Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup. Ct. No. 04F09186
MORRISON, J.
Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, search and arrest, defendant Razhan Broadnax pled guilty to one count of transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a); undesignated statutory references are to this code) and admitted he committed that offense while released from custody on three prior cases (Pen. Code, § 12022.1) in exchange for a sentence of five years in state prison and dismissal of all remaining charges against him. The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison consistent with the plea agreement.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and requests correction of an error in the abstract of judgment. We shall affirm the judgment and direct the trial court to correct the abstract.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 31, 2006, California Highway Patrol Officer Jeffrey Bosnich was driving eastbound on Kilconnel Road, a two-lane street. Defendant was also driving eastbound on Kilconnel Road, two cars ahead of Bosnich. Bosnich received information from the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement that defendant might be transporting something in his car and was told to try to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion to pull defendant’s car over.
For two to three seconds, Bosnich “observed both left side tires of [defendant’s] vehicle cross from the eastbound lane over the broken yellow line into the westbound lane approximately two feet into the opposing traffic lane” as the road made a “sweeping left-hand turn.” Defendant’s car then “drift[ed] back to the right again into the eastbound lane.” Bosnich observed defendant’s vehicle for a total of 30 to 35 seconds.
Based on his training and experience, Bosnich concluded defendant’s pattern of driving was consistent with someone possibly under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and initiated a traffic stop. Bosnich approached the passenger’s side of defendant’s car and spoke with defendant through the partially open front passenger window. He asked defendant to roll the window all the way down and immediately smelled a “very strong odor of marijuana” coming from inside defendant’s car. When Bosnich asked defendant if there was any marijuana in the car, defendant told him there was none.
Bosnich testified he had numerous hours of training (including field training and experience) in identifying people driving under the influence and was, at the time of the incident, certified as a drug recognition expert.
Bosnich instructed defendant to get out of the car and patted him down for weapons. He noted defendant was “extremely nervous” -- “abnormally” so -- and emanated a strong smell of marijuana. He asked defendant if he had smoked any marijuana recently. Defendant told Bosnich he had a prescription for medical marijuana and had smoked some several hours prior. Bosnich conducted a series of field sobriety tests on defendant and concluded defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
When another officer arrived, Bosnich placed defendant in the back seat of the patrol car and retrieved his police service dog to sniff the exterior and interior of defendant’s car. The dog alerted to the trunk area outside the car, as well as the rear seat cushion. When Bosnich searched the car, he found two clear plastic bags of marijuana in the center console and four large clear plastic bags of marijuana in a duffel bag in the trunk. Defendant was placed under arrest and taken into custody.
Bosnich testified that his police service dog was trained and certified in narcotics detection, including marijuana.
Defendant was charged by amended information with three counts of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359 -- counts one, three and five) and two counts of transportation of marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a) -- counts four and six). The information alleged defendant committed the offenses charged while released from custody on three prior cases (Pen. Code, § 12022.1). It was also alleged that defendant suffered a prior conviction in 1998 for violation of section 11351.5. Defendant initially pled not guilty to all charges.
On January 9, 2007, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop, search and arrest, arguing seizure of that evidence violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitutions of the United States and the State of California. Following a hearing at which Bosnich testified, the court denied the motion.
After the court denied the suppression motion, defendant withdrew his plea and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, entered a plea of guilty to count six (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), and admitted he committed that offense while released from custody in several other matters (Pen. Code, § 12022.1) in exchange for a five-year sentence in state prison and dismissal of all remaining charges against him. Consistent with the plea, the court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison and ordered that he pay specified fees and fines. The remainder of charges against defendant were dismissed in the interest of justice.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that his conduct--briefly drifting across the broken yellow line for two to three seconds -- was not enough, in and of itself, to raise a reasonable suspicion that he was driving under the influence for purposes of conducting a traffic stop. We disagree.
“In order to justify a detention ‘the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that 1) some activity relating to a crime has taken place or is occurring or is about to occur, and 2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation] to suspect the same criminal activity. . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Perez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 10.)
“[P]ronounced weaving within a lane provides an officer with reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence where such weaving continues for a substantial distance.” (People v. Perez, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 11 [italics added].)
It is well settled that weaving between lanes provides reasonable cause no matter how long the conduct continues. (Kiskey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415 [weaving through traffic without headlights on]; People v. Weaver (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 926, 928 [“creeping along at approximately five miles per hour, weaving between two lanes”]; People v. Goldbreath (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 989 [straddling two traffic lanes and weaving back and forth for a distance of approximately two blocks]; People v. Tennessee (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 788, 790 [weaving in long sweeping curves from center lane to curb and back again three times in four or five blocks].)
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for substantial evidence. (People v. North (1981) 29 Cal.3d 509, 513.) If it is determined that substantial evidence supports the findings of fact, we must then decide if those findings of fact support a constitutional standard of reasonableness. (Ibid.)
Here, after hearing testimony from Bosnich, the trial court found that, for at least two seconds, defendant traveled across the center line and into the opposing lane of traffic. He did so not on a long stretch of desert road, but in a residential area. That behavior, the court found, was “extremely dangerous” and warranted, at the very least, a “traffic stop and a check of the defendant.”
We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support that finding. Bosnich testified he had a clear view of defendant’s vehicle and followed it for approximately 10 to 15 seconds, when he observed defendant’s car weave across the center line nearly two feet into the opposite lane. After approximately two to three seconds, defendant’s car drifted back into the lane from which it strayed. Based on his training and experience, and his observations of defendant’s actions, Bosnich formed the opinion that defendant might be driving while under the influence.
We conclude, based on those findings, that Bosnich’s decision to stop defendant’s vehicle based on suspicion of driving under the influence was reasonable. We find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant also contends, and the People agree, that the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects an order that he register as a “sex drug offender pursuant to [Health and Safety Code section] 11590,” when in fact the court ordered defendant to “register as a narcotics offender under [s]ection 11590 of the Health and Safety Code.”
Defendant was convicted of violating section 11360, subdivision (a). Section 11590 requires persons convicted of that offense to register as controlled substance offenders. That is what the trial court ordered defendant to do at the sentencing hearing. Inclusion of the word “sex” in paragraph 7 of the abstract of judgment was clearly a clerical error. Under our inherent power to correct such errors, we direct the trial court to amend the abstract to accurately reflect the true facts. (People v. Rowland (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 119, 123; People v. Anthony (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1125.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment as directed in this opinion and forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: RAYE, Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.