Opinion
No. 14-70498
01-26-2016
ALVARO MOISES RAMOS-DIAZ, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A200-670-941 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Alvaro Moises Ramos-Diaz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of a continuance. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to continue and review de novo claims of due process violations. Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramos-Diaz's motion for a continuance to seek post-conviction relief because Ramos-Diaz failed to demonstrate good cause. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n IJ 'may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.'" (citation omitted)). Ramos-Diaz conceded removability, he was ineligible for the relief sought, and collateral post-conviction relief remained a merely speculative possibility at the time of his final hearing. See id. ("[T]he IJ [is] not required to grant a continuance based on . . . speculations.").
Ramos-Diaz's due process claim concerning voluntary departure fails because he has not established prejudice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (requiring a good moral character showing to receive voluntary departure); Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.