Ragland v. Watson

Full title: JOHNNY RAGLAND, # 111474, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN STEVE WATSON, et al.…

Court: United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

Date published: Jun 4, 2007

CASE NO. 3:05-cv-251-WKW (M.D. Ala. Jun. 4, 2007)

Opinion

CASE NO. 3:05-cv-251-WKW.

June 4, 2007

ORDER

W. WATKINS, District Judge

Johnny Ragland ("Ragland"), a state inmate confined in Easterling Correctional Facility ("Easterling"), filed a complaint against prison warden Steve Watson and other individuals associated with Easterling (collectively the "defendants"). Ragland complains that the defendants violated his constitutional right to due process by removing him from work release and by placing him in a different prison facility with medium security classification. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Ragland has no liberty interest in work release or in confinement to a prison of his choice. The magistrate judge recommends that the motion for summary judgment be granted (Doc. # 31). Ragland objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation.

After an independent and de novo review of the record, the court MODIFIES a portion of the magistrate judge's recommendation to sufficiently address plaintiff's objections.

The magistrate judge correctly concluded that Ragland does not possess a liberty interest, under federal law, in a work release program. The United States Supreme Court recognized that "States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The appropriate analysis to ascertain whether the state of Alabama has created a liberty interest in an inmate's continued work release is whether the removal from work release "imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484. The magistrate judge correctly concluded that, by application of Sandin, a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in continued work release. The court finds, however, that Ragland's objection to the recommendation of the magistrate judge warrants additional discussion on the magistrate judge's finding that "the law is well settled that an inmate in the Alabama prison system has no liberty interest which entitles him to work release." (Rec. at 10.)

Ragland has pointed out that Alabama has previously recognized that an inmate may have a liberty interest in continued work release through language found in the Alabama Department of Corrections' ("ADOC") Classification Manual. Ex parte Deramus, 882 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 2003); Luster v. State, 935 So. 2d 1193 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004); see also Ex Parte Berry, 794 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 2000) (holding that an inmate who is removed from work release status possessed a liberty interest in continued work release because ADOC's Classification Manual requires a due process hearing before removal); Baskin v. State 856 So. 2d 951 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003). However, on July 9, 2003, subsequent to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Berry, ADOC amended the Classification Manual to delete the requirement that a due process hearing be had before removal from a work release program. See Ward v. State, 929 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (recognizing ADOC's amendment to the manual). The deletion by ADOC of the required due process hearing in the Classification Manual essentially voided the holding of Ex parte Berry and the subsequent cases that relied upon its analysis.

However, even if Alabama law did recognize a liberty interest in continued work release, it is of no accord to the holding of this opinion and the legal reasoning applied by the magistrate judge. The court is required to apply Sandin to the facts of this case and is similarly prohibited from analyzing the level of discretion afforded ADOC in its Classification Manual. See Sandin at 483 ("[W]e believe that the search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.") For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's recommendation, removal from work release does not "impose [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484.

It is ORDERED that

1) Plaintiff's Objection (Doc. # 32) is OVERRULED;

2) The recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. # 31), as MODIFIED above, is ADOPTED; and

3) Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST 1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing : Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4 Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , , , , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).