Opinion
A154574
05-21-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SOMALY SIV, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 51802867)
Defendant Somaly Siv appeals from a judgment of conviction on two counts of identity theft, to which she received one year of probation. She argues the lower court erred in denying her motion under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress evidence because a deputy sheriff's warrantless search of her person violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, and all of the evidence that was subsequently discovered was the proverbial fruit of this poisonous tree. We conclude that, assuming for the sake of argument that the deputy's search of Siv's person was unlawful, all of the evidence inevitably would have been discovered as the lower court concluded and the People argue on appeal. Therefore, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2018, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint against Siv, and against Rebecca Bocage, who is not a party to this appeal. Siv was charged with theft of personal identifying information of 10 or more persons, a felony (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(3) ; count 1) and theft with a prior conviction of the personal identifying information of numerous persons, also a felony (§ 530.5, subdivision (c)(2); count 2), and sentence enhancements were alleged. The charges stemmed from the warrantless detention, search and arrest of Siv and Bocage, and a warrantless search of Bocage's vehicle, on January 22, 2018.
We only discuss the case against Bocage as it relates to Siv's appeal.
All references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I.
The Motion to Suppress Hearing
Siv (and Bocage) filed a motion under section 1538.5 to suppress all evidence seized during the incident, arguing it was obtained as a result of a deputy sheriff's unconstitutional, warrantless search of her person, and that her detention was unjustifiably prolonged. The People opposed the motion. The court considered Siv's motion and whether to hold her over at the same preliminary hearing.
A. The Incident
The court heard testimony from two deputy sheriffs involved in Siv's arrest and admitted into evidence a video recording (video) from the body camera of one of them, Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriff Valerie Murillo. The parties discuss events based on Murillo's testimony and, to a lesser extent, the video. We rely more significantly on the video because it often provides the clearest evidence of what occurred.
The lower court admitted the entire video into evidence but only reviewed portions of it at the hearing. The parties agree that we may consider the entire video.
Murillo testified that she was on patrol in Danville, California on January 22, 2018, at 11:40 p.m. when she saw a vehicle at a gas station that was parked partially in a handicapped space and partially in a "no parking" zone and that displayed only a paper plate in the rear, all in violation of Vehicle Code. All of this can be seen in the video. Murillo testified that she parked her patrol car and walked up to a woman standing outside the vehicle's driver's door, and that a passenger was in the vehicle.
In the video, Murillo questions the woman standing outside the vehicle, later determined to be Bocage, who says the two had stopped to throw out some trash and for her to use the bathroom; that the vehicle's rear license plate had fallen off because the plate holder holes were too big; that she had received a "fix-it" ticket for the rear license plate problem; and that she has identification with her. Bocage then opens the driver's door and begins searching.
Murillo asks for the passenger's identification also and walks to the front of the vehicle. She comments that the front also lacks a license plate. Bocage, looking through a black purse, says she has that plate and sits down in the driver's seat. The passenger, later determined to be Siv, says she does not have identification. Bocage reaches to her right, grabs a license plate and gives it to Murillo.
Murillo testified that Siv indicated she did not have her own identification and then looked through a little "beige-type zip-up bag" while Bocage looked in her black purse and reached down to the front passenger floorboard area of the vehicle. Murillo became suspicious about Bocage's "erratic movements," particularly regarding whether there were weapons in the vehicle.
In the video, Murillo asks the two for identifying information. Siv states her name, birthdate and that she is from Stockton. Bocage tells Murillo she cannot find her identification and states her name and her birthdate. Murillo asks if either of them is on probation or has ever been arrested; she testified that each replied in the negative. In the video, Bocage, after saying no, says she was arrested four to five years ago in Stockton on drug-related charges but is not on probation. Murillo radios the names given to her and asks whether Bocage is on probation in San Joaquin County. Earlier, she had radioed for a check of the car's vehicle identification number; she testified that she received a response at some point that the vehicle was current, registered to "Rebecca Bocage" and not reported as stolen. Also, she was told at some point that "Rebecca Bocage" had a valid driver's license.
