Opinion
F076622
07-08-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANLEY KEITH PIPES, Defendant and Appellant.
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Tia M. Coronado and Daniel B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. F15907812)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B. Conklin, Judge. Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Tia M. Coronado and Daniel B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Stanley Keith Pipes of second degree murder of his fiancée after he admitted to shooting her repeatedly and was found next to her body with the murder weapon. The jury also found true an enhancement that defendant personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury or death pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53. During trial, the defense argued the killing was manslaughter as opposed to murder. In support, the defense presented a psychiatrist who testified defendant's existing psychiatric conditions resulted in a dissociative or psychotic episode that prevented him from thinking rationally during the killing.
We note at the outset defendant does not challenge his firearm enhancement or otherwise seek remand pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Senate Bill No. 620, signed into law on October 11, 2017, amended Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to provide the trial court with discretion to dismiss, in furtherance of justice, firearm enhancements imposed pursuant to sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h). The new law took effect on January 1, 2018.
The California Supreme Court has held: "'A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that "informed discretion" than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant's record.' [Citation.] In such circumstances, ... the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record 'clearly indicate[s]' that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion 'even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.' [Citations.]" (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; see People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)
Here, defendant was sentenced on November 20, 2017, after Senate Bill No. 620 was passed but before it went into effect on January 1, 2018. Notably, the court acknowledged the impending change in the law and stated on the record during sentencing it would not have struck the firearm enhancement even if it had the discretion to do so at that time: "The 12022.53(d) enhancement also calls for 25 years to life. I recognize I do not have the discretion at this point to alter that enhancement, but if I did, I—." Defense counsel then objected and the court continued, "I know you are going to object, but I'm going to clarify it because I believe it's necessary from the state of the law today that I am clarifying—I do not believe I have the discretion to alter that enhancement. But if I did, I would not. Not in this case. Not given the facts and circumstances of this case. I believe that enhancement is clearly warranted."
On this record, experienced appellate counsel has wisely chosen not to seek a remand in light of the court's clearly stated intentions. (See People v. McVey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 405, 419 [defendant not entitled to remand because court's "pointed comments" on record established it would not strike firearm enhancement]; see also People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 275 [concluding remand not warranted for consideration of Senate Bill No. 1393 where court expressed its "'great satisfaction'" with the "'very lengthy sentence imposed'"]; People v. Jefferson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 399, 408 [defendant not entitled to remand for consideration of mental health diversion where trial court clearly indicated defendant's alleged mental health disorder did not substantially contribute to commission of charged offenses]; see generally People v. Coelho (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 861, 889 ["[R]eviewing courts have consistently declined to remand cases where doing so would be an idle act that exalts form over substance because it is not reasonably probable the court would impose a different sentence"].)
After the verdict was returned, defendant moved to obtain juror identifying information to investigate alleged juror misconduct. The motion was based on the jury foreperson's declaration that two jurors stated during deliberations, "'[A]ny person could hire a psychiatrist to say anything that person wanted them to say.'" Defendant argued the declaration suggested some jurors concealed a bias against defense psychiatric testimony during voir dire. The court denied defendant's motion, holding defendant failed to establish good cause for the disclosure. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error by denying his request for juror identifying information. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Joseph N., defendant's stepson, testified defendant was married to his mother for 30 years before she passed away. Joseph's contact with defendant became more sporadic when defendant began dating the victim, Kristie Claassen. Defendant appeared happy at the beginning of the relationship but after a few months he and Claassen "became estranged" and were "on and off a little bit." Defendant "started asking for legal advice on how to handle [Claassen's] behavior towards him. He was concerned because she had become threatening in different ways to him. ... [I]t initially started off with him being concerned she was going through his financials or possibly was looking for money out of him ... [to] concerns of her making allegations that he had done something to her and might get him in legal trouble." Defendant also reported to Joseph his "concern[] that he might physically be in danger from her because of her erratic behavior" and asked about "possibly getting a restraining order." Joseph's wife Tara recalled hearing threatening voicemails Claassen left for defendant.
Joseph and Tara only met Claassen once, when they stood watch at defendant's house as Claassen moved out in the spring of 2015. Defendant asked Joseph and Tara to be present because defendant "was concerned that [Claassen] was going to claim that he was breaking her things or claim that he did something to her physically." Defendant asked Claassen to move out after he found her going through his financials. When Joseph and Tara arrived, Claassen was upset and appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and/or medications. She was rude and spoke negatively about Joseph's late mother, "making allegations ... of a possible affair that might have occurred [between her and defendant] before [his mother] had passed away." Claassen slowly loaded her car with her belongings, and Joseph went to the car to remove the bullets from a firearm defendant had told him Claassen kept in her car. Claassen eventually left but "came back with her vehicle at a fairly high rate of speed, pulled into the garage, nearly hitting" Joseph with her car; Joseph "had to move out of the way in order to not be struck." Joseph was alarmed by Claassen's behavior and he told defendant to stay away from her. Joseph also told defendant he did not want Claassen at his home or near his children. Defendant and Claassen reconciled and Joseph and Tara had less contact with defendant; defendant knew they did not approve of Claassen.
In the early morning of December 28, 2015, defendant called Joseph; he sounded distressed and admitted he had shot Claassen. Joseph asked defendant where he was and Joseph told Tara to call 911 from her phone; defendant sounded suicidal and reported he had a gun. Joseph told defendant he was going to send police and to put the gun down. Defendant said he "had drank a lot" and "ingested pills" and Joseph heard defendant "vomiting pretty violently." Joseph handed Tara his phone so he could speak with police on Tara's phone; Tara heard a gunshot.
Sergeant Erich Garringer with the Fresno County Sheriff's Office responded to the scene. While outside defendant's house, Garringer heard a gunshot in the house. When additional police units arrived, Garringer and other officers went into the house. The security door to the house was unlocked and the front door had been left cracked open. The police announced their presence and their canine barked to alert but they heard no response. After entering the house, police encountered Claassen's body lying on the floor. The police canine bit and shook her leg and Sergeant Garringer could see from the movement that Claassen was dead. She had been shot six times: once in the back of the head, three times in the right side of her head, and two times in her chest. Garringer saw defendant lying on a couch to the left and told him to put his hands up, but defendant did not respond. Garringer approached defendant and noticed a handgun within two inches of defendant's right hand. Sergeant Garringer checked defendant to see if he was alive and confirmed defendant was breathing and warm to the touch. Garringer then seized the gun, which was a revolver "cocked back in the ready position to be fired." Other officers rolled defendant over, handcuffed him, and dragged him out of the house; defendant did not respond.
At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf. He explained he suffered from mounting anxiety over the years in conjunction with supraventricular tachycardia, which causes a rapid heart rate and produces chronic anxiety. He ultimately stopped working due to his anxiety and lived off of a family trust that he also used to support other family members; the trust was valued at $400,000 at the time of trial. He testified regarding three incidents in his past when he suffered trauma to his head. He also discussed an incident when he "lost time," meaning he could not remember a period of time during which his blood sugar was low and he left the house to get fast food. Thereafter he went to a physician who performed various cognitive tests and determined defendant had suffered from a single incident of transient global amnesia.
Defendant explained he met Claassen when she and her boyfriend moved into a house on defendant's street. After his wife had passed, defendant and Claassen became closer. Claassen's boyfriend moved out and defendant began to help Claassen financially; he eventually offered to let her move into his house. After about three to six months into his relationship with Claassen, defendant found his files open and became suspicious Claassen was gathering information about his financials. Defendant changed the password to his accounts out of fear Claassen would gain access to them. He testified Claassen "would combine alcohol with pills and would become belligerent, vindictive, nasty, [and] accusatory." Defendant believed Claassen was addicted to pain pills. Defendant testified he began managing Claassen's pain medication dosages and fell into depression around the same time.
On the day of the shooting, defendant found his fax machine jammed with his mother's identification on top, which made him suspicious Claassen was trying to steal his mother's identity. He confronted Claassen and she responded she must have been sleepwalking and did not recall putting his mother's identification on the fax machine. He and Claassen then argued about her overfeeding her cat. According to defendant, he grabbed the plate of cat food Claassen was holding and Claassen slipped and fell when she lost her grip on the plate. Claassen threatened to call the police and tell them defendant had pushed her.
