Opinion
No. 05-13-00575-CR
12-02-2014
AARON RAMSEY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-12-53925-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Myers
Opinion by Justice Bridges
Aaron Ramsey appeals his conviction for intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a child by omission. A jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In two points of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the admission of his pre-Miranda statements. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
On March 29, 2012, around 11:00 p.m., Dallas police officer Dan Waller responded to a "welfare check" concerning the location of a ten-year-old child. Edward Ramsey (Ed), appellant's father, contacted the police because he was concerned about his son and ten-year-old grandson, Johnathan Ramsey.
Ed reported that appellant, his new wife Elizabeth, and Johnathan moved to Dallas in January 2011, and that was the last time he saw Johnathan. Ed asked to come and visit in Dallas, but he was never given a street address and was told "they wanted to do some fixing up" before anyone could visit. Prior to moving to Dallas, appellant and Johnathan lived in Ennis, Texas, either with appellant's mother Julie, or Ed's parents.
In January 2004, when Johnathan was three years old, appellant and Johnathan's mother separated. The mother, her daughter from a previous relationship, and Eric, Johnathan's five-month-old brother, moved to New Mexico, while Johnathan and appellant stayed in Ennis with appellant's mother. Appellant and Judy's divorce was final in 2006. Appellant raised Johnathan in Ennis with the assistance of his family until he re-married and moved to Dallas in 2011, with his new wife Elizabeth, and Johnathan.
Ed called and texted appellant on numerous occasions, but their conversations were "awkward." When asking if he could visit, Ed was always told Johnathan was busy with school, scouting, or church. Sometimes it was reported that Johnathan was at the lake with Elizabeth's relatives, the Brinkley family. Appellant also told Ed that he was working at a shoe repair shop owned and operated by Elizabeth's father, Ralph Brinkley.
On Thursday, March 22, 2012, Ed decided he needed to find appellant and Johnathan. Not having a home address for them, Ed decided to visit Brinkley's shoe repair shop. Upon his arrival, Brinkley told Ed that appellant had not worked at the shop for quite a while due to a foot injury. Brinkley also reported that appellant had Johnathan tested and it was determined that Johnathan was not appellant's son. Johnathan had gone to live with his mother in New Mexico and Brinkley thought Johnathan "may have even died."
Ed stopped at the nearest place he could find, a fire station, and called the police. The police were of no help, and Ed returned to Ennis. Over the next week, Ed had multiple conversations with Child Protective Services (CPS) in Ennis who assisted Ed with having the Dallas Police Department visit appellant's home. During this same week, Ed sent a text message to appellant stating, "we'd like to see Johnathan today"; appellant's response was "not possible." Ed responded, "then tomorrow"; appellant responded, "I don't think we can make that." Ed tried again, "the next day - - or you name the day, whatever"; appellant responded with, "we'll see what we can work out."
Finally, the following Thursday, March 29, 2012, when responding to the "welfare check," Officer Waller called Ed on his way to appellant's home. When Waller approached appellant's house, appellant was in the front yard. Waller explained he was there because appellant's family was concerned about not being able to contact Johnathan. Appellant told Waller that "everything is fine," and that Johnathan was with his biological mother in New Mexico. Then Elizabeth came outside, and Waller expressed the same concern to her. Appellant and Elizabeth both assured Waller that everything was fine.
Waller got back in his car and called Ed again. Waller asked Ed to call Johnathan's mother in New Mexico to verify that Johnathan was there. Ed complied and called Waller back reporting that Johnathan was not there. Waller returned to appellant, this time asking for contact information for Johnathan's mother. Elizabeth went inside the house to retrieve the information, and Waller asked appellant how Johnathan got to New Mexico. Appellant reported that "Jenny" picked him up and took him to New Mexico. Waller pressed appellant for information about Jenny, her last name, address, phone number, a physical description, and description of her vehicle. Appellant was unable to provide any information other than her first name was Jenny and her car was blue. Appellant told Waller that Johnathan called him when he arrived in New Mexico. Elizabeth returned with phone numbers for Johnathan's mother so Waller went back to his car to make more phone calls. Neither number given to Waller by Elizabeth was a working number. Using a phone number provided by Ed, Waller next called Johnathan's mother in New Mexico. When Waller talked with her, she told him she had not seen her son in years. Waller was concerned that appellant had given the child to someone who took him across state lines and the police did not know where to start looking. Waller then decided to call for assistance.
