Opinion
D073725
08-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE OSMIN LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. INF1500036) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Anthony R. Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed. Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Jose Osmin Lopez of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 by force (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 2). The trial court sentenced Lopez to prison for eight years.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Lopez appeals, contending (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it did not allow him to present expert witness testimony to explain how police interrogation techniques used to elicit Lopez's partial confession could lead to a false confession and (2) his right to present a complete defense as well as his right to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments was violated. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2008, Lopez dated the aunt of the victim, Jane Doe. Doe was about 10 years old. Doe and her family celebrated her grandmother's birthday at her aunt's home in Coachella. Lopez was at the party and asked Doe to accompany him into the garage to get a CD. Lopez and Doe went into the garage toward his pickup truck. Doe climbed up to the bed of the pickup and sat down. Lopez told Doe's special needs cousin to turn off the lights in the garage. The garage was dimly lit. Lopez sat down next to Doe, suddenly placed his hand inside her shorts, and touched her vagina in an up and down stroking motion. Doe told Lopez, "[N]o." Lopez then grabbed Doe's hand and made her touch his groin area. Doe got off the truck and went into the house.
During the summer of 2008, Doe played Marco Polo with her cousins in her aunt's pool. Lopez also was in the pool. Doe had her eyes closed and was positioned in the water like she was sitting in a chair but floating at the same time. Doe suddenly felt somebody touch her vagina over her bikini bottom. When she opened her eyes, she saw Lopez near her. She immediately got out of the pool and went into the house.
Doe later disclosed both of her inappropriate interactions with Lopez to her cousin. In July 2012, the cousin told Doe's mother about the incidents. That same month, a report was made to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department. Due to shortages in personnel, the investigation was suspended for over two years.
In November 2014, Doe's case was reassigned to Riverside County Sheriff Department Investigator Damen Butvidas. Butvidas arranged for a forensic interview of Doe with child abuse specialists. Butvidas then coordinated pretext phone calls between Doe and Lopez on December 1, 2014 and December 10, 2014, hoping Lopez would corroborate Doe's allegations. However, during those calls, Lopez denied any wrongdoing. Butvidas subsequently called Lopez and asked him to appear at the sheriff's station for an interview.
On December 11, 2014, Butvidas talked to Lopez for the first of three interviews at the sheriff's station. For the first interview, Investigator Lisandro Tijerina initially assisted Butvidas as an interpreter. The investigators provided a Beheler admonishment to Lopez, and they spoke for about an hour. For the first 45 minutes, Butvidas used Tijerina solely as an interpreter. Later, Butvidas and Tijerina conferred in private and agreed to let Tijerina interview Lopez alone because they thought Lopez would be more comfortable talking directly with a Spanish speaking investigator without an interpreter.
California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121. In that case, the suspect voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the station and was specifically told he was not under arrest. The court determined that no warning needed to be given under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) because the suspect was not in custody. (Beheler, supra, at pp. 1122-1225.)
Tijerina then interviewed Lopez alone for less than 10 minutes. Tijerina told Lopez he knew Lopez was lying about the incidents. But Lopez denied Doe's allegations and left the station. Tijerina had no further involvement with the investigation.
On January 6, 2015, Lopez went to the sheriff's station for a second interview. During this interview, Lopez submitted to a polygraph examination that was administered by Detective Dave Rios. After the polygraph test, Rios told Lopez that he failed the test. Lopez then admitted to Rios that he touched Doe in the swimming pool out of curiosity. However, he still denied the incident in the garage.
The account of the polygraph examination was related to the trial court during a motion hearing. The police destroyed all charts and notes from the polygraph examination.
No evidence regarding the polygraph examination or Rios's interview of Lopez was admitted at trial.
Lopez subsequently reiterated to Butvidas, during a separate interrogation after the polygraph examination, that he touched Doe in the pool out of curiosity. Although Lopez admitted to touching Lopez in the pool, he continued to deny the April 2008 incident in the garage. Lopez wrote Doe an apology note, gave it to Butvidas, and left the station.
On January 9, 2015, Lopez visited the sheriff's station for the third interview. Butvidas read Lopez his Miranda rights and placed him under arrest. Lopez again admitted to touching Doe over her bathing suit. However, he denied any other touching occurred.
The three interviews with Lopez were audio and video recorded and played before the jury.
