Opinion
No. 99 C 7268.
February 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin Quinn ("Quinn") petitions this court for an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 as the prevailing party in his action under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189, against defendant Ultimo Enterprises, Ltd., et. al. ("Ultimo"). Plaintiff seeks an award of $160,267.50 in fees and $4,980.12 in costs, and $3723.72 in post-judgment interest for a total award of $168,971.34. This court finds that Quinn is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $88,520.12.
Plaintiffs request is an amount through January 7, 2001.
BACKGROUND
Quinn is a former at-will sales employee of Ultimo. Quinn worked for Ultimo for sightly more than 90 days, and on November 8, 1999, Quinn filed a single count complaint against Ultimo under the ADA. Quinn claimed that Ultimo unlawfully terminated him due to his disability, HIV. Quinn alleges that he was fired from Ultimo the next business day after disclosing to Ultimo that he suffered from HIV. Following discovery in this case, the parties attended private mediation on August 15, 2000. The parties resolved the case before the mediator on terms that provided a complete settlement to Quinn of his damages but did not include payment for Quinn's attorneys' fees and costs. On November 9, 2000, this court ruled Quinn to be the prevailing party as a result of the mediation. At that time on November 9, 2000, the parties agreed to attempt to separately resolve the fee issue and this court ordered Quinn's fee petition filed by November 28, 2000 if the issue could not be resolved by then. Ultimately, the parties could not agree on an amount and Quinn filed this petition for attorneys' fees and expenses on November 28, 2000.
This order was not docketed until November 13, 2000. As a result, November 13, 2000 is the date that the judgment is considered entered. Accordingly, as discussed later in this opinion, November 13, 2000, is the date that will be used in calculating any post-judgment interest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Determination of a fee award is left to the discretion of the district court in light of its `superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.'" Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc., 965 F.2d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983)). The party requesting the fee award bears the burden of substantiating, to this court's satisfaction, the requested hourly rate as well as the hours expended. McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 518 (7th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court of the United States makes it clear that, in calculating attorneys' fees, a certain methodology must be followed. See Eddleman, 965 F.2d at 424. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983), the Supreme Court stated:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services. The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly. The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not "reasonably expended." Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. The reasonable hourly rate used in the above calculation should be based on "the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question." Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 193 (7th Cir. 1984). In addition, this court may increase or decrease the fee request in light of the twelve Hensley factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 461 U.S. at 429-430 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 n. 3 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974)).
ANALYSIS
In light of the twelve Hensley factors and the submissions in the record, this court finds that an award of $88,520.12 is appropriate in this case. This court finds that the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented in this case to be minimal. In addition, this court is persuaded as to the capabilities, skill and efficiency of plaintiff's counsel. As a result, this court finds that due to the rather uncomplicated nature of this case, in conjunction with the proven skill and adeptness of plaintiffs counsel that a reasonable amount of time and labor required to successfully litigate this claim is somewhat lower than what Quinn petitions this court to award.
It is undisputed in this case that Quinn is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, as the prevailing party in this case. Ultimo, however, objects to the amount of fees requested by plaintiff. First Ultimo, argues that the hourly rates charged by Quinn's attorneys are unjustifiably high. This court finds, however, that Quinn has proven, to this court's satisfaction, that the hourly rates of $325 for attorneys Robin B. Potter and Mark S. Schaffner, $100 for senior paralegal N. Alex Taylor, and $80 for junior paralegals reflect the rates currently charged in the Chicago area by attorneys and legal staff of similar ability and experience. The court bases its findings on the affidavits attached to Quinn's petition for attorneys' fees. These affidavits contain statements by practioners in the Chicagoland area regarding the rates charged by other attorneys in the Chicago community conducting civil rights and labor litigation and contain a detailed discussion of the qualifications of the attorneys involved in this case.
After determining the reasonable hourly rates of the attorneys involved in this case, this court's next step is to calculate the number of overall hours reasonably expended on all aspects of plaintiffs case. In this petition, Quinn submitted billing records for each attorney involved in this case, and a table documenting the total attorney hours spent on plaintiff's case. Quinn claims that a total of 528.50 billable hours were expended on this case through November 14, 2000.
In response, Ultimo argues that this is a straight-forward case, involving just four depositions, none of which lasted more than several hours and therefore the number of hours expended in litigating this case should be no more than 284.80. Ultimo argues that the time spent by plaintiffs counsel on specific matters is excessive and duplicative, that the documentation of attorney hours spent on Quinn's case is vague and lacks adequate detail, and that counsel for Quinn are attempting to be compensated for hours spent on issues not relevant to this litigation.
Specifically, Ultimo asserts that the time plaintiffs counsel spent in finding Quinn adequate health insurance should not be compensated through this petition. Ultimo also argues that the time Quinn spent reviewing nationwide personnel files and time cards of Ultimo for a complaint centered in Chicago is unreasonable and unnecessary. In addition, Ultimo argues that the time spent by plaintiffs counsel in meetings with Quinn and in preparation for a one day mediation is excessive. Ultimo argues that the several hours of paralegal research on HIV issues is unreasonable, that the time spent on this litigation before the case was filed and before an answer was due was unnecessary. Additionally, Ultimo argues that of the time documentation submitted, it is difficult to dispute specific line items of hours billed because many line items are linked to "blocks" of tasks. Finally, Ultimo provides documentation that its own attorneys' fees in defending this case was a total of $60,256.25 split between two law firms in support of its arguments that time spent by Quinn's counsel is excessive and unnecessary.
