Opinion
C082952
04-03-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON FLINT REYNOLDS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 62145134)
Based on a handgun and methamphetamine found in Yolo County, defendant Jason Flint Reynolds was convicted in Placer County Superior Court of possessing a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count fifteen), unlawful firearm activity in violation of a restraining order (Pen. Code, § 29825, subd. (b); count sixteen), and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count seventeen). He was also convicted of several firearm-related offenses for guns found in Placer County, and the court declared a mistrial on several other firearm offenses, which were also based on guns found in Placer County. He was sentenced to two years in state prison.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count fifteen, the felony possession of a controlled substance with a firearm charge. He argues that Placer County was not a proper venue to try the offense because neither the crime nor its effects were committed or felt in Placer County. He further contends his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for moving to dismiss rather than transfer counts sixteen and seventeen, the misdemeanor drug possession and violation of a court order charges based on the Yolo County contraband. Finding no merit to his contentions, we shall affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
For several years, defendant and C.C. had an on-again off-again relationship. They shared a son, J.C., who was eight years old at the time of trial. In 2011 C.C. obtained a restraining order against defendant from Sacramento County Superior Court. The restraining order required peaceful interactions and prohibited defendant from possessing firearms.
C.C. and J.C. lived in Roseville in Placer County. C.C. would allow defendant, who was often times homeless, to stay at her home on weekends so he could spend time with J.C. Defendant would also sometimes stay with Carole and Karin Sitts, his two aunts who lived together in West Sacramento in Yolo County. He would stay either in their home, or in a tent or a van on their property.
In March 2015 defendant, C.C., and J.C. drove to Reno to attend a gun show. Defendant's aunts met them there. According to C.C. and J.C., defendant purchased guns at the gun show. Defendant stored the guns at C.C.'s home under her bed.
After a heated argument in December 2015 over how defendant was treating their son, C.C. ended her relationship with defendant and no longer allowed him to stay at her house on the weekends. In March 2016 defendant began acting in a very rude and aggressive manner towards C.C. The next month, defendant told C.C. he wished she was dead. C.C. felt scared and threatened. Three days later, she reported to police that defendant had guns stored under her bed, and that she had a restraining order against him that prohibited him from having guns.
When officers arrived at her house, they found five firearms and ammunition under C.C.'s bed. The firearms included an AM-15 rifle, a Savage Bolt Action .308 rifle, a Remington 870 shotgun, a Norinco SKS fully-automatic machine gun with a pistol grip and a sling, and a Saiga .308 rifle.
Given the restraining order and discovery of the firearms in Placer County, officers traveled to West Sacramento to arrest defendant. Defendant informed officers that he was staying at his aunts' West Sacramento home. Although defendant initially consented to a search, he revoked his consent when the officers tried to get the key to a white van located on the property; the key was on defendant's key ring. Officers obtained a search warrant and searched the van. Inside, they found paperwork with defendant's name on it as well as a loaded handgun, firearm magazines, and a useable amount of methamphetamine. One of his aunts also testified that defendant had most often stayed in the white van where the contraband was found.
An amended 17-count information filed in Placer County charged defendant with multiple weapons-related offenses and drug possession offenses based on the firearms and methamphetamine found in Placer and Yolo counties. Defendant was charged with possession of a machine gun (§ 32625, subd. (a), count one), possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a), count two), two counts of unlawful assault weapon activity (§ 30600, subd. (a), counts three & four), six counts of unlawful firearm activity in violation of a restraining order (§ 29825, subd. (b), counts five through nine [Placer County firearms] & count sixteen [Yolo County firearm]), three counts of possession of a large capacity magazine (§ 32310, counts ten through twelve), possession of a firearm with identification numbers removed (§ 23920, count thirteen), disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4), count fourteen), possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a), count fifteen [Yolo County]), and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count seventeen [Yolo County]).
Prior to trial, defendant objected that the Placer County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over the three offenses related to the firearm and methamphetamine found in Yolo County. He demurred and moved to dismiss the Yolo County charges. (§ 995.) The court denied the demurrer and motion to dismiss, finding venue of those offenses was proper in Placer County because the primary purpose of section 29825 was to safeguard the protected person in the restraining order, C.C., from the use of firearms by defendant. Because C.C. lived in Placer County, defendant's alleged possession of the firearm in Yolo County affected her. Discovery of the methamphetamine with the gun, moreover, had the effect of increasing the risk to C.C. in Placer County.
The jury found defendant guilty of counts seven, eight, nine, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen, and acquitted him of counts three, four, ten, eleven, and twelve. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to counts one, two, five, six, and thirteen, and the court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison calculated as follows: two years for the count fifteen possession of a controlled substance with a firearm offense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)), and concurrent 30-day terms each for counts seven, eight, nine, fourteen, sixteen, and seventeen. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Venue
Defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the felony possession of a controlled substance with a firearm charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)) alleged in count fifteen for improper venue. The charge was based on the loaded handgun and methamphetamine found in Yolo County. In his view, the proper venue for that offense was in Yolo County and not Placer County because he did not commit the offense in Placer County and his acts had no effect there. We disagree.
