Opinion
Case No. 1:01-CV-449
July 22, 2003
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion filed on this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Judgment Based Upon the Administrative Record (docket no. 28) is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant.
This case is CONCLUDED.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Judy A. Proctor ("Proctor"), has sued Defendant, American United Life Insurance Company ("AUL"), under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 to 1461, for review of Fortis' denial of long-term disability ("LTD") benefits. AUL has filed a motion for judgment based upon the administrative record pursuant to the procedure set forth in Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 1998) for determining ERISA denial of benefits claims. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.
Proctor also initially sued the Donnelly Corporation of Holland Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, which was dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties early in the case.
Although the Court issued its standard Case Management Order for ERISA cases in this case, the parties treated the case as if it were a non-ERISA case by engaging in discovery and retaining expert witnesses. In fact, AUL's original counsel even filed an answer with a jury demand, in spite of the fact that there is no right to a jury trial in ERISA cases involving claims for benefits. After substituting for AUL's original counsel, AUL's current counsel took corrective action by filing the administrative record with the Court and moving for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to the procedure outlined inWilkins, 150 F.3d at 619.
Facts
Proctor was employed by Donnelly Corporation ("Donnelly") as an assembly and press operator until May 1999. At all times relevant to this case, Donnelly maintained an LTD plan (the "Plan") for its employees through a group LTD policy (the "Policy") issued by AUL. As an employee who worked more than sixteen hours per week, Proctor was eligible for LTD benefits under the Plan. Although Donnelly is identified in the LTD Policy as the Plan Administrator, AUL administers the Plan on behalf of Donnelly pursuant to a subscription agreement.The Policy provides LTD benefits as follows:
Monthly Benefit Payments: Written notice of Disability must be given to AUL during the Elimination Period. When AUL receives proof that a Person is Disabled due to Sickness or Injury and requires the regular attendance of a legally qualified Physician, AUL will pay the Person a Monthly Benefit after satisfying the Elimination Period. The Elimination Period must be satisfied by Total Disability, Partial Disability, or a combination of both.
The Monthly Benefit will be paid as long as Disability continues provided that proof of continued Disability is submitted to AUL upon request and the Person is under the regular attendance of a Physician. . . .
(Policy at 13, Administrative Record (hereafter "A.R.") Ex. 2.) The Policy defines "total disability" as follows:
For the duration of this Opinion, the Court will refer to the Policy, identified as Exhibit 2 in the Administrative Record, as "Policy," and the designation "A.R." will refer to those documents identified as Exhibit 3 in the Administrative Record.
Total Disability and Totally Disabled mean that because of Injury or Sickness, the person cannot perform the material and substantial duties of his regular occupation and after benefits have been paid for 24 months the Person cannot perform the material and substantial duties of any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably fitted by training, education or experience.
(Id. at 8.) In addition, the Policy defines "Sickness" as "illness, bodily disorder, disease, Mental illness, or pregnancy." Finally, the Elimination Period is defined as "a period of consecutive days of Total Disability, Partial Disability, or a combination of both for which no benefit is payable." (Id. at 4.) The Policy prescribes 180 days as the number of continuous days of disability for the Elimination Period. (Id. at 1.)
Proctor's application for LTD benefits was submitted to AUL on or about December 14, 1999. In her application, Proctor stated that her last day of employment at Donnelly was May 5, 1999, and that she was unable to perform her occupation due to "ongoing pain in back, muscles, nerves, rash, insomia (sic) — itching." (A.R. at 000193, 000196.) Proctor also submitted an "Attending Physician's Statement" signed by Brenda Zook, M.D., Proctor's treating physician. In her statement, Dr. Zook diagnosed Proctor's condition as "fibromyalgia, back pain, leg weakness." (Id at 000097.)
