Opinion
C083032
05-30-2018
In re J.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.V., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JV135849)
A juvenile court may commit a minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) only if it finds he or she has committed a "DJF-eligible offense" (one listed in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b), or Pen. Code, § 290.008, subd. (c)), and only if it was "the most recent offense alleged in any [section 602] petition and admitted or found to be true by the court." (§ 733, subd. (c); hereafter § 733(c)]; In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 944 (D.B.); In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 400 (Greg F.).) However, the court "may dismiss [a section 602] petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal." (§ 782.) Under certain conditions--if the "structured institutional environment and special programs available only at the DJF" would best serve a minor's needs, and if "the severity of a minor's offenses, and the minor's own special needs, call for a disposition that includes DJF"--the " 'interests of justice and the welfare of the minor' " may both point toward a DJF commitment. (Greg F., at p. 417, italics omitted; § 782.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 733(c) does not apply to probation violations. Therefore, charging a noneligible offense as a probation violation does not preclude a DJF commitment based on an earlier eligible offense. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) In the present case, however, the People did not use this method of avoiding section 733(c).
Thus, despite the apparently absolute rule of section 733(c), when a minor has been placed on probation for a duly adjudicated DJF-eligible offense, and a new section 602 petition alleges a subsequent non-DJF-eligible offense, the juvenile court may use section 782 to dismiss the new petition and commit the minor to DJF based on the prior offense. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 405-417.)
The question posed in this case is whether section 782 permits the court to impose a DJF commitment after dismissing already adjudicated petitions alleging noneligible offenses--a point not decided in Greg F. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.) We conclude that it does.
Successive section 602 petitions accused minor J.V. of noneligible offenses, all admitted or found true. Then a new petition alleged a DJF-eligible sexual offense committed before the already adjudicated offenses, but not chargeable earlier because the victim did not sufficiently identify the minor and the DNA evidence pointing to him had only just been processed. The juvenile court found the allegation true and placed the minor on formal probation, with terms and conditions that included obtaining sex offender counseling.
After the minor had repeatedly violated this condition of probation, the prosecutor asked the juvenile court to revoke probation and commit the minor to DJF, asserting that under section 782 the court could dismiss the petitions that alleged subsequent noneligible offenses so as to make the DJF-eligible offense "the most recent" for purposes of section 733(c).
Over the minor's objection, the juvenile court dismissed the prior petitions, found the new petition's allegation true, and committed the minor to DJF. The associated minute order states in part: "The court ordered that the Subsequent Petitions [f]iled 6/18/14, 7/29/14 & 10/14/14 are dismissed pursuant to [section] 782 on the grounds that the Court finds that the interest of justice is best served by dismissing, as the subject has refused to participate in sexual offender counseling in a less restrictive setting. The Court finds it is in the best interest of the subject to receive intensive treatment and rehabilitative services."
The minor contends that to dismiss already adjudicated petitions in order to commit him to DJF is a bridge too far under sections 733(c) and 782. For the reasons stated below, we disagree. However, we strike the conditions of probation the court imposed when making its commitment order, because probation conditions cannot be imposed on a DJF commitment. As modified, the court's order is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
History of the case before the last-filed section 602 petition
On February 4, 2014, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed a section 602 petition alleging that J.V., then 16 years old, committed petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)), evaded a fare (Pen. Code, § 640, subd. (c)(1)), possessed tobacco (Pen. Code, § 308, former subd. (b)), and possessed marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)). The minor admitted the petty theft allegation and received six months of court probation. (§ 725, subd. (a).)
On April 16, 2014, the minor was adjudged to have violated probation and was ordered to serve 19 days in juvenile hall, with credit for time served, and 30 days on electronic monitoring. Two days later, another probation violation petition was filed, alleging the violation of the minor's electronic monitoring; he admitted the violation on May 16, 2014.
On June 18, 2014, the District Attorney filed a new section 602 petition, alleging that the minor committed auto theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), evaded a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), drove without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and possessed stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). On July 14, 2014, the minor admitted misdemeanor auto theft and felony evading an officer. The juvenile court ordered him to serve 45 days in juvenile hall followed by 45 days on electronic monitoring and six days in the juvenile work project.