In the video, Murillo asks Bocage about her identification and Bocage says she has it but cannot find it. A little later, as Bocage continues her search, Murillo radios that she is waiting for another deputy to conduct a vehicle search. She shines her flashlight on the rear window and asks if there is anything illegal in the car. Bocage says "no" quietly. In response to Bocage's plea that Murillo not ticket her, Murillo says, "I haven't decided what I am going to do yet, alright? I'm going to wait until my partner gets here. Since you don't have your ID on you, I'm going to search the car for it, okay?"
Bocage says she has a picture of her identification and searches a phone. Murillo asks if she is going to find anything that "is not supposed to be in the vehicle," like "drugs." Bocage says there is not. She shows Murillo a photograph on the phone of what appears to be a driver's license. Murillo testified that she did not look at it; in the video she shines her flashlight on it briefly and says, "Okay, but now why don't you have it on you?," to which Bocage says, "I misplace everything." Murillo testified that Bocage also showed her a college identification card with Bocage's name on it. Although Murillo could not recall if the card displayed a photograph, the video indicates it did (though one cannot tell from the video who it depicts).
Murillo tells Bocage to exit the car and asks if she has anything on her that is going to harm Murillo. As another deputy sheriff walks up, Murillo searches Bocage's pockets, then instructs her to sit down on the curb next to the other deputy; Murillo testified that she asked Bocage to step out of the vehicle to search her for identification. Murillo next goes over and opens the vehicle's passenger side door and tells Siv to step out. Siv does so and Murillo tells her to put her hands behind her head, that she is not under arrest and that Murillo is going to search her "to see if there is anything on you that might hurt me," and asks if she minds. Siv says she does not. Murillo testified that she searched Siv because she was "not going to try and locate something with another person in the car" and that Siv was not free to leave at the time.
Murillo testified that she began a pat search of Siv but found it difficult to feel for any weapons because Siv was wearing two pairs of pants. In the video, Murillo searches around Siv's right pocket and beltline and comments on the two pairs of pants. She asks Siv, "Honestly, is there anything in the car that I need to worry about? Because I'm gonna find it. I'd rather not waste your guys's time and my time." It is unclear if Siv responds. Murillo searches some of Siv's pockets and finds some folded-up bills, a card and other items. She questions Siv, who says she works as a motel housekeeper and is not paid in cash. Murillo finds Siv's identification card in a back pocket, checks other pockets, finds a wad of bills and comments that Siv has a lot of money on her. Murillo then reaches into a left front pocket of Siv's jeans, which are under the other pants, and pulls out a folded-up piece of white paper. She asks Siv about it and Siv says she found it on the ground and thought she could use it. Murillo unfolds and examines the paper; she testified that handwritten on it were the account number, expiration date and security code for a credit card, a dollar amount and a third party's signed name. She tells Siv she is detained until Murillo can "figure out what's going on," handcuffs her, finds more cash on her person, and puts her in the deputy's car.
At Murillo's request, the other deputy goes off to try to contact the person whose name is on the piece of paper. (He later reports that the person said she did not know anyone named Bocage or Siv and did not write the piece of paper.) Murillo walks over to the open driver's door of the vehicle and says to Bocage, who is sitting on a curb, "This is the last chance. Is there anything in this car that should not be in this car?" Bocage says there is a pipe in the center console.
Murillo returns to the open driver's door, leans down and searches through the door's inside storage pocket. Almost immediately, she holds up an identification card for a third party and steps away from the door to ask Bocage about it. Bocage says the person identified on the card is a "friend of a friend," that she went out drinking with the two several nights before and that she became "wasted," so "they drove." Murillo, as she returns to the driver's door, asks why the license plate is not on the vehicle and Bocage responds, "Because it fell off." Murillo then picks up a batch of cards that are perched on the inside of the driver's door and asks Bocage about "all of these Apple cards"; Bocage says they are gift cards and denies that they are stolen. Murillo asks why she has "so many 50 dollar ones." Bocage again denies stealing them and says they are for trading. Murillo says she is detaining Bocage and handcuffs her, and the other deputy takes her away.
