Opinion
Sept. 10, 1974.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Neef, Swanson & Myer, Glen B. Clark, Jr., David C. Miller, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Stitt, Wittenbrink & Roan, P.C., James R. Stitt, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
RULAND, Judge.
The City Council of the City of Westminster (City) appeals from a judgment of the district court modifying its order suspending the liquor license of Felix Leonard Pomponio, d/b/a Pomp's Liquors (Pomp's). We affirm the judgment.
The City issued a liquor license to Pomp's for the calendar year 1972. Pursuant to notice and public hearing on October 16, 1972, the City entered an order purporting to suspend that license for a period of six months. The suspension was based upon sales of beer by Pomp's to a minor. As of the date of the hearing, no application had been filed by Pomp's with the City to renew the license for the calendar year 1973. See C.R.S. 1963, 75--2--9(3).
City found and the record confirms that the minor possessed false identification which purported to verify that the minor was 21 years-of-age at the time of the various purchases. Although the Liquor Code was amended in 1973 so that a license may no longer be suspended for sale of liquor to a minor who exhibits false identification, See Colo.Sess.Laws 1973, ch. 258, 75--1--15 at 906, we need not consider the effect of that statute.
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106, Pomp's filed the present action on October 19, 1972, contending that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in entering its order of suspension, and that, therefore, the suspension was invalid. The district court enjoined enforcement of the suspension pending its review thereof. A hearing was held on December 8, 1972, at which time it was stipulated by counsel that an application for renewal had been filed by Pomp's and that the City had denied the application. Pursuant to that stipulation, the issue of whether the renewal application could be denied without notice to Pomp's and an opportunity to appear was included for determination by the district court.
Following presentation of argument, the district court entered judgment affirming the order of suspension but ordered the term thereof to end on December 31, 1972, because the existing license expired on that date. Relative to the denial of Pomp's application for renewal, the court concluded that the City must give Pomp's notice and an opportunity to appear before denying the application and remanded the case to the City for that purpose. The City filed its motion for new trial challenging only the court's order which limited the term of suspension to the term of existing license. Thereafter, Pomp's filed a petition requesting that the City be held in contempt for failure to hold a hearing, and we are advised by counsel that the City then issued Pomp's 1973 license without a hearing and without restrictions, and the contempt proceeding was dismissed.
In this appeal, the City requests that we determine whether the City may suspend a liquor license for a period of time beyond the expiration date of the then current annual license.
A licensee has no vested right to renewal of a license, Commissioners v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108, 213 P.2d 608, and the City may refuse to renew a license for 'good cause.' 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 75--2--9(1); Manitou Springs v. Walk, 149 Colo. 43, 367 P.2d 744. In recognition of these principles, the district court's order remanding the case to the City imposed no limitations on any decision the City might make relative to Pomp's 1973 license; rather, the court required only that Pomp's be given notice and an opportunity to appear at a hearing relative to what action should be taken on the application for a 1973 license. For reasons that do not appear of record, the City chose not to hold a hearing, but, instead, issued Pomp's 1973 license without any restriction or limitation on its use. Since the 1973 license was issued without restriction or limitation, the asserted issue of whether the order of suspension extends to or affects the 1973 license is not properly before us.
Judgment affirmed.
ENOCH and KELLY, JJ., concur.