Opinion
F086009
05-09-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RELIGH WALTER BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, Super. Ct. No. CR-22-011694 Dawna Reeves, Judge.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
INTRODUCTION
Religh Walter Briggs, appellant, was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, as well as a number of enhancements. Appellant was sentenced to 13 years in prison. He now argues the trial court admitting appellant's prior act of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109 was in error. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 28, 2022, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed an information charging appellant with assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1). It was further alleged appellant had inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)), that he had a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)). The information also alleged a number of aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.21).
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
On January 26, 2023, a jury found appellant guilty on count 1, but found the great bodily injury enhancement not true. The jury also found true two aggravating factors- that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (rule 4.421, subd. (a)(1)); and that appellant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime (rule 4.421, subd. (a)(2)).
On February 2, 2023, in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true appellant had a prior serious and violent felony conviction from 2021 (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (a), (d)). On March 22, 2023, the court sentenced appellant to 13 years in prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Conviction Offense
On August 2, 2022, at around 5:40 a.m., officers were dispatched to a Modesto residence to respond to a stabbing. Officers encountered the victim's wife outside the residence, screaming, "My husband is dying." Inside the residence, officers identified the victim, appellant's brother-in-law, lying in a pool of blood on the ground. A silver kitchen knife was lying next to the victim's shoulder, blood was splattered around the kitchen, and the victim had knife wounds to his left forearm and the left side of his ribcage. The victim was taken to the hospital and survived his injuries.
Appellant was apprehended a mile or two from the victim's home. He was found hiding in the bushes near another residence, his shorts and shirt covered in blood. Appellant was taken into custody and interviewed. He told officers he was staying at the victim's residence for a couple of weeks. Appellant's sister had asked him to leave the morning of the stabbing. Appellant was outside the residence at the time and pushed his way into the residence through the front door, knocking his sister to the ground. The victim then told appellant to get out and a fight ensued. The victim fought with appellant, and appellant claimed the victim had placed him in a headlock and punched him in the face. Appellant broke free and ran to the kitchen, where he got a knife and stabbed the victim at least two times. Eventually, appellant left the residence. Appellant admitted he had been drinking before the incident and appeared intoxicated during the interview. Appellant did not have any visible injuries on his person and declined an offer for medical attention.
Prior Acts Evidence
In November 2020, appellant was in an intimate relationship with T.N. On November 13, 2020, at around 1:30 a.m., appellant took T.N. to some orchards "in the middle of nowhere" for a date. Appellant asked T.N. to get out of the car and locked the car with T.N.'s phone inside. Appellant then put a knife against T.N.'s neck and told T.N. she should be afraid of him because if he killed her right there, no one would find her.
T.N. broke away and ran through the orchards to a nearby house. She banged on the door and told the resident that appellant was trying to kill her. The resident called 911. T.N. hid in the house's backyard as appellant drove past the house. The resident then let T.N. in, but appellant came back and began to bang on the doors and windows trying to get inside. Appellant was ultimately arrested, and officers took T.N. home safely.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion Allowing Evidence of Appellant's Prior Act of Domestic Violence
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion admitting the prior act as evidence, because it was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree.
A. Background
In their trial brief, the prosecution moved to introduce evidence of appellant's prior acts of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109. The prosecution alleged appellant's charged offense was a crime involving domestic violence, and identified three prior incidents of domestic violence, the most recent of which was appellant's assault of T.N. with a knife in November 2020.
Further statutory references are to the Evidence Code, unless otherwise noted.
The trial court found appellant's charged crime to be domestic violence related, and directed the prosecution to choose one act they intended to admit, finding that admitting all of the acts would be "too much." Before hearing arguments, the court commented "[t]he reason [that section] 1109 evidence is so damaging is because it's prior bad acts offered against the defendant to establish a character trait basically for violence." During argument, the court clarified with the prosecution that the incident with T.N. did not result in an injury more serious or grotesque than the one in the charged offense, the incident happened about two years prior, and testimony about the prior offense would take around 20 minutes. After argument, the court indicated its tentative ruling was to allow the evidence.
At a subsequent hearing, the trial court heard further argument and issued its ruling admitting the evidence. The court ruled:
"[T]he only thing that excludes [a section] 1109 incident of this nature is whether or not it's prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. And in this particular case, I considered the fact that the prior incident that's offered doesn't involve an injury that's more substantial than the one that's here. In fact, there's no injury at all .... [¶] ... [¶] It's the threat of the use of a knife and the willingness to use it that's similar. It's the knife use that's similar. It's close in time to the current incident rather than remote. [¶] ... [¶]
"In addition to that, it's my understanding that the [section] 1109 incident that's offered was actually a conviction. So that's some indication to the [c]ourt that the allegations are supported by an actual opportunity to try them or to test them in court, and the allegation itself is supported with the conviction. It gives some credibility to it, even though that's not going to be demonstrated to the jurors in the context of the [section] 1109 presentation..
"Also, in this whole balancing scenario, I excluded the other three offered [section] 1109 incidents-really two because the [prosecution doesn't] yet have the witness on one. So I excluded two others, accepted the closest one in time, that being the one that the [prosecution] most wanted to rely on. [¶] I think that the [c]ourt's tentative ruling is sound, and I'm going to make that be the [c]ourt's ruling."
B. Legal Standard
Evidence of a person's character or trait of his or her character is generally inadmissible to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. (§ 1101, subd. (a).) Section 1109 provides an exception to this general rule, stating "[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by [s]ection 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [s]ection 352." (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).)