Murillo then enters the vehicle through the driver's door and focuses her flashlight on the center console between the driver's and front passenger's seats. A small beige bag with a zippered top and an eyeglass case are on top of the front of the console. Murillo opens the top of the storage box in the console's rear and finds a pipe in an open tube; she testified that the pipe appeared to be for smoking methamphetamine. A few moments later, she picks up the small beige bag, unzips it, pulls out a bunch of plastic cards and examines the first nine cards individually. She testified that she saw Siv looking through the bag, and that it contained multiple credit cards belonging to people other than Siv.
Murillo testified that she searched the rest of the vehicle and found more personal identifying information for people other than Bocage and Siv and related items. A credit card scanner was inside the eyeglasses case and she found "lots of mail and checks" for numerous people, much of which was on the floor below the front passenger seat; Bocage's purse contained a small black notebook with "lots of different account numbers and different names and some Social Security numbers"; a bag in the backseat contained multiple receipts from various department stores, mail and W-2 tax returns; and Murillo found sand paper that she understood could be used to remove information on credit cards or checks, as well as some checks with information removed.
In the video, Murillo, after searching the vehicle, taking photographs and conferring with other deputies, informs Siv of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, questions her briefly and does the same with Bocage. About 15 minutes later, Murillo pauses her work on arrest paperwork, retrieves Siv's identification card and radios a request for a probation check of Siv, indicating she does not recall if she had done so before. A few minutes later, she searches Siv's person again in preparation for Siv's transport to jail. Some minutes later, she learns Siv is in violation of a felony probation that includes search terms.
Murillo testified that she later contacted at least eleven of the people whose mail, checks or other documents were found in the vehicle. All said they did not know Bocage or Siv. Another deputy sheriff testified that he contacted two other people, who also said they did not know Bocage or Siv. Murillo did not issue any traffic citations.
B. The Court's Denial of Siv's Motion
Siv's counsel argued that Siv, rather than consent to Murillo's search of her person, involuntarily submitted to Murillo's authority and that, even if she validly consented, Murillo exceeded the scope of the consent when she searched Siv's pockets. Therefore, Murillo's search of Siv's person was unlawful and all the evidence seized, including in the vehicle, was fruit of this poisonous tree. The People argued the motion should be denied because Siv consented to Murillo's search.
The court denied the motion and ordered Siv held over for trial. Noting the vehicle was illegally parked in two different ways and had no license plates, it ruled there was probable cause to detain the vehicle's occupants, including in order to enter the vehicle to search for Bocage's license and vehicle registration. When Siv's counsel noted that Siv was a passenger only, the court responded, "Doesn't matter. Additionally, [Siv] is subject to a parole [sic] search. Once ID'd, the officer is advised that [Siv] has search terms pursuant to a parole [sic] search. The officer can search Ms. Siv and the vehicle. [¶] Additionally, the vehicle's an instrumentality of a crime. On Ms. Siv is found identifying information and access card information, which is verified to belong to somebody that has not authorized this possession. And the vehicle's being used to transport stolen access card information . . . which would justify a search of the vehicle."
Siv was on probation, not parole.
The court further ruled that, even though Murillo obtained Siv's consent to a search of her person, Siv's consent was not required for a pat down search. The court concluded, "I mean, how many different ways do they need to have authority to search the car? There is no search and seizure valid objection, given the circumstances of this case, so the [section] 1538.5 motion is denied." Then, in response to Siv's counsel questioning the propriety of Murillo's search of Siv's person before Murillo knew of Siv's probation status, the court said it "doesn't negate the inevitable discovery doctrine. Ultimately the officer would have discovered that your client was on probation with a search clause and then she would have been searched. So it would have been inevitably discovered in any case."
C. Subsequent Events
The district attorney subsequently filed an information charging Siv with the same offenses alleged in the felony complaint. Siv moved under section 995 to set aside count one of the information on the ground that her motion to suppress was wrongly denied, relying on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The superior court denied this motion, including because once Murillo properly identified Siv, she inevitably would have discovered Siv's probation status and searched her person.
The parties subsequently agreed to a negotiated disposition in which Siv pleaded no contest to both charges against her. The court accepted her plea, found her guilty, suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on probation for one year, subject to her serving 364 days in county jail. This timely appeal followed. The parties also filed supplemental briefing addressing questions posed by this court.
