Summary
In Galle, the evidence showed that the "defendant [had] injected the decedent with her first two doses of cocaine, knowing full well that she planned to continue taking injections that evening until their relatively substantial supply of the drug had been exhausted," but "the decedent subsequently [had] administered her own injections, including the one which immediately preceded her death...."
Summary of this case from State v. WassilOpinion
Argued March 22, 1991
Decided April 30, 1991
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, Carmen Parenti, J.
Ronald C. Valentine, Public Defender (Arthur B. Williams of counsel), for appellant.
Valerie Friedlander and Stephen R. Sirkin, District Attorney, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10), based upon his having twice injected his girlfriend with cocaine on the night she died from a drug overdose. On appeal, he contends that his conviction should be reversed and the indictment against him dismissed on the ground that the evidence introduced at his trial was legally insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. We cannot agree.
Defendant was also convicted of criminal injection of a narcotic drug (Penal Law § 220.46).
The proof adduced at trial demonstrated that, on the night in question, defendant injected the decedent with her first two doses of cocaine, knowing full well that she planned to continue taking injections that evening until their relatively substantial supply of that drug had been exhausted. Although the decedent subsequently administered her own injections, including the one which immediately preceded her death, an expert witness called by the People testified that each of the injections, including the two given to the decedent by defendant, was a contributing cause of her death.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495; People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we conclude that the jury could have reasonably found that defendant's actions were a "sufficiently direct cause" of death to subject him to criminal liability (People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 307; People v Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412; see, Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 280-281; People v Cruciani, 36 N.Y.2d 304; Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 125, at 497-498). Contrary to defendant's contention, the "ultimate harm" here was something which he should have, under the circumstances, plainly "foreseen as being reasonably related to [his] acts" (People v Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412, supra; see, Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 280-281, supra; People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, supra; People v Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 697).
We likewise disagree with defendant's assertion that the People failed to prove, as a matter of law, that he acted with criminal negligence. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury could have rationally found that defendant, by intravenously administering cocaine to the decedent when he knew that she intended to continue taking injections of that drug throughout the night, had created "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his actions would contribute to her death, and that this "risk [was] of such nature and degree that [defendant's] failure to perceive it constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" (Penal Law § 15.05; § 125.10; see, People v Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692; People v Ricardo B., 73 N.Y.2d 228, 235-236; People v Haney, 30 N.Y.2d 328; see also, People v Cruciani, 36 N.Y.2d 304, supra).
We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.