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explaining the allegations in the complaint were “not sufficient to show that his excessive force claim is distinct from the incident that led to his conviction for resisting an officer.”
Summary of this case from Williams v. ConstantOpinion
No. 17-56948
05-23-2018
IMMANUEL CHRISTIAN PRICE, AKA Immanuel C. Price, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALEXANDRU GALIU, Deputy Sheriff in San Diego; JOHN DOE, Deputy #2, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00412-BEN-PCL MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
California state prisoner Immanuel Christian Price, AKA Immanuel C. Price, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from his initial booking process at the San Diego County Jail while he was a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Price's excessive force claim because success on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Price failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Contrary to Price's contentions, his allegations are not sufficient to show that his excessive force claim is distinct from the incident that led to his conviction for resisting an officer. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Heck-bar does not apply if claim arises from events that did not occur at the same time and place as the criminal offense).
Dismissal of Price's unreasonable search and seizure claim was proper because Price failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (body cavity search permissible where probable cause exists); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (exigent circumstances exception to probable cause warrant requirement).
AFFIRMED.