Defendant testified he then realized Claassen "had a plan to take control of [his] finances," "live in [his] house," "sell [his] possessions," "make off with an investment if she could," "[a]nd most importantly she was going to have [him] arrested for a false accusation of domestic violence." Defendant felt panic, anxiety, and feelings of dread. He "sense[d] time slowing down" and "a certain level of detachment from [him]self." According to defendant, he was in a "dream-like state" and " began to see and perceive a white aura around the periphery of [his] vision," "as though [he was] outside of [him]self ... looking in." He "didn't feel he was in control" or "acting of [his] own volition."
Defendant testified he watched himself retrieve his gun, aim it at the back of Claassen's head, and pull the trigger. He testified it was like "watching a movie." He walked away, heard Claassen still breathing, and then shot her again because he "couldn't let [her] suffer." Again, he heard Claassen still breathing so he shot her one more time. He felt "relief' because she had stopped breathing, and then he considered taking his own life. He reloaded his gun and wrote a note "to explain [him]self." He prepared for authorities by unlocking the doors and pulling out Claassen's identification and his wallet. He took medication because he felt his blood sugar was high and then laid on the couch. Defendant testified he held the gun to his head but could not shoot himself and the gun discharged as he moved it away.
Psychiatrist Avak Howsepian testified on behalf of the defense. He interviewed defendant five times for approximately 20 hours at defense counsel's request. Dr. Howsepian testified he charged his normal consultation fee of $300 per hour for the first 40 hours he spent on defendant's case, and then a reduced rate of $250 per hour for approximately 120 more hours he spent on the case. Accordingly, the total fee he charged defendant for the case was approximately $42,000.
Based on his interviews with defendant and his review of materials, Dr. Howsepian diagnosed defendant with nine psychiatric disorders: schizotypal personality disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, obsessive compulsive personality disorder, acute dissociative reaction to stressful situations, an unspecified anxiety disorder, polysubstance abuse disorder (in remission), major depressive disorder, a chronic adjustment disorder, and partner relational problem. Dr. Howsepian explained a dissociative condition causes a person to feel his volitions and actions are disconnected, "like they are acting but they are not volunteering to act," "[t]hey are kind of acting, instead automatically, almost mechanically." He testified the circumstances leading up to Claassen's shooting, including defendant's existing conditions and his fear that Claassen was trying to access his finances, caused defendant to suffer from depression and anxiety and led to a "dissociative episode." This caused defendant to be unable to think rationally about what he was doing and substantially impaired his reasoning.
In closing, the prosecutor argued defendant committed first degree murder. He asserted defendant acted with the intent to kill, willfully, with deliberation, evidenced by the fact defendant continued to repeatedly shoot Claassen when he heard her still breathing. He stated it was "textbook deliberation" in that defendant weighed the consequences of his actions. With regard to Dr. Howsepian's testimony, the prosecutor stated he could "think of 42,000 reasons why [Dr. Howsepian] did not test this defendant for malingering." He argued "defendant had never been diagnosed by another medical doctor for this condition testified to by Dr. Howsepian until this case."
Defense counsel argued in closing the killing was voluntary manslaughter. He argued there was sufficient provocation to reduce the crime from first degree murder to second degree murder. He further argued such provocation and/or defendant's mental impairment reduced the killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. He noted Dr. Howsepian was a "well-educated, immensely qualified psychiatrist" who "worked very hard on this case. And he earned every penny of his fee. His fee was not dependent on his testimony or the outcome of this case. He testified to what he believed to be the case based on his long experience and his education." Emphasizing Dr. Howsepian's testimony, defense counsel argued the prosecutor had not established the requisite mental state for murder.
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and found true an allegation he personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense. After the verdict was announced, the court ordered sealed the "record of personal juror identifying information" "until further order of [the court] or a reviewing court." Defendant subsequently sought release of the jurors' identifying information; the trial court denied the requests.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the court committed reversible error in denying his second request for juror identifying information. We disagree.
