Opinion
CV125034247S.
11-14-2012
Russell PERILLO v. QUIROS et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WILSON, J.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Russell Perillo, a pro se inmate, filed the present civil rights action against the defendants, Angel Quiros, John Brighthaupt, James Watson and Kathryn Dudley, on April 2, 2012. In counts one through seven of his thirteen-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On June 13, 2011, the plaintiff was an inmate at the Cheshire correctional institution and was residing in the north block two housing unit. On that date, the plaintiff wrote to the defendants to inform them of an escalating situation involving three other inmates in his housing block. At that time, the defendants were all employees of the Connecticut Department of Correction in the towns of Cheshire and Wethersfield, Connecticut, acting under the color of state law. In order to avoid any altercations, the plaintiff requested a transfer to another correctional facility with available rehabilitation programs in his letter to the defendants. The defendants, with the exception of Brighthaupt, replied to the plaintiff but expressed no concern and did not inquire further regarding the plaintiff's situation. On July 8, 2011, the plaintiff was stabbed by Mike Mussington, one of the three inmates who was involved in the escalating situation of which the plaintiff complained in his letter to the defendants. As a result of the stabbing, the plaintiff suffered injuries and experienced severe pain. Following an investigation of the stabbing, Mussington was issued a disciplinary report while the plaintiff was not disciplined. On July 12, 2011, the plaintiff filed a grievance, and on July 22, 2011, the plaintiff was transferred to Corrigan correctional institution, a facility that does not have available rehabilitation programs.
In counts eight through eleven, the plaintiff alleges failures on the part of the specific defendants to protect the plaintiff's safety. In counts twelve and thirteen, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' actions deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, specifically his rights to: due process of the law, equal protection of the law, freedom from racial discrimination and freedom of association. The plaintiff further alleges that he was subject to deprivation of liberty and cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff alleges that his rights were deprived in violation of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988, as well as the laws and constitution of Connecticut. The plaintiff requests injunctive relief in the form of his removal from high security status to a facility that offers rehabilitative programs as well as declaratory relief and monetary damages.
Section 1981 provides in relevant part: " (a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to enter and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other ... (c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law."
Section 1983 provides in relevant part: " Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..."
Section 1988(a) provides jurisdictional instruction for United States District Courts in civil rights cases. Section 1988(b) provides in relevant part for an award of attorneys fees in certain actions brought pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983. Subsection (c) provides that the court may award expert fees in actions brought pursuant to § 1981. In the present case, while the plaintiff does not specify in his complaint upon which subsection of § 1988 he relies, it seems probable that he included § 1988 due to its attorneys fees provision given that he makes a claim for attorneys fees in his statement of the amount in demand.
The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages on the grounds of lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction on July 6, 2012. The plaintiff has not filed an objection to the defendants' partial motion to dismiss. The matter was marked take papers on the July 23, 2012 short calendar.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
" A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011). " The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10-31. " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss ... it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" [I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ... Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 497-98, 863 A.2d 680 (2005).
II
The Nature of the Plaintiff's Claims
A
The Defendants' Arguments
The defendants move for partial dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. The defendants contend that the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages should be dismissed as to the defendants in their individual capacities because the plaintiff did not serve the defendants personally or at their usual places of abode as is required pursuant to Connecticut law. The defendants further contend that because the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants solely in their official capacities, the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As stated above, the plaintiff has not filed an objection to the defendants' partial motion to dismiss.
B
State Law Claims: The Spring v. Constantino Test
In order to address the defendants' personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity arguments, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has brought his claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their individual or official capacities. The court will first examine the plaintiff's claims pursuant to state law. " If the plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). The fact that the state is not named as a defendant, however, does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent ... To determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in his individual capacity, we look to the four criteria established by our Supreme Court in Somers [ v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 123 A.2d 468 (1956), ] and as explained further in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state and, therefore, is barred. Id., at 568. The criteria are: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 216, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010).
