Opinion
B321427
09-19-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERTO E. KOURCHENKO, Defendant and Appellant.
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. KA119661, Victor D. Martinez, Judge.
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, P. J.
Roberto Kourchenko appeals from a judgment which sentences him to 30 years to life in state prison for two counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b).) Kourchenko contends the trial court prejudicially erred on two grounds when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to the police: (1) he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and (2) his confession was involuntary. We affirm.
All further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTS
The victim's mother and Kourchenko's ex-wife are sisters. The victim's father, a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy, had a close friendship with Kourchenko. The victim often slept over at Kourchenko's home when the latter was still married to her aunt because the victim viewed Kourchenko's daughter (the victim's cousin) "like a younger sister" and their home as a "safe space."
1. The Sexual Abuse
During one such sleepover, when the victim was eight years old, Kourchenko sexually abused her. The victim recalled she wore her favorite purple monkey pajamas that night and was sleeping in her cousin's full-sized bed. She was sleeping on her left side, facing her cousin, when she felt Kourchenko lay next to her on the bed. He pulled her hips so her bottom touched his groin, put his hand over her mouth, and put his other hand over her underwear. When she attempted to make noise and move away, he shushed her. She recognized it was Kourchenko by his voice. He then put his fingers inside her underwear and between her outer labia, which hurt her. He eventually stopped, got up, and left. The victim did not tell anyone about this incident because she did not think anyone would believe her. She also did not fully understand what had happened to her.
In 2013, Kourchenko and the victim's aunt separated and Kourchenko moved into an apartment in the City of Arcadia. The victim continued to encounter Kourchenko due to her father's friendship with him. Shortly after Kourchenko moved to Arcadia, his daughter begged the victim, now nine or ten years old, to sleep over with her at his new apartment. The victim agreed and slept over two nights. When it was time to go to bed on the first night, Kourchenko instructed the victim to sleep in his room, telling her he would sleep with his daughter in her bedroom.
Dreading another incident, the victim attempted to lock the bedroom door, but the lock did not work. She was partially awake when she heard the door open later that night. As before, Kourchenko got in bed behind her, pulled her body against his, put his hand in her underwear, rubbed her labia, and then put his finger between the labia. On the second night, Kourchenko again touched her labia but the amount of time "was much shorter." When the victim went home, she tried to act like nothing happened because she did not think her parents would believe her.
In seventh grade, the victim's best friend disclosed to her that his mother had experienced a sexual assault when she was young. The victim then gradually revealed to the friend that her uncle had touched her inappropriately. The best friend encouraged her to tell her parents, but she was too scared to do so. In November 2018, her freshman year of high school, the victim told her older sister of the abuse, and the sister told their mother. The victim's mother reported the sexual assault to the police.
2. Kourchenko's Statements to Law Enforcement
On November 20, 2018, El Monte Police Detective George Fierro interviewed Kourchenko with his partner, Detective Carlos Molina. In total, five or six officers from the El Monte Police Department arrived at Kourchenko's home in Glendora at eight in the morning. Only Fierro and Molina approached the front door; the other officers positioned themselves in the back and sides of the house "in case he tried to flee and for officer safety."
When Kourchenko answered the door, Fierro and Molina introduced themselves and told him, "We need you to come down to the police department with us and, uh, talk to us about some stuff ...." Kourchenko agreed but asked to go upstairs to get his identification and change his clothes. The detectives told him to "stay here" while Kourchenko's fiancee and Fierro went upstairs to collect those items. Fierro, Molina, and one other officer drove Kourchenko to the El Monte police station. During the ride to the station, Fierro told Kourchenko, "Roberto, you know that you're not under arrest, right?" Kourchenko indicated he knew.
The police interactions with Kourchenko on November 20, 2018, were recorded. Transcripts of his statements to the detectives at his home, in the police car, and at the police station were submitted to the trial court in connection with Kourchenko's motion to suppress. At trial, portions of the audio recording of the interview at the police station were played to the jury and a certified transcript of that interview was admitted into evidence.
At the preliminary hearing, Molina explained they kept Kourchenko downstairs and within sight for officer safety because they were unsure whether he had any weapons in his home.
At the police station, Molina repeated, "the first thing is I want to explain to you is that you're not under arrest, do you understand that?" Kourchenko confirmed his understanding and that he was not threatened or harmed to come to the police station. Molina further offered Kourchenko breaks for water, smoking, or to use the restroom. He explained, "when you're done and you don't want to talk to me anymore, that's all you've got to do, just tell me, hey, I don't want to talk to you anymore. And then, we'll go from there, okay?"
