Opinion
C.A. No. 99J-07-010, JD No. V-18-056
Date Submitted: January 30, 2002
Date Decided: March 21, 2002
Upon Defendant's Request for Hearing on Plaintiff J.G. Wentworth's Motion for Order Compelling Garnishee to Turn Over Property to Plaintiff — DENIED.
John G. Harris, Esquire, Reed Smith, LLC, 1201 Market Street, Suite 1500, Wilmington, DE 19801.
Mr. Jerry D. Crawford, #300-151, E.C.I., 30420 Revells Neck Road, Westover, M.D. 21890.
Dear Mr. Harris and Mr. Crawford:
The Court is in receipt of Mr. Crawford's letter, dated August 13, 2001, which requests another hearing on plaintiff J.G. Wentworth's ("Wentworth") Motion for Order Compelling Garnishee to Turn Over Property to Plaintiff. Mr. Crawford asserts that he never received notice of the motion or a copy of the motion itself. For the reasons set forth below, the request is denied.
By way of background, in December 1998, a Judgment by Confession in the amount of $684,738.80 was entered against Mr. Crawford in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. On July 1, 1999, Wentworth registered that judgment in the Delaware Superior Court. Judgment was entered against Mr. Crawford on that action on July 6, 1999. In an effort to satisfy the judgment, on July 28, 1999 Wentworth filed a Praecipe to issue a Writ of Attachment Fieri Facias in the Delaware Superior Court to garnish annuity checks issued to Mr. Crawford by American International Life Assurance Company of New York (the "garnishee"). Service upon garnishee was accomplished on August 17, 1999 and the garnishee complied with the writ by providing Wentworth with requested information and suspending payments to Mr. Crawford. However, garnishee refused to turn over the payments to Wentworth unless ordered to do so by this Court. Wentworth then moved the Court for an Order Compelling Garnishee to Turn Over Property to Plaintiff. It is this motion and hearing to which Mr. Crawford objects on the ground of lack of notice.
A valid judgment granted in a court of competent jurisdiction is an essential prerequisite to a garnishment. Once a judgment is granted, the plaintiff or creditor may seek satisfaction of it through garnishment. Garnishment is a legal device that enables "a judgment creditor to satisfy an underlying judgment by reaching assets, property, money . . . of a judgment debtor in the possession of, or under the control of, a third person or party, called a garnishee." The parties to garnishment proceedings are the plaintiff or judgment creditor and a third party called a garnishee. Post-judgment garnishment proceedings are ancillary in nature. Thus, the original debtor is not a party and is not provided with notice of the garnishee's appearance. The judgment creditor may garnish the property of the judgment debtor by securing a writ of attachment fieri facias. The authority for this is founded upon Del. C. ANN. Tit. 10 Del. C. § 5031 (1999), which provides, in pertinent part:
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions, Etc. § 669 (1994).
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions, Etc. § 644 (1994).
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions, Etc. § 686 (1994).
Schwander v. Feeney's, 29 A.2d 369, 371 (Del.Super. 1942).
Id. at 371.
Wilmington Trust Company v. Barron, 470 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 1983).
The plaintiff in any judgment in a court of record, or any person for such plaintiff lawfully authorized, may cause an attachment, as well as any other execution, to be issued thereon, containing an order for the summoning of garnishees, to be proceeded upon and returned as in cases of foreign attachment. The attachment, condemnation, or judgment thereon, shall be pleadable in bar by the garnishee in any action against the garnishee at the suit of the defendant in the attachment. . . .
Given the nature of the garnishment proceedings, Mr. Crawford was not entitled to notice of the motion compelling the garnishee to turn over annuity proceeds to Wentworth. Accordingly, Mr. Crawford's request for a hearing on the issue of notice is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.