Regarding the first two criteria, the defendants, as employees of the department of correction, are state officials who have been sued for actions taken as representatives of the state. Thus, the first two criteria are satisfied. When evaluating the third criterion, whether the state is the party against whom the plaintiff is seeking relief, the court may consider a number of factors. " Analysis under [the third criterion] requires scrutiny of the complaint because it has been established that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of [the] complaint ... The court may also look to the summons for the manner in which the plaintiff references the defendants and the addresses provided for the defendants. Miller v. Egan, [ supra, 265 Conn. at 308-09] ." Hanton v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5030962 (June 3, 2011, Wilson, J.). In considering the third criterion, courts may also consider whether " [d]amages are sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant for performing or not performing acts that are part of his official duties." Kenney v. Weaving, supra, at 123 Conn.App. 216-17.
While the plaintiff directs counts eight through eleven toward the actions of each of the defendants, the plaintiff only references actions taken by the defendants in their capacities as employees of the department of correction. In addition, the plaintiff listed the defendants' work addresses on the summons and not their residence addresses. Furthermore, the return of service indicates that the plaintiff served Perry Zinn Rowthorn, an associate attorney general located at 55 Elm Street in Hartford, Connecticut, in accordance with the procedure provided in General Statutes § 52-64 for service in an action against the state. Thus, the plaintiff did not serve the defendants personally or at their usual places of abode as is generally required in actions against individuals pursuant to § 52-57. Because the state is the real party against whom relief is sought, the third criterion is satisfied as to all of the defendants.
On the summons, Dudley's address is listed as 1153 East Street South, Suffield, Connecticut. The court takes judicial notice that this is the address of the MacDougall-Walker correctional institution. The plaintiff listed Quiros's address as 944 Highland Ave., Cheshire, Connecticut, which is the address of the corrections department at the Cheshire correctional institution. The plaintiff provided the Cheshire correctional institution at 900 Highland Ave. in Cheshire, Connecticut, as the address of Brighthaupt and Watson.
Section 52-64 provides in relevant part: " Service of civil process in any civil action or proceeding maintainable against ... the state, or against any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state ... as such, may be made by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process ... with the Attorney General or the Attorney General's office in Hartford ..."
Section 52-57 provides in relevant part: " (a) Except as otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of it ... with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state."
" In analyzing the state's possible liability in the fourth criterion, courts look to General Statutes § 5-141d(a) to determine whether the state would possibly be required to indemnify the state official in the event of a judgment being rendered against the official." Hanton v. Williams, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 09 5030962. Section 5-141d(a) provides in relevant part: " The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee ... from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee ... is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious." Thus, pursuant to § 5-141d(a), the state is not required to indemnify state officers if their alleged conduct was reckless, wanton or malicious. General Statutes § 5-141d(a).
In the present case, the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants' conduct was wanton or malicious. In count six, the plaintiff alleges, however, that the defendants " acted jointly and in concert by recklessly failing to protect the plaintiff from physical assault by other inmates ..." (Emphasis added.) This is the only explicit allegation of recklessness in the complaint. " In order to establish that the defendants' conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts ... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 181, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part, Miller v. Egan, [ supra, 265 Conn. at 325].
In reading the plaintiff's allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's use of the word " recklessly" in one sentence of the complaint does not constitute an allegation of recklessness where the plaintiff has neither alleged that the defendants acted with the requisite state of consciousness nor alleged facts from which reckless conduct can be inferred. Rather, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants had certain duties as employees of the department of correction and that the defendants failed to carry out those duties. See Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 94, 267 A.2d 452 (1971) (" We do not think that such a brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence, is sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply using the word ‘ reckless' or ‘ recklessness' is not enough" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Because the state would likely be required to indemnify the defendants pursuant to § 5-141d(a) in the event of a judgment against them, the fourth criterion, the relief sought by the plaintiff would subject the state to liability, is satisfied. Thus, the facts as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint satisfy all four criteria pursuant to Spring v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. at 563. Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiff's state law claims are brought against the defendants in their official, not individual, capacities.
C
Federal Claims: The " Course of Proceedings" Test
The court must also determine whether the plaintiff's federal claims for monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988 are against the defendants in their official or individual capacities. In Wright v. DeSantis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5032806 (June 15, 2011, Wilson, J.), this court examined the relevant factors for determining whether federal claims are brought against a state official in his individual or official capacity. " [A]lthough the test set forth in Spring [ v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. at 563, ] and Miller [ v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 301, ] is an appropriate mechanism for our state courts to determine the capacity in which the named defendants are sued in actions asserting violations of state law, to employ that test to divest state courts of jurisdiction to hear otherwise cognizable § 1983 claims would be to erect a constitutionally impermissible barrier to the vindication of federal rights ... To determine whether a suit is against a defendant in his or her official or individual capacity federal courts may look to how the complaint is drafted, the defenses raised and other factors." (Citations omitted.) Wright v. DeSantis, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5032806.