In response, Quinn argues that Ultimo fails to substantiation its objections with counter-affidavits or declarations and that Ultimo fails to object to any specific line item of time billed by Quinn's counsel. Quinn also argues that Ultimo's billed hours are incomplete when compared to the number of hours counsel for Ultimo actually spent on this case. Finally, Quinn argues that this case would have been simple and thereby required less time, if Ultimo had cooperated at any point in this litigation. In support of the number of hours billed by Quinn's counsel, Quinn states that the time spent in preparation, research, and in meetings are consistent with the past practices of counsel in the Chicagoland area involved in complex employment litigation.
As a starting point for determining what is a reasonable number of hours that plaintiffs counsel should have expended in this case, it would be helpful for the court to understand the overall economic value of this case. Specifically, it would have been helpful to know how much this case settled for and the precedential value of this claim to society at large. Neither of these figures, however, have been submitted or argued to this court. It is only by reading a copy of a letter sent by counsel for Quinn to counsel for Ultimo dated November 2, 2000 attached to plaintiffs reply brief, that this court found out that this case settled for "over $200,000" in mediation. See Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Petition for Attorneys' Fees, Plaintiffs Exhibit B, page 3. of all the paper submitted in connection with this fee petition, counsel for both sides seem content to argue at one another as opposed to arguing the legal issues to the court on which this petition hinges. As a result of the zealous litigation of this petition conducted by both sides, this court has been provided with less then ideal information with which to discern the reasonableness of this petition. As mentioned earlier, at one end of the spectrum Quinn asks in excess of $160,000.00 in attorneys' fees for a case involving one litigant, four depositions, no briefing of dispositive motions, which ended in mediation and turned on a seemingly simple fact pattern. At the other end of the spectrum, Ultimo states that a reasonable award should be $80,000.00 for a case that seems to have been contested and litigated at every possible turn. Quinn does admit, however, that the depositions taken were limited to his own witnesses and to the facts needed for mediation. In addition, Quinn contends that his counsel narrowly limited time spent in pretrial discovery to mediation.
Upon further review of the record, this court finds that the overall hours billed by plaintiffs attorneys must be reduced due to duplicative, excessive, unreasonable and unnecessary billing, the billing of matters not related to litigation, and inadequate documentation and records. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983) ("When the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Id.); FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1316 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A district court may deny a fee request where the claim for fees is not supported by accurate and detailed records." Id. (citations omitted)); and Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir. 1989) ("While we have refused to lay down a flat rule of one lawyer per case, the tendency of law firms to overstaff a case should cause the trial court to scrutinize a fees petition carefully for duplicative time." Id. (citations omitted)).
Of plaintiffs attorneys' billings, this court strikes 13.75 hours from the fees requested by plaintiff which dealt with health insurance issues. It is unclear from the record how Quinn's lack of health insurance coverage weighed upon whether Ultimo was liable to Quinn under the ADA. In addition, this court strikes 52 hours from the fees requested by plaintiff in connection with meetings between counsel and client due to inadequate detail as to their necessity. This court acknowledges that meeting with the client is necessary, but it is unclear from the record what part of the case offered such a level of complexity that it necessitated in essence three complete, 24 hour days of billed meeting time. This court holds that 20 hours of meeting time is sufficient for this case. Furthermore, this court strikes 48.75 hours from the time it took plaintiff's counsel to prepare for mediation as being unnecessary and unreasonable. The mediation between the two parties took one day, as a result it is difficult for this court to believe that a single day mediation required 58.75 hours for preparation. This court holds that 10 hours of preparation is certainly sufficient for this case. In addition, this court strikes 37 hours from the time counsel for Quinn researched HIV issues. Whereas proper research is necessary with any case, with the advances made in electronic research it is hard to imagine how 43 hours of research on the questions presented in this case was necessary. This court holds that 8 hours of research is reasonable for this case. Lastly this court strikes 83 hours from the plaintiff's pre-answer billed hours because of unreasonableness. Again this case presented a single plaintiff, whose alleged discrimination hinged almost exclusively on one conversation, as a result, it is hard to believe that pre-litigation investigation and EEOC filings done by skilled and competent counsel took more than 30 hours of time billed. After making the above reductions, this court finds the total number of overall legal hours reasonably expended on plaintiffs case to be 294 hours.
Thus, the court's determination of reasonable hourly rates and the number of overall hours reasonably expended on plaintiffs case results in the following calculation of attorneys' fees and expenses:
Hours Rate Total Robin B. Potter 321.75-125.70 = 195.30 $325.00 $63,472.50 Mark S. Schaffner 120.00-72.8 = 47.2 $325.00 $15,340.00 Paralegal 58.75-33 = 25.75 $80.00 $2060 Alex Taylor 27.50-2.25 = 25.25 $100.00 $2550 Michael P. Latz .50 $235.00 $117.50 TOTAL HOURS 294.00 TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES $83,540.00 COSTS $ 4,980.12 TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS $88,520.12 After thorough consideration of all the relevant factors, the court concludes that $88,520.12 appropriately compensates plaintiff for the hours reasonably expended by plaintiffs counsel on Quinn's case multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate of the legal staff involved plus the reasonable costs in this case. As to post-judgment interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, plaintiff is entitled to interest on $88,520.12 at a rate of 6.375% commencing on November 13, 2000. Accordingly, the amount of daily interest from November 13, 2000 on $88,520.12 rounded to the nearest penny is $15.46 per day (.06375/365 x $88,520.12). $15.46 per day multiplied by the 94 days between November 13, 2000, and the date of this order, February 9, 2001, is a total of $1,453.24.CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated herein, Quinn is awarded $88,520.12 in attorneys' fees and costs plus interest of $1453.24 for a total of $89,973.36. Defendant is ordered to pay $89,973.36 to plaintiff immediately. In addition, the defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff an additional $15.46 in interest for each day past February 9, 2001, until plaintiff receives payment. Defendant is ordered to make full payment no later than February 28, 2001. All other pending motions are moot. All previous dates and schedules are moot. This case is closed.