Waller's sergeant and a supervisor arrived to assist on the call. Waller talked with appellant while a different officer talked with Elizabeth. Elizabeth began to complain about having stomach pains, claiming she was 37-weeks pregnant and having contractions. The police called for an ambulance, which arrived and transported her to the hospital. Appellant appeared very calm and not overly concerned about his missing son or his wife. He did not ask to accompany Elizabeth to the hospital.
Before leaving in the ambulance, Elizabeth told the officer that Johnathan had been going to a private school and was doing great. Appellant told Waller that Johnathan had been home schooled and his last real school was in Ennis. Further, a roommate came out of the house, Lora Hesseltine, who told the officers that Johnathan was at the Buckner State School and that appellant had released all legal custody of Johnathan to this school.
Sergeant Shelly Johnston testified she was the supervisor on duty when Waller called for assistance. Johnston arrived at appellant's home just before midnight. In her first conversations with appellant, she was told that he home schooled Johnathan. When Johnston pressed further, appellant did not have any information regarding a home school program. Johnston asked appellant about his expectations of Johnathan's return, and appellant did not have any information about flight arrangements or flight numbers. When Johnston asked appellant why he would not let Ed see Johnathan, appellant volunteered information about his mother repossessing his truck three months earlier. Johnston asked appellant if he was keeping his parents from seeing Johnathan out of revenge, and he replied, "no." At some point, appellant told Johnston that on two occasions last year, Johnathan had become "out of control" and had punched Elizabeth in the stomach repeatedly, causing her to miscarry the previous year. Appellant said he confronted Johnathan and gave him a small knife, challenging him to kill appellant if he thought he could. Johnston asked for contact information for Johnathan's mother, and Elizabeth provided her with copies of emails.
One email was dated one week prior, on March 23rd, from Elizabeth to Johnathan's mother and states, "Just thought I would give you an update. Johnathan has made the honor roll in school for the fourth time. He is so proud. He has also been doing well in Boy Scouts and loves his troop. He has a baby sister on the way. Elizabeth."
The police determined they were dealing with a missing person situation and began trying to obtain enough information to produce a bulletin. To assist with finding Johnathan, appellant's roommate, Lora, accompanied Johnston to the police station, and appellant rode with Waller. Both Lora and appellant seemed cooperative and willing to give statements to assist in locating Johnathan.
Detective Daniel Green testified he worked in the Child Abuse Unit and was assigned to consult in the missing person's investigation of Johnathan. Green met with appellant around 8:00 a.m., on Friday, March 30th, and their interview was video recorded.
The video begins with appellant sitting in the police interview room alone; he is not handcuffed and appears to be communicating on his phone. Appellant told Green the story about Jenny picking up Johnathan and taking him to New Mexico. Appellant said he made Jenny wait on the front porch because he "doesn't let strangers in the house." He reported that Johnathan used Jenny's cell phone to call Elizabeth when they arrived and said, "Hey dad, I'm here alive."
Appellant also told Green about his estranged relationship with his family. In 2009, appellant's mother bought him a truck with the understanding appellant would be making all of the payments. After his move to Dallas in 2011, appellant failed to make the payments and his mother re-possessed the truck. Appellant reported that Johnathan began being aggressive shortly after the truck was taken. As punishment for his aggressive behavior, appellant required Johnathan to stay in his room except to go to the bathroom. Appellant placed a "thumb latch" on the outside of Johnathan's bedroom door so that he could not sneak out. He also reported that Elizabeth started missing clothes; they did not know where they went but it was after Johnathan had been in the room alone with the clothes.
Around 11:00 a.m., Green told appellant that Elizabeth was telling the police a different story and they just wanted to find Johnathan. Appellant then began to tell Green that he thought Johnathan had run away from home after getting in trouble. When Green asked who "Jenny" was, appellant told him she was someone from his past who had never been to his house and he had last seen Johnathan on August 2, 2011. Appellant reported he had a printed map of how to drive to Ennis that was also missing so he suspected Johnathan had run away to Ennis. Appellant claimed he and Elizabeth tried to find Johnathan and drove to Ennis on the night they discovered him missing. He said he made up the story about Jenny because he did not know how to tell his family, "I lost my kid."
Green next told appellant that Elizabeth had been lying to him. He told appellant that after Elizabeth's trip to the emergency room, the police had learned she was not really pregnant. Green then asked appellant if he knew where Johnathan was, and appellant said "yes, in Ennis." When pressed further, appellant said Johnathan was on the side of the road in Ennis. Green asked if appellant could take him there and appellant replied, "yes." At that point, Green informed appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant verbally and in writing, waived his rights and voluntarily continued with assisting the police to locate Johnathan.
