Opinion
No. 1842 C.D. 2011
08-13-2012
Philadelphia Parking Authority, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
The Philadelphia Parking Authority (Employer) seeks review of the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which reversed the referee's denial of benefits to Megan Morris (Claimant) under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e) (stating that employees are ineligible for compensation for any week in which their unemployment is due to discharge from work for willful misconduct connected with their work).
The facts, as found by the Board, are as follows:
1. The claimant was last employed as a full-time parking enforcement officer with the employer from July 28, 2009 until April 18, 2011, at a final rate of pay of $14.23 per hour.
2. The employer has a vehicle use policy (Policy). The [P]olicy states that "[a]n employee who uses an
Authority vehicle must have a valid driver's license." In addition, "[e]mployees required to maintain a license [for their job classification] must notify their department manager immediately if their license is suspended, revoked or not valid for any reason."
3. Failure to report the loss of driving privileges is cause for termination.
4. The claimant was aware or should have been aware of [the Policy].
5. The claimant was required to maintain a valid driver's license in her position.
6. The employer conducted a routine review of its employees' driver['s] licenses on [April 1, 2011].
7. The employer became aware that the claimant's driver's license was suspended on October 8, 2010.
8. [On August 26, 2010, the claimant attended a hearing in magisterial district court, where she pled guilty to the charges of permitting someone to operate her unregistered vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1371(a), and permitting someone whose operating privileges were suspended to operate her vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1575(a)].
9. [On July 6, 2010,] [t]he claimant was cited by the police because her fiancé[,] [whose operating privileges were suspended at the time,] drove her vehicle when it was not registered and was not insured.
10. The claimant could not afford to pay her insurance and her registration fee.
11. The claimant's fiancé was not allowed to take the claimant's vehicle.
12. After the hearing, the claimant was told she would receive a fine. The claimant also set up a payment plan.
13. The claimant was not told that her driver's license would be suspended.
14. The claimant moved to a new address on March 1, 2010.
15. The claimant submitted a change of address form with the Department of Transportation.
16. The Department of Transportation did not receive the claimant's change of address form.
17. The Department of Transportation mailed the claimant a suspension letter; however, the letter was returned to the Department of Transportation.
18. The claimant did not know that her driver's license was suspended until April 6, 2011.
19. The claimant operated the employer's vehicle on November 2, 2010, November 27, 2010, December 11, 2010 and December 18, 2010.Board Decision, August 30, 2011, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1-20 at 1-2; R.R. at 46a-47a.
20. The claimant was terminated for failing to maintain a valid driver's license, and for failing to notify the employer of the suspension of her driver's license
Philadelphia Parking Authority Employee Manual, at 48; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 12a.
Philadelphia Parking Authority Employee Manual, at 48; R.R. at 12a.
Philadelphia Parking Authority Employee Manual, at 48; R.R. at 12a.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1371(a) provides:
(a) General rule.—No person shall operate and no owner shall permit to be operated upon any highway a vehicle the registration of which has been suspended.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1575(a) provides:
(a) General rule.—No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven in violation of any of the provisions of this title.
The Board determined that Claimant did not commit willful misconduct:
Here, the possession of a valid driver's license was a prerequisite of the claimant's employment. Based upon the above credible Findings of Fact, the Board cannot find that the claimant's loss of her license was through fault of her own. Further, the claimant offered credible testimony that she did not deliberately violate [the Policy]. In fact, the claimant offered credible testimony that she did not know her driver's license was suspended until April 6, 2011. Therefore, because the claimant was unaware that her driver's license was suspended, the Board cannot determine that she committed willful misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are granted pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law.Board Decision at 3; R.R. at 48a.
Employer contends that the Board committed an error of law when it determined that Claimant sustained her burden of establishing good cause for violating the Policy, and, thereby, that her conduct did not rise to the level of willful misconduct.
This Court's review in an unemployment compensation case is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, errors of law were committed, or essential findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence. Lee Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 637 A.2d 695 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
Whether a claimant's conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct is a question of law subject to this Court's review. Lee Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 589 A.2d 297 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Willful misconduct is defined as conduct that represents a wanton and willful disregard for an employer's interest, deliberate violation of rules, disregard for standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect of an employee, or negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer's interest or employee's duties and obligations. Frick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 375 A.2d 879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). The employer bears the burden of proving that it discharged an employee for willful misconduct. City of Beaver Falls v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 441 A.2d 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982).
Where willful misconduct is based upon the violation of a work rule, the employer must establish the existence of the rule, its reasonableness, and that the employee was aware of the rule. Bishop Carroll High School v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 557 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Once employer meets this burden, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that the rule was unreasonable or that he had good cause for violating the rule. Guthrie v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 738 A.2d 518, 522 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
Whether Claimant's Failure to Maintain Valid License
Constituted Willful Misconduct
It is well-established in this Commonwealth that "where one of the prerequisites for employment is possession of a driver's license and an employee loses his driving privileges through his own fault, he is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits." Williams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 651 A.2d 708, 710 (Pa. Cmwlth 1994) (citation omitted).