DISCUSSION
Siv's arguments include that the lower court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Murillo, unaware of Siv's probation status when she searched Siv's person, lacked reasonable suspicion to pat search her for weapons and probable cause to reach into her pockets. We need not address these arguments because, assuming for the sake of argument that Murillo's search of Siv's person was unlawful, the challenged evidence inevitably would have been discovered, as the lower court concluded and the People contend.
I.
Standard of Review
Siv appealed after the superior court denied her motion under section 995 to set aside the information. In such a circumstance, the preliminary hearing magistrate " 'is the finder of fact; the superior court has none of the foregoing powers, and sits merely as a reviewing court . . . . On review by appeal . . . the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate . . . .' " (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141; Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1071-1072.) We defer to the magistrate's "factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine the constitutionality of the challenged search or seizure. (People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205.) We may affirm the lower court's ruling if it was correct on any theory, even if the court's reasoning was incorrect. (People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.)
II.
We May Consider the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine on Appeal.
Siv argues we should not consider the inevitable discovery doctrine at all because the People did not rely on it below and, since she had no reason to present all the relevant evidence possible, the trial court erroneously relied on it to deny her motion. The People concede they did not rely on the doctrine below, but contend we may consider it because Siv was not prejudiced by the lower court's reliance on it, since "it does not appear that [Siv] could have introduced any evidence at the . . . hearing to defeat the inevitable discovery doctrine." We agree with the People.
We asked the parties to address in supplemental briefing whether Siv has preserved her argument that the lower court improperly relied on the inevitable discovery doctrine, even though she did not object to the court's reliance on it at the preliminary hearing. Siv and the People agree that we should address its merits. Therefore, we assume for argument's sake that Siv has preserved her argument and address its merits.
"Although it is a settled principle of appellate review that a correct decision of the trial court will be affirmed even if based on erroneous reasons, [our] Supreme Court has cautioned that 'appellate courts should not consider a Fourth Amendment theory for the first time on appeal when "the People's new theory was not supported by the record made at the first hearing and would have necessitated the taking of considerably more evidence . . ." or when "the defendant had no notice of the new theory and thus no opportunity to present evidence in opposition." ' (Robey v. Superior Court [(2013)] 56 Cal.4th [1218,] 1242.) However, when 'the record fully establishes another basis for affirming the trial court's ruling and there does not appear to be any further evidence that could have been introduced to defeat the theory,' a ruling denying a motion to suppress will be upheld on appeal. (Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138-139; see People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1383; People v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004-1005.)" (People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1032.)
In one of the leading cases, Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126 (Green), the defendant claimed that his consent to a search was the product of illegal custodial interrogation. Although the inevitable discovery doctrine was not raised below, our high court addressed it because the parties had fully developed the relevant evidence. (Id. at pp. 136-137.) The court explained, "To close our eyes to the clear applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine would run contrary to the settled principle of appellate review that a correct decision of the trial court must be affirmed on appeal even if it is based on erroneous reasoning." (Id. at p. 138; see also People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 267, fn. 1 [considering the People's shift in legal theory to present an argument for the first time on appeal under Green in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress].)
Siv argues we should not consider the inevitable discovery doctrine because, if she had had timely notice that the court might rely on it, her counsel could have elicited other information during Murillo's examination, such as "whether [the Danville] police department had any policies or protocols on detaining passengers until probation status could be checked" and whether it was "Murillo's practice . . . to choose to conduct a probation search anytime she encountered someone who was on probation." Siv also argues her counsel had no occasion to cross-examine Murillo regarding why the photograph of a license that Bocage attempted to show Murillo, combined with Murillo's knowledge of the vehicle's registration to Bocage, was insufficient for Murillo to issue traffic citations for the Vehicle Code violations she had observed and forgo any further investigation. Therefore, Siv contends, she might have elicited evidence that Murillo would not necessarily have searched her person or the vehicle.