Appellant accompanied Green and other officers to Ennis to locate the body. After searching unsuccessfully for hours, they returned to Dallas and interviewed appellant further. Appellant told Green he hid the sleeping bag with the body in a storm shelter on a vacant lot next door to their house. He left it there for two days and put dryer sheets in the bag for "the smell." When asked whose idea it was to lock Johnathan in the bedroom, he replied that it was his. At some point, he put a bucket in the bedroom for Johnathan to use as a toilet. He knew Johnathan had vomited in the bucket but did not think he needed medical attention. He also said he would not allow Elizabeth to call for medical help when she tried. One day when appellant checked on him, Johnathan had feces on his hands and face. Appellant said "it was kind of disturbing" that Johnathan would eat his own feces. This behavior continued until August 2, 2011, when appellant entered the room and found Johnathan had died. He bathed Johnathan and dressed him in his favorite shirt and pants. Because Johnathan had wanted to go camping, appellant put Johnathan's body in a blue sleeping bag and dumped it on the side of the road near Ennis.
Elizabeth told the police that beginning in March 2011, she witnessed appellant giving Johnathan "military rations" for ten-to-fifteen days at a time. She claimed appellant would let Johnathan out of the room, make him stand while being lectured, and then put him back in the room. Elizabeth testified that Johnathan "looked thin" in April 2011, and by the end of May 2011, Johnathan could not hold his head up on his own. She told the detective that she saw appellant prepare food for Johnathan, take the food into Johnathan's room, and return with the same full bowl, so she knew Johnathan was not eating. She said she did not see Johnathan from May until August when he died. Elizabeth told the police that after Johnathan died, appellant put his body in a storm shelter for two days before they made the trip to Ennis to dispose of the body. Near Ennis, they stopped on the side of the road, and appellant told her to stay in the car. He removed the blue bundle from the back, walked down to a ditch, and threw the bag. Appellant told Elizabeth that after he threw the bag, he heard the body roll.
On April 21, 2012, another search ensued with assistance of the FBI. The City Department from Ellis County drained the creek near appellant's reported placement of the body. Search dogs positively alerted to a blue sleeping bag in the creek bed. Inside the sleeping bag were a child's NFL pajamas, containing bones consistent with those of a ten-year-old child, and fifteen dryer sheets.
The Dallas County Medical Examiner's office produced an autopsy report showing "no trauma is evident on the remains present . . . no evidence of injury . . . " and Johnathan died from starvation and/or dehydration.
In the indictment, appellant was charged with the offense of injury to a child by omission, causing serious bodily injury to Johnathan by two omissions: failing to seek adequate medical attention and failing to provide adequate nutrition. After hearing the evidence, the jury convicted appellant of injury to a child.
In his first point of error, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant contends the evidence fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he harmed Johnathan, causing Johnathan's death. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "We defer to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This standard applies equally to direct and circumstantial evidence. Id.
A person commits such an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes a child serious bodily injury, and has a legal or statutory duty to act. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (West Supp. 2014). "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ID. § 1.07(a)(46) (West Supp. 2014). A parent of a child has a statutory duty "to support the child, including providing the child with clothing, food, shelter, medical and dental care, and education. . . ." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(3) (West 2014). The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for injury to a child by omission under section 22.04(a) of the penal code if the State proves either that appellant intended to cause the injury through his omission or that he was aware that his omission was reasonably certain to cause the injury. See Johnson v. State, 150 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). The jury may infer both knowledge and intent from any facts that tend to prove the existence of these mental states, including the appellant's acts, words, or conduct, and from the nature of the injury inflicted on the victim. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for harming the child, causing his death. We disagree. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence reveals facts and circumstances proving appellant harmed Johnathan, causing his death. Appellant does not challenge that Johnathan was "a child" as defined by statute or that appellant was Johnathan's biological father. After his divorce to Johnathan's mother, appellant retained custody of Johnathan and was statutorily responsible to support Johnathan, providing him with clothing, food, shelter, and medical care. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(3). This assumption of care made any omission by appellant actionable under section 22.04(a). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a).
Ed Ramsey is appellant's father and was Johnathan's grandfather. Ed testified he contacted appellant on numerous occasions trying to visit with Johnathan. Appellant would always respond with "don't think we can make that" or "we'll see what we can work out." Julie Ramsey, appellant's mother, testified at trial under subpoena. Julie told the jury she had tried to call, text message, and email appellant trying to arrange a visit with Johnathan. Appellant and Elizabeth both told Julie that Johnathan was well and happy, but Julie could not visit. This evidence showed that appellant continuously concealed his abuse of Johnathan, as well as Johnathan's condition, from appellant's parents.
