Opinion
No. 7:18-cv-00194-BO
11-26-2018
Amanda Poore, Plaintiff, v. Ray Evans, III, et al., Defendants.
Order & Memorandum & Recommendation
Plaintiff Amanda Poore asks the court to relieve her from paying the filing fee and other costs associated with a civil lawsuit (otherwise known as proceeding "in forma pauperis" or "IFP"). As part of its evaluation of Poore's request, the court must also consider the viability of her claims. If the court determines that the Complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the following reasons, the court grants Poore's IFP motion and the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss Poore's Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. Background
The facts underlying Poore's suit are not entirely clear. The court infers from the proposed Complaint (D.E. 1-1) that Poore purchased a residence in a transaction that involved Ray Evans, III; Mary Jane Winchester; and Choice Jacksonville Realty. Poore alleges the residence suffers from several unsafe or unsanitary conditions that the defendants knew about before closing. Poore also alleges without explanation that Winchester threatened her.
II. Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs
Poore requests permission to proceed without paying the fees and costs typically associated with filing a civil action. The court has reviewed Poore's Application (D.E. 1) and has determined that her monthly income does not exceed her monthly expenditures. The court finds that Poore lacks sufficient resources to pay the costs associated with litigation. The court thus grants her Application (D.E. 1) and will allow Poore to proceed without full prepayment of fees and costs.
III. Screening of the Proposed Complaint
In addition to determining whether Poore is entitled to IFP status, the court must also analyze the viability of the claims in the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate those claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of a complaint it determines is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from that relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A court may also consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure"). The court must dismiss an action if it determines it lacks of subject-matter jurisdiction at any point in the proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific situations authorized by Congress." Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968).
Jurisdiction in the federal courts may be based on the existence of a federal question or upon diversity of citizenship among the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. To warrant federal question jurisdiction, a claim must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To warrant jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, more than $75,000 must be at stake in the action and the plaintiffs and defendants must be citizens of different states. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978).
A federal court will presume that it lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is established that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895). The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction ... is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction."). A complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. If the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Here, the essential allegations contained in Poore's Complaint cannot show that the case is one "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Complaint makes no reference to federal law. D.E. 1-1 at 2. Instead, it alleges that the defendants failed to disclose several problems with a home Poore purchased. It also alleges that one of the defendants threatened her. Poore claims that North Carolina "laws ... protect people from this sort [of] robbery." D.E. 1-1 at 3.
Poore's Civil Cover Sheet (D.E. 1-3) lists "US CIVIL STATUTE 47 USC 553" in a box asking plaintiffs to describe the cause of action. The provision Poore referred to provides for civil and criminal actions if a "person intercept[s] or receive[s] or assist[s] in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so...." Id. There are no facts alleged in the proposed Complaint that appear to pertain to this statute, nor does Poore reference the statute in her proposed Complaint. Thus, it appears Poore is asserting claims under state law and cannot rely on federal question jurisdiction to maintain her claims in this court.
Poore also explains in the Complaint that all parties are residents of North Carolina. D.E. 1-1 at 2. This eliminates diversity of citizenship as a basis for jurisdiction. The undersigned thus recommends that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the court grants Poore's IFP motion. The undersigned recommends the district court dismiss Poore's Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R") on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Dated: November 26, 2018
/s/_________
Robert T. Numbers, II
United States Magistrate Judge