DISCUSSION
I
EXCLUSION OF EXPERT WITNESS
A. Lopez's Contentions
Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding an expert witness who would have testified about false confessions. Specifically, Lopez claims "there was no reasonable basis to exclude [the expert's testimony] considering how important it was to [his] defense." In addition, he argues that the trial court's exclusion of the expert witness denied him his right to a complete defense as well as his right to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject these contentions.
B. Background
Lopez moved in limine to suppress his partial confession, arguing it was illegally obtained before he received any Miranda warning. In the alternative, Lopez sought leave to offer the expert opinions of Dr. Veronica Thomas regarding the psychology of and factors leading to a false confession. Specifically, Lopez represented that he would offer Thomas's expert testimony "regarding the phenomenon of false confessions, the types of interrogation techniques that create the risk that a suspect will confess falsely, the kinds of individuals who may be vulnerable to such techniques, the failure of police training regarding the dangers of such confessions, and the difficulties in determining whether or not a particular statement is accurate."
During the hearing on the motions in limine, Lopez's trial counsel argued that Lopez's partial confession was false. He explained that he asked Thomas "to look at the three pretexts calls. I have asked her to look at the post polygraph interview by Rios and Butvidas as well as the Mirandized interview three days later and to give an opinion about whether or not the admission was a false confession. . . . [¶] False confession defenses are well-known defenses. She is a well-known false confession psychologist expert. . . . [S]he certainly was in a position to give an opinion about whether or not this was a false confession."
The trial court expressed concern about Thomas using the polygraph examination and/or the results of the examination because such evidence is prohibited under Evidence Code section 351.1. Defense counsel replied that he was "not going to talk about the result of the polygraph exam in any way[.]" However, Lopez's counsel indicated that he wanted to tell the jury that Lopez took a polygraph exam, was told he failed it, and then confessed to the pool incident. Counsel believed such evidence would better allow the jury to properly weigh the partial confession.
Lopez's trial counsel later explained the importance of Thomas's proposed testimony regarding the defense theory at trial:
"So without the ability to have my expert testify fully in this case regarding the particularities of this particular case and this particular defendant and why she believes his confession is false, I mean it does not do much good to either use her or to certainly stand alone and argue about the polys. [¶] So that's my request, that if the Court is inclined to allow Dr. Thomas to testify, that she be allowed to testify regarding her testing of this defendant, her examination of the particularities in this case including the post polygraph interview, the one-hour interview before, the three pretext calls, and to make the opinion based on all of that that this defendant was overborne."
The trial court found that the jury would not need expert witness testimony to "understand and evaluate" Lopez's partial confession. In making its ruling, the court emphasized that the defense would be allowed to question the pretext calls, the interrogation tactics of the investigators, and "the different interviews that [investigators] had with [Lopez]." The court also made clear that the prosecutor could not mention "the polygraph, any results, anything having to do with the polygraph." In addition, the court determined that Lopez's partial confession was voluntary, and there was no Miranda violation.
Thomas did testify at trial on behalf of Lopez. She opined that Lopez did not have a "deviant sexual interest in minor children."
Lopez does not challenge here the trial court's ruling that his partial confession was voluntary and did not violate Miranda.
C. Analysis
Admitting expert testimony relating to allegedly false confessions is subject to the trial court's discretion. And we will reverse only if an abuse of discretion is shown. (People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1205 (Ramos).)
The leading case on the admissibility of expert testimony concerning false confessions is Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 684, 690-691 (Crane), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the manner in which a criminal defendant's voluntary confession is obtained is admissible to show that the confession is unreliable. Accordingly, "where the prosecutor's case is based on the defendant's confession, the defense must be permitted to delve into the circumstances under which the confession was secured. (Crane, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 689.)" (People v. Page (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161, 185 (Page); Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205.) However, Crane does not compel admission of all expert testimony relating to a false confession. It only precludes "blanket exclusion" of all evidence relating to the circumstances of a confession. (Ramos, supra, at p. 1206; Page, supra, at p. 185.)
For example, in Page, the defendant, who had been jogging with the victim a month before her body was discovered, confessed to the killing after a lengthy interrogation, but later recanted. At trial, he testified that false statements made to him by the police caused him to question his own perception of reality. The defendant sought to introduce a psychologist's expert testimony falling into three categories: "(1) the general psychological factors which might lead to an unreliable confession, along with descriptions of the supporting experiments; (2) the particular evidence in [the defendant's] taped statements which indicated that those psychological factors were present in this case; and (3) the reliability of [the defendant's] confession, given the overall method of interrogation." (Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 183; italics omitted.) The trial court permitted testimony from the first category, but excluded the other two categories of evidence. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that, unlike the defendant in Crane, supra, 476 U.S. 683, the defendant in Page was not denied the opportunity to present a false confession defense. He was allowed to explore the physical and psychological environment in which the confession was made, and the psychologist was allowed to testify as to the psychological factors that can lead to a false confession. (Page, supra, at pp. 185-186.)
