining Agreement.
The board's conclusion that Reardon was not totally and permanently disabled was supported by substantial evidence, namely, Dyer's opinion that he would recover within three to six months to the point of being able to perform work other than his previous occupation.
In accordance with the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed. CT Page 7992