Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura, No. 2007012717, Bruce A. Young, Judge
Christina J. Alvarez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Javier Medina appeals from the judgment after his conviction by court trial of possession of cocaine base for sale and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351.5 & 11378); five weapon and ammunition offenses and giving false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12025, subd. (a)(1), 12031, subd. (a)(2)(A), 12316, subd. (b)(1) & 148.9, subd. (a)). The court also found true allegations that appellant had one prior felony strike conviction and that he was personally armed with a firearm (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1), 12022, subd. (c)). The court sentenced him to 12 years in state prison, including a 4-year middle term for possession of cocaine base for sale, doubled pursuant to sections 667, subdivision (e)(1) and 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c)(1); and a 4-year enhancement for being personally armed with a firearm, pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (c). It imposed concurrent sentences for the remaining offenses and enhancements. Appellant contends that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and admitting involuntary statements he made to investigating officers. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
BACKGROUND
On April 4, 2007, just after 5:00 p.m., California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Craig Williams drove into a parking lot in Oxnard. He noticed appellant sitting, slumped forward, in the driver's seat of a parked car. Thinking that appellant might be unconscious, Williams parked his patrol vehicle behind appellant's car and approached it. Two men, who had been outside the car, hurried away. When Williams reached the driver's side door, appellant looked up. He had a cell phone and an open address book on his lap. He dropped something on his car's floorboard. Williams saw an unopened beer can in the center console. He noticed that the car smelled like alcohol, the keys were in the ignition, and its hood felt warm.
Williams told appellant to step outside the car. When he complied, a metal container fell onto the pavement. Williams told appellant to identify himself and provide his birth date. Appellant responded with the name Rodolfo Garcia, and birth date of September 3, 1949. Williams attempted to verify that information but it did not match any listed identification card or license in any state. He saw something in appellant's back pocket that looked like a wallet and asked appellant to hand it to him. Appellant ignored him. Williams removed the wallet from appellant's pocket. It contained an identification card, with appellant's photograph, bearing the name Javier Medina and a December 3, 1949 birth date.
Williams arrested appellant for giving a peace officer a false name, and searched him. He found $871 cash in appellant's wallet and several of his pockets, including a one-dollar bill and some five, ten, twenty, and one-hundred dollar bills. The metal container that fell outside the car had five bindles of methamphetamine with a collective weight of 2.2 grams. Appellant's car contained another metal container with 14 bindles of cocaine salts with a collective weight of 8.6 grams. Williams found a loaded.25 caliber semiautomatic handgun between the driver's seat cushion and its thin seat cover.
Later, at the Ventura CHP office, appellant told Officer Manuel Fernandez that the drugs in the metal containers were not his but that they might belong to other people who used that car. He later stated that he was in the parking lot to sell cocaine and methamphetamine and that he had sold cocaine to a woman earlier that day. Appellant said that he would receive 20 percent of the sales proceeds and identified his supplier as "El Guerrero." He said that El Guerrero had delivered drugs to him at 4:00 p.m. that day. He also said that he was slumped over when Williams approached him because he was using his cell phone.
Appellant testified at trial and denied that anyone was near his car when Williams approached. He said that Williams never asked him for an identification card. Appellant denied that a container fell from the car when he got out. Appellant did not know there was a gun in the car.
Appellant denied that he gave Williams a false birth date or said that his name was Rodolfo Garcia. He showed Williams papers in Garcia's name that may have confused him. When Williams asked him to do the field sobriety tests, appellant explained, in Spanish, that he had arthritis and could not stand. The cash he carried was part of a $2,800 sum that he had since 2004.
Appellant admitted that he told the officer that he had sold drugs, but that was untrue. He made false statements regarding the drugs because the officer said that he would try to get him a deal for identifying his dealer. He also acknowledged that during his prior arrest, he gave the police a false identification. At the time of his prior arrest, he possessed methamphetamine and cocaine.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized During Detention
Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence because Williams unlawfully detained him, and unlawfully searched him and his vehicle. We disagree.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5, we view the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and defer to factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether the facts support the court's finding that the challenged search or seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384; People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 175.)
