Opinion
December 7, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldstein, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We disagree with the defendant's contention that the court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict based on alleged jury misconduct. It is well settled that a jury verdict may not be impeached by a juror's post-verdict affidavit (see, People v Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394; People v Lehrman, 155 A.D.2d 693, 694), absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances (People v Testa, 61 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009). No such showing was made in this case.
We also disagree with the defendant's contention that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress identification testimony. While showup identification procedures are inherently suggestive (see, People v Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529), the showup conducted in this instance was confirmatory because the identifying witness knew the defendant as a participant in the crack-cocaine operation which precipitated the instant offense (see, People v Brown, 161 A.D.2d 721; People v Jackson, 159 A.D.2d 640, 641; People v Knight, 156 A.D.2d 588, 589). Moreover, and contrary to the defendant's contention, the court's charge on identification was entirely proper.
While the court erred in declining the defendant's request to elaborate in its charge on the "forcible stealing" element of robbery as requiring the intention to permanently deprive another of property (see, Penal Law § 160.00, 155.05 Penal, 155.00 Penal [3], [4]; People v Blacknall, 63 N.Y.2d 912; People v Zambuto, 93 A.D.2d 873), the error was harmless (People v Nowak, 105 A.D.2d 1130).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see also, People v Burch, 188 A.D.2d 479; People v Andre, 188 A.D.2d 476 [both decided herewith]). Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Miller, JJ., concur.