Opinion
C083319
09-29-2017
In re M.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.M., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JV138135)
The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and declared the minor M.M. a ward of the court after finding he committed misdemeanor theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of ammunition by a minor (§ 29650).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, the minor contends that the juvenile court prejudicially erred in admitting statements he made without a Miranda warning. We shall affirm.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
BACKGROUND
The Miranda Hearing
On July 4, 2016, around 1:32 a.m., Sacramento Sheriff's Deputies Steven Gonzales and Billy Ly were dispatched to investigate a report of two stolen handguns. The deputies arrived at the home the minor shared with his mother, Sheila M. She believed the 14-year-old minor stole the firearms. The deputies went to the house to look for the missing firearms and ammunition.
The deputies were met at the door by Sheila M.'s boyfriend. Sheila M. invited them in shortly thereafter. She told the deputies the minor was staying at a friend's home and gave them permission to enter his room. Deputy Gonzales went to the minor's room, opened the closed door, and announced, "Sheriff's Department." He was very surprised to find the minor was in the room. The room was dark and the minor was lying on his bed. The minor did not respond when Deputy Gonzales entered. Deputy Gonzales asked the minor in a normal tone of voice to get up and go to the living room. The minor walked to the living room with Deputy Gonzales following about two feet behind him.
The minor sat on a sofa and was questioned by Deputy Ly. Deputy Gonzales was in and out of the living room during the interview, which took about 20 minutes. When the minor entered the living room, Deputy Ly continued speaking with Sheila M. for a minute or so, and then addressed the minor. Deputy Ly stood about three to four feet away from the minor; Sheila M. stood to the left of Deputy Ly. She was not involved in the interview except when questions were directed at her.
Deputy Ly was in full uniform with a visible firearm. He did not block the door way and never drew his gun. The minor was not told he was free to go, but he was not commanded to sit or remain seated. Deputy Ly made no threats to the minor and did not promise the minor anything for talking to him. His tone was calm and professional throughout the interview, and he never raised his voice at the minor. At one point, Deputy Ly asked the minor to go to Google Maps to show where he had been. The minor, with Deputy Ly following him, moved to the computer, which was two to three feet away. The minor navigated Google Maps without any instruction from Deputy Ly.
The minor made a statement during the interview. The trial court denied a motion to suppress and admitted the statement, finding the minor was not in custody during the interview.
The contents of the minor's statements during the interview were not brought up in the Miranda hearing. At the jurisdiction hearing, Deputy Ly testified that the minor told him that he took the guns at around 11:30 a.m., put them in his backpack, and skateboarded with them to a friend's house. The minor showed the guns to his friend Sergio. The pair then met two other youths at an elementary school, after which the group went to Sergio's home, where they were met by others. At Sergio's home, one youth took one gun and left, while Sergio's brother took the other gun and went to his bedroom. The guns were eventually recovered. --------
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the juvenile court's denial of his Miranda motion was erroneous because he was in custody during the interview. We disagree.
"To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, [individuals] interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. [Citation.]" (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 107 [133 L.Ed.2d 383, 391].) "The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, [and] to relieve the ' "inherently compelling pressures" ' generated by the custodial setting itself, ' "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," ' . . . " (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 433 [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 330], fns. omitted.) The People may not use statements obtained in violation of Miranda to establish guilt. (Id. at p. 429 .)
We apply federal standards in determining whether the government elicited a defendant's statements in violation of Miranda. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440.) In determining whether a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 476.) We independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395 (Moore).)
Miranda warnings are required only when the suspect is in custody. (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 [128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298].) An interrogation is custodial when the suspect is placed under arrest or his freedom of movement is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) Whether an interrogation is custodial is an objective inquiry. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 270 [180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 322].) The United States Supreme Court has held the inquiry involves two discrete questions: " '[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave[?]' " (Id. at p. 270 .) In J.D.B., the United States Supreme Court concluded: "[W]e hold that so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test. This is not to say that a child's age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. . . . It is, however, a reality that courts cannot simply ignore." (Id. at p. 277 [180 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-327], fn. omitted.)
Federal courts have identified some factors which guide our analysis: (1) where the questioning occurred, (2) the number of officers present, (3) the degree of physical restraint placed on the defendant, (4) the length and manner of the questioning, and (5) whether the defendant was told he did not need to answer the questions. (United States v. Crooker (1st Cir. 2012) 688 F.3d 1, 11; United States v. Hinojosa (6th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 875, 883.) The California Supreme Court has similarly stated that all the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant in determining whether a defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda, including the location, length, and form of the interrogation and whether any indicia of arrest were present. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 395; see People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753 [listing the following indicia of custody for Miranda purposes: (1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning].)
In re Kenneth S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54, is instructive. The juvenile court in Kenneth S. reversed its order sustaining the petition and dismissed the petition with prejudice after finding the minor was in custody when he confessed without a Miranda warning. (Id. at p. 60.) In reversing the juvenile court, the Court of Appeal found: "Although respondent was brought into a room by himself, this was only with his foster mother's permission for him to talk to Detective Carranza alone. The room to which respondent was brought was only 10 feet from his foster mother, and the door to the room was kept partially open during the interview. Respondent spoke only with Detective Carranza, as there were no other officers in the interrogation room. While the interview was conducted in a section of the police station to which the public was not given free access, and respondent would have required the accompaniment of an officer to leave, this was insufficient to have led a reasonable person in respondent's position to understand that he was in custody." (Id. at p. 65.)
The minor was not questioned at a police station but at home. His mother was not in another room 10 feet away, but present during the questioning, which was conducted by only one officer. The questioning lasted only 20 minutes, and was done in a calm and professional manner, which are further indicia that the minor was not in custody. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1167 [identifying 30-minute duration and that the questioning was not "aggressive or particularly confrontational" as factors supporting a finding the defendant was not in custody].) The minor was not placed under arrest and was not ordered into the living room, but rather was asked to go there and complied with the request, which are also consistent with a finding that the minor was not in custody.
While the minor's age of 14 is a relevant factor in determining whether questioning is custodial, it is not dispositive. Here, the minor was subjected to a relatively brief questioning, in an unthreatening manner, at home, and in his mother's presence. The fact that he was 14 does not transform this into a custodial interrogation that warrants the protections established in Miranda. The juvenile court did not err in denying the Miranda motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, J. /s/_________
Duarte, J.