Opinion
November 6, 1989
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County, Baker, J., Delin, J.
Ordered that the order and the judgments are affirmed.
On appeal, the defendant contends that his right to counsel and to self-representation was violated when the court failed to assign new counsel upon the defendant's showing of good cause, failed to inquire into the defendant's claims regarding assigned counsel's alleged inadequacies and refused to permit the defendant to proceed pro se. It is undisputed that a criminal defendant is entitled to representation by an attorney of his own choosing (see, People v Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 18; People v Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207). "As a necessary corollary to this right, a defendant must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to select and retain his counsel" (People v Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 270). On the other hand, before a substitution of counsel is granted, good cause must be demonstrated (see, People v Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, supra; People v Willis, 147 A.D.2d 727).
"[A] request to change counsel previously retained or assigned must be addressed to the Trial Judge's discretion to insure that the defendant's purported exercise of the right does not serve to delay or obstruct the criminal proceedings * * *.
"It is no abuse of discretion for a trial court, acting on the eve of trial, to consider the interests of judicial economy [and] the integrity of the criminal process * * * in denying [such] a motion" (People v Tineo, 64 N.Y.2d 531, 536-537). In light of the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, the defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel of his choosing. The defendant had a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel and the Trial Judge made it clear that he was willing to have him substitute retained counsel for assigned counsel if he was ready to proceed, but was properly unwilling to allow the defendant to delay the proceedings (see, People v Brown, 134 A.D.2d 438, 440). In view of the lateness of the defendant's requests, i.e., on the eve of the hearings and at trial, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to conclude that this was a dilatory tactic and to reject the requests (see, People v Rascio, 136 A.D.2d 575, 576).
In regard to the defendant's request to represent himself, since the defendant abandoned his request to proceed pro se, the issue is not properly before this court (see, People v Grippo, 124 A.D.2d 985, 986). Also, a defendant is not entitled to proceed pro se if his request is made after the trial has commenced unless there are compelling reasons for the late request (see, People v McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17; People v Blaswell, 121 A.D.2d 458, 459). There was no compelling reason on this record to grant the defendant's request. Moreover, because of the defendant's disruptive and obstreperous behavior during the proceedings, the Trial Judge's denial of his request to so proceed was proper (see, People v McIntyre, supra).
We also find that in view of the defendant's criminal history and the gravity of the instant offenses, the sentences imposed were not excessive (see, People v Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839; People v Yarrell, 146 A.D.2d 819, 821, lv granted 73 N.Y.2d 985).
We have examined the defendant's other contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (see, People v Gomez, 67 N.Y.2d 843, 845; People v Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 250). Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Bracken and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.