After receiving Proctor's application for benefits, AUL began to investigate her claim. On August 1, 2000, AUL determined that Proctor was eligible to receive benefits under the Policy as of November 3, 1999, the expiration of the 180-day elimination period. (Id. at 000140.) The letter informing Proctor of the decision stated that "the Claims Examiner's extensive investigation revealed that at this time there is a lack of objective evidence in your medical records to support impairment due to a physical condition," but that benefits were approved based upon the medical evidence for treatment of Proctor's "depression and post traumatic stress disorder." (Id.) AUL also notified Proctor that benefits based upon mental illness were limited under the Policy to a maximum of twenty-four months. (Id.) AUL's determination that Proctor was entitled to benefits for mental illness was based upon treatment Proctor received between May 1999 and May 2000 for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. On May 11, 1999, Proctor was treated by Marie W. Vander Linde, M.D., who made a diagnosis of depression and prescribed Paxil to treat Proctor's depression and anxiety. (Id. at 000402.) On October 28, 1999, during an appointment with Dr. Zook, Proctor related that she had been "severely anxious," was "unable to sleep," and that the Paxil was not helping at all. (Id. at 000392.) Proctor was also treated by Sandra Terwillegar, M.D., at the Newaygo Mental Health Center between October 1999 and May 2000. (Id. at 000441-458, 000499-518.) Dr. Terwillegar made a diagnosis of severe post-traumatic stress disorder on October 13, 1999 (Id. at 000517), and continued to treat Proctor through May 2000 for depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
The Policy contains a limitation for benefits based upon mental illness which provides that, except in certain circumstances not applicable in this case, "Benefits for Disability due to Mental Illness will not exceed 24 months of Monthly Benefit payments." (Policy at 20.)
On February 5, 2001, Proctor underwent surgery at Columbus Hospital in Chicago for Chiari malformation for treatment of headaches and neck pain. (Id., at 000364-65.) The surgery was performed by Dan S. Heffez, M.D. Proctor was discharged from the hospital on February 8, 2001, with restrictions against driving or lifting more than ten pounds. (Id. at 000369.) On March 16, 2001, Proctor saw Dr. Heffez for a follow-up visit. Following the examination, Dr. Heffez summarized his observations in a letter to Robert Gunnell, M.D., Proctor's treating physician, as follows:
She is now approximately six weeks out from a suboccipital craniectomy and duraplasty for a Chiari Type I malformation. She appears to be doing extremely well at this time. She reports complete resolution of her headaches. She no longer has any nausea. Her dizziness has resolved completely. Tinnitus is no longer present. She no longer has any fullness in the ears or hyperacusis. Her temporomandibular joint discomfort remains present but is improved. Her overall pain is also improved. She continues to have some neck pain but attributes this to the surgery. She has some lower back pain but no longer has any arm pain. She has no numbness or paresthesias of the hands and feet. Valsalva maneuver is no longer provocative of headaches. She has complete normalization of her bowels, without evidence of constipation. She no longer has blurred vision, photophobia or diplopia. She denies any hoarseness of her voice. She denies clumsiness or instability of gait. She feels that her cognitive functioning has normalized. She reports improvement in short-term memory and concentration. She has not become disoriented or confused since surgery. While she continues to experience fatigue, this has also improved since surgery. She reports that her sleeping has completely normalized.
Chiari malformation is a condition in which the lower part of the cerebellum protrudes into the spinal canal, causing tissue compression and hindering normal spinal fluid flow. Some of the symptoms include headaches, dizziness, double vision, and pain or numbness in the face and extremities. (A.R. at 000345.)
. . . .
I have discussed these findings with the patient. She has done extremely well at this time. . . .
(Id. 000321-22.)
On April 16, 2001, Proctor was seen by Dr. Gunnell. Dr. Gunnell noted that Proctor had fewer headaches and was sleeping better, although Proctor continued to experience chronic fatigue and myalgia. (Id. at 000326.) Dr. Gunnell ordered a heavy metal screen as well as testing for lyme disease based upon Proctor's concern that her symptoms might indicate either condition. (Id.) Following the examination, Dr. Gunnell sent an Attending Physician's Supplemental Statement to AUL. (Id. at 000238.) Dr. Gunnell's diagnosis was chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia, and he concluded that Proctor was totally disabled. However, Dr. Gunnell indicated an approximate return-to-work date of July 1, 2001, on a part-time basis. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 2001, Proctor saw an associate of Dr. Gunnell, complaining of low back pain after a bug bite. The physician noted Proctor's complaints of pain and concluded, "Chronic low back pain, etiology not clear." ( Id. at 000325.)
Dr. Gunnell saw Proctor on May 2, 2001, as a follow-up to her April 26 examination for low back pain. Although Dr. Gunnell did not observe swelling, he noted "tenderness right over the sacrum." (Id. at 000324.) Dr. Gunnell also indicated that an MRI done in 2000 failed to reveal any abnormality of the lumbar spine. Dr. Gunnell referred Proctor to Dr. Webb, a specialist, "for consideration of surgical exploration of the area." (Id.) Dr. Webb examined Proctor, but found "no current evidence of a pilonidal cyst." (Id. at 000309.) He recommended "orthopedic consultation, or perhaps pain management consultation with possibly some injections in the area," and referred Proctor back to Dr. Gunnell. (Id.)