Williams testified at the hearing on the motion. At approximately 5:07 p.m., on April 4, 2007, he drove his CHP vehicle into a parking lot at the intersection of Vineyard and Stroube in Oxnard. He noticed appellant in a parked "purplish" car, sitting slumped forward in the driver's seat. He was concerned that appellant might be unconscious. He parked the CHP vehicle, with its passenger side door behind the trunk of the parked car. Two men who had been outside appellant's car hurried away, but appellant remained in the car, slumped forward. Williams activated the "rear ambers" of his CHP vehicle "to illuminate [his] presence to other people," and show that there was a car there because he "was kind of blocking the normal path of travel." He did not activate the siren or any other lights.
When Williams approached the driver's side of the parked car, appellant sat up quickly and tossed something in his left hand toward the floorboard. He had a cell phone in his right hand and an open notebook with a list of names. Williams could smell alcohol and saw a cold, unopened beer can in the center console. The car's hood was warm and its key was in the ignition.
Suspecting that appellant may have been driving under the influence of alcohol, Williams asked him to step outside the car. As appellant stepped out, a metal object fell from the floorboard onto the parking lot.
Williams asked appellant to identify himself. He responded that his name was Rodolfo Garcia, his birthday was September 3, 1949, but that he did not have any identification. Upon checking, Williams could not find any license or identification card in any state that matched that name and birth date. Williams tried to have appellant perform field sobriety tests. Instead of following directions, appellant stared blankly over Williams's shoulders, said nothing, and did not move. Williams used Spanish and English to communicate with appellant.
Williams saw a bulge that looked like a wallet in appellant's rear pants pocket. When he asked appellant to remove it, he neither complied nor responded. Williams retrieved the wallet and looked inside. He found a Mexican identification card bearing appellant's photograph, issued to Javier Medina, with a birth date of December 3, 1949. Williams arrested appellant for providing false identification to a peace officer.
Consensual Encounter or Detention?
"Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual's liberty. [Citations.] Our present inquiry concerns the distinction between consensual encounters and detentions. Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. [Citation.] Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. [Citation.] [¶] [A] detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions. [Citation.] As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual's liberty, does a seizure occur. [Citations.] '[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.' [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. [Citation.]" (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)
A Fourth Amendment detention generally occurs when the police park their vehicles so as to block an individual from driving away. (See, e.g., People v. Wilkins (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804, 809.) The People bear the burden of proving that a detention was justified. (People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) In this case, it is unclear whether the CHP vehicle blocked appellant's car, and thereby detained appellant. Even if appellant was detained when Williams parked behind his car, the detention was justified.
Law enforcement officers perform many tasks that have nothing to do with crime detection, including, "'community caretaking functions' - helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, assisting and protecting citizens in need...." (People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 467; People v. Madrid (2008)168 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1058.) Williams parked behind appellant's car after noticing that he was slumped in the driver's seat of a parked car, motionless, and thinking that he might be unconscious. His conduct was a reasonable exercise of his community caretaking functions.
Appellant makes the related argument that Williams lacked the authority to order him out of his car because he lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for driving under the influence of alcohol. We disagree.
An officer may temporarily detain a person to investigate possible criminal activity if the officer can point to specific articulable facts "that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230-231.) "[M]erely stepping out of the vehicle is a minimal intrusion upon privacy, far less than involved in a bodily search, a frisk, or a search of the vehicle. [Citation.]" (People v. Beal (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 216, 221.) Here, Williams articulated facts to support his suspicion that appellant might have been driving under the influence. He saw appellant slumped over, with his forehead facing down in a parked car. When he approached the car, it smelled like alcohol, its hood was warm, and the key was in the ignition. Under the circumstances, he acted reasonably in ordering appellant to step outside the car where he could observe his condition and determine if had been driving under the influence, or whether he was too intoxicated to drive safely upon leaving the parking lot. (Id. at pp. 220-221.)