The test applied by this court in Wright v. DeSantis, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5032806, is known as the " course of proceedings" test. Moore v. Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir.2001). " [T]he vast majority of [the federal circuit courts] apply the ‘ course of proceedings' test to determine whether suit has been brought against a state official as an official or as an individual." Id., at 773. " The Supreme Court has noted that [t]he ‘ course of proceedings' in such [unspecified capacity] cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Harriman, supra, at 773. In Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84 (2nd Cir.1991), the court explained that the course of proceedings is a somewhat flexible standard: " In place of express pleading, we look to the totality of the complaint as well as the course of proceedings to determine whether the defendants were provided with sufficient notice of potential exposure to personal liability." Id., at 88-89.
In analyzing the course of proceedings, courts examine several factors. One factor is whether the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, which are not available against the states, and thus, are not available in official capacity actions. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 482 (2nd Cir.1995). Courts also consider the arguments advanced by the parties in the relevant motions and pleadings. See Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 700 (2nd Cir.1993) (" [n]otwithstanding the complaint's ambiguous language and the defendants' numerous affirmative defenses, [the plaintiff's] request for punitive and compensatory damages, coupled with the defendants' summary judgment motion on qualified immunity but not Eleventh Amendment grounds, suggests that the parties believed that this action is a personal capacity suit"). Ultimately, " [i]n order to determine whether a state official is sued in his official or personal capacity, reference should be made to the ‘ capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.’ Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991)." Kroll v. Steere, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 99 549783 (August 13, 1999, Mihalakos, J.).
As set forth above, because the allegations are comprised of the defendants' alleged failures in carrying out their duties as employees of the department of correction, the manner in which the complaint is drafted suggests that the plaintiff is bringing the present action against the defendants solely in their official capacities. The plaintiff also has not made a claim for punitive damages in the present case. In addition, as discussed above, the plaintiff served the defendants through the office of the attorney general, not personally or at their usual places of abode. Furthermore, in the present motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has not brought his claims against the defendants in their individual capacities and have raised the defense of sovereign immunity, a defense which is not available to defendants sued in their individual capacities. Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, supra, 948 F.2d at 89. Additionally, the defendants have not filed any motions in their individual capacities. While the court recognizes that " a plaintiff who has not clearly identified in her complaint the capacity in which the defendant is sued should not have the complaint automatically construed as focusing on one capacity to the exclusion of the other; " Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326 (2nd Cir.1993); the relevant factors suggest both that the plaintiff did not intend to assert claims against the defendants in their individual capacities and that the defendants do not believe that such claims have been asserted against them in their individual capacities. Thus, the course of proceedings indicates that the plaintiff's federal claims have also been brought against the defendants in their official capacities.
II
Personal Jurisdiction
Although the Spring v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. at 563, and " course of proceedings" tests indicate that the plaintiff's claims have been asserted against the defendants in their official capacities, the court will nonetheless address the defendant's argument regarding any potential individual capacity claims. The defendants argue that even if the plaintiff has asserted claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacities, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacities because they have been served solely in their official capacities.
" Failure to comply with the statutory requirements of service renders a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction ... Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). " Unlike subject matter jurisdiction ... personal jurisdiction may be created through consent or waiver ... [T]he filing of an appearance on behalf of a party, in and of itself, does not waive that party's personal jurisdiction claims. Nevertheless, [a]ny defendant, wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction, may do so even after having entered a general appearance, but must do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance ... Practice Book § 10-30. The rule specifically and unambiguously provides that any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the person as a result of insufficiency of service of process is waived unless it is raised by a motion to dismiss filed within thirty days [after the filing of an appearance] ..." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Narayan v. Narayan, 305 Conn. 394, 402, 46 A.3d 90 (2012).
In the present case, the defendants filed their appearances on June 28 and 29, 2012. The defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on July 6, 2012. Thus, the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction was filed within thirty days of the filing of their appearances and is therefore procedurally proper.