On or about October 1, 2001, Karen Oxford, a registered nurse employed by AUL, reviewed Proctor's medical records to determine whether she was entitled to continued benefits. Based upon her review, Nurse Oxford concluded:
It appears that the patient went out for a mental nervous diagnosis, which appears to be reasonable. She did have surgery for chiari malformation, but Dr. Heffez letter dated 03/16/01 reveals a wonderful response. It appears that the patient is now claiming a physical impairment of back pain at this time. It appears that there is a lack of objective medical evidence to support impairment of back pain at this time.
(Id. at 000648.) On November 2, 2001, Nurse Oxford wrote to Dr. Gunnell for additional information regarding Proctor's condition. Nurse Oxford wrote: "After a complete review [of the medical records], we believe it is most reasonable for Ms. Proctor to return to her pre-disability occupation as of 11/01/01, as it appears that there is a lack of objective medical evidence to support the impairment of back pain." (Id. at 000306.) Dr. Gunnell responded that Proctor could "possibly" return to work, but indicated that he had not seen Proctor in four months. (Id.) A few days later, Dr.
Gunnell called Nurse Oxford to discuss Proctor's condition. Dr. Gunnell informed Nurse Oxford that he had not seen Proctor for four-to-five months and stated that "[t]he only thing remotely that he could think of might be fibromyalgia." (Id. at 000634.) The notes from the conversation further state:
Dr. Gunnell stated that he was unsure about [Proctor's] pre-disability occupation, but if I would order a [functional capacities examination], certainly a trial of sedentary-light work activity would be appropriate and "I would back you up." . . . Dr. Gunnell said that he generally "gives people the benefit of doubt, however malingering comes to mind. That is an old term." Dr. Gunnel stated however he is hesitant to charge malingering and that is why Dr. Gunnell stated again that "if you would set up an FCE, I would sign on. . . ." Dr. Gunnell did mention that Judy does know all about trigger points and appears to have studied up.
(Id.)
On December 11, 2001, AUL sent a letter to Proctor notifying her that benefits were terminated as of November 3, 2001, "due to the lack of objective medical evidence . . . to support that you have an impairment severe enough to prevent you from performing the material and substantial duties of any gainful occupation for which your [sic] are titled [sic] by training, education or experience." (Id. at 000103.) AUL also informed Proctor of her rights to appeal the decision terminating benefits within sixty days and to submit additional medical information in support of her claim. (Id. at 000105-06.) However, Proctor did not submit any additional information to AUL in support of her claim.
Discussion
I. Standard of ReviewThe issue presented in this case is whether Proctor is entitled to disability benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). A plan administrator's denial of benefits under an ERISA plan is reviewedde novo "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956-57 (1989):see also Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1998). The de novo standard of review applies to both the factual determinations and legal conclusions of the plan administrator.See Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys. Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1998).
Section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought —
(1) by a participant or beneficiary —
***
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. . . .29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Where the plan clearly confers discretion upon the administrator to determine eligibility or construe the plan's provisions, the determination is reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.Wells v. United States Steel Carnegie Pension Fund. Inc., 950 F.2d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991). The arbitrary and capricious standard "`is the least demanding form of judicial review of administrative action. When it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious.'" Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that administrators' decisions "are not arbitrary and capricious if they are `rational in light of the plan's provisions'") (quoting Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988)). In applying this standard, the Court must defer to the administrator's interpretation when the plan vests the administrator with discretion to interpret the plan; an administrator's determination will be overturned only upon a showing of internal inconsistency in the plan or bad faith. Davis, 887 F.2d at 695. While no particular language is necessary to vest the plan administrator with discretion to interpret the plan or make benefit determinations, the Sixth Circuit "has consistently required that a plan contain `a clear grant of discretion [to the administrator] to determine benefits or interpret the plan.'" Perez, 150 F.3d at 555 (quoting Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1993) (italics and alteration in original)).
The Policy contains the following provision with regard to the Plan Administrator's authority:
The plan administrator shall have the discretionary authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan. The plan administrator, in his discretionary authority, shall determine eligibility for benefits, construe the terms of the plan and resolve any disputes which may arise with regard to the rights of any persons under the terms of the plan, including, but not limited to, eligibility for participation and claims for benefits.