We also reject appellant's argument that Williams unlawfully prolonged his detention because he "display[ed] no objective signs of intoxication." Williams had a legitimate basis for ordering appellant outside the car to determine if he had been driving under the influence, question him to determine his identity, and gather information to confirm or dispel his suspicion. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679.) Appellant provided Williams a name and birth date that did not match any recorded identification or license in any state. Williams asked appellant to perform field sobriety test tasks. Instead of complying, appellant stared blankly over Williams's shoulder, said nothing, and did not move. We reject appellant's claim that "a reasonable officer's suspicions would have been dispelled prior to this point."
Appellant further argues that Williams conducted an unlawful search and seizure by removing his wallet from his pocket. We disagree. In making this argument, appellant cites our decision in People v. Garcia (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 782, 787-788, an inapposite case. In Garcia, the defendant was riding a bicycle without an operative headlamp. An officer lawfully detained him for violating Vehicle Code section 2120l, subdivision (d), and requested his identification. Garcia, who spoke limited English, said that he had no identification. He did not provide a false name and birth date. The officer then started to pat Garcia down, and used force to restrain him when he pulled away. He continued the search and located incriminating evidence. Under those circumstances, this court concluded that the search was unlawful. (People v. Garcia, supra, at pp. 784-785, 789.)
Appellant's situation is more akin to that of the defendant in People v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, where the court upheld the seizure of a wallet. In Loudermilk, officers stopped a hitchhiking defendant who matched the description of a person suspected of committing a firearm assault. The officers asked the defendant to produce identification and the defendant responded that he did not have any. One of the officers then performed a patdown search for weapons and felt what appeared to be a wallet in the defendant's rear pocket. The officer reached in, removed the wallet, opened it, and began searching for identification. (Id. at p. 1000.) Noting that the right to inquire into a suspect's identity is necessary for an effective investigatory detention, the court stated that "[t]o require defendant... to display his driver's license or other proof of identification is a minor intrusion which is strictly limited to the sole justification of the detention." (Id. at p. 1002; see Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1) "[T]he Terry suspect may not lie to the officer with impunity about his identity if there is a quick and minimally intrusive method of resolving the doubt." (People v. Loudermilk, supra, at p. 1002.) The court concluded that the seizure of the defendant's wallet was reasonably related to the purpose and scope of the investigative detention and that the officer was not conducting a general "'fishing expedition'" for whatever evidence he could find, but merely seeking to ascertain the defendant's identity. (Ibid.) Where the defendant had "lied to the officer and himself created the confusion as to his own identity... [,] the seizure of [his] wallet was minimal and strictly limited to the legitimate inquiry into his identity." (Id. at p. 1004.)
Appellant stresses that contrary to this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant before they seized the wallet. (People v. Loudermilk, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1006.) Nonetheless, Williams had a legitimate basis for detaining appellant in view of his misleading, bizarre behavior. He provided a false name and birth date, claimed he had no identification, and failed to comply when asked to perform a field sobriety test, and when asked to produce his wallet. He also stood motionless and stared over Williams's shoulder. Like any detained suspect, appellant was not free to "lie to the officer with impunity about his identity if there [was] a quick and minimally intrusive method of resolving the doubt." (Id. at p. 1002.) Under the circumstances, Williams's seizure of appellant's wallet was a minimally intrusive method to obtain his identity rather than a general fishing expedition. (Id. at pp. 1002-1006.) The court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence.
Admission of Appellant's Post Arrest Statements
We also reject appellant's contention that the court erred by admitting involuntary statements into evidence. Appellant objected to the admission of his statements for the first time during trial.
