Opinion
May 15, 1995
Appeal from the County Court, Orange County (Pano Z. Patsalos, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant argues that the present matter should be remitted for resentencing because, at the sentencing proceedings held on April 28, 1993, the court allowed the victim to make a statement as authorized by CPL 380.50 (2) (b). The defendant argues that CPL 380.50 (2) (b) is unconstitutional in that "it serves no useful purpose in the sentencing process". We disagree.
The psychological impact that the defendant's crime had on his victim was undoubtedly a proper factor to be considered by the County Court in imposing sentence (see, e.g., People v White, 192 A.D.2d 736). Nothing in the State or Federal Constitutions prohibited the County Court from considering the victim's own account of the defendant's crime in assessing the true dimensions of this psychological impact (see, e.g., Williams v New York, 337 U.S. 241, affg 298 N.Y. 803; People v Jones, 195 A.D.2d 482; People v Wright, 187 A.D.2d 1016; People v Lader, 114 A.D.2d 390; see also, Payne v Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, overruling Booth v Maryland, 482 U.S. 496). The terms of CPL 380.50 (2) (b) advance the State's "`legitimate interest in * * * reminding the sentencer that just as the [convicted criminal] should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual'" (Payne v Tennessee, supra, at 825, quoting Maryland v Booth, 482 US, supra, at 517 [White, J., dissenting]). In sum, CPL 380.50 (2) (b) advances a legitimate State interest, and its application in this case did not deprive the defendant of any of his constitutionally-guaranteed rights. Balletta, J.P., Copertino, Altman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.