Opinion
H046981
06-09-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FELIPE GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 18CR00566)
After the trial court denied defendant Felipe Gonzalez's motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant pleaded no contest to carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. Defendant contends that he was unlawfully detained and thus the trial court erred when it denied his suppression motion. We find no error and affirm the order.
I. Statement of Facts
The statement of facts is based on the evidence presented at the combined preliminary hearing and hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
At approximately 12:05 a.m. on January 28, 2018, Scotts Valley Police Officer Paul Meier was patrolling on Santa's Village Road, which is parallel to Highway 17. There is a large business complex at the intersection of Santa's Village Road and 100 Enterprise Way. This complex contains various small businesses, which were closed. The complex is not immediately off the roadway and an individual "ha[d] to go out of the way to get there." There are no gas stations near this location. Officer Meier was aware that the complex had been burglarized and that there had been vehicle break-ins in the adjoining parking lot. The area north of the complex was undergoing construction. Officers had been directed to patrol both the grounds at 100 Enterprise Way and the area of new construction to "make sure nothing criminal was occurring."
Officer Meier saw a van parked in a loading zone in front of the complex. There were two men standing on either side of the van. Defendant was standing outside the driver's side door and leaning into the van while the other man was standing outside the front passenger's side door. Defendant "appear[ed] to be rummaging through" the van. It "appear[ed] that he wasn't leaning in to fetch one item" and "wasn't getting into the vehicle." Defendant "was leaned out of [the officer's] sight for a long period." Officer Meier could not see what the passenger was doing, but it appeared that he was doing something similar. There was "[v]ery little street light, very little ambient light." The officer decided to stop because the men could have either needed assistance or been engaged in a burglary. He parked two or three car lengths behind the van and activated his overhead lights.
Officer Meier approached the driver's side of the van and asked in a "[c]ordial" tone if anything was wrong. Defendant told him that everything was fine. The officer proceeded forward to determine why they were parked at that location if everything was fine. Defendant told him that they had spilled something and pulled over to clean the car. The officer asked if the vehicle belonged to him and he said that it did. When the officer asked for "ID or his name, any form of identification," defendant "did not initially acknowledge" him. Officer Meier wanted to confirm that defendant was a licensed operator of the van. He asked defendant a second time for identification. Defendant told him that he had something and began to reach towards a backpack between the driver's seat and the front passenger seat. Due to concerns for his safety, the officer stopped defendant from reaching into "any backpacks or containers that [he] couldn't see . . . ." He then directed defendant towards the rear of the van and asked him to provide his name. After defendant identified himself and gave his date of birth, Officer Meier requested a records check.
While Officer Meier was waiting to hear from dispatch regarding the records check, he contacted the passenger, who was "very reluctant to identify himself" and "repeatedly asked if he was under arrest." The officer "told him that he wasn't but that [the officer] wanted to know who he was speaking to in this remote area and what his purpose was there." Officer Meier also told him that he was not free to leave.
At this point, dispatch advised Officer Meier that defendant had a warrant for his arrest and that his license had been suspended. The officer asked dispatch to confirm the validity of the warrant and requested additional units for assistance. After he directed defendant to sit on the curb, he obtained identification information from the passenger. Dispatch then informed Officer Meier that defendant could be cited and released. After Officer Terrell arrived to provide cover, Officer Meier began writing the citation for the arrest warrant. Sergeant Brandon Polito then arrived with his K-9 partner Atlas. Atlas conducted a "free air sniff" around the van's exterior and alerted to the presence of a controlled substance in the vehicle.
Sergeant Polito searched the van and found three methamphetamine pipes in a black backpack between the driver's seat and the front passenger seat. Officer Meier found an unregistered nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun and a loaded magazine clip in a green backpack next to the black backpack. Defendant was arrested and told Officer Meier that the gun belonged to him.
II. The Trial Court's Ruling
Following argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence. It stated: "I don't think the pulling up behind the vehicle, illuminating the white light is detention. [¶] But I do think when the officer ordered Mr. Gonzales not reach into the bag and step back, then that is a detention. [¶] I find the officer's conduct was reasonable. He had a reasonable suspicion to believe that some kind of criminal activity may be occurring or was about to occur given the time of day, the location, and the history of criminal activity in that area."
III. Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence.
"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] And in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citation.]" (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)
The federal and state Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. (U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends., Cal. Const., art. 1, § 13.) "A seizure occurs whenever a police officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority' restrains the liberty of a person to walk away. [Citation.]" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229 (Souza).) Here, there is no dispute that a detention occurred when Officer Meier directed defendant towards the rear of the van.