Kourchenko acknowledged he knew the purpose of the interview because the victim had called him the previous day and accused him of touching her inappropriately. During the first half of the approximately two and one-half hour interview, Kourchenko denied touching the victim.
The police arranged for the pretext call from the victim to Kourchenko.
The detectives pressed him to help the victim overcome her severe depression and mental health issues arising from the sexual abuse. They emphasized her credibility, citing to her recall of the details of the incidents and falsely asserting she had passed a polygraph test. When Kourchenko continued to deny the abuse, they suggested Kourchenko's DNA would likely still be on the victim's purple monkey pajamas, which she had kept.
At several points, Kourchenko asked whether he should contact a lawyer. The detectives either avoided the question or, in one instance, told him a lawyer would not be able to answer his questions. At this time, Kourchenko confirmed, "I'm not getting arrested." When the detectives asked whether he would take a polygraph test, he agreed, they discussed possible dates, and Molina left the interview room to schedule one.
Fierro continued to press Kourchenko to help the victim. Kourchenko stated he needed to explain what was happening to his fiancee. Fierro told Kourchenko he could call her when they were available but he did not want to interrupt the interview to allow Kourchenko to speak to her.
Kourchenko then confessed to Fierro, "it's possible that, that I touched her inappropriately, but I didn't put my finger in." Kourchenko explained he was going through a tough time with his divorce and he "wanted love" but did not intend to hurt the victim. He denied touching anyone else. Kourchenko demonstrated on Fierro's hand how and where he touched her. When Molina returned, Fierro left the room, and Kourchenko admitted it happened three times and he put his finger "in between her lips." He also demonstrated on Molina's hand. Kourchenko was arrested immediately after the interview.
3. The Motion to Suppress
Kourchenko was charged by information with three counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger in violation of section 288.7, subdivision (b).
At the preliminary hearing, Kourchenko moved to suppress his confession to the detectives for all purposes because he was in custody and not Mirandized. Kourchenko argued the officers arrived at his home, insisted he accompany them to the police station, and limited his movement in his own home when he asked to go upstairs to retrieve his identification and change his clothes.
The prosecution opposed the motion to suppress, arguing Kourchenko agreed to go to the police station, was told multiple times that he was not under arrest, was not handcuffed, and the interrogation room door was left open. The detectives further told Kourchenko he could take a break or otherwise end the interview.
The court (Judge Steven D. Blades) denied the suppression motion, finding Kourchenko was not in custody simply because he was questioned at the police station. The court found persuasive that Kourchenko was told multiple times that he was not under arrest, that he could tell them he did not want to talk to them anymore, that he was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and that the door to the interview room was not locked. The court found a reasonable person in Kourchenko's position could conclude he would be able to leave because he asked when he could get to work and believed he could come back another day for a polygraph test. The trial court (Judge Victor D. Martinez) later declined to reconsider Judge Blades's ruling on whether Kourchenko's confession was admissible under Miranda.
4. The Trial
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from the victim, her best friend, and her aunt, who was Kourchenko's ex-wife. Portions of Kourchenko's recorded interview were played to the jury and a transcript of it, including a translation from the Spanish-language portions of the interview, was admitted into evidence. The jury also saw a video, which Fierro narrated, that showed Kourchenko demonstrating how and where he touched the victim using Molina's hand to simulate a vagina.
Kourchenko explained to the detectives that his father was Russian but he was raised in Mexico.
The defense presented testimony from Dr. Richard Leo, an expert on police interrogation, false confessions, and psychological coercions. Dr. Leo explained that an interrogation presumes guilt and the goal is to break down denials and get a confession. He further testified that certain interrogation techniques, which were used on Kourchenko, could be effective in getting confessions, including false confessions.
The jury found Kourchenko guilty of two counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger under section 288.7, subdivision (b) but was deadlocked on the third count. The court dismissed the third count and imposed consecutive life terms with a minimum term of 15 years, along with other penalties and fines, on the first two counts.
Kourchenko timely appealed. (§ 1237.)
DISCUSSION
Kourchenko argues his confession at the police station was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and it was coerced by Fierro and Molina. He does not challenge the admission of his statements at his home or in the detectives' car.