"Section 352, which section 1109 'expressly incorporates' [citation], gives the trial court discretion to exclude or admit evidence of past domestic violence after the court weighs the probative value of the evidence against 'the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury' (§ 352). The law requires' "the probative value of the evidence must be balanced against four factors: (1) the inflammatory nature of the uncharged conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the uncharged offenses; and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the evidence of uncharged offenses."' [Citation.]' "The principal factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its similarity to the charged offense." '" (People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630.)
We review a trial court's decision to admit such evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531 (Johnson).) "We will only disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion under ... section 352 'when the prejudicial effect of the evidence clearly outweighed its probative value.' [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling 'falls outside the bounds of reason.'" (People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274.)
C. Analysis
Appellant argues the prior act evidence is more prejudicial than probative because the two acts were not similar, and the prior act was far more egregious than the current offense.
Reviewing the record as a whole, however, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion admitting the evidence of the prior domestic violence incident. First, the court was well aware of, and applied the proper legal standard when determining whether to admit the prior act, finding that it must consider whether the prior act's "prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value." To that end, the court only permitted the prosecution to choose one prior act to admit, even though appellant had previously committed multiple other acts of domestic violence.
The trial court then confirmed that the prior act of domestic violence against T.N. was not remote in time, having occurred only two years prior, and introducing the evidence would not take much time at trial-both factors weighing in favor of admissibility.
Appellant relies on People v. Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129 (Poplar) and Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 520 to emphasize that his prior act of violence against T.N. was not similar to the current offense, and therefore the introduction of the prior act was prejudicial.
In Poplar, the defendant was convicted of the forcible rape of his girlfriend. Two prior acts of domestic violence were introduced at trial pursuant to section 1109- one where the defendant pulled the hair of a prior girlfriend and pushed her into a glass table, and the second where the defendant slammed another prior girlfriend through a wall and repeatedly called her from jail, threatening to "get" her. (Poplar, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 1135.) The appellate court found that testimony about these prior incidents was no more inflammatory than the current victim's description of the rape. (Id. at p. 1139.) The incidents were also relatively recent and the testimony regarding the incidents was brief. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded the evidence was extremely probative, showing the defendant's propensity for violence against domestic partners. (Ibid.)
In Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 520, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder and related charges and enhancements. The defendant had invited the victim, his girlfriend at the time, to meet in the parking lot of a daycare to get some of his things from her. He then proceeded to shoot her multiple times before speeding off. (Johnson, at pp. 525-526.)
At trial, the Johnson court admitted two prior incidents of domestic violence where the defendant shot women he had previously been in a relationship with. (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) One shooting was preceded by the defendant tormenting the victim, Floyd, and breaking into her home. The victim was shot near the elbow and suffered a broken arm. The second shooting occurred when the defendant was arguing with another victim, pulled out a gun, and shot the victim twice. The bullet lodged in her leg and ultimately required a hip replacement. (Id. at p. 531.)
The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion admitting the prior incidents, and the prior acts' probative value was "great." (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at 532.) The court noted "[t]he common factors in all three crimes strongly suggest [the] defendant has a problem with anger management, specifically with regard to female intimate partners, and specifically when he feels rejected or challenged by such a partner. He has demonstrated a pattern of using guns to exact revenge." (Id. at 533.) "Also weighing in favor of admissibility, the evidence of the prior assaults came from independent sources, which reduced the danger of fabrication. [Citation.] In addition, [the] defendant was convicted of the prior offenses. Although the jury was not so informed, the fact that the prior misconduct had resulted in conviction-ultimately proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the court-reduced the likelihood that [the] defendant could have produced evidence to rebut the witnesses' testimony." (Ibid.)
The court concluded, "[t]he fact that damning inferences may be drawn from [the] defendant's treatment of Floyd does not make evidence of that shooting unduly prejudicial. The word 'prejudicial' is not synonymous with 'damaging.' [Citation.] Rather, evidence is unduly prejudicial under section 352 only if it '" 'uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and ... has very little effect on the issues'"' [citation], or if it invites the jury to prejudge '" 'a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.'"' [Citation.] 'Painting a person faithfully is not, of itself, unfair.'" (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th, at p. 534.)
We do not agree with appellant that the trial court abused its discretion finding the prior offense was less egregious than the conviction offense. In his prior offense, appellant assaulted T.N. with a knife and expressed an ability to kill her, but the assault did not result in any physical injuries. In the conviction offense, appellant cut the victim at least two times, leaving the victim laying in a pool of his own blood. The attack was so bloody it left appellant's sister believing that the victim was going to die. Much like in Johnson, even though the prior offense was inflammatory, particularly because of appellant's threat that he could kill T.N. without repercussion, the conviction offense involved appellant not only arming himself with a deadly weapon, but attacking the victim with the knife and inflicting significant injuries.
While it is true appellant's prior act of violence was against a female partner and the conviction offense was against appellant's brother-in-law, we find the acts are not so dissimilar that the trial court abused its discretion admitting the prior act. As noted by the court, in both cases, appellant armed himself with a knife. In his prior offense, he threatened T.N. with a knife for no apparent reason, then pursued her when she ran and ultimately attempted to break into the home where she was sheltering. In the conviction offense, appellant barged into his sister's home when she asked him to leave, then escalated the confrontation with his brother-in-law by attacking him with a knife. The prior act is probative because it shows appellant's "propensity for violence," specifically, his propensity to use a knife as a weapon during a domestic violence incident. (Poplar, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.)
Finally, just as in Johnson, in this case the evidence of the prior assault came from an independent source, which reduced the danger of fabrication, and appellant was convicted of the prior offense. (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 533.) Both of these factors weigh in favor of admissibility. Reviewing the record as a whole, the trial court's ruling did not fall outside the bounds of reason and the evidence was properly admitted. (People v. Hollie, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
[*] Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.