Mark Ingram, a forensic anthropologist, testified the skeleton found in the creek in Ennis was consistent with a child who was starved to death for a short period of time. Dr. Jill Urban, with the Dallas County Medical Examiner's office, testified there was no evidence of injury or natural disease to Johnathan's skeletal remains. The autopsy report states, "It is our opinion that Johnathan Lloyd Ramsey, a 10-year-old white male, died as the result of homicidal violence including starvation and/or dehydration." And further, Dr. Matthew Cox, a board certified pediatrician and specialized child abuse pediatrician, testified that a child who went from 90 pounds to 65 pounds in a period of two to four months could die from what is described as a "broken heart," meaning the heart stops when the body is severely malnourished. When asked if a ten-year-old could starve himself to death, the doctor responded "no, children don't commit suicide by starvation."
Appellant admitted that it was his idea to lock Johnathan in a bedroom. Appellant said he installed a "thumb latch" on the outside of Johnathan's bedroom door to ensure Johnathan could not get out. He locked Johnathan in a bedroom, gave him a bucket to use as a toilet, and only fed him bread, sometimes with peanut butter, water, and milk. During his interviews with the police, appellant expressed concern about his twenty-something dogs and cats, at home alone, needing to be fed; appellant knew the gravity of animals going hungry, and yet he used hunger as punishment for his son. See Hill v. State, 881 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994), aff'd, 913 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for injury to a child by failing to provide food or medical care). Appellant admitted he knew Johnathan was losing weight, vomiting, and had eaten his own feces, but appellant still refused to seek medical attention for his son. The evidence showed that in January 2011, appellant called the Dallas Police Department because he thought his truck had been stolen. Then again in August 2011, on the approximate date of Johnathan's death, appellant and Elizabeth called 9-1-1 to seek medical help for Elizabeth, claiming she was having heart problems. So it was clear that appellant was willing to seek medical help for himself and Elizabeth, but not for his son. See Adame v. State, 407 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. ref'd) (finding the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for injury to a child by omission for failure to seek medical care).
From these facts, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnathan suffered serious bodily injury because appellant failed to provide adequate nutrition or failed to seek adequate medical attention. The attempts to conceal treatment of Johnathan, coupled with the testimony of Elizabeth concerning the severity of his malnourishment, permitted the jury to reasonably infer that Johnathan suffered serious bodily injury because appellant intentionally and knowingly failed to provide him with adequate nutrition and medical care. See, e.g., Hill, 881 S.W.2d at 900-01 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction for injury to child by food deprivation where evidence suggested that deprivation occurred over course of several years, victim's growth chart had flat-lined, parents ate normal food separately from children and punished victim for attempting to take food from kitchen when hungry, and victim was restrained to prevent him from obtaining food without permission and essentially died of starvation.)
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the trial court acted rationally in determining that appellant was aware his omission—failing to provide adequate nutrition and failure to obtain medical care for Johnathan for two-to-three months when he was unable to care for himself—was reasonably certain to cause Johnathan's death. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to his videotaped statement to the police. Appellant contends he was in custody when he arrived at the police station, and, therefore, the detective was required to warn him in compliance with Miranda and article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West Supp. 2014).
We review the trial court's decision to admit appellant's videotaped statement under an abuse of discretion standard. Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under that standard, we must affirm the trial court's decision to admit the testimony if the decision is within a zone of reasonable disagreement. See Berry, 233 S.W.3d at 855; Hailey v. State, 413 S.W.3d 457, 479 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref'd).
When an accused is held in custody, he must be given the required warnings "prior to questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Similarly, the code of criminal procedure provides that a statement is admissible against a defendant in a criminal proceeding if, among other things, the defendant was given the warnings set out in section 2(a) of article 38.22 before the statement was made and the defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived the rights set out in the warnings. Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a).
