Opinion
7:02-CV-086-R
April 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on this day to be considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court finds and orders as follows:
Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants motion for summary judgment.
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate who, at the time of the events giving rise to this action, was confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas.
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied proper medical care for the treatment for chronic testicular pain, pain in his waist and back, symptoms of venereal disease, a prostate infection and a gelatinous discharge. Complaint ¶ V and attachment thereto, Perez seeks unspecified medication and treatment by a specialist. Complaint ¶ VI.
In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege acts or omissions "sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct 285, 292 (1976). "Deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disagreement over the appropriate medical treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct. at 293; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
The summary judgment evidence submitted by Defendants reflects that Plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from chronic prostatitis and epididymitis during the relevant time period. Appendix to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 40, 78, 81 85 (hereinafter "App. p.___). It further appears from the physicians' affidavits and from the medical records, that Plaintiff was seen numerous times between May of 1999 and April of 2002 for evaluation and treatment with regard to his complaints. App. pp. 80, 82 85-86. The medical records show that he was repeatedly prescribed pain medication, antibiotics and other medications. App. pp. 25, 27, 33, 42-44, 47-50, 52, 56, 60-66, 77, 79. The summary judgment evidence reflects that, although Plaintiff had a condition that was painful and difficult to treat, he was not denied medical care. App. pp. 78-87; Defendants' Supplement to Appendix 81 and Supplement to Appendix 84 ( signed affidavits). Plaintiff's complaint challenges, at best, the diagnosis and the nature of the medical care provided to him at the Allred Unit rather than any lack of medical care. While he may disagree with Defendants' assessment and treatment of his medical condition, such a disagreement is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. See Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated statutory or constitutional rights, clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, of which a reasonable person would have known). It is clear from the facts of this case, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, that Defendants' actions in treating his chronic illness did not give rise to any issue of constitutional magnitude.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Sell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant is not required to respond to the motion until the movant properly supports his motion with competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). However, once the movant has carried his burden of proof, the nonmovant may not sit idly by and wait for trial. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988).
When a movant carries his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden," Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, as "the adverse parry's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative, however, will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted if he meets his burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992).
The summary judgment evidence presented in this case establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) mandates dismissal of any action filed in forma pauperis if the court determines that the claims raised therein are frivolous. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). In this case, Plaintiff's claims lack an arguable basis in law and are, therefore, frivolous.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.
SO ORDERED.