In Ramos, the defendant was convicted of four counts of attempted murder based in part on his statement to police that, after an altercation with rival gang members, he aimed a handgun at the rival gang members' fleeing car and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of an expert on police interrogation techniques and false confessions. The trial court excluded the expert testimony, finding no evidentiary basis for an opinion that the confession was false, notwithstanding evidence that the defendant made the confession based on promises of leniency. (Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1204-1205.) The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that, unlike in Crane, supra, 476 U.S. 683, the trial court did not make a blanket exclusion of all evidence related to the circumstances of the defendant's confession; on the contrary, the defendant introduced evidence of the interrogation techniques used on him and other witnesses. (Ramos, supra, at p. 1206; see People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 224, 240-241 [no abuse of discretion to preclude sociologist from testifying about police tactics used to wear down suspects into making false confessions where there was no evidence that the police had engaged in any tactics to wear down the defendant].)
Here, Lopez argues the instant matter is analogous to Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 161. We disagree. In Page, the police began questioning the defendant at 10:12 a.m. in a windowless room. (Id. at p. 170.) At that time, he was Mirandized and waived his Miranda rights. Over the next 15 or so hours, the police interviewed the defendant multiple times (resulting in four taped statements), including subjecting him to a polygraph examination. The police lied to the defendant, telling him that they found his fingerprints at the crime scene and a witness had seen his car near the crime scene. During this ordeal, the defendant confessed to killing his girlfriend, but later recanted his confession when he spoke with the deputy district attorney. Eventually, sometime after the defendant's fourth taped statement, which began about 1:00 a.m., the police arrested him. (Id. at pp. 170-176.)
In contrast to Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 161, here the investigators interviewed Lopez the first time for about an hour. He was not read his Miranda rights and was told he could leave whenever he wanted to do so. He returned to the sheriff's station at a later date when he was administered a polygraph examination. After the polygraph examination, he met again with Butvidas and admitted to the pool incident. Lopez never recanted to the investigators. Unlike the police in Page, there is no indication that the investigators lied to Lopez.
In a postarrest interview, Lopez told Thomas that he did not molest Doe.
In addition, in Page, the defendant testified at length about the interrogation process. (Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 177-179.) Moreover, the defendant explained that the police's false statements caused him "to question his own perception of reality." (Id. at p. 178.) However, at trial below, Lopez did not testify about his perception during his interviews or why he may have been forced to confess. Indeed, Lopez did not testify at trial.
Perhaps to fill this void, Lopez represents here that Thomas planned to testify at trial that the investigator's tactics influenced Lopez to falsely confess to avoid charges that would lead to deportation. However, there is no indication how Thomas knew Lopez believed he would not be deported if he confessed. And Lopez does explain why expert testimony would be needed to explain his motivation to the jury.
Nevertheless, Lopez does share one similarity with the defendant in Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 161. Both submitted to polygraph examinations. Yet, in Page, evidence of the defendant's polygraph examination was presented to the jury. In the instant matter, there was no mention of Lopez's polygraph examination to the jury.
Although Lopez does not present a cogent argument why Thomas's expert testimony was necessary to support his defense that he falsely confessed, it appears that the polygraph examination is central to his theory. Lopez did not confess to any wrongdoing during the three pretext telephone calls. Lopez did not confess that he improperly touched Doe during his first interview with Butvidas and Tijerina. However, after his second interview, where he took the polygraph examination and Rios told him that he failed, Lopez confessed to Rios that he touched Doe's vagina in the pool. He then confessed in a separate, short interview with Butvidas. Against this backdrop, it appears Lopez asserts the polygraph examination is the catalyst that precipitated his false confession. This assertion would have required the parties to extensively litigate the polygraph examination.
California courts have found that the results of a polygraph examination have no probative value in criminal trials. (See People v. Wilkenson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 849.) Absent a stipulation of all parties, "the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal proceeding[.]" (Evid. Code, § 351.1, subd. (a).) Additionally, the giving of a polygraph examination, in and of itself, does not inherently render an interrogation coercive and/or a confession false. (See People v. Brown (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 116, 127 [" 'Where the evidence shows that before he confessed the defendant took a lie detector test, if it was taken willingly, neither the fact it was given nor the fact that the defendant was told by the test giver it revealed in his opinion that the defendant was not telling the truth, inherently demonstrates coercion.' "].)