1. Miranda Advisements Were Not Required Because Kourchenko Was Not in Custody
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"A statement obtained in violation of a suspect's Miranda rights may not be admitted to establish guilt in a criminal case." (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 339.) A Miranda warning is required only when a suspect has been taken into custody, that is, there has been a "formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) "When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have understood his situation. [Citation.] All the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the location, length and form of the interrogation, the degree to which the investigation was focused on the defendant, and whether any indicia of arrest were present." (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395 (Moore).) An interrogation is not custodial, for purposes of requiring Miranda advisements, when "a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave." (Id. at p. 395.)
In Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 395, the police initially asked the defendant to accompany them to the police station to answer questions, telling him "we have to do [it] now," because they believed he was a critical witness to a child's murder. The defendant agreed and was transported to the station by the officers with no other means of returning home. The defendant was interviewed in a room that was not locked, was not handcuffed or restrained, and was told he was not under arrest and was free to leave. (Id. at p. 395.)
Although the officers eventually conveyed their suspicion of the defendant's possible involvement in the crime, the "fairly long" interview, at one hour and 45 minutes, was not particularly intense or confrontational. (Moore, supra, at p. 395.) The trial court found the defendant was not in custody and denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to police. (Id. at p. 394.)
The California Supreme Court affirmed, finding a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances would have believed, despite indications of police suspicion, that he was not under arrest and was free to terminate the interview and leave if he chose to do so. (Id. at p. 403.)
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained: "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect." (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.)
"Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must 'apply a deferential substantial evidence standard' [citation] to the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, 'a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.'" (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.)
b. Analysis
Here, the circumstances of Kourchenko's interview parallel that of the defendant's interview in Moore. As in Moore, Kourchenko agreed to accompany the detectives to the El Monte police station and was transported there by them. Kourchenko was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, his interview occurred in a room with the door open, and he was told multiple times he was not under arrest. He was also told he could end the interview at any time. Although the detectives expressed their belief in Kourchenko's guilt, the interview on the whole was not intense or confrontational. Given these facts, Moore tells us that Kourchenko was not in custody and Miranda was not implicated.
Kourchenko attempts to distinguish Moore, arguing his presence at the police station was not voluntary and there were several restraints on his freedom. Kourchenko contends we should rely instead on People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 (Aguilera), People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162 (Torres), and People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432 (Saldana) to determine whether he was in custody. None of these cases persuades us to change our analysis.
Aguilera catalogued the various factors identified in the appellate courts to determine whether a defendant was in custody: "[1.] whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; [2.] whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; [3.] where the interview took place; [4.] whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; [5.] whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; [6.] whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview; [7.] how long the interrogation lasted; [8.] how many police officers participated; [9.] whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; [10.] whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; [11.] whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; [12.] whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and [13.] whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation. [Numbering added.]" (Ibid.)
Aguilera advised that no one factor is dispositive, and courts should instead look at "the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest." (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162 .)
We examine each of the Aguilera factors now.
i. Voluntary Interview
The police initiated contact by arriving at Kourchenko's home. No weapons were displayed, and Kourchenko agreed to accompany them to the police station, even knowing, from the victim's earlier phone call, that the police suspected him of sexual abuse. While "voluntary contact with the police is only the beginning" of our inquiry (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 456), this factor weighs slightly in favor of a finding that Kourchenko was not in custody.
We are not persuaded by Kourchenko's contention that a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to decline the police summons given the presence of the other officers surrounding the home and the detectives' refusal to allow him to retrieve his ID and change his clothes. First, there is no indication that Kourchenko knew about the other officers when he agreed to accompany the detectives. Second, Fierro asked whether his fiancee could bring the items down; he did not order her to. We likewise do not interpret Molina's statement - "Hey, um, sorry. We need you to come down to the police department with us and, uh, talk to us about some stuff" - to be anything other than a request.
ii. Express Purpose
The purpose of the interview was to question Kourchenko as a suspect. "Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest." (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325; see also Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 399 [officers asked a series of questions suggesting appellant's culpability while also still assuring him he was not under arrest].)
iii. Location
The interview took place at the police station in El Monte, but this fact does not by itself render the interrogation custodial. (Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495; Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 402.)
iv. Whether the Police Informed the Person He Was Under Arrest or Was Free to Leave
At the outset, Molina told Kourchenko that "when you're done and you don't want to talk to me anymore, that's all you've got to do, just tell me, hey, I don't want to talk to you anymore. And then, we'll go from there, okay?" After his confession, Kourchenko acknowledged he understood he "could have said . . . I want a lawyer, and I'm not going to talk with you." The detectives further told Kourchenko he was not under arrest multiple times, and he confirmed his understanding each time. They also told him he could ask for bathroom, smoke, or water breaks at any time.
