Opinion
Case No. 99-4136-DES
February 8, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 67), plaintiff's Motion to Convert and Defer Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 72), plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48), and defendants Richards and Walker's Motion to Strike or Stay Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60). In this case, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State of Kansas to extend reciprocity privileges throughout the state to plaintiff's tribally-issued vehicle registrations and certificates of title.
I. BACKGROUND
The court and the parties are well versed in the procedural journey of this case, so the court will only briefly recount the procedural and factual highlights.
A. Factual History
On March 16, 1999, plaintiff, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in Jackson County, Kansas, enacted its own motor vehicle code. Prairie Band Motor Vehicle Code Ch. 17-1.
The code requires tribal registrations and titles for all vehicles owned by plaintiff and for all vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation. State law, however, requires all vehicles that operate within Kansas to have registration and titles issued by the state. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-142. Eventually, on August 7, 1999, a tribal member was cited for displaying a tribal registration and title outside the reservation.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed its original complaint in this action on September 14, 1999. Thereafter, on October 13, 1999, the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from applying or enforcing the Kansas motor vehicle registration or titling laws against plaintiff and any persons who operate or own a vehicle registered or titled under plaintiff's registration code. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 75 F. Supp.2d 1186 (D. Kan. 1999). Defendants requested the court stay the injunction pending their appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The court denied the request. Id. However, on November 12, 1999, the Tenth Circuit granted defendant's requested stay. Finally, in an opinion dated June 25, 2001, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court's injunction. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce ("Prairie Band"), 253 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2001). In the interim, on September 25, 2000, United States Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara granted plaintiff's request to amend its complaint. (Doc. 84). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 85) is, therefore, the controlling complaint in this matter. Also in the interim, the parties filed the motions presently pending before the court.
C. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit addressed two major issues in its June 25, 2001, opinion: (1) whether this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action and (2) whether this court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1239. Under the first inquiry, the Tenth Circuit found, contrary to defendant's assertion, that the court had federal question jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 1239-41. In addition, the Tenth Circuit found plaintiff presented an Article III case or controversy, plaintiff had sufficient standing to bring the action, and that the Younger abstention doctrine was inapplicable. Id. at 1240-42.
As to the second inquiry, the Tenth Circuit found that this court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction. Id. at 1242-57. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit rejected numerous arguments presented by defendants. Defendants unsuccessfully asserted that: (1) the injunction lacked proper specificity; (2) the court applied the wrong standard in issuing the preliminary injunction; and (3) the merits of the injunction failed the traditional four-part preliminary injunction standard. Id. Within its analysis, the Tenth Circuit identified and highlighted those issues most relevant to the determination of the ultimate question before this court.
D. Show Cause Order
Most, if not all, of the issues raised in defendant Brownlee' s presently pending motion to dismiss were considered and rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Prairie Band. In light of this duplicity, on October 24, 2001, the court ordered defendant Brownlee to show cause why his motion to dismiss should not be denied. The court permitted plaintiff to respond to defendant Brownlee's filing. Defendant Brownlee's singular response to the court's order is that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (2001), which was also decided on June 25, 2001, so altered the legal landscape that the Tenth Circuit's opinion should be given little to no weight. On the other hand, plaintiff argues Hicks is not controlling. For the following reasons, the court concurs with plaintiff and finds it appropriate to deny defendant Brownlee's motion to dismiss.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Nevada v. Hicks
In Hicks, a tribal member brought suit in tribal court against the State of Nevada and its state officials. Id. at 2308. The suit alleged the member's civil rights were violated by certain state game wardens during the execution of both state and tribal search warrants at his home located on reservation land. Id. The search meant to uncover evidence related to an off-reservation crime. Id. The tribal courts as well as the district court and the Ninth Circuit found that the tribal court had jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on tribal land. Id. at 2309.
However, the Supreme Court, relying on Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. In reaching its conclusion, the Court first reemphasized that "[w]here nonmembers are concerned, the `exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.'" Hicks, 121 S.Ct. at 2309-10 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (internal emphasis omitted). After finding that the rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land, the Court concluded "that tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations. . . ." Id. at 2313.
B. Application to Present Case
Defendant Brownlee asserts Hicks is controlling by stating: "The issue before the court . . . is whether as an exercise of its inherent sovereignty, the Tribe has the power to regulate the activities of State officials enforcing State law." (Def. Brownlee Resp. to Court's Show Cause Order at 3). According to defendant Brownlee, the ultimate question presented in this case is whether plaintiff can "order" state officials not to issue citations to tribally registered vehicles. This assertion misconstrues the core issue in this case and misinterprets the holding in Hicks.
As noted by the Tenth Circuit, this case does not concern the breadth of tribal authority over nonmembers, but, rather, this case concerns tribal authority over members. Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1256 n. 11. In particular, the court will be considering whether the doctrines of federal preemption or Indian sovereignty act as barriers to the state's exercise of its regulatory power. Stated differently, the central question is whether plaintiff's powers extend over its members as they (and their vehicles) travel beyond the boundaries of the reservation. These issues will not be controlled by an application of the rules announced in Montana and later interpreted in Hicks. Instead, as once again noted by the Tenth Circuit, this case squarely rests on the teachings of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) and its progeny. Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1256 n. 11. In sum, contrary to defendant Brownlee's assertion, the court does not find Hicks has adversely affected the authoritative weight this court must give to the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
In light of the aforementioned duplicity between the Tenth Circuit's June 25, 2001, opinion and the instant motion to dismiss, the court shall deny defendant Brownlee's motion.
C. Remaining Motions
On January 22, 2002, the court held a telephonic status conference with the respective parties. In light of the protracted nature of this litigation and the court of appeals opinion, the parties submitted proposals to the court for reaching a final disposition in this matter. Plaintiff has since filed a motion to withdraw its motion for summary judgment, which the court shall grant. This ruling necessarily makes the remaining motions moot, and they are summarily denied. In addition, the parties have submitted to the court a report of their meeting held pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. United States Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara is hereby directed to issue a scheduling order in this case, which reflects the parties' agreed deadlines.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendant Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 67) is denied, and defendant Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) is denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER BY THIS COURT ORDERED that:
1) Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 98) is granted;
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) is denied without prejudice;
3) Plaintiff's Motion to Convert Defendant Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) is denied as moot;
4) Plaintiff's Motion to Convert and Defer Defendant Brownlee's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 72) is denied as moot; and
5) Defendants Richards and Walker's Motion to Strike or Stay Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) is denied as moot.IT IS FURTHER BY THIS COURT ORDERED that United States Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara is hereby directed to issue a scheduling order in this case, which reflects the parties' agreed deadlines.