I. Procedural History
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors about their potential bias against "a psychiatric defense." Two jurors, Prospective Jurors Nos. 26 and 38, voiced skepticism towards such evidence. Specifically, when asked about a defense based on a mental disorder, Prospective Juror No. 26 stated, "Sometimes I think it's kind of a cop out or excuse, like ... for a lesser plea." Prospective Juror No. 26, however, agreed to "listen to the testimony—all the testimony, the People's testimony and the Defense's testimony with an open mind" and not make up his or her mind before hearing all the evidence. In response to defense counsel's inquiry on voir dire whether the juror would "be able to put what appears ... to be a fairly strong bias ... aside," Prospective Juror No. 38 stated, "I don't think so to be fair to you, no. I don't think so." Defense counsel then proceeded, "Would it be fair to say, then, knowing what the potential defense in this case is, that it's likely that my client would not be able to get a fair and impartial decision on your part without any bias?" Prospective Juror No. 38 responded: "From the minute you mentioned it I was like oh, no." However, Prospective Juror No. 38 also agreed to "be fair to everybody in this trial" and to "be very open minded, take it all in—into consideration."
After the verdict, defendant moved for an order permitting him to obtain juror contact information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 206, subdivision (g), and 237. In his motion, defendant explained: "Defense counsel and his investigator wish to interview jurors to determine what role non-testimonial extraneous facts played in the jury's determination, and whether they followed the Court's instruction pertaining to assessing the testimony of witnesses." He argued good cause supported his request. In support, he attached a declaration in which defense counsel averred he questioned jurors after the case and one juror stated the jury felt Dr. Howsepian's testimony was less believable because Dr. Howsepian sat through the entirety of defendant's testimony. Defendant argued the jurors were not to consider Dr. Howsepian's nontestimonial courtroom demeanor because it was irrelevant. He asserted the juror's statement evidenced "apparent wholesale discounting of the testimony of Dr. Howsepian," which "is a matter that must be explored" because Dr. Howsepian's testimony was "the evidence to support voluntary manslaughter over second degree murder."
The People opposed the motion, arguing defendant had "not made a sufficient showing of misconduct." They asserted Dr. Howsepian repeatedly testified he was present during defendant's testimony and the juror's challenged statement did not comment upon the "non-testimonial demeanor" of Dr. Howsepian as defendant contended. They noted, regardless, "the 'demeanor' of Dr. Howsepian is entirely appropriate to consider, including the fact that he was present during the testimony of the defendant." They also argued, as CALCRIM Nos. 105 and 226 provide, "Dr. Howsepian's ability to 'see, hear or otherwise perceive' the defendant's testimony and behavior on the stand was an important foundation of his testimony and opinion." Accordingly, "all that has been alleged is that a juror properly considered the evidence presented at trial," so "good cause has not been shown."
The court denied defendant's motion without prejudice to defendant refiling, holding he had failed to establish good cause for the release of the jurors' identifying information. It noted:
"Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in every day life experience. ... [T]he safeguards of jury impartiality are not infallible. It is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence they might—that might theoretically affect their vote. [¶] So I do find that at present there has not been a sufficient good cause established to allow for the disclosure of personal juror identifying information.... [T]he request to disclose or access personal juror identifying information is denied due to failure to establish good cause of jury misconduct or reasonable possibility thereof."
Two months later, defendant filed a motion for new trial, a renewed motion for disclosure of juror contact information, a motion to continue sentencing, and a request for an evidentiary hearing. In support of his motion for new trial and motion for disclosure of juror identifying information, defendant attached a declaration by the jury foreman. The foreman's declaration stated, "During deliberations, some of the other jurors made statements about Dr. Howsepian's testimony causing me to believe that they weren't going to consider it (his testimony)." The foreman averred two jurors made statements "in reference to any person being able to hire a psychiatrist to say anything that person wanted them to say." Defense counsel also submitted a declaration in which he renewed the request for juror contact information to permit him to interview all the jurors. In support, he averred he "questioned each juror extensively [during voir dire] about any possible bias against psychiatrists" because "the testimony of Dr. Howsepian was an essential component of the defense." He argued, "[h]ad [he] known that any juror harbored such a bias even in general [he] would have challenged him or her for cause. In the event that they were not excused for cause, [he] would have exercised a preemptory challenge to excuse that juror."