We reject Kourchenko's interpretation of Molina's statement, "we'll go from there" to mean Kourchenko would not have been free to terminate the interview at any time. That statement could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the interview would stop.
Kourchenko retained control of his mobile phone and used it. At the conclusion of his interview, Kourchenko asked to text his work, stating, "I think that I won't make [lunch at work] or I'll make it later," indicating he believed he could leave the station when the interview ended. Given these circumstances, a reasonable person in Kourchenko's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.
v. Physical Restraints, Duration, Number of Officers
Molina's uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing was that Kourchenko was not handcuffed at any time and the door to the interview room was "wide open." (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 459 [no physical restraints tended to weigh against a finding of custody].)
The interview at the El Monte police station lasted approximately two and a half hours. Courts have not found this length of time to be so protracted that an interview became custodial. (See, e.g., People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1178 [two and one quarter hour long interview with breaks]; People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400 [three and a half hours]; Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 135 [two-hour interview in locked room noncustodial].)
Molina and Fierro were the only officers in the interview room in the first half of the interview. Thereafter, either Molina or Fierro left the room for periods of time, leaving the other detective alone in the room with Kourchenko. (See Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 459 [lone interrogating detective weighed against custody].)
vi. Nature of the Interview
"The remaining factors involve the nature of the interrogation: Whether police (1) dominated and controlled the interrogation; (2) manifested a belief [Kourchenko] was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; (3) were aggressive, confrontational, and accusatory; (4) used interrogation techniques to pressure [Kourchenko]; and (5) arrested him at the end of the interrogation." (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 459.)
Kourchenko contends the detectives dominated and controlled the interrogation by redirecting him to focus on helping the victim when he asked whether he should obtain counsel. The People acknowledge the detectives manifested a belief Kourchenko was guilty. The detectives identified evidence, both true and contrived, to demonstrate their belief in Kourchenko's culpability, including that the victim was credible, that her best friend had identified Kourchenko by name, that his DNA was still on the victim's pajamas, and that they had obtained a warrant for Kourchenko's credit cards to substantiate the victim's description of the events occurring before and after the incidents. Additionally, Kourchenko was arrested at the end of the interview. These factors tend to weigh in favor of a finding of custody.
Although the detectives stated their belief in Kourchenko's culpability, the trial court also found "there were parts of it that were confrontational, but generally speaking, it was not intense or confrontational. There were many parts of the interview I thought were more conversational. Certainly, no threats or anything during the interview." The trial court's finding is supported by the transcripts of the interview and Kourchenko's confirmation at the end of the interview that he did not feel threatened. This factor tends to weigh against a finding of custody.
At trial, Fierro testified to the interrogation techniques he and Molina used to elicit Kourchenko's confession, including minimizing the accusations, distracting him from the potential ramifications of a confession, and the use of ruses to obtain a confession.
The nature of Kourchenko's interview parallels that of People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 542 (Potter). In Potter, the detective, also investigating the molestation of a child, professed to understand and sympathize with the defendant, which was "undoubtedly an interrogation tactic designed to elicit a confession." (Ibid.) The detective also indicated he believed the child's allegations, implored the defendant to tell the truth, and expressed suspicion about the defendant's story. The Potter court determined this conduct, in the absence of other restraints on the defendant's freedom of movement, was insufficient to convert his voluntary presence at an interview into custody. (Ibid.) Here, Molina's and Fierro's sympathetic questioning of Kourchenko and statements regarding the victim's credibility also were insufficient to convert Kourchenko's voluntary presence at the police station into custody.
vii. The Totality of the Circumstances
Here, the factors tending to show Kourchenko was in custody include the fact that Kourchenko was a suspect, the interview was held at the police station, and the detectives dominated the interview, manifested a belief of his culpability, and arrested him. The factors tending to show he was not in custody include the fact that he voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the station, he was told he was not under arrest and could stop the interview, the interview was not prolonged, he was not restrained, the door was "wide open," and the detectives were not aggressive or confrontational.