In light of the evidence that we discuss in the next section, none of these contentions are persuasive. The relevant evidence was fully developed at the suppression hearing just as it was in Green, and it makes clear that Murillo inevitably would have discovered all of the challenged evidence even if she had not searched Siv's person. The circumstances that existed just prior to Murillo's search of Siv show she intended then to conduct a lawful, limited search of the vehicle for Bocage's identification under In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 (Arturo D.), that in fact her initial search of the vehicle was in strict compliance with Arturo D., that although Arturo D. was later overruled, her search was lawful under the good faith exception established in Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 232 (Davis), and that she undoubtedly inevitably would have discovered all of the challenged evidence upon her search of the vehicle and lawful arrest of Siv. Siv fails to establish that there was anything more her defense could have developed or established that would have undermined this conclusion. Therefore, we will consider the inevitable discovery doctrine in this appeal.
III.
The Challenged Evidence Inevitably Would Have Been Discovered.
As for the merits, Siv argues that we should reverse the court's denial of her motion for multiple reasons. We disagree.
A. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
"[E]vidence that has been illegally obtained need not always be suppressed . . . ." (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441 (Nix).) "[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred." (Id. at p. 443.) Thus, such evidence may be admitted "[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." (Id. at p. 444.)
"The inevitable discovery exception requires the court ' "to determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred." ' " (People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.) The doctrine "applies to evidence which otherwise would be inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree; it was developed to avoid unjustly conferring immunity from prosecution and conviction on criminals. [Citation.] Thus, where there is a reasonably strong probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means independent of the illegality, such evidence will not be excluded." (Hernandez v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 355, 364; accord, In re Javier A. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 913, 928.)
B. The Contested Evidence Inevitably Would Have Been Discovered.
Siv first argues that the scope of Murillo's vehicle search exceeded the scope of the authority she had at the time under Arturo D. We disagree.
In Arturo D., the defendant driver, stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation, said he was underage and did not have a license. (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 78.) The California Supreme Court held that the officer "was not obligated to take the driver's word on these matters at face value, however. When the officer prepared to cite [the defendant] for a Vehicle Code violation, he had both a right and an obligation to ascertain the driver's true identity, to ensure that the driver's true name appeared on the citation and on the written promise to appear." (Ibid.) Accordingly, the officer "was entitled to enter the vehicle to conduct a limited search for both registration and identification documents." (Ibid.) The court also rejected the defendant's argument that such a search be confined to " 'traditional repositories' such as a glove compartment or a sun visor," holding instead that an officer "is entitled to conduct a nonpretextual warrantless search for such documents in those locations where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found." (Ibid.) The court cited a long list of cases in California and other jurisdictions where courts upheld the discovery and seizure of wallets from beneath the front seats of vehicles by police. (Id. at pp. 80-81.) Although this holding of Arturo D. was later overruled in People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 381, it was still good law at the time of the incident in the present case and entitled Murillo to conduct her search. When such precedent is later overruled, "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 232.)
The evidence shows that Murillo, well before she searched Siv's person, intended to search the vehicle for Bocage's identification. It also shows that she initially engaged in a limited search of the vehicle for Bocage's identification and discovered incriminating evidence, which entitled her to search the remainder of the vehicle.
Immediately upon encountering Bocage, Murillo asked her for identification. Bocage indicated she had it somewhere, and she and Siv (after Siv denied having her own identification) searched for some time, including in a black purse, a small beige bag and on the floorboard of Siv's front passenger seat. Murillo repeatedly asked Bocage if she had found her identification and Bocage repeatedly said she could not find it. Murillo radioed that she was waiting for another deputy sheriff to conduct a vehicle search and moments later she made her intent clear when she said to Bocage, "Since you don't have your ID on you, I'm going to search the car for it, okay?" All of this occurred before Murillo searched Siv's person, which Murillo testified she did in preparation for her search of the vehicle.