The People opposed the motion and request for disclosure, responding there was no evidence of juror bias or misconduct. They noted the foreman's affidavit was hearsay and, irrespective, it was insufficient to establish juror bias or misconduct. They argued the alleged statement attested to by the foreman was "likely the simple opinion of the juror(s) after hearing all of the evidence in this case. That is, the jurors weighed all of the evidence and decided that Dr. Howsepian's testimony was insufficient to reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter." They argued, even assuming for argument's sake juror misconduct had occurred, there was no possibility of prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
The court denied defendant's motion for new trial and request for disclosure. It held:
"... I don't believe there was any juror misconduct. I've—the initial claim was that there was error because Dr. Howsepian was in the courtroom and the jurors were able to observe him. But that later on was determined to be a point of evidence. The jurors were told that he was in the courtroom for that reason. The juror misconduct argument then focused or narrowed
to one [sic] as to whether or not a claim by a juror that there may have been a potential bias against psychiatrists, supports or establishes error. I don't find that it did.
"We tell jurors as—it's this court's habit during jury selection to acknowledge the bias of jurors. Jurors come to trials with bias. And the purpose of jury selection is to get them to discuss that bias. Both attorneys had absolute opportunity to do that. ... Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in every day life and experiences. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of the weaknesses. It has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such weakness, however, must be tolerated. It is an impossible standard to require the jury to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and free from any external factors. Moreover, under that standard few verdicts would be proof against challenge. The safeguards of jury impartiality are not infallible. It is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote.
"So I do find that the comments provided by the juror were at best comments on the deliberative process and do not establish that the juror had such bias against, um, mental health professionals that was either hidden from the attorneys or would equate to juror misconduct for the purpose of allowing further contact of the jurors. And for those reasons denies—I deny the request for any contact information and deny the claim of a new trial based upon juror misconduct."
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure sections 206 and 237 to maximize the safety and privacy of trial jurors after they have served as jurors, while retaining the defendant's ability to contact jurors after trial if he or she shows sufficient need for such information. (See Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1087, 1096; People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124-1126.) Section 206 authorizes a criminal defendant to petition for access to personal juror identifying information (their names, addresses and phone numbers) when the sealed information is "necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose." (Id., § 206, subd. (g).) The petition must be supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause for the release of the information. (Id., § 237, subd. (b).) If the court determines the petition and supporting declaration establish a prima facie showing of good cause for release of juror information, the court must set a hearing, unless the record establishes a compelling interest against disclosure. (Ibid.)
Good cause, in the context of a petition for disclosure, requires "'a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.'" (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 317; see People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 552; accord, People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 850-852.) The alleged misconduct must be "'of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.'" (People v. Jefflo (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1322.) Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported. (See People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 346; People v. Wilson, supra, at p. 852.) "'Absent a satisfactory, preliminary showing of possible juror misconduct, the strong public interests in the integrity of our jury system and a juror's right to privacy outweigh the countervailing public interest served by disclosure of the juror information as a matter of right in each case.'" (Townsel v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1094.)
We review the denial of a petition for disclosure for abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 317.) A court abuses its discretion if the ruling in question "'fall[s] "outside the bounds of reason"'" under the applicable law and the relevant facts. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 714; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.)
III. Analysis
Defendant argues the court abused its discretion when it denied his second request for juror identifying information in his motion for new trial, warranting reversal of his conviction. He argues he "established good cause for release of the jurors' identifying information," that was "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the jurors' statements to the foreperson reflected a preexisting and undisclosed bias against psychiatric testimony, and that the jurors had committed misconduct by failing to disclose their bias." He contends the two jurors' statements "did not simply express skepticism about Dr. Howsepian, but rather they categorically dismissed the credibility of any and all psychiatric defense testimony as worthless" and "indicated an unwillingness to consider the merits of any defense psychiatrist's testimony." Citing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, he asserts the denial of his requests for juror identifying information amounted to a "violation of his constitutional right to a trial by 12 impartial jurors." The People respond the jury foreperson's statement regarding his impression based on the other jurors' statements was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150. They further contend defendant's argument the foreperson's declaration reflected jurors had concealed a bias during voir dire was based on speculation; thus, it did not establish good cause. Finally, they argue, even if the court erred in refusing to release juror identifying information, reversal would not be warranted. We agree with the People; the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant's motion did not establish good cause, that is, a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, as necessary to support a request for juror identifying information.