On July 29, 2014, the District Attorney filed a new section 602 petition, alleging that the minor attempted auto theft (Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), possessed stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), resisted a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and committed vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(a)). On August 28, 2014, the minor admitted misdemeanor resisting a peace officer and felony attempted auto theft, and was ordered to serve 75 days in juvenile hall, 30 days on electronic monitoring, and 12 days in the juvenile work project.
On September 30, 2014, a violation of probation was filed and a warrant issued for the minor's arrest.
On October 14, 2014, the District Attorney filed a new section 602 petition, alleging that on October 9, 2014, the minor possessed burglary tools. (Pen. Code, § 466.) On November 3, 2014, the minor admitted the allegation and was ordered to serve 60 days in juvenile hall, 15 days on electronic monitoring, and 15 days in the juvenile work project.
The minor's DJF-eligible offense
On November 19, 2014, the District Attorney filed a new section 602 petition alleging that on or about May 7, 2014 (earlier than the offenses found true as to all but the first § 602 petition), the minor committed two counts of forcible lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under age 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).) On February 27, 2015, the minor admitted one count of nonforcible lewd and lascivious conduct, a related offense (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); hereafter Pen. Code, § 288(a)), and the remaining count was dismissed.
Any violation of section 288 is DJF-eligible. (Pen. Code, § 290.008, subd. (c).)
According to the probation officer's report, the 13-year-old victim stated on May 8, 2014, that the previous night she was sexually assaulted by the minor and another suspect; the minor's penis penetrated her vagina and rectum. She identified the minor only by his first name, which is a common one. Months later, DNA evidence taken from the victim's underwear was determined to match the minor's profile in the Combined DNA Index System. Interviewed on October 12, 2014, the minor admitted consensual sex with the victim, but denied assaulting her or placing his penis in her anus. The District Attorney issued a warrant for his arrest in this matter on November 19, 2014; he was arrested five days later.
On April 28, 2015, the juvenile court continued the minor as a ward of the court, ordered him to serve 180 days in juvenile hall with credit of 156 days for time served, ordered him upon completion of that commitment to be released into his own care and custody (since he had turned 18 prior to the hearing), ordered him to complete 45 days on electronic monitoring and 15 days in the juvenile work project, and imposed terms and conditions of probation including participation in a sex offender treatment program.
Further probation violations
On May 27, 2015, a probation violation petition was filed alleging the minor had failed to obey the probation officer, to participate in sex offender counseling, and to participate in alcohol and drug counseling. After the minor was detained, another probation violation petition was filed on June 5, 2015, alleging that the minor had resisted a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) On June 25, 2015, the minor admitted one count of the violations alleged in the May 27 petition, with the remaining counts of that petition and the allegation of the June 5 petition dismissed. The juvenile court ordered the minor to serve 60 days in juvenile hall with credit for 23 days of time served, and imposed further terms and conditions of probation.
On January 4, 2016, a probation violation petition was filed alleging the minor had failed to maintain contact with his probation officer, had failed to participate in sex offender counseling, had failed to complete alcohol and drug counseling, had used marijuana, and had shoplifted. (Pen. Code, § 459.5.) On March 24, 2016, the minor admitted using marijuana, and the remaining allegations were dismissed.
An adult criminal complaint alleging misdemeanor violations for shoplifting and resisting a peace officer was also filed. On January 8, 2016, the minor admitted both counts and received credit for time served as to both.
On May 11, 2016, the prosecutor filed a brief urging the minor's commitment to DJF, based on his Penal Code section 288(a) offense and his failure to participate in sex offender counseling. The brief did not discuss section 733(c).
Disposition
On July 14, 2016, the juvenile court heard argument on the minor's eligibility for DJF. At the outset, the court noted that under section 733(c) and D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th 941, "if any petition is sustained and the most recent offense is a nonviolence [sic] offense, the minor is [not] eligible for a commitment to the [DJF]."
As we discuss further below, D.B. had no occasion to consider the effect of section 782, which was not relied on by the juvenile court or raised by any party on appeal.
The prosecutor asserted that despite D.B., the court had discretion under section 782, as construed in Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th 393, to dismiss already adjudicated petitions alleging subsequent non-eligible offenses in order to serve the best interests of the minor and society. No non-DJF option was appropriate: the minor, now 19, could not be placed at an in-state or out-of-state facility, and he would continue to refuse sex offender counseling under any less restrictive regime. Because delayed discovery prevented the People from charging the DJF-eligible offense when committed, this case was distinguishable from D.B., where the high court found that the prosecution could have avoided a section 733(c) problem by taking more care not to charge and adjudicate non-eligible offenses or by dismissing them during plea negotiations.