CHP Officer Fernandez testified that he spoke with appellant in the Ventura CHP office briefing room shortly after 5:43 p.m., on April 4. He advised him of his constitutional rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) Appellant invoked his rights and declined to speak with him. Fernandez went about his business in the office. Within an hour, appellant asked Fernandez several questions about what had happened, the scene, and "possibly even the items that were found." Fernandez then asked appellant if he had decided he wanted to talk. He said he did. Fernandez again advised him of his constitutional rights. He indicated that he understood his rights and wanted to speak with Fernandez. Fernandez interviewed appellant for approximately 45 minutes, from the time that he waived his rights.
In speaking with appellant, Fernandez sought information regarding his supplier rather than facts about his drug sales. Appellant initially denied that the drugs were his. He said they might belong to other people who used his car. Fernandez told appellant he did not believe him. He also told appellant that the officers would contact the prosecutor's office based on information appellant provided; that it was possible they could work with him and make a deal; that appellant was facing serious charges; and that it was in his best interest to tell the truth. He never told appellant what to say or what words he wanted to hear before he would contact the prosecutor's office or said that he would be punished more harshly if he did not tell the truth, or that he would put in a good word for appellant at the prosecutor's office if he admitted selling drugs.
After Fernandez said that he did not believe him, appellant admitted that he had been selling cocaine and methamphetamine during the past several months and that he sold a baggie of cocaine to a woman that day. He was slumped in his car because he was using a cell phone. Appellant told Fernandez that his supplier had placed drugs in the compartment of the driver's side door of his car earlier that day. Appellant gave Fernandez his supplier's nickname.
Appellant also testified about his interview with Fernandez. He said that after advising him of his rights, Fernandez said that if he "wanted to tell them who sold the drugs to [him,] they could get [him] a deal with the courts or with the DA's office, that they [would] give [him] less time if [he] told them." Appellant thought it was a good deal because he would get less time or possibly no jail time. According to appellant, Fernandez asked if he would be willing to get more drugs from his supplier. Another investigator then said that appellant was a liar and had not provided enough information to find his supplier.
Appellant further testified that he did tell the officers that he sold drugs, including a bag of cocaine on the day of his arrest. Those were untrue statements that he made to get a deal. He actually purchased $150 of cocaine for his personal use and he knew nothing about the methamphetamine.
"An involuntary confession may not be introduced into evidence at trial. [Citation.] The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily made. [Citations.] In determining whether a confession was voluntary, '"[t]he question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not 'essentially free' because his [or her] will was overborne."' [Citation.] Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.] '"On appeal, the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court's finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review."' [Citation.]" (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 169.)
"'... [M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary....'" (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) An improper promise by police does not require exclusion of a confession, unless "the promise was a motivating factor in the giving of the statement." (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 874.)
Appellant claims that Fernandez induced him to admit that he sold cocaine by underscoring the seriousness of the charges (which implied that he could receive a severe penalty) and then promising appellant that if he told Fernandez the truth, he would seek leniency for him. Consequently, he argues that his incriminating statements were involuntary and inadmissible. We disagree.
Police may urge "a suspect to tell the truth by factually outlining the benefits that may flow from confessing...." (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Fernandez testified that he sought information regarding appellant's suppliers rather than information regarding appellant's sale of drugs to anyone. While he told appellant that if he told the truth, the officers could speak with the prosecutors and try to get him a deal, Fernandez never told appellant what he had to say before he would contact the prosecutor's office. Nor did he say that appellant would be punished more harshly if he did not tell the truth, or that he would put in a good word for appellant at the prosecutor's office if he admitted selling drugs. Fernandez "did no more than tell defendant the benefit that might flow... '"naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct'" [citation]...." (Id. at p. 116.)
The court found that by the time appellant initiated his contact with Fernandez, the officers had already concluded that he "was selling drugs," and that their main interest in speaking with him was to obtain information regarding suppliers. It concluded that no improper promises had been made to obtain his statements and properly denied appellant's motion to exclude them. Substantial evidence supports its findings on conflicting factual issues. From our independent review of the record, we conclude that appellant's statements were voluntary. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 827.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.