At issue is whether the detention was reasonable. "A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.) Since the officer's subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, " 'an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]' [Citation.] But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, 'the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances "in the proper exercise of the officer's duties." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)
A person's presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a detention. (Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52.) However, "officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation." (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124.) "The time of night is another pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a detention." (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 241.) Moreover, "the possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct." (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733.)
Here, Officer Meier was on patrol around midnight near a business complex in which there had been burglaries of businesses and vehicles. The complex was not immediately off the roadway and all of the businesses were closed. The officer saw defendant's van parked in a loading zone of the complex and defendant and his passenger were leaning into the van and rummaging through it. Defendant's explanation that they had stopped to clean the van after spilling a drink was suspicious in light of the fact that the location was not adjacent to the exits from the highway. Defendant also ignored the officer's initial request to identify himself, thus suggesting that he was not being entirely truthful. Taken together, these facts establish that Officer Meier had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity.
The cases on which defendant relies do not persuade us that his detention was unlawful. In People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808 (Casares), the officer saw a van parked in a poorly lit area lacking demarcated parking spots. The store was open and the officer was aware of prior thefts in which suspects exited the store near where the defendant was parked. (Id. at p. 837.) The officer pulled in behind the van and approached the defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat and the only occupant of the van. The defendant stated that he did not have identification and that the van was owned by his friend's uncle. The officer then searched the defendant and the van. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that "his mere presence in a car legally parked on the less illuminated north side of the convenience store, in an area without demarcated parking spaces at a time when other parking spaces were available, did not justify his detention. The circumstance that Officer Stowe was aware of prior robberies at the store and that in some instances robbers had exited the parking lot on the north side of the building, without more, did not raise a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity." (Id. at p. 838.)
Casares, supra, 62 Cal.4th 808 was overruled on another ground in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.
In People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, the defendant's car was running and parked near the exit of a 7-Eleven store in a high-crime area. (Id. at p. 231.) Though several 7-Eleven stores had been robbed recently, it was not particularly late at night and the store was open. (Id. at p. 234.) When the defendant saw the officers, he turned off the engine, exited the car, and walked quickly to the store entrance. (Id. at p. 231.) The officers then detained the defendant, searched him, and found weapons and drugs. (Id. at p. 232.) The Court of Appeal held that the detention of the defendant was unlawful. (Id. at p. 234.)
In People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, the officer was conducting surveillance of a residence suspected of narcotics activity. (Id. at p. 883.) At about 1:00 p.m., the officer noticed a male sitting in a truck and then standing on a corner near the suspected residence. The officer stopped the man for questioning as well as a woman who walked around the corner from the residence. A few minutes later, the defendant walked around the corner from the same block. The officer recognized the defendant from a " 'be on the lookout' " bulletin, which was issued a month earlier and based on information from an untested informant. The officer immediately detained the defendant. (Id. at p. 884.) The Court of Appeal concluded: the bulletin was "purely speculative and unsupported"; the officer's suspicion that the residence was a site for drug activity was "based upon an attenuated set of facts"; the conduct of the man and woman stopped for questioning did not suggest illegal activity; and that the defendant was walking from the direction of the residence did not suggest he was engaged in criminal activity. (Id. at pp. 886-889.) The Pitts court held that none of these factors either individually or collectively provided the officer with a lawful basis to detain the defendant. (Id. at p. 889.)
In People v. Roth (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 211, the officers were conducting a security check of closed businesses in a shopping center at about 1:20 a.m. when they saw the defendant walking in the parking lot. (Id. at p. 213.) One of the officers shined a spotlight on the defendant and asked him to approach. The officer asked the defendant what he was doing in the area at that hour and he replied that he was going to the Alpha Beta store. When the officer pointed out that the store was closed, the defendant said he was going to look in the dumpster at Alpha Beta for junk. The officer detained him. (Ibid.) The Roth court held that the officer unlawfully detained the defendant based on his early morning presence in a parking lot where the businesses were closed. (Id. at p. 215.)
As in those cases, certain circumstances were not tied to defendant. These circumstances included that the business complex was not immediately off of the roadway, it was midnight, the businesses were closed, the area was poorly lit, the complex and vehicles had been burglarized, and the van was parked in a loading zone. However, these circumstances provided a context in which Officer Meier made his observations. He saw defendant and another man rummaging through a van and defendant initially failed to identify himself. Thus, the facts known to Officer Meier provided an "objective manifestation that [defendant] may [have been] involved in criminal activity." (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)
IV. Disposition
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Mihara, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Elia, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.