Here, Lopez implies that Rios's questioning of him, after the polygraph examination, caused him to make a false confession. Specifically, Rios told Lopez that he failed the polygraph examination. Lopez argues Rios's statement is what led him to admit to something he did not do. However, implicit in Lopez's argument is that Rios was either lying about the results of the polygraph examination or, if Rios was not lying, he administered the examination incorrectly. Either way, Lopez would have had to challenge the giving of the examination and/or the results of examination. Because the results of the examination were destroyed before trial, Lopez would have had to establish how the polygraph was administered to him and then call an expert witness to opine that the method was improper. Alternatively stated, Lopez would have to establish that there was something incorrect in the way the test was administered or that Rios lied about the results to show the polygraph examination had any improper impact on his partial confession. Indeed, if Rios truthfully told Lopez that he failed the polygraph examination, such a statement could not be coercive, especially in a situation like the instant matter where Lopez took the polygraph examination willingly. Thus, the issue of the polygraph examination would have required extensive litigation, wherein Lopez would have questioned and the prosecution would have defended the results of an examination that California courts and the Legislature have determined has no probative value in criminal trials. (See People v. Wilkenson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 849; Evid. Code, § 351.1, subd. (a).) The trial court was well within its discretion to prohibit any testimony about the polygraph examination.
Absent the polygraph examination, Lopez does not offer any persuasive argument why Thomas's expert testimony about false confessions was needed. Defense counsel was permitted to explore the pretext calls, the multiple investigator interviews, and the techniques used in both the calls and the interviews. Counsel could cross-examine the witnesses participating in the calls and interviews. Indeed, Butvidas and Tijerina testified at trial, and defense counsel cross-examined them about their participation in the interviews of Lopez. All the interviews were videotaped. The tapes were played for the jury. The jury also was provided with transcripts of the interviews. Lopez's trial attorney could point out that Lopez did not admit guilt in the pretext calls or the first interview. Moreover, when he did admit guilt, Lopez only admitted to the pool incident and steadfastly denied that he ever touched Doe while in the garage. In short, the trial court gave defense counsel significant latitude to explore the sheriff's investigative and interview techniques to argue the partial confession was false. Further, with this evidence before the jury, it could decide for itself whether Lopez might have confessed to a crime he did not commit due to coercive interrogation techniques. (See Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207 [no abuse of discretion "[b]ecause the jury could understand and evaluate all the evidence presented at [the] trial without the assistance of an expert on police interrogation"].)
We acknowledge that Lopez cites to multiple federal and non-California state cases in which courts found error in prohibiting the testimony of expert witnesses regarding police interrogations and false confessions. However, we do not find these cases helpful here because they do not explain how the trial court below abused its discretion in prohibiting Thomas's testimony about false confessions. Put differently, these cases on which Lopez relies do not and cannot address the factual situation facing the court below. Moreover, there is no requirement under federal or California law that a trial court must allow a defendant to call an expert witness regarding police interrogation techniques and false confessions. Instead, such a determination rests squarely within the trial court's discretion. (Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205.)
Further, during closing argument, defense counsel asserted that Lopez's confession was false. To this end, Lopez's trial counsel pointed out that Lopez did not admit to any wrongdoing despite the three pretext calls where Doe told him that she would not report the touching if he apologized. Defense counsel noted that both Butvidas and Tijerina questioned Lopez for 45 minutes, but Lopez did not admit to touching Doe. Then Tijerina questioned Lopez to no avail. Counsel then told the jury that Lopez made up the "cockamamy story of the pool" because he was of lower intelligence and was concerned he would be deported if he was prosecuted.
During closing argument, defense counsel admitted the tactics used by Butvidas and Tijerina were "authorized[.]"
During closing argument, defense counsel argued Lopez was threatened with deportation unless he confessed. However, Lopez does not provide any citation to the record where his immigration status was discussed during trial, except that he was born in El Salvador. --------
Additionally, this is not the case, like Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 161, wherein the interrogation techniques were complex, the defendant was questioned multiple times over a 16-hour period, law enforcement lied during questioning, and the defendant confessed but later recanted. (Id. at pp. 170-176.) Indeed, Lopez does not point to specific portions of the transcript where the investigators engaged in tactics designed to elicit a false confession. This case is much closer to Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, where the court determined that an expert witness was not needed to explain the interrogation techniques to the jury. (Id. at p. 1207.)