Here, Employer produced the Policy which required "an employee who uses an Authority vehicle must have a valid driver's license." Philadelphia Parking Authority Employee Manual, at 48; R.R. at 12a. The Policy also provided that "[e]mployees required to maintain a license for their job classification must notify their department manager immediately if their license is suspended..." Id. The Policy clearly stated that "failure to adhere to these regulations will be subject to disciplinary action up to, and including termination." Id.
The Board specifically determined that having a valid driver's license was a prerequisite of Claimant's employment. Board Decision at 3; R.R. at 48a; see also Board Decision, F.F. No. 5 ("[t]he claimant was required to maintain a valid driver's license in her position"). The Board also found that Claimant's employment was terminated for: (1) failing to maintain a valid driver's license, and (2) failing to notify the employer of the suspension of her driver's license. See Board Decision, F.F. No. 20; Letter from Employer to Employee's Union Representative, April 18, 2011, (Letter) at 3; R.R. at 18a.
On August 26, 2010, Claimant pled guilty to the charges of permitting someone to operate her unregistered vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1371(a), and permitting someone whose operating privileges were suspended to operate her vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1575(a). The mandatory penalty for these violations was a "three-month license suspension." When Claimant pled guilty to the two violations of the Vehicle Code she, without question, admitted she failed , through her own fault, to maintain a valid driver's license . Claimant offered no explanation for her failure to maintain a valid license, nor could she because she voluntarily pled guilty to the charges before the District Magistrate. It is well-settled that a guilty plea is the process by which a defendant admits that he/she committed the actions outlined in the factual basis for the plea. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Under Williams, Claimant's failure to maintain a valid driver's license was through her own fault and, therefore, rose to the level of willful misconduct. Employer was justified in terminating her employment based on this infraction alone.
Claimant's Failure to Notify Employer of Suspension
At the hearing, in opposition to Employer's second and independent reason for her employment termination, (i.e., failure to notify Employer of her suspension), Claimant testified at length that she was unaware that her license was suspended. This evidence was offered to demonstrate her "good cause" for her violation of Employer's prompt notification policy. She testified that she moved from the address on file with Pennsylvania Department of Motor Vehicles (DOT), and that she notified DOT and the U.S. Postal Service of her new address. Again, she explained that she was unaware that her guilty plea resulted in a suspension of her license. The Board concentrated on Claimant's explanation for why she failed to promptly notify Employer that her license was suspended. The Board overemphasized that one issue and concluded that Claimant "was unaware that her driver's license was suspended" and, therefore, it could not determine "that she committed willful misconduct." Board Decision at 3; R.R. at 46a.
Specifically, Claimant testified that neither the Magisterial District Judge, who presided over the August 26, 2010, hearing, nor any other court personnel advised her that her driver's license would be suspended as a result of her pleading guilty. Notes of Testimony, June 13, 2011, (N.T.) at 15; R.R. at 39a. Further, Claimant testified that she never received notice from DOT that her operating privileges were suspended because DOT mailed the notice to her prior address—its address of record for Claimant. Claimant testified that she moved to a new address on March 1, 2010 and was under the impression that DOT was up to date regarding her current address:
I mailed in one of the change of address cards and I honestly did not know that they didn't receive it because I changed it with the Parking Authority, I changed it with the post office and I mailed in the change of address card...I got mail forwarded to me, so I was under the assumption that PennDOT received it and I did not know until after the fact, when I got suspended from work, that PennDOT said that they never received the change of address.
The problem with the Board's rationale is that Employer terminated Claimant's employment for several reasons, including her failure to maintain a valid driver's license. Thus, contrary to the Board's emphasis, Claimant's failure to notify Employer that her license was suspended was inconsequential in light of the fact that her employment was terminated, not only for failing to notify her Employer of the suspension, but also "for fail[ing] to maintain a valid driver's license" and "operating an Authority vehicle without a valid license." Letter at 3; R.R. at 18a. As stated, because maintaining a valid driver's license was a prerequisite to Claimant's continued employment, her loss of driving privileges through her own pleas of guilty established willful misconduct and disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.
On a final note, Claimant continues to assert in this appeal, that she was unaware that her convictions carried with them a mandatory three-month suspension of her driver's license. To the extent that Claimant seeks to challenge or negate the underlying guilty pleas, this is a collateral attack on the guilty pleas, the validity of which is not before this Court. See Commonwealth v. Duffy, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994) (holding that it is not proper for a licensee to collaterally attack the validity of a criminal conviction, upon which a license suspension is based, in a civil proceeding). On this record, Claimant may not dispute that the underlying guilty pleas were entered voluntarily and knowingly. Claimant's guilty pleas and consequent license suspension served as a valid and independent basis for Employer to terminate Claimant's employment based on willful misconduct.
Accordingly, the Order of the Board is hereby reversed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2012, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is reversed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
N.T. at 11-12; R.R. at 35a-36a.