(Policy at 4.) The Court concludes that the quoted provision is sufficient to grant the Plan Administrator the discretionary authority to interpret the Plan and to determine eligibility for benefits required to support application of the arbitrary and capricious standard. Proctor does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the deferential standard of review will be applied to AUL's decision.
II. Denial of Benefits
A. Administrative Record
A preliminary issue presented by both parties is the scope of the administrative record. The issue arises for two reasons: (1) AUL has included in the administrative record a surveillance video of Proctor taken by Don Brooks Investigations, Inc., which AUL concedes it did not have at the time it made its determination to deny benefits; and (2) in her response to AUL's motion, Proctor has submitted medical records showing that she was seen by a physician's assistant on August 16, 2001, and August 27, 2001, and by Dr. Schwarz on October 30, 2001, and November 29, 2001, for chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia, and lyme disease. The Sixth Circuit has firmly established that "in an ERISA claim contesting a denial of benefits, the district court is strictly limited to a consideration of the information actually considered by the administrator." Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs. Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 1998).
With regard to the surveillance video and records, the Court concludes that there is no basis to consider those items part of the administrative record, because AUL received them after it had made its decision to deny benefits. Although AUL suggests that those items may be considered part of the administrative record because AUL received them during the appeal period, AUL cites no authority to support such a proposition, and those documents could not have affected the decision before the Court for review. Similarly, the Court will not consider the medical records attached to Proctor's brief as a part of the administrative record because there is no evidence that Proctor submitted those documents to AUL before or after it made its decision to deny benefits or that AUL had those documents in its possession when it made its decision. While Proctor asserts that AUL "may have misplaced or lost [the] medical records" and that "[t]hese records were supplied directly to [AUL's] counsel," (Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 3-4), Proctor does not assert that those records were ever part of the administrative record, nor has she challenged the sufficiency of the administrative record submitted by AUL.
Proctor also argues that the fact that she has established disability for purposes of Social Security benefits should be considered as proof of disability under the Policy. However, at the time AUL made its decision to deny benefits, Proctor's claim for Social Security Benefits had been denied and was on appeal. In addition, the administrative record does not indicate either the information supporting or the basis for the award. Therefore, the award of Social Security benefits is irrelevant to the Court's review of AUL's decision.
B. AUL's Decision
Based upon the evidence in the administrative record, the Court concludes that AUL's determination that Proctor was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits, was not arbitrary and capricious. Under the Policy, Proctor was entitled to benefits only if she was unable to "perform the material and substantial duties of any gainful occupation for which [s]he [wa]s reasonably fitted by training, education or experience." In addition, Proctor was obligated to furnish proof of disability to AUL on a continuing basis. (Policy at 13.) Thus, Proctor bore the burden of proving that she was entitled to disability benefits.See Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 985 (6th Cir. 1991).
In February 2001, Proctor underwent surgery for Chiari malformation to relieve her neck pain and headaches. In a follow-up visit on March 16, 2001, Dr. Heffez, the surgeon, found that the surgery was very successful and noted significant improvements in Proctor's medical condition. One month later, Proctor was seen by her treating physician, Dr. Gunnell. Although Proctor complained of continued fatigue and low back pain, Dr. Gunnell noted that Proctor had fewer headaches and was sleeping better. Dr. Gunnell also reported to AUL that Proctor should be able to return to work by July 1, 2001, at least on a part-time basis. Ten days later, Proctor was seen by an associate of Dr.
Gunnell regarding complaints of low back pain. One week later, Dr. Gunnell examined Proctor about her complaints of back pain. Neither Dr. Gunnell nor his associate were able to locate the physical cause of Proctor's pain. Similarly, Dr. Webb, a specialist to whom Dr. Gunnell referred Proctor, was unable to determine a physical cause of Proctor's pain.
In November 2001, AUL reviewed Proctor's medical records and determined that there was no objective medical evidence to support her claim of disability. AUL contacted Dr. Gunnell regarding whether Proctor was able to return to work by November 1, 2001, and Dr. Gunnell declined to give an opinion because he had not seen Proctor in four or five months. However, Dr. Gunnell did state that Proctor should be able to perform light or sedentary work. While Dr. Gunnell did state that Proctor might have fibromyalgia, he opined that it was a "remote" possibility.