We therefore do not conclude the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting Thomas's testimony because we cannot say that the trial court's ruling was arbitrary or beyond the bounds of reason in light of all of the circumstances. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
For similar reasons, we find meritless Lopez's argument that his rights to present a defense and to a fair trial were violated. Lopez's argument is entirely contingent upon the exclusion of his police interrogation and false confession expert witness. As we discuss above, the court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Thomas's testimony. "[A]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense." (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.) Lopez makes no argument that takes the instant matter outside this general principle. Unlike Crane, supra, 476 U.S. 683, here there was no blanket exclusion of evidence concerning the sheriff's questioning of Lopez. (See Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206.) Although trial counsel did not allow Thomas to testify about law enforcement interrogation techniques, it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine the investigators about their interrogation techniques and question the pretext calls. And Lopez's trial counsel argued to the jury that Lopez's partial confession was false. Lopez was not prevented from presenting his defense that he falsely confessed. Consequently, Lopez has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J. I CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. AARON, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the issue of the polygraph examination, and in particular, the fact that appellant was told that he had failed the polygraph, is integral to appellant's argument; appellant maintains that he confessed to having improperly touched Doe in the pool only after he was told that he had failed the polygraph examination. As the majority states, Lopez argues that "the polygraph examination is the catalyst that precipitated his false confession." I also agree with the majority that evidence pertaining to the polygraph examination is not admissible, and that as a result, the trial court did not err in precluding Lopez from presenting expert testimony that would necessarily revolve around the impact of Lopez having been told that he had failed the polygraph examination.
However, to the extent that the majority opinion's discussion of People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194 (Ramos), indicates its approval of the opinion in that case, I disagree. In Ramos, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony regarding police interrogation techniques and false confessions. The defendant argued that this testimony, " 'would have let the jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it, and how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case being tried.' " (Id. at p. 1205.) The defendant maintained that informing the jury that "certain police interrogation techniques have a tendency to produce unreliable acknowledgements of guilt would have served to refute the commonly held notion that people do not confess to crimes that they did not commit." (Ibid.) The trial court excluded the expert testimony, asserting that, " '[T]here is absolutely not a shred of evidence before us at this point to render a basis . . . for any opinion by [the expert witness] that the confession was false,' " (id. at p. 1204)—despite the defendant's proffer of the testimony of defendant's mother, who was present during the interrogation, that the defendant had confessed only after promises of leniency were made to him by the interrogating law enforcement officer. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the expert witness testimony, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision. (Id. at p. 1207.) In reaching its decision, the court noted that the trial court had not excluded all evidence related to the circumstances of the defendant's confession, but instead, had permitted the defendant to cross-examine the interrogating officer extensively regarding the interrogation techniques he employed in questioning Ramos, and to call other witnesses who testified that the same officer had threatened them and attempted to coerce statements from them. (Id. at p. 1206.) The Ramos court concluded that this was sufficient under Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683. (Ramos, at pp. 1206-1207.)
I disagree with the Ramos court's holding. Where the defense is relying on the contention that the defendant's confession is false and there is evidence in the record to support that contention, such as evidence of promises of leniency or coercion by law enforcement officers, in my view, a trial court would abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to present expert testimony regarding the psychology of, and factors leading to, a false confession.
In this case, contrary to the trial court's comment that the jury would not need an expert witness to understand and evaluate Lopez's partial confession, in fact, it is not widely recognized among members of the public that people do confess to crimes that they did not commit. Upon learning that a person has confessed to a crime but now maintains his innocence, many people would ask, "Why would someone confess to a crime that he did not commit?" The answer to this question is "sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact." (Evid. Code, § 801(a).) Extensive cross-examination of the interrogating officer regarding the interrogation techniques employed and testimony of other witnesses that the interrogating officer had previously threatened and coerced them, as in Ramos, cannot take the place of expert testimony explaining the psychology of this phenomenon and the factors that can lead a suspect to falsely confess.
While I believe that trial courts should allow expert witness testimony concerning the psychology of, and factors that may lead to, false confessions where the defendant maintains that he falsely confessed to the charged offense, in this case, I conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit Lopez to present such expert testimony because the testimony would necessarily have required the admission of inadmissible evidence pertaining to the polygraph examination of Lopez.
AARON, J.