Opinion
Case No. 1:99-CV-92.
DATE: April 5, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. At the hearing on March 6, 2000, the Court took under advisement the issue of whether plaintiff's claim for damages before February 1996 is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Section 507 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 507 (b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that plaintiff's claim for damages before February 1996 is barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
According to Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). There is no genuine issue of material fact when considering the record as a whole, the trier of fact could not rationally find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show specific facts that a triable issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986).
Defendant argues plaintiff's claim for damages prior to February 18, 1996 should be dismissed as time-barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to copyright infringement cases.See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (b). Defendant relies on Hoste v. Radio Corp. of America, 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981), which holds that the three year statute of limitations set forth in Section 507 bars recovery of any claims based on damages accruing more than three years before the complaint was filed. Defendant states that the statute began to run on February 18, 1999, with the issuance of the summons to defendants on February 18, 1996. Therefore, according to defendant, any claim for damages before February 1996 would be time-barred.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the statute of limitations is tolled in this case until plaintiff had knowledge of the copyright violation, which first occurred in March 1996. Relying on Roley v. New World Pictures, 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994) and Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983), plaintiff further argues that because the infringement by the defendant was a continuing wrong, plaintiff is entitled to all damages caused by defendant's wrongful conduct.
Section 507 of the copyright statute provides, "no civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued." 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). The Sixth Circuit has determined in copyright infringement cases the three year statute of limitations in Section 507 bars recovery of any claims based on damages accruing more that three years before the complaint was filed. See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of America, 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981). However, plaintiff argues that the Court should apply Roley and hold that a cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one had knowledge or is charged with knowledge of an infringement. Roley clearly holds that the "prevailing view [is] that the statute bars recovery on any claim for damages that accrued more than three years before commencement of suit." Roley v. New World Pictures, 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Court finds Roley stands for the same principle as Hoste, and in fact relies onHoste's holding case.
In addition, plaintiff further argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled in accordance with the principles set forth in Taylor. However, Taylor is distinguishable from this case. In Taylor, the Court determined that the statute was tolled for several different reasons. First, because the defendant infringer failed to take steps to stop the infringement and to recall the infringing products; second, because the defendant fraudulently concealed the infringement; and third, because the defendant's infringement was a continuing wrong. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1983). More significantly, the Taylor court explicitly held that had the defendant infringer stopped selling the infringing items and taken reasonable steps to recall the infringing items then the action would have been barred by the three year statute of limitations in Section 507(b). Id.
This case is factually distinguishable from Taylor. Here, defendant did take steps to stop selling the infringing items and to recall the infringing items. Additionally, here there are no special circumstances, such as fraudulent concealment, which suggest that the statute should be tolled.
The Taylor Court also applied the "rolling statute of limitations theory" which permits a plaintiff to "reach back" and sue for damages for all the infringing acts so long as any allegedly infringing conduct occurs within the three years preceding the filing of the action. Id. Plaintiff argues that this rolling statute of limitations should be applied to this case. However, the rolling statute of limitations was rejected by other courts, including the Roley Court cited by the plaintiff, and is contrary to the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Hoste.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Defendant's position is in accordance with the Sixth Circuit in Hoste. Further, even if the Court were to apply the cases and law cited by plaintiff, it would be insufficient to survive summary judgment. The law cited by plaintiff clearly supports the position that plaintiff's claim for damages before February 1996 is nevertheless barred by Section 507. There are no special circumstances that suggest the statute should be tolled. However, the law also clearly indicates the statute of limitations bars recovery of any claims based on damages accruing more than three years before the complaint was filed. Here, the complaint was filed on February 3, 1999, and three year three years prior to that date would be February 3, 1996. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim for damages before February 3, 1996, will be granted.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim for damages before February 3, 1996, is GRANTED, because Section 507 of the Copyright Act bars recovery of any claims based on damages accruing more than three years before the complaint was filed in copyright infringement cases.