Opinion
05 Civ. 5284 (KNF).
August 15, 2006
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Steve Persaud ("Persaud") commenced this action in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County. Thereafter, the defendant removed the action to this court for adjudication. The plaintiff contends that the defendant union breached the duty of fair representation it owed to him by failing to represent his interests adequately in connection with an arbitration proceeding. The arbitration proceeding was occasioned by a grievance the plaintiff filed with the union alleging that he was being harassed by his former employer.
Before the Court is a motion made by the defendant, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), that the Court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. According to the defendant, a claim, such as the one made by Persaud in the instant action, that a union has breached the duty of fair representation that it owes to its members, must be brought within six months from the date the union member had or should have had knowledge that the duty owed to the union member by the union was breached. In the case at bar, the defendant maintains that the date on which Persaud had or should have had knowledge of the alleged breach is June 20, 2003. Therefore, since Persaud did not commence this action until May 20, 2005, almost two years after June 20, 2003, the defendant contends, the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and, consequently, should be dismissed by the Court.
Persaud opposes the defendant's motion to dismiss his complaint. He contends that, on June 3, 2002, he filed a grievance with the defendant concerning the termination of his employment with his former employer. Thereafter, on October 23, 2002, Persaud filed an administrative charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), through which he alleged that, in the six months immediately preceding the filing of that charge, the defendant had failed to process the grievance he had filed with it. However, by December 2002, an arbitration hearing had been scheduled to resolve the grievance that was the subject of the NLRB charge Persaud had filed. In that same month, the NLRB regional director advised Persaud that she had approved the withdrawal of the administrative charge Persaud had lodged with the NLRB against the defendant in October 2002.
Just prior to the commencement of the arbitration hearing, Persaud, a union attorney and Persaud's former employer reached a settlement agreement. Under its terms, Persaud agreed to resign from his position with his former employer in return for a payment by the former employer to Persaud of $8,500. Approximately one week after the settlement was achieved, Persaud met with the union attorney who had negotiated the settlement's terms on Persaud's behalf. At that time, the attorney presented a General Release to Persaud for his review and signature. Persaud refused to sign the document.
Thereafter, the defendant petitioned for a second arbitration hearing to be held because Persaud determined not to finalize the settlement agreement. An arbitration hearing was scheduled for April 2003. However, before the date on which it was to be held, Persaud's former employer filed a petition in the New York State Supreme Court requesting that the court stay the arbitration proceeding.
Counsel to the union advised Persaud of the petition and, thereafter, met with him to prepare an affidavit for Persaud to submit to the court in opposition to his former employer's petition. However, during the meeting with the union's counsel, Persaud refused to sign the affidavit. Consequently, on June 20, 2003, counsel to the union sent Persaud a letter informing Persaud that, if he elected not to cooperate with the union in responding to his former employer's petition, the union would not oppose that petition.
Persaud did not cooperate with the union after its counsel's letter was dispatched to him. Instead, Persaud filed an affidavit directly with the court. However, because Persaud was not a party to the proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court, the court determined not to consider Persaud's affidavit. On November 30, 2003, the petition filed by Persuad's former employer was granted, and the court issued an order staying the arbitration proceeding permanently.
As noted above, Persaud commenced this action in 2005. Persaud alleges that, by virtue of his having lodged the administrative charge with the NLRB in October 2002, the instant action is timely. Therefore, according to Persaud, the defendant's motion to dismiss his complaint, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, should be denied.
A court may dismiss an action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, only if "it appears beyond doubt, even when the complaint is liberally construed, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Jaghory v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). In considering the motion, the court must take "as true the facts alleged in the complaint and [draw] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. v. Merrill Lynch Co., 32 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1994). The court may consider all papers and exhibits appended to the complaint, as well as any matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1995); Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).
In a case such as this, in which the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court must be mindful that the plaintiff's pleadings "[are to be] held `to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595). "The Court has the duty to `read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Dibbs v. Roldan, 356 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999)[citations omitted]).
A claim that a union has breached the duty of fair representation that it owes to one of its members must be brought within six months from the date on which the union member has or should have had knowledge that a breach has occurred. See Engelhardt v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 756 F.2d 1368, 1369-70 (2d Cir. 1985); Eatz v. The DME Unit of Local Union Number 3 of the Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 794 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1986); Bimler v. The Stop Shop Supermarket Co., 965 F. Supp. 292, 303 (D. Conn. 1997). The record evidence establishes that, in June 2003, counsel to the defendant advised the plaintiff, in writing, that unless he cooperated with the union in its effort to defeat the petition to stay arbitration filed by Persaud's former employer, by executing an affidavit that would be filed in opposition to the petition, the union would not oppose that petition. Persaud elected not to furnish the defendant's counsel with the requested affidavit. As a result, the union did not oppose the petition made by Persaud's former employer to stay arbitration. The Court finds that Persaud knew or should have known that the breach of the duty of fair representation alleged to have occurred in the instant case happened on or about June 20, 2003. Therefore, he had six months from that point to commence this action. Persaud failed to do so. Persaud's suggestion that an administrative charge he filed with the NLRB in October 2002, and which was withdrawn in December 2002, tolled the six-month statute of limitations that began to run in June 2003, is baseless.
Based on the record before it, the Court finds that Persaud failed to commence this action, alleging that the defendant union breached the duty of fair representation it owed to him, within the applicable six-month statute of limitations. Therefore, the motion made by the defendant, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, is granted.
SO ORDERED.