Opinion
2015-04-08
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Christopher WALTERS, appellant.
Judith E. Permutt, Eastchester, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Hae Jin Liu, Richard Longworth Hecht, Jennifer L. Spencer, and Laurie G. Sapakoff of counsel), for respondent.
Judith E. Permutt, Eastchester, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Hae Jin Liu, Richard Longworth Hecht, Jennifer L. Spencer, and Laurie G. Sapakoff of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P. THOMAS A. DICKERSON JEFFREY A. COHEN COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cacace, J.), rendered April 5, 2012, convicting him of criminal contempt in the first degree (three counts), assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, aggravated criminal contempt, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the People to elicit evidence of the defendant's prior bad act involving the complainant ( see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286). The evidence was properly admitted as relevant background material to enable the jury to understand the defendant's relationship with the complainant and to explain the issuance of an order of protection ( see People v. Marji, 43 A.D.3d 961, 841 N.Y.S.2d 361).
In addition, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting expert testimony regarding battered women's syndrome ( see People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084; People v. Thompson, 119 A.D.3d 966, 989 N.Y.S.2d 881; People v. Roblee, 83 A.D.3d 1126, 1128, 920 N.Y.S.2d 467; People v. Smith, 9 A.D.3d 745, 747, 779 N.Y.S.2d 853; People v. Gillard, 7 A.D.3d 540, 776 N.Y.S.2d 95). The court did not allow the expert to offer an opinion as to whether the conduct at issue constituted domestic violence or whether the complainant exhibited symptoms of battered women's syndrome. Instead, the expert described the general behavior patterns of domestic violence perpetrators and victims in order to explain behaviors of a battered woman that might be beyond the ken of the average juror ( see People v. Thompson, 119 A.D.3d at 966–967, 989 N.Y.S.2d 881; People v. Johnson, 22 A.D.3d 600, 801 N.Y.S.2d 755).
The defendant's contentions regarding improper comments by the prosecutor on summation and the People's failure to test certain physical evidence for DNA or fingerprints, are unpreserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2] ), and we decline to reach them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
The defendant's remaining contentions, including the contention raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit.