Summary
overturning conviction for trial court's failure to instruct jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's mild mental retardation on the question of intent to commit homicide
Summary of this case from Singh v. GreeneOpinion
June 3, 1993
Appeal from the County Court of Chenango County (Dowd, J.).
Defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide. After trial, the jury rendered a verdict convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and acquitting him of the other charges. County Court imposed a prison sentence of 8 1/3 to 25 years. This appeal by defendant ensued.
Defendant's first argument for reversal is that County Court erroneously admitted evidence of his uncharged prior bad acts, consisting of injuries allegedly inflicted upon the 12-week-old infant victim by defendant approximately 10 days to three weeks prior to the occurrence of the incident alleged in the indictment. We find this contention to be without merit. The People properly contend that such evidence was admissible to rebut the defense of mistake or accident (see, People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 55; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241; People v Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264). Defendant had initially claimed that he was bathing his 12-week-old son in the kitchen sink of his mobile home when the baby fell and hit his head on the sink while momentarily unattended. In response to police questions, however, defendant indicated that he struck the baby on the head and threw him into a chair because the baby would not stop crying.
Evidence of defendant's prior uncharged act or acts causing injury to the victim was admissible to demonstrate that the injuries resulting from the charged incident were not accidentally sustained (see, People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 71-73; People v. Kloster, 167 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 908). The evidence of the prior injuries was relevant to the issues and its probative value outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice (see, People v. Hudy, supra; People v. Engler, 150 A.D.2d 827, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 770). The lack of a clear link between the injuries to the child abuse victim here and defendant did not render such evidence inadmissible (see, People v. Henson, supra, at 72-73; People v. Sims, 110 A.D.2d 214, 221, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 657).
Although the People did not seek a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the prior injury evidence (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 361-363), the failure to do so was not fatal. The record indicates that defendant was aware prior to trial of the People's intention to use the evidence and was not improperly surprised at trial (see, People v. Battes, 190 A.D.2d 625). It is significant that here the prior injury evidence was admissible and the arguments of unfair prejudice are greatly diminished.
Defendant's other argument for reversal is meritorious. Defendant contends that County Court improperly denied his request to charge the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's diminished mental capacity in determining whether defendant had the ability to form the requisite mens rea. Defendant's expert psychiatrist testified that defendant was mildly mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 69 and an intellectual age of approximately 10 years. The psychiatrist also opined that defendant could not perceive any danger to the baby if he threw the child on a chair. The People elicited from the expert on cross-examination that defendant had the ability to make moral judgments and to know "what was wrong and what was not wrong". We are compelled to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to require the instruction requested (see, Penal Law § 125.20; see also, People v. Ferguson, 191 A.D.2d 809, 811; cf., People v Westergard, 69 N.Y.2d 642, 644-645). The People here were required to establish defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state (see, People v. Segal, 54 N.Y.2d 58, 66; People v Matthews, 148 A.D.2d 272, 278, lv dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 950; People v. Morales, 125 A.D.2d 605, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 651); consequently, County Court should have charged the jury with the legal principles pertinent to that issue (see, CPL 300.10; People v. Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1031). Contrary to the People's position, County Court did not adequately address this issue elsewhere in its charge and a new trial is therefore required (see, People v. Ferguson, supra, at 811).
Yesawich Jr., Crew III, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Chenango County for a new trial.