This evidence was more than sufficient to support AUL's decision, because there was absolutely no medical evidence in the administrative record showing that Proctor could not return to work or that her condition imposed physical limitations that precluded her from working. Moreover, given that Proctor's complaints of fatigue and back pain were subjective and not supported by any objective evidence of a physical impairment, the denial was not an abuse of discretion. See Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 381-82 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of disability benefits under an arbitrary and capricious standard where the plaintiffs claimed disabling condition was fibromyalgia but there was no confirming medical diagnosis and no evidence that the plaintiff could not perform the duties of her regular occupation); Wages v. Sandier O'Neill Partners. L.P., No. 00-5994, 2002 WL 339221 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2002) ("Although both Dr. Craven and Dr. Chapman wrote letters indicating that [the plaintiffs] fibromyalgia precluded even the lightest work, neither doctor quantified the plaintiffs functional limitations in terms of the number of hours she could sit or stand comfortably, or the like."). Finally, AUL's decision must be affirmed because the under the Policy, a person is entitled to benefits only if she is "under the regular attendance of a Physician," (Policy at 13), and in November 2001 when AUL made its decision, there was no evidence showing that Proctor had sought treatment since May 2001.
The circumstances in this case are even more compelling than those in Wages for affirming the denial of benefits, because here, no medical provider has indicated that Proctor would not be able to work or that her fibromyalgia would preclude Proctor from performing even light or sedentary work. In Wages, the plaintiffs primary care physician and a rheumatologist both submitted letters to the plan administrator stating that the plaintiffs condition prevented her from performing even light or sedentary work. Wages, 2002 WL 339221, at *l-2.
Proctor also argues that the Court should consider AUL's apparent conflict of interest in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. It is true that a plan administrator's conflict of interest may impact a court's review of a plan administrator's determination.Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2003). However, the existence of a conflict is simply a factor to be considered by a court in determining whether the plan administrator's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Killian, 152 F.3d at 520. Here there is no showing that AUL's conflict affected its review of Proctor's claim for benefits.
Proctor contends that AUL's decision was arbitrary and capricious because there was no medical evidence supporting AUL's determination that Proctor was disabled due to a mental illness, and AUL essentially fabricated the mental illness determination in order to limit Proctor's benefits under the Policy to 24 months. This argument must be rejected, because as set forth above, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support AUL's determination that Proctor was disabled as a result of mental illness.
Proctor also complains about AUL's refusal to provide medical records or opinions supporting its conclusion that Proctor was entitled to benefits on the basis of a mental illness. The administrative record shows that AUL refused to provide the documents requested by Proctor's counsel based upon its "policy not to provide medical records or medical opinions to policyholders, their attorneys, or other entities." (A.R. at 000135.) As AUL notes, AUL is prohibited from disclosing many of the records it receives from providers, and AUL furnished a list of providers to Proctor's counsel, from whom Proctor could obtain medical records.
Finally, Proctor argues that AUL's review of her claim was less than sincere, because the level of review was insubstantial and there was no real effort to gather medical evidence which would properly and factually substantiate Proctor's condition. This argument also fails, because there is no evidence that AUL only sought information that was unfavorable to Proctor's claim for benefits. In addition, AUL gave Proctor the opportunity to submit any additional medical information supporting her claim. (Id. at 000105.) Thus, "there was adequate room in the claims process for any argument that [Proctor] wished to assert."Nicholas v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 00-1728, 2002 WL 31269690, at *8 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2002) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the defendant failed to elicit certain information regarding the plaintiffs condition, "including how the demands of being vice president of sales exacerbated [the plaintiffs] cardiac condition").
Proctor also asserted a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in her complaint. Because Proctor did not address the claim in her brief, the Court deems the claim waived. Even if not waived, such a claim would be improper in this case. First, to the extent Proctor seeks to rely on 29 U.S.C. § 1109 in support of her claim, her claim would be improper because that provision affords a remedy only to the plan, not to an individual participant or beneficiary. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 3089 (1985). Second, the claim must be rejected to the extent Proctor asserts it under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996), the Supreme Court held that § 1132(a)(3) afforded a participants and beneficiaries a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty where no other remedy was available under ERISA. Id at 506-515, 116 S.Ct. at 1074-79. However, such a claim may not be maintained where it is essentially a repackaged claim for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1998); Weiner v. Aetna Health Plans of Ohio. Inc., No. 97-3136, 1998 WL 381642, at *5 (6th Cir. June 23, 1998). Proctor's breach of fiduciary duty claim alleges that AUL breached its fiduciary duties by "imposing limitations or exclusions with regard to her entitlement to benefits." (Compl. ¶ 15.) Such a claim is a claim for benefits properly brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Thus, there is no basis for a claim under § 1132(a)(3).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered in favor of AUL.