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finding that while prompt-outcry exception ideally might have omitted the complainant's report that she had been beaten and verbally abused in addition to having been sodomized and raped, such limited detail did not unduly prejudice defendant, as witness had previously described his observation of the complainant's physical condition, and photographs of her bruises had previously been entered into evidence
Summary of this case from Jamison v. SuperintendentOpinion
June 2, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.).
Defendant had pretrial knowledge of the complainant's drug use, about which the complainant freely testified on direct examination. Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial court did not improperly curtail his cross-examination of the complainant on the issue, but rather, after allowing exhaustive cross-examination thereon, the court appropriately directed counsel to thereafter limit his questioning in the area to issues relevant to the case. Thus, defendant received a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material at trial (People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868, 870).
While the prompt outcry testimony herein ideally might have omitted the complainant's report that she had been beaten and verbally abused in addition to having been sodomized and raped, such limited detail did not unduly prejudice defendant, as the witness in question had previously described his observation of the complainant's physical condition at the relevant time, and photographs of her bruises had previously been entered into evidence. Thus, the details elicited cannot reasonably be viewed as exceeding an allowable level (see, People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 18). In this connection, the witness' observations do not fall within the category of prompt outcry by the complainant and therefore are not subject to the attendant limitations. Similarly, the trial court properly admitted lay testimony describing the physical and emotional demeanor of the complainant following the crime, as relevant to the issues before the jury (People v. Jones, 188 A.D.2d 364, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 972).
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in admitting testimony that defendant failed to appear at a scheduled court appearance in this case and eventually was returned involuntarily after four additional arrests in connection with which he gave names other than Gil Terrence. This testimony constituted evidence of consciousness of guilt (see, People v. Reyes, 162 A.D.2d 357, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 896), and the court gave specific limiting instructions, both when the testimony was admitted and in its general charge, that the testimony was admitted for a limited purpose and was not to be considered by the jurors as proof of guilt of any crime, nor of a propensity to commit the crimes charged herein. It is presumed that the jurors understood and followed these instructions (People v. Davis, 58 N.Y.2d 1102, 1104).
We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing, nor any ground for reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., ROSS, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.