"The warnings required by Miranda and article 38.22 are intended to safeguard a person's privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation." Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The defendant bears the initial burden of proving that a statement was the product of "custodial interrogation." Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court of criminal appeals has identified four general situations that may constitute custody for purposes of Miranda and article 38.22: (1) the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2) a law enforcement officer tells the suspect he is not free to leave; (3) law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) there is probable cause to arrest the suspect, and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect he is free to leave. Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 294. The fourth situation only applies when the officer's knowledge of probable cause is communicated to the suspect or by the suspect to the officer; even then custody is established only "if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest." Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 295 n. 48. The reasonable person standard presupposes an innocent person. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The determination of custody must be made on an ad hoc basis, after considering all of the objective circumstances. Id., 931 S.W.3d at 255. "Stationhouse questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody." Id. (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-1125 (1983)). However, the mere fact that an interrogation begins as noncustodial does not prevent custody from arising later; police conduct during the encounter may cause a consensual inquiry to escalate into custodial interrogation. Ussery v. State, 651 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Factors we must consider in determining when custody attaches include whether the suspect arrived at the place of interrogation voluntarily, the length of the interrogation, whether the suspect's requests to see relatives and friends are refused, and the degree of control exercised over the suspect. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255-57. Finally, we must look at whether a "pivotal admission established custody," as in Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (in Ruth, the suspect's "statement that he had shot the victim immediately focused the investigation on him and furnished probable cause to believe that he had committed an offense; [a]fter that time, the continued interrogation must be considered a custodial one").
Appellant argues the trial court erred by admitting State's Exhibit 13 (the video recording of the Friday morning interview), Exhibit 72 (the audio recording of the trip to Ennis), and Exhibit 70 (appellant's written affidavit) because the police failed to inform appellant of his Miranda rights before asking him questions about his missing son. Appellant contends he was in custody when he arrived at the police station because the detective knew he and Elizabeth were not being truthful about what happened to Johnathan. Further, appellant argues that because "someone had reported that the child was deceased," there was probable cause to arrest him, and the detective did not tell the appellant he was free to leave.
In considering all of the objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation, we conclude a reasonable innocent person would not have believed his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254-55. After being informed that his son was not in New Mexico as he claimed, appellant voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, and it appeared from appellant's statements that he was trying to assist the police in locating his son. Appellant gave the police a statement about "Jenny" leaving the house with Johnathan and reportedly taking Johnathan to see his mother in New Mexico. During the videotaped interview, appellant was never handcuffed and never asked to leave—even to check on his wife who had left their house in an ambulance claiming she was having "contractions." The detective offered appellant food, and appellant refused the offer. Appellant did request something to drink, and it was provided for him. The police officer and detective both testified regarding the inconsistencies in appellant's story regarding Johnathan's disappearance. However, both testified they were just trying to find out where to begin searching for the child to ensure his safety. The detective repeatedly told appellant how good it was for appellant to assist them with finding the child and how important it was for appellant to remember what Johnathan was wearing and what Johnathan took with him when he left. After three hours of discussing Johnathan leaving with "Jenny," appellant's story changed, and he began talking about Johnathan running away. His excuse was he did not know how to tell his family that he had "lost his kid." Shortly after this change in story, the detective told appellant that Elizabeth had been lying to him—she was not really pregnant. Then when the detective asked where Johnathan might be, appellant told him he had taken Johnathan to Ennis and left him on the side of the road. At this point, the detective informed appellant of his Miranda rights.
In addition, a listener can clearly hear on State's Exhibit 13 appellant being informed of his Miranda rights, appellant stating that he understood them, and see appellant signing a waiver of these rights when the detective had reason to believe a crime had been committed. Appellant's subsequent course of conduct is also consistent with a waiver of these rights. See Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (stating that, in absence of express and explicit waiver of Miranda rights, the totality of circumstances may show voluntary waiver of these rights), and at 29 (Cochran, J., concurring) ("Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understood those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver 'may' support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights."). After being informed of his rights and subsequently waiving them, appellant voluntarily proceeded to show the police the exact location where he dumped Johnathan's body on the side of the road in Ennis.
After thoroughly reviewing appellant's recorded statement, we decide that it supports the trial court's finding that it was given voluntarily. Appellant's recorded statement fairly reflects that the interrogation techniques employed in this case were not the type of brutal "third-degree" techniques that would render a defendant's "statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms." See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-57; State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 723-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that the voluntariness test is whether "the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker" and whether the confession is true or false is irrelevant to a voluntariness determination because "it is the methods used to extract an involuntary confession that offends constitutional principles" (internal quotes omitted)), and at 726-27 (discussing examples of interrogation methods that offend constitutional principles). We further note that appellant has not cited to any portions of his recorded statement where he claims that the police used improper interrogation techniques. Appellant has failed to establish that his statements were involuntary or that he was subjected to custodial interrogation prior to being informed of his rights. Point of error two is overruled.
We affirm the trial court's judgment. DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
130575F.U05
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-12-53925-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Francis and Myers participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.