"Venue is a question of law that is governed by statute." (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 1282 (Thomas).) "In general, the proper venue for the prosecution of a criminal offense is in the superior court of the county where the crime was committed." (Id. at p. 1281.) Section 777 provides, "[e]very person is liable to punishment by the laws of this State, for a public offense committed by him . . . and except as otherwise provided by law the jurisdiction of every public offense is in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is committed."
Where an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, however, section 781 provides that jurisdiction of the offense lies in either county. (§ 781.) The statute states in relevant part: "when a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another jurisdictional territory, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction for the offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory." (§ 781.)
"[S]ection 781 closed a loophole in the common law that had often made it difficult to prosecute a crime begun in one county but completed in another . . . ." (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283.) Because the statute is remedial, we must construe it liberally to achieve its purpose of expanding criminal jurisdiction beyond rigid common law limits. (Ibid.) We thus " ' "interpret section 781 in a commonsense manner with proper regard for the facts and circumstances of the case rather than technical niceties." ' " (Ibid., quoting People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1118.) "The prosecution has the burden of proving the facts supporting venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and '[o]n review, a trial court's determination of territorial jurisdiction will be upheld as long as there is "some evidence" to support its holding.' " (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283.)
Applying these principles here, we believe the trial court reasonably could have found that the People had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Placer County was an appropriate place for trial under section 781 for the charges based on the evidence found in Yolo County. There was evidence that C.C., a resident of Placer County, was expressly protected by the restraining order that prohibited defendant from possessing firearms. His actions in violating the restraining order certainly affected her in Placer County. She testified that defendant was becoming increasingly aggressive and threatening, and she was worried and scared that he had more guns somewhere else in addition to the guns stored underneath her bed.
The trial court also reasonably concluded that defendant's possession of the firearm with the methamphetamine, a "powerful and highly addictive synthetic stimulant," increased the risk to C.C.'s safety—which the restraining order was meant to protect. (See, e.g., PDK Laboratories Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. (D.C. Cir. 2006) 438 F.3d 1184, 1186 [noting that " '[c]hronic methamphetamine abuse can lead to psychotic behavior including intense paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, and out-of-control rages that can result in violent episodes' "].) Reaching such a conclusion, moreover, does not mean that the court improperly conflated the concepts of venue and consolidation as defendant argues. (§§ 781, 954.) Instead, it simply means that the court reasonably determined that each of the charged Yolo County-related offenses also had "effects" in Placer County, making the latter county an appropriate venue to try those offenses.
Defendant's argument that his conduct in Yolo County had no effect in Placer County is unpersuasive. He analogizes to People v. Crise (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5 where the court found that a defendant who was under the influence of a controlled substance when arrested in Los Angeles County and was later transported to Ventura County could not be tried in Ventura County for the under the influence charge since his only connection to that county was "by handcuff." Unlike the defendant in Crise, defendant's contacts with Placer County cannot be characterized as involuntary. Defendant repeatedly traveled to Placer County to visit his son. While in Placer County he impliedly threatened C.C. by claiming he wished she was dead. C.C. was the person protected by the restraining order defendant was found guilty of violating. Placer County, then, was not a distant county to which defendant had absolutely no connection.
Defendant's reliance on section 784.5 is likewise misplaced. That statute provides that child abduction may be prosecuted in "[a]ny jurisdictional territory in which the victimized person resides . . . ." (§ 784.5, subd. (a).) Had the Legislature intended section 781 to permit venue where a victim resides, defendant argues, it would have crafted section 781 with language similar to section 784.5. The problem with defendant's argument is that he ignores the effects his prohibited conduct had on C.C., the person protected by the restraining order. It is not merely her residence but rather the effects of defendant's illegal conduct that makes Placer County a proper venue under section 781. The fact that section 781 does not have language similar to section 784.5 is therefore irrelevant.
Defendant's argument that venue was improper in Placer County because he did not commit "any acts there" is without merit. Section 781 provides that venue may be based upon "the acts or effects" of a public offense. (§ 781, italics added.)
Similarly, we reject defendant's contention that the only way Placer County could be a proper venue for the crimes based on the Yolo County contraband was if C.C. knew he possessed the firearm in Yolo County and her state of mind was relevant to the section 29825, subdivision (b) offense. "[A] defendant who commits a crime in one county with effects in another county that are 'requisite to . . . the achievement of the [defendant's] unlawful purpose' may be tried in the latter county under section 781, even though the effects were not elements of the offense." (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1285; see also People v. Graves (1934) 137 Cal.App. 1, 7-9, 19 [bribery trial in Los Angeles County for bribe paid in San Francisco County was proper even though dishonest vote in Los Angeles County was not element of offense and offense was complete before vote was given].)
Applying section 781 liberally, as we must (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283), we cannot say that the court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss count fifteen, possession of a controlled substance with a firearm, based on the contraband found in Yolo County. There is "some evidence" that the effects of defendant's conduct were felt in Placer County where the person protected by the restraining order that prohibited defendant from possessing firearms lived and where defendant visited often. That showing is sufficient to support the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue. (Ibid.)