The juvenile court asked why the People had not cited section 782 at the dispositional hearing on the Penal Code section 288(a) allegation in February 2015. The prosecutor replied that she was not on the case at that time, but her office would normally request formal probation on a minor's first serious offense.
The minor's counsel asserted that section 733(c) did not allow the course proposed by the prosecutor. Furthermore, this case was distinguishable factually from Greg F., where the minor was an apparently incorrigible repeat violent offender; here, unlike in Greg F., the juvenile court could safely maintain formal probation while requiring more frequent scrutiny of the minor's compliance. Counsel also suggested that the People could not now rely on section 782 because they had failed to do so when they charged the DJF-eligible offense.
The prosecutor replied that the resolution of the section 288 petition had benefited the minor, and since the prior petitions had already gone through disposition he could not show prejudice from the failure to invoke section 782 then. A DJF commitment would also benefit him because the sex offender counseling he needed, as a person assessed as a "moderate risk" to reoffend, would be available there, unlike adult prison. Further recommitments to juvenile hall would be useless.
At a subsequent hearing on July 22, 2016, the minor's counsel requested continuing the minor on probation with 60 days in juvenile hall, as recommended by the probation department.
The juvenile court ruled: Given the "unambiguous" character of section 733(c), the minor was not eligible for DJF "with the current state of the petitions." However, section 782 gave the court the discretion to dismiss petitions even after disposition, although Greg F. did not specifically authorize doing so; thus, "[n]ew ground would be broken" if the court used section 782 in this way. The court knew of no case where section 782 discretion had been exercised "against the minor," but the statute's purpose and the minor's history of failure to rehabilitate justified taking that step here. Therefore, the court dismissed "post disposition" the petitions filed on June 18, 2014, July 29, 2014, and October 14, 2014 (that is, the petitions alleging non-eligible offenses filed after the date of the minor's Penal Code section 288(a) offense, but before the petition alleging that offense). The court allowed the remaining petitions and probation violations to stand.
As Greg F. explains, where it would serve a minor's welfare to exercise section 782 discretion in order to commit him to DJF, the juvenile court is not using section 782 "against the minor," but for him. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417.) Indeed, Greg F. itself presents such a case.
The court stated: "[T]he minute order shall reflect the Court's reasons for granting [section] 782 relief. On the prong of what would best serve the interest of justice here, both parties agree that [the minor] poses at least low to moderate risk of reoffending on a sexual offense[,] left untreated. The Court is not convinced that even with one more opportunity, that [the minor] can complete a program of juvenile sexual offender treatment without a DJF commitment. [¶] . . . [H]e has refused to participate in any less restrictive setting. And pursuant to . . . [the] doctors' reports, he does continue to pose a risk to society as a sex offender. And the Court must take that into consideration in balancing the interest of justice for the 13-year-old victim of the sex offense and for the risk to the public that is not mitigated against, since he is not actually receiving treatment. [¶] The Court must also consider the welfare of the minor. And [minor], this is w[h]ere I'm convinced that the only way to get you off the road you're on right now, is to get you intensive treatment. And juvenile court has that ability. [¶] In adult court, it is just punishment. But in juvenile court, we can still offer you the services of getting your high school diploma, of getting the treatment needs that you have, of giving you job skills. So when you get out of DJF, that you can actually get a job with real skills and have a chance at being successful. [¶] You have not had the best supportive environment and you were not dealt a good hand, but the only way to address those treatment needs for you and to prevent you from heading to state prison, is to give you that intensive therapeutic treatment. [¶] As much as people fear a commitment to the [DJF], it is still far better than a commitment to state prison, which[,] unfortunately, with your track record[,] is where you're headed if this Court does not take the opportunity to give you the rehabilitative services to help you make a life for yourself once you are released from your commitment. [¶] So the Court finds that . . . it is for the minor's own welfare and in the best interest of the minor to get this intensive treatment for his long term success in life. [¶] And because of the Court making those findings, the Court is exercising its discretion under [section] 782."