We conclude the overall nature of the interview tips the balance of factors in favor of a finding that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Although we evaluate the circumstances under a reasonable person standard, it is noteworthy that Kourchenko, after his confession, stated he may be late for a work lunch, indicating he continued to believe he could leave the police station. Kourchenko also acknowledged at the end of the interview that he was not threatened and "could have said . . . I want a lawyer, and I'm not going to talk with you."
Kourchenko's reliance on Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at page 432 and Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at page 179 to argue the interview was custodial is misplaced.
In Saldana, the interrogating officer told the defendant he was not under arrest and could leave when he wanted, but then the interrogation became "persistent, confrontational and accusatory." (Id. at p. 437.) The court explained, "in light of the detective's repeated rejection of Saldana's denials, a reasonable person in Saldana's position eventually would have realized that telling the 'truth' meant admitting the detective's information was correct-and that until this 'truth' came out, the person could not leave." (Id. at p. 458.) The Saldana court reasoned the "more significant factor" was "the nature of the questioning, the character and quality of the interaction between law enforcement and the person being interrogated." (Id. at p. 463.) The court held, "when police create an atmosphere equivalent to that of formal arrest by questioning a suspect who is isolated behind closed doors in a police station interrogation room, by repeatedly confronting him with the evidence against him, repeatedly dismissing his denials, and telling him at the outset he is free to leave-when all the objective circumstances later are to the contrary-Miranda is triggered." (Id. at p. 438.)
In Torres, "the detectives went further than the detective in Saldana, essentially telling Torres they would not leave, and Torres could not return home, until Torres stopped lying and confessed ...." (Torres, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
By contrast, the court here found the interview on the whole to be "conversational" and not confrontational despite the fact that Kourchenko was a suspect and the detectives believed he was guilty. The objective circumstances surrounding Kourchenko's interview-he was told he was not under arrest and he could terminate the interview at any time, he agreed to accompany the detectives, the door to the interview room was open, he was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, he kept his phone, he used his phone-would indicate to a reasonable person in Kourchenko's position that he was not in custody.
2. Kourchenko's Confession Was Not Coerced
Kourchenko next argues that, aside from the Miranda violation, his confession was coerced, and his conviction should be reversed on that basis.
" 'The basic law is settled. A criminal conviction may not be founded upon an involuntary confession. [Citation.] "The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily made. [Citations.] In determining whether a confession was voluntary,' "[t]he question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not 'essentially free' because his [or her] will was overborne."' [Citation.] Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]' "On appeal, the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court's finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review." '" (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 436 (Williams).)
"In evaluating the voluntariness of a statement, no single factor is dispositive. [Citation.] The question is whether the statement is the product of an' "essentially free and unconstrained choice"' or whether the defendant's' "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired"' by coercion. [Citation.] Relevant considerations are' "the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity"' as well as 'the defendant's maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.'" (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
According to Kourchenko, the detectives coerced him to confess through deception and minimization: They falsely told Kourchenko that the victim was "very, very depressed," and perhaps suicidal; they falsely told Kourchenko that the victim's best friend identified Kourchenko by name; they falsely told Kourchenko that they had the victim's pajamas and would be testing them for DNA; and they falsely said they had obtained a warrant for Kourchenko's credit cards to corroborate the victim's description of where Kourchenko took her before and after the incidents.
" 'Lies told by the police to a suspect under questioning can affect the voluntariness of an ensuing confession, but they are not per se sufficient to make it involuntary.'" (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182.) In Williams, for example, our high court found the police officers' use of deception-the police alluded to fictitious witnesses and fingerprint evidence-did not render the defendant's statement involuntary. (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 443; see, e.g., People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 182 [falsely telling defendant his fingerprints were on victim's wallet did not render confession involuntary]; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299 [officer implied he could prove more than he could; statement voluntary].) Molina and Fierro's deceptions are similarly insufficient to render Kourchenko's confession involuntary.
Aside from a vague reference to his "confinement," Kourchenko does not contend any factor other than deception led to his will being overborne. If by confinement, Kourchenko means the length of the interview and its location, the objective facts are that the interview was not prolonged, and he has failed to demonstrate how these circumstances led to an involuntary confession. Finally, Kourchenko does not contend anything about his background-his maturity level, education, physical condition, and mental health-impaired his capacity for self-determination.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOOR, J., KIM, J.