Opinion
Case No. 2D18-4199
03-20-2020
Charles Edward PITTMAN, a/k/a Charles Elbert Pittman, a/k/a Charles E. Pittman, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela Cordova Papasov, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela Cordova Papasov, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
VILLANTI, Judge.
Charles E. Pittman appeals the order granting in part and denying in part his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and the order that corrected his sentence. We affirm the postconviction court's ruling on the motion; however, because the postconviction court did not prepare and render amended sentencing documents, we remand with directions to the postconviction court to render amended sentencing documents that reflect the correct sentence.
In his rule 3.800(a) motion, Pittman raised two claims: first, that the written sentencing documents did not comport with the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence, and second, that the orally pronounced sentence was illegal. After reviewing the record, the postconviction court granted the motion to the extent that it contended that the written sentence did not comport with the oral pronouncement. The court then ordered the State to respond to Pittman's argument concerning the legality of his sentence.
After considering the State's response and holding a hearing, the postconviction court determined that the sentence that had been orally pronounced was legal. Therefore, the court granted Pittman relief solely on the basis that the written sentencing documents needed to be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement. Unfortunately, the postconviction court recorded this ruling solely on a "snap-out" memorandum of sentence form, and it neither prepared amended sentencing documents nor ordered them to be prepared.
In this appeal, Pittman again alleges that his sentence is illegal, a claim which we reject without further comment. He also contends that the postconviction court erred in denying him a de novo sentencing hearing, at which the State would have been required to prove anew that he qualified as a habitual felony offender (HFO) and a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) and at which the trial court would have been required to reconsider any award of jail credit. However, correcting written sentencing documents to comport with an oral pronouncement does not require a de novo sentencing hearing; instead, such an error constitutes only a scrivener's error that may be corrected as a ministerial act. See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 n.3 (Fla. 2003) ("The term scrivener's error refers to a mistake in the written sentence that is at variance with the oral pronouncement of sentence." (quoting Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 , 761 So. 2d 1015, 1023 (Fla. 2000) )); Devlin v. State, 224 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (affirming Devlin's convictions and sentences but remanding for correction of a scrivener's error when the oral pronouncement of sentence was for time served but the written sentencing documents reflected a ten-year prison sentence); Rivera v. State, 117 So. 3d 449, 449-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (affirming the revocation of probation and the sentence imposed but remanding for correction of a scrivener's error when the written sentencing documents clearly conflicted with the oral pronouncement of sentence from the trial court). Since Pittman was not entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing, the State was not required to "re-prove" that he qualified as an HFO and a PRR nor was the trial court required to reconsider the jail credit awarded. Therefore, Pittman is not entitled to the relief he seeks in this appeal, and we affirm the postconviction court's ruling on the rule 3.800(a) motion.
But that does not end our work in this case. As noted above, despite recognizing that the written sentencing documents needed to be amended to comport with the sentence orally pronounced, the postconviction court did not actually render new sentencing documents. Instead, it prepared a "snap-out" memorandum of sentence that purported to "clarify" the sentence, and it entered a separate written order that identified the new sentence. While the postconviction court directed that this order identifying the new sentence be sent to the Department of Corrections, the postconviction court never prepared amended sentencing documents that reflected the proper sentence. Hence, even now, Pittman's written sentencing documents do not properly reflect his orally pronounced sentence.
This court has repeatedly criticized the Tenth Circuit's continued use of these "snap-out" memoranda of sentence forms because of the problems that they can cause both on appellate review and in future proceedings. See Phillips v. State, 198 So. 3d 789, 790 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (collecting cases and noting that this court has been discouraging the use of "snap-outs" for over twenty years); see also Dagan v. State, 302 So.3d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 17, 2019) (collecting cases and identifying the myriad ways in which snap-outs have been used inappropriately). More importantly, we have explicitly held that a "snap out" memorandum of sentence form "does not qualify as a rendered sentence that can be attached to a commitment." Gray v. State, 198 So. 3d 780, 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Simply put, the Department of Corrections has no obligation to regard a local snap-out form as a proper sentencing document in lieu of the standard, statewide judgment and sentence form. Id. at 782-83 (noting that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(a) requires a circuit court to use a judgment and sentence that conforms to the form provided in that rule and identifying the many ways in which a "memo of sentence" fails to conform). Hence, regardless of whatever purposes these forms may have for simple local matters, they cannot serve as a defendant's official sentencing documents for use by the Department of Corrections. Therefore, while we affirm the sentence as orally pronounced, we remand with directions to the postconviction court to prepare, sign, and render proper sentencing documents that accurately reflect the sentence imposed on Pittman.
Affirmed and remanded with directions.
KHOUZAM, C.J., and LaROSE, J., Concur.