Further, whatever Murillo may have suspected as a result of finding the folded-up paper in Siv's pocket and learning from Bocage that a pipe was in the vehicle's center console, she began the vehicle search as a limited search for Bocage's identification, beginning with the storage pocket of the driver's door and the center console, where she very quickly found highly suspicious items. The storage pocket on the vehicle's driver's door was unquestionably a place where Bocage's identification "reasonably could be expected to be found" (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 78), and in that location Murillo almost immediately found an identification card for a third party. She then interrupted her search to ask Bocage about it. After receiving a questionable response, Murillo returned to her search and quickly found, also on the inside of the driver's door, a batch of 50-dollar Apple gift cards. She again interrupted her search to question Bocage. Even after Bocage gave another questionable answer, Murillo continued a search limited to where Bocage's identification "reasonably could be expected to be found," on and inside the center console. There, she found, inside a zippered beige bag she had seen Siv search for identification, a raft of credit cards in other people's names. This evidence, especially combined with the other suspicious circumstances known to Murillo before she searched Siv's person—that the vehicle lacked license plates, was parked illegally late at night and was occupied by two people who did not produce identification, one of whom engaged in suspicious movements in the vehicle as she purportedly searched for her identification—provided ample justification for Murillo's search of the entire vehicle. Given what Murillo inevitably would have discovered in the vehicle, she would have had cause to arrest, and would have arrested, both Bocage and Siv. This inevitably would have led to both Murillo's discovery of Siv's probation status and Murillo's search of Siv incident to her arrest. Therefore, we conclude that Murillo inevitably would have discovered all of the challenged evidence.
To the extent our conclusion that Murillo inevitably would have discovered all of the challenged evidence is based on a more fully developed factual analysis than the trial court's, again, we may affirm the trial court's application of the doctrine even if the court employed a different reasoning in doing so. (Green, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 138.)
C. Siv's Other Arguments Lack Merit.
Siv also argues we should reverse because discovery of the challenged evidence was not inevitable, since (1) Murillo had all the information required to issue a parking citation without searching the vehicle, and (2) there is no evidence that Murillo would have detained Siv long enough to discover her probation status and search her person. We disagree with both arguments.
First, Siv argues that "Murillo had everything she needed to issue the citation or warning" to Bocage based on the information she received from Bocage and over her radio and, therefore, the encounter would have ended before she learned of Siv's probation status. This argument ignores Murillo's evident and justified intent from early in the encounter to search the vehicle for Bocage's identification in the face of Bocage's insistence that she had it but could not find it, as well as the other suspicious circumstances that Murillo quickly discovered, all of which we have already discussed. Furthermore, Arturo D. specifically held that an officer is "not obligated to take the driver's word" regarding questions of identification at face value. (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 78.) Although Murillo learned the vehicle was registered to a person named Bocage who had a valid driver's license, and although Bocage identified herself by that name and showed Murillo a purported photograph of her driver's license and college identification card, Murillo had good reason to suspect that something was amiss about the identification of Bocage, Siv and the vehicle because neither Bocage nor Siv produced identification and the vehicle did not display any plates, even though Bocage had a plate readily available inside the vehicle.
Murillo had good reason to disregard the photograph of a driver's license, as "with the advent of computer software programs such as Adobe Photoshop 'it does not always take skill, experience, or even cognizance to alter a digital photo.' " (People v. Beckley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509, 515.)
That the college identification card displayed a photo of some kind did not prove Bocage's identity because, even assuming it looked like Bocage, Murillo obviously had no way of determining the card's authenticity.
Second, Siv argues that had the inevitable discovery doctrine been timely raised, she might have been able to show that, absent Murillo's search of her person, Murillo would have not detained her at the scene until her probation status was discovered. This poses the wrong question—the issue is actually whether Murillo would have required her to remain at the scene until Murillo searched the vehicle and found incriminating evidence. There is no doubt Murillo would have done so. This is evident from the fact that, rather than allow Siv to leave the scene, Murillo searched her in preparation for the search of the vehicle; Murillo's testimony that she did not consider Siv free to leave at that time; the fact that when Murillo began searching the vehicle she almost immediately found suspicious third-party personal identifying information; and that upon finding this information, Murillo immediately handcuffed Bocage and placed her in a patrol car—which she almost certainly also would have done with Siv if she had not already done so.
In short, the evidence clearly shows Murillo inevitably would have discovered the challenged evidence, and Siv has failed to persuade us she could have elicited evidence to the contrary. We therefore consider the inevitable discovery doctrine on appeal and conclude that Murillo inevitably would have discovered the challenged evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
STEWART, J. We concur. /s/_________
KLINE, P.J. /s/_________
MILLER, J.