" [W]hen a particular method of serving process is set forth by statute, that method must be followed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pedro v. Miller, 281 Conn. 112, 117, 914 A.2d 524 (2007). " In order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a state employee in his individual capacity, [the employee] has to be served by leaving a true and attested copy of [process], including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state. General Statutes § 52-57." Hanton v. Williams, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 09 5030962. As set forth above, the plaintiff served the defendants through the office of the attorney general and has therefore served the defendants in their official, not individual, capacities. Accordingly, even if the plaintiff had brought his claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacities, the court would lack personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacities.
III
Sovereign Immunity
Because the plaintiff has sued the defendants in their official capacities, however, the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be addressed. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's action for monetary damages is precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that portion of the plaintiff's complaint. " [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 301 Conn. at 274. Accordingly, " a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity ... bars the action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). In the present case, the plaintiff raises state and federal claims. The court will therefore address the doctrine of sovereign immunity pursuant to both federal and state law. See Hanton v. Williams, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 09 5030962 (" [b]ecause the plaintiff raises both state and federal claims ... federal ... and state sovereign immunity ... will be addressed").
A
The Plaintiff's Federal Claims
As set forth above, the plaintiff has alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988 against the defendants in their official capacities. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages are barred by sovereign immunity. " [W]hen sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). " [T]he [United States] Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress did not intend to defeat traditional notions of sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, [440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) ]. Instead, these principles inform the meaning of the term ‘ person’ as used in § 1983." Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, at 140.
" A state, as an entity having immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution, is not a ‘ person’ within the meaning of § 1983 and thus is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court ... This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 311. " [A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office ... As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." (Citation omitted .) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Accordingly, " [s]uits seeking monetary damages may not be brought against the state or its agencies and departments, pursuant to § 1983; rather, only suits for injunctive [or declaratory] relief may be maintained against the state. Quern v. Jordan, [ supra, at 338]. State officers acting in their official capacity may, typically, only be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)." Richards v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.Supp.2d 278, 288 (D.Conn.2004).
Sovereign immunity also applies to the plaintiff's claims pursuant to § 1981. " Congress did not abrogate states' sovereign immunity when it passed 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Boykin v. Bloomsburg [University of Pennsylvania], 893 F.Supp. 378, 394 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that states' immunity has not been abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986), affd, 91 F .3d 122 (3d Cir.1996)." Watson v. Dept. of Services for Children, Youths and Their Families Delaware, United States District Court, Docket No. 12-019 (D.Del. June 8, 2012).
As discussed above, the plaintiff has sued the defendants in their official, not individual, capacities. In addition, the plaintiff has not argued that any exceptions to sovereign immunity apply, and the state has not waived sovereign immunity in the present case. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages pursuant to federal law are barred by sovereign immunity.
The court notes that the defendants do not seek dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.
B
The Plaintiff's State Claims
The court will now address the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it relates to the plaintiff's state law claims. " We have long recognized the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent ... We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer [or agent] concerning a matter in which the officer [or agent] represents the state is, in effect, against the state ... Therefore, we have dealt with such suits as if they were solely against the state and have referred to the state as the defendant ... Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107, 856 A.2d 335 (2004). The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. DeSantis, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5032806.
" It has long been recognized that [w]hen a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state, he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 752, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). In the present case, the plaintiff has neither alleged, nor does the record reveal, that he sought permission from the office of the claims commissioner to pursue his action for monetary damages. Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity therefore precludes the monetary damages portion of the plaintiff's state law claims.
While the defendants acknowledge that there are certain limited exceptions to sovereign immunity, the defendants argue that none of the exceptions apply in the present case to the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages. " [T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity; ... (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; ... and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted.) Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 720, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).
The plaintiff has neither alleged in his complaint, nor has he argued, that the state has statutorily waived its sovereign immunity in the present case. Thus, the first exception is not applicable in the present case. In addition, the second and third exceptions only apply to claims for declaratory or injunctive relief Therefore, the exceptions do not apply to the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages pursuant to state law.
While the second exception is implicated insofar as the plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, the defendants have not argued that the plaintiff's claims for injunctive or declaratory relief should be dismissed. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief remain.
As set forth above, the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages pursuant to both federal and state law are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages, the defendants' partial motion to dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' partial motion to dismiss is granted.