Defendant does not challenge the denial of his initial motion for juror identifying information.
First, Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides: "Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly." (Ibid.) However, "[n]o evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." (Ibid., italics added; see In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294.) Thus, "where a verdict is attacked for juror taint, the focus is on whether there is any overt event or circumstance, 'open to [corroboration by] sight, hearing, and the other senses' [citation], which suggests a likelihood that one or more members of the jury were influenced by improper bias." (In re Hamilton, supra, at p. 294; accord, In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 398 ["jurors may testify to 'overt acts' ... but may not testify to 'the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror'"].)
Here, the foreperson's comment that the other jurors' statements caused him "to believe that [those jurors] weren't going to consider it ([the defendant's] testimony)" relates to the effect of the other jurors' statements and the subjective reasoning processes of those individual jurors. Accordingly, this portion of the foreperson's declaration was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). On the other hand, the foreperson's recitation of the statements themselves made by the other jurors in the jury room was not barred by section 1150. (In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 398 ["Among the overt acts that are admissible and to which jurors are competent to testify are statements. Section 1150, subdivision (a), expressly allows proof of 'statements made ... either within or without the jury room'"].) But, as we discuss, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this admissible evidence was insufficient to justify the release of juror identifying information.
Notably, the California Supreme Court has advised, "[a]lthough this evidence may be received, it must be admitted with caution. Statements have a greater tendency than nonverbal acts to implicate the reasoning processes of jurors—e.g., what the juror making the statement meant and what the juror hearing it understood. They are therefore more apt to be misused by counsel in an effort to improperly open such processes to scrutiny." (In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 398.)
Evidence Code section 722, subdivision (b) expressly provides: "The compensation and expenses paid or to be paid to an expert witness by the party calling [the expert] is ... relevant to the credibility of the witness and the weight of [the expert's] testimony." (See generally People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 783-784 [prosecutor did not commit misconduct by commenting on defense expert's "substantial fee," "history of testifying only for criminal defendants," and "'collect[ing] good money for testimony'"]; People v. Arias (1996)13 Cal.4th 92, 162 ["counsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased"].) And section 780, subdivision (f) permits jurors to consider "the existence ... of a bias, interest, or other motive" in evaluating a witness's credibility. (See CALCRIM No. 226 [instructing jury to consider whether "witness's testimony [was] influenced by a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided" when evaluating credibility].)
Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 722 and 780, here, the jury was entitled to consider the compensation paid to Dr. Howsepian in evaluating his credibility and the weight to give his testimony. The alleged statement made by the two jurors—that any person could hire a psychiatrist to say anything that person wanted them to say—evidences that these jurors appropriately acknowledged the potential for bias in evaluating the testimony of a paid witness during their deliberative process. We cannot conclude it was "outside the bounds of reason" for the court to conclude the referenced statements reflected the jurors' deliberative process and did not evidence an improper bias that amounted to misconduct.
Notably, declarations from members of the jury about their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, or the weight given to certain evidence, would have been inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). (See § 1150, subd. (a) ["No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined"]; see also People v. Stevenson (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 443, 445 [jurors' affidavits inadmissible because they "showed only the mental processes of the respective jurors, and the subjective considerations which influenced their verdicts"].)
We would have to engage in speculation to accept defendant's arguments that the jurors' statements established they wholly disregarded Dr. Howsepian's testimony and they concealed during voir dire a preexisting bias towards all psychiatric testimony. Such speculation does not provide good cause for disclosure of juror identifying information. (People v. Cook, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 346 [good cause does not exist where the allegation of jury misconduct is speculative]; People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [counsel's declaration was insufficient to establish good cause because it stated "'at best, speculation on the part of how the jurors might have arrived at their verdict'"].) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
We reject defendant's sole contention on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
PEÑA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J. /s/_________
DESANTOS, J.