DISCUSSION
I
The minor contends that the juvenile court's dismissal of the petitions filed and adjudicated after the date of his Penal Code section 288(a) offense in order to avoid section 733(c) was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. For the reasons given in Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th 393, section 733(c) does not override the court's discretion to dismiss prior petitions under section 782, even if already adjudicated, where such dismissal serves "the interests of justice and the welfare of [the minor]." (§ 782.) D.B., on which the minor seeks to rely, is not to the contrary because it does not overrule or limit Greg F.'s analysis of section 782. Finally, the minor fails to show any constitutional considerations that would require a different result.
We review a decision to commit a minor to DJF for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the decision. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) In doing so, we note that a trial court's exercise of discretion is bounded by the " ' "legal principles governing the subject of its action . . . ." ' [Citation.] The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied . . . . Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 'abuse' of discretion. [Citation.]" (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)
Greg F .
In Greg F., our Supreme Court had to assess the "interplay between" sections 733(c) and 782 in a situation where "a ward on probation for a DJF-eligible offense commits a new offense that is not listed in section 707[, subdivision] (b)," and that offense has been charged in a new section 602 petition. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 400.) The court held that, under the circumstances presented, the juvenile court could use its discretion under section 782 to dismiss the newly filed petition "so that the matter can be treated as a probation violation," which does not implicate section 733(c), thus allowing a DJF commitment. (Greg F., at p. 400.) The court reached this conclusion by addressing the statutory language, the legislative history of the statutes' adoption, and policy considerations.
As to the statutory language, the court found: (1) When the Legislature wishes a statute to "prevail over all contrary law," it uses phrases such as " 'notwithstanding any other law' " or " 'notwithstanding any other provision of law,' " but the Legislature did not use such language in section 733(c) or add it later by amendment; thus, section 733(c) on its face does not show a legislative intent to override section 782. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 406-407.) (2) The Legislature is presumed aware of prior law, but when enacting section 733(c) it did not choose to eliminate or reduce the discretion the courts had already exercised for 40 years under section 782. (Greg F., at p. 407.) (3) Because section 733(c) does not mention section 782, it is not more specific than section 782. (Greg F., at p. 407.) (4) The two provisions are not "irreconcilably in conflict," but can be harmonized. (Ibid.) If a juvenile court dismisses a section 602 petition under section 782, "its decision does not nullify or abrogate section 733(c). It simply changes the 'most recent offense alleged in any petition' to which section 733(c) applies in that particular case. . . . If the minor has been given an opportunity to benefit from probation after committing a DJF-eligible offense, and then goes on to commit a new offense while on probation, the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor may be best served by a DJF commitment. Section 782 gives the juvenile court a discretionary tool in such cases to control the operative petition for purposes of section 733(c) and, consequently, expand its dispositional options. Allowing section 782 dismissals in the interests of justice and for the minor's welfare thus gives effect to both statutes." (Greg F., at p. 408.)
As to legislative history, the court found that section 733(c), enacted as part of the 2007 realignment statutory scheme, was intended to reduce the number of youthful offenders housed in state facilities by excluding nonviolent offenders from that number. There was no indication the Legislature had considered the situation where a youthful offender, already on probation for a recent serious and violent offense, was the subject of a new section 602 petition alleging a non-DJF-eligible offense, or that the Legislature intended to strip juvenile courts of discretion to impose DJF commitments in such cases. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 408-410.)
As to policy considerations, the court's finding that section 733(c) does not override section 782 avoids the "absurd and unreasonable consequences" that could ensue if the prosecutor "has simply filed the wrong piece of paper: a 602 petition instead of a 777 notice." (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 410-411.) In other words, it would be absurd and unreasonable to prevent the juvenile court from committing to DJF a minor already on probation for a DJF-eligible offense, merely because a later, non-eligible offense had been mistakenly alleged in a section 602 petition (to which section 733(c) applies) rather than in a probation violation notice (to which section 733(c) does not apply). To do so would unreasonably restrict the flexibility, which the juvenile delinquency statutory scheme bestows on juvenile courts, and would elevate form over substance. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 411-412.)
The court further reinforced the point that section 733(c) does not restrict a juvenile court's discretion under section 782 by discussing an appellate decision that presented somewhat similar facts to those of our case. (V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455 (V.C.), discussed in Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 414-415.) In V.C., the minor, on probation for a DJF-eligible sex offense, was found to have committed a non-DJF-eligible offense charged in a later section 602 petition and admitted under a plea agreement; then the minor failed to participate in sex offender treatment. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the most recent section 602 petition in order to permit a DJF commitment. After the juvenile court granted the motion, the minor successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate. (V.C., at pp. 1459-1461.)