II
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant next contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he moved to dismiss rather than transfer the unlawful firearm activity in violation of a restraining order charge alleged in count sixteen (§ 29825, subd. (b)) and the possession of methamphetamine charge alleged in count seventeen (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377). Both misdemeanor charges were based on the contraband found in Yolo County.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must establish trial counsel's representation fell below professional standards of reasonableness and must affirmatively establish prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693] (Strickland); People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 386.) "A claim on appeal of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected ' "[if] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation." ' " (People v. Hinds (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 897, 901.) Unless the record affirmatively discloses that counsel had no tactical purpose for his or her act or omission, the conviction will be affirmed and the defendant relegated to habeas corpus proceedings at which evidence outside the record may be taken to determine the basis, if any, for counsel's conduct or omission. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-582.)
"[I]t is well established that the power to control judicial proceedings is vested exclusively in counsel." (Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781.) Courts have also recognized that "[t]he decision not to raise . . . venue falls within the attorney's authority to control the tactical direction of a proceeding." (People v. Gbadebo-Soda (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 160, 171.)
Although defendant acknowledges that an attorney has authority not to object on venue grounds on his client's behalf, he nevertheless argues that his counsel chose to object, but did so ineptly, which does not qualify as a tactical decision to which deference is due. His counsel, he argues, was clearly ignorant of the law regarding improperly charged misdemeanors, specifically section 1462.2. The statute provides that the proper court for the criminal trial of a misdemeanor is the superior court of the county within which the offense was committed, and it contains a provision to transfer misdemeanor charges commenced in an improper county. (§ 1462.2.)
Nothing in the record, however, shows his counsel was unaware of section 1462.2. Defendant's contention is wholly speculative.
But even if we assume, without deciding, that defendant's counsel was unaware he could seek to transfer the misdemeanors alleged in counts sixteen and seventeen to Yolo County, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fails because he has not, and cannot, demonstrate prejudice. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 ["If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed"].)
As the People point out, it is not reasonably likely that the court would have granted a motion to transfer given the court's ruling that denied defendant's motion to dismiss after finding Placer County was a proper venue to try the charges based on the Yolo County contraband.
We also find defendant's contention that he suffered a prejudicial "spillover" effect from the "12 other weapons related offenses" tried with the misdemeanors unpersuasive. Although he argues that the evidence concerning the Yolo County contraband was much weaker than the evidence concerning the firearms and ammunition found in Placer County, the jury's mixed verdict shows that the evidence tending to prove the Yolo County misdemeanors was not comparatively less compelling than the Placer County firearm evidence. Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of counts three, four, ten, eleven, and twelve, and was unable to reach a verdict as to counts one, two, five, six, and thirteen. Thus, of the 14 counts that related to evidence found in Placer County, 10 were either found not guilty or dismissed for failure to reach a verdict.
Ample evidence in the record, moreover, connected defendant to the handgun and methamphetamine found in the van in Yolo County. This case is thus unlike In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 956, where the court found counsel prejudicially failed to object to the admission of the defendant's statements that were made as a result of state action that was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating statements in the absence of counsel. Nothing directly linked the defendant in In re Wilson to the crimes and the defendant was not found in possession of the victim's wallet or any other item associated with the victim or the crimes. (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence at trial showed defendant had been staying primarily in the white van where the contraband was located. His aunts did not use the van. On the day of his arrest, defendant had the key to the van on his person, and he tried to object to the officers' taking the key from his key ring even though he had originally consented to a search of the van. After obtaining a search warrant for the van, officers found not only methamphetamine and a loaded handgun, but also paperwork with defendant's name on it.
In People v. Clark (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 890, 898, the court found that the defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's error in moving to dismiss a misdemeanor instead of transferring it because had the case been transferred it would have been tried on the same evidence, with the same result. Similarly, had the misdemeanors been transferred to Yolo County, the same strong evidence linking defendant to the van and its contraband would have been presented. Given that the jury obviously did not find the evidence related to the firearms found in Placer County particularly compelling, the absence of such evidence in a Yolo County trial would not have made a difference in the outcome on the misdemeanors.
The evidence proving defendant's guilt of the misdemeanor methamphetamine and firearm possession offenses was strong regardless of whether he was on trial for any other weapons-related offenses. We thus conclude there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome even if defendant's counsel had moved to transfer the misdemeanors alleged in counts sixteen and seventeen to Yolo County. We therefore reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant's reliance on the nonbinding decision from the Second Circuit in Cornell v. Kirkpatrick (2d Cir. 2011) 665 F.3d 369, to show that is it reasonably probable a more favorable outcome was likely had his counsel moved to transfer the misdemeanors, is misplaced. The defendant in Cornell was on trial for the rape of two victims in two different counties. (Id. at pp. 378-379.) The court found that had his counsel raised a proper venue objection, there was a reasonable probability that the charges stemming from the second rape victim would have been dismissed because the evidence was less compelling than the evidence for the first victim. (Id. at pp. 381-382.) As previously explained, the evidence related to the contraband found in Yolo County was not less compelling that the evidence found in Placer County making Cornell inapt. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RAYE, P. J. We concur: BLEASE, J. BUTZ, J.