Opinion
2014–05280 Ind. No. 2928/12
12-05-2018
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ramon R. VILLALTA, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Yvonne Shivers, New York, of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Kew Gardens, and Jonathan K. Yi of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Yvonne Shivers, New York, of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Kew Gardens, and Jonathan K. Yi of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Charles S. Lopresto, J.), rendered April 24, 2014, convicting him of unlawful surveillance in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
Moreover, upon its consideration of the competing expert testimony presented by the parties, and its application of the relevant factors for determining the authentication of videographic evidence (see generally People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 472, 476, 58 N.Y.S.3d 259, 80 N.E.3d 1005 ; People v. Patterson, 93 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 688 N.Y.S.2d 101, 710 N.E.2d 665 ), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding that the video proffered by the prosecution was properly authenticated and, therefore, admissible (see e.g. People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 59, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 1177 ; People v. Hill, 110 A.D.3d 410, 411, 971 N.Y.S.2d 532 ; People v. Bonhomme, 85 A.D.3d 939, 940, 925 N.Y.S.2d 157 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining, after consideration of the nature and circumstances of the crime of unlawful surveillance in the second degree, and the history and character of the defendant, that his registration as a sex offender would not be "unduly harsh and inappropriate" ( Correction Law § 168–a[2][e] ; see People v. Lema, 157 A.D.3d 406, 68 N.Y.S.3d 436 ; People v. Marke, 144 A.D.3d 651, 652, 39 N.Y.S.3d 834 ; People v. Simmons, 129 A.D.3d 520, 10 N.Y.S.3d 426 ), and in denying the defendant's motion for an exemption from sex offender registration.
MASTRO, J.P., COHEN, MALTESE and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.