Although the later petition also charged the minor with new sex offenses, the minor entered into a plea bargain under which he admitted only a non-DJF-eligible misdemeanor and the remaining allegations were dismissed. (V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460.)
Greg F. upheld the appellate court's ruling on the ground that to commit the minor to DJF on these facts would not serve the interests of justice because it would violate the minor's executed plea agreement. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.) However, Greg F. disapproved V.C.'s broader holding that "section 733(c) must always override the juvenile court's ability to dismiss a delinquency petition under section 782." (Greg F., at p. 415, disapproving "that portion of V.C. v. Superior Court, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1467-1469.")
In this context, Greg F. stated in dicta: "Dismissing a 602 petition after disposition potentially raises a host of constitutional concerns not presented in the case before us. We express no opinion on whether such a dismissal could ever be appropriate." (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
D .B .
In D.B., the high court "answer[ed] a question . . . left unresolved in In re Greg F. . . . : When a . . . section 602 petition alleges a minor has committed a series of criminal offenses, including serious or violent offenses, can the minor be committed to [DJF] if the last offense in the series is nonviolent? We hold that the answer is no." (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 944, fn. omitted.) The reason is that such a disposition violates the " 'most recent offense' " requirement of section 733(c). (D.B., at p. 944.)
The minor in D.B. (not previously adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court, so far as the opinion shows) was accused in a single section 602 petition of committing multiple offenses on May 23, 2010, some DJF-eligible, and then of committing a non-eligible offense a week later. The juvenile court committed the minor to DJF. Because the non- eligible offense was the most recent one alleged in a section 602 petition, this disposition was error. (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 944-945.)
The high court noted that the People could have avoided tripping over section 733(c) on these facts: "Prosecutors may elect not to allege nonqualifying offenses when their presence would affect a minor's DJF eligibility. Prosecutors can also dismiss nonqualifying offenses before a jurisdictional finding or as part of plea negotiations." (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948.) However, where the People do not become aware of a DJF-eligible offense until after they have alleged later-occurring, non-eligible offenses and those allegations have been admitted or found true, as in our case, the options suggested by D.B. are not available.
The juvenile court did not use section 782 to arrive at its disposition, no party cited section 782 on appeal, and the high court does not discuss it. The opinion simply analyzes the effect of section 733(c) on its face without regard to any other provision of law. (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 945-948.) Thus, it is not authority for the proposition, already rejected in Greg F., that section 733(c) limits a juvenile court's discretion under section 782.
The minor's arguments
The minor argues that the court's disposition was an abuse of discretion because it went beyond what Greg F. authorizes and because it violated his due process right to the enforcement of his plea agreement. We are not persuaded.
Greg F. holds that section 782 discretion may be exercised to impose a DJF commitment where that disposition serves the interests of justice and the minor's welfare. D.B. does not limit Greg F.'s reading of section 782 in any way.
The juvenile court orally gave the " 'specific reasons' " required by Greg F. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 413) to explain its exercise of discretion, and directed those reasons to be spelled out in the minute order. All are supported by the evidence.
Although Greg F. suggests in dicta that to dismiss petitions postdisposition, as here, could raise unspecified "constitutional concerns," the opinion does not declare that such an act is categorically impermissible. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.) And on the unique facts of this case, where the People could not have known of the existence of a DJF-eligible offense until after later noneligible offenses had been alleged in section 602 petitions and adjudicated, we do not see any constitutional bar to what the juvenile court did. The minor's attempt to show otherwise is unpersuasive.
The minor asserts that his DJF commitment deprived him of his constitutional right to the benefit of his plea agreement, as the minor's DJF commitment did in V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1455. (Cf. Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415; see People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860.) We disagree because V.C. is factually and procedurally distinguishable.
In V.C., pursuant to the minor's plea agreement, he was placed in a Level A facility where he could receive sex offender counseling, among other benefits. After he allegedly failed to participate in counseling and committed other non-criminal violations of probation, the prosecutor filed a probation violation notice recommending DJF commitment, but under the newly enacted section 733(c), the minor could not be committed to DJF for such violations. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss a previously filed section 602 petition alleging a non-DJF-eligible offense in order to make his admitted sexual offense the most recent for purposes of section 733(c). (V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460.) The juvenile court granted the motion, stating among other things that neither the court nor the attorneys had realized the full effect of " 'the nuances of the newest law,' " and that the minor's " 'entire delinquent history' " was DJF-worthy; the court also acknowledged that the most recent probation violation notice was based on orders that, after the dismissal, were no longer in effect, " 'but it doesn't mean that he's not in violation of the Court's orders.' " (Id. at p. 1461.)
