Opinion
Argued September 17, 1997
Decided October 21, 1997
APPEAL, by permission of an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered January 23, 1997, which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court (Harold J. Rothwax, J.), rendered in New York County upon a verdict convicting defendant of robbery in the first degree (12 counts), rape in the first degree (six counts), burglary in the first degree (four counts), sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), sodomy in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
While investigating a series of crimes involving gunpoint break-ins, robberies and rapes, the police, who had found one of defendant's fingerprints at one of the crime scenes, went to defendant's home and asked him to accompany them to the station house. Defendant did so; he was not handcuffed. At the precinct, a detective told defendant, in effect, that they knew he was involved in the crimes and that he should implicate the other perpetrators or else he alone would be blamed for all of the crimes. Admittedly, the officers were trying to "scare" defendant. They left him alone in the interrogation room for several minutes. When they returned, they administered the Miranda warnings, whereupon defendant began making incriminating statements.
In ruling on defendant's suppression motion, Supreme Court stated that the Miranda warnings were properly administered in advance of any questions; that the purpose of the "scare" tactic was not to obtain inculpatory statements but to obtain evidence regarding the accomplices; that the police did not use any ruses, did not employ deception, and did not mislead or lie to defendant; that they indicated to him the depth of his situation; and that it was not until after defendant had had a time to reflect upon the officers' statements and after he had been advised of his Miranda warnings that he then made the incriminating statements.
The Appellate Division concluded, inter alia, that Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements since the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the People met their burden of establishing the voluntariness of the statements; that the record establishes that the remarks made by the police to defendant prior to the administration of the Miranda warnings did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent and had no coercive effect; and that defendant's subsequent statements to the police were spontaneous and his videotaped statement was preceded by the readministration of Miranda warnings and was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.
People v Vasquez, 235 A.D.2d 322, affirmed.
Andrew C. Fine, New York City, and Daniel L. Greenberg for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County, New York City ( Susan Gliner and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent.
Order affirmed for the reasons stated in the memorandum at the Appellate Division ( 235 A.D.2d 322).
Concur: Chief Judge KAYE and Judges TITONE, BELLACOSA, SMITH, LEVINE, CIPARICK and WESLEY.