The appellate court found that the lower court's action amounted to a violation of the minor's constitutional right to the enforcement of his plea bargain, which was not "in the interests of justice." (V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1467.) The high court approved the appellate court's reasoning on this point: "[T]he decision rested primarily on the fact that dismissal of the most recent 602 petition was an attempt to undo an executed plea bargain. [Citation.] It would be difficult indeed to conclude that such an action served the interests of justice." (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
In the present case, by contrast, the minor got the full benefit of his plea agreement. After admitting an offense that could have earned him an immediate DJF commitment, he received probation, then was committed to his own care and custody. Even though he repeatedly flouted his probation conditions, he remained at liberty for a full year with only brief stays in juvenile hall. Unlike the minor in V.C., he was not removed from a rehabilitative placement in which he had been placed under a plea agreement, or found DJF-worthy based on his " 'entire delinquent history' " despite the legal effect of his plea agreement on that history. (V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461.) So far as the minor complains that he incurred the consequences of violating the probation conditions he agreed to, and then was committed to DJF in addition, he cites no authority holding that such consequences amount to a violation of his plea agreement, and we know of none.
The minor asserts that his commitment was not in the interests of justice or his own welfare because he is not one of "the most serious youthful offenders" for whom DJF is intended. However, when reviewing a commitment decision for abuse of discretion, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court's decision. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) The minor, by contrast, asks us to draw all inferences in his favor. In any event, his admission of a DJF-eligible offense, together with the court's finding that he was in need of sex offender counseling available at DJF and persistently refused by him under any less restrictive regime, makes his argument untenable as a matter of law. So far as he asserts that he "was not sent to DJF because he was a violent offender . . . [but] because he had not completed the sex offender counseling," he is mistaken: his commitment was possible only because he had committed an offense specified in section 733(c).
We also note that in support of his argument the minor cites the portion of V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, which Greg F. expressly disapproved. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
The minor has not shown that his DJF commitment was an abuse of discretion.
II
The minor contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that the juvenile court erred by purporting to impose probation conditions in its order of DJF commitment. A DJF commitment removes a ward from the juvenile court's direct supervision and deprives the court of the authority to impose conditions of probation. (In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 202; In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1208.) We shall strike the probation conditions from the commitment order.
III
The minor contends the juvenile court erred in calculating his custody credits, in that the court deducted 60 days for time the minor was sentenced to Sacramento County Jail in an adult case. According to the minor, the court should not have done so because the minor was "simultaneously detained on [his] juvenile case," and he is therefore entitled to those 60 days of juvenile credit. The minor cites only case law dealing with custody credit accrued entirely in juvenile cases. (In re Stephon L. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1231-1232, and cases cited therein.)
The Attorney General replies that the minor is not entitled to those additional days because "the 60 days subtracted by the juvenile court was not for simultaneous pretrial custody but was for an actual jail term to which [the minor] was sentenced on an adult conviction" and it would therefore be "double count[ing]" to credit that time also against his juvenile custody. The Attorney General relies on the following statement of the law: "[W]here a period of presentence custody stems from multiple, unrelated incidents of misconduct, such custody may not be credited against a subsequent formal term of incarceration if the prisoner has not shown that the conduct which underlies the term to be credited was also a 'but for' cause of the earlier restraint." (People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1193-1194 (Bruner).)
The record bears out the Attorney General's account of the juvenile court's method of calculation. It also shows that after the court explained its calculations, the minor's counsel did not object. --------
The minor replies that Bruner is not controlling because it deals only with adult custody credits. By the same token, however, the minor has not cited any authority that deals with what he calls "the cross-over between adult and juvenile court that appears here." As it was his burden to show error, and he gives no reason why the principle stated in Bruner should not apply, we conclude that his claim of error fails.
DISPOSITION
The order committing the minor to DJF is modified by striking the probation conditions. As modified, the order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Butz, J. /s/_________
Murray, J.