Opinion
F077803
09-24-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN GABRIOLA BARRERA, Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CRM033973A)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K. Ash, Judge. Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Franson, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Ruben Gabriola Barrera pled no contest to one count of attempted murder, in violation of Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a) and 664. He also admitted a gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), and a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e). Barrera contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We disagree and affirm.
References to code sections are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On April 30, 2014, Merced County Sheriff's Detective Sam Sanchez was called to the scene of a shooting on August Avenue in Delhi. Sergeant Mike Ruiz and Detective Ruben Orozco also were involved in the investigation of the shooting.
Deputy Satveer Sohal also assisted in the investigation. Sohal interviewed a witness who gave a description of the suspect vehicle. On May 4, 2014, Sohal was on duty and responding to a call for service in Winton when he spotted a vehicle that closely resembled the description of the suspect vehicle. When the vehicle parked, another deputy took a picture of it.
Sanchez compared the vehicle to the video surveillance of the suspect vehicle from the shooting. A "GPS tracker warrant for the vehicle" was obtained. An investigative stop on the vehicle was made and the driver identified herself as Barrera's wife.
Deputies spoke with Barrera's work supervisor, who indicated Barrera usually went to lunch between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Moreover, the supervisor stated that Barrera typically went to Delhi during his lunch hour. The shooting in Delhi occurred on a weekday around 12:30 p.m. Barrera's Facebook page identified him as a "Ghost Town Sureno gang member."
On June 6, 2014, deputies were planning to execute several search warrants in connection with the shooting in Delhi. One search warrant was for Barrera's house. Barrera had already left for work when deputies arrived at his residence.
Deputies drove to Barrera's place of work. Barrera was handcuffed, searched and placed in the back of a patrol vehicle. He was driven to the sheriff's station and taken to an interview room, where he was advised of his constitutional rights. Barrera agreed to speak with deputies and admitted he was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the shooting in Delhi.
On January 15, 2016, an information was filed charging Barrera in count 1 with attempted murder (§§ 187, 664); in count 2 with assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)); and in count 3 with being an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The gang enhancement set forth in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) also was appended to counts 1 and 2. As to count 1, it also was alleged that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury.
Barrera filed a motion to suppress pursuant to section 1538.5 on September 23, 2016. The People opposed the motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on March 28, 2017.
On January 2, 2018, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Barrera pled no contest to count 1 and admitted enhancements pursuant to sections 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and 12022.53, subdivision (d). The plea agreement included a stipulated term of 25 years in state prison and dismissal of the other counts and enhancements.
On July 12, 2018, Barrera was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. A timely notice of appeal was filed that same day.
DISCUSSION
Barrera contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was not probable cause to arrest him, and consequently, his incriminating statements should have been excluded as the product of an unlawful arrest. The People contend Barrera was detained, not arrested, and taken to the sheriff's department to be interviewed and his statements were therefore admissible. Alternatively, the People contend there was probable cause to arrest Barrera.
We conclude the deputies had probable cause to arrest Barrera and his statements made after arrest were admissible.
Standard of Review
"The standard of review on a motion to suppress is well established. The appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. But in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the appellate court exercises its independent judgment. [Citations.] Appellate review is confined to the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling, not the reasons for its ruling." (People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)
Our review defers to the trial court's factual findings and independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis).) "We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard." (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134.) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. (Celis, supra, at p. 679.) We accept the trial court's assessment of the testifying deputies' credibility. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement personnel. "The prosecution always bears the burden of justifying, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search or seizure falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." (People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152.)
Fourth Amendment
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (U.S. Const. 4th Amend.; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [Fourth Amendment made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment].) The Fourth Amendment protects the people from arrest without probable cause (Bailey v. United States (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192; Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 630), investigatory detention without reasonable suspicion (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 6-7; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498), and the use of excessive force by law enforcement during the course of either (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 395).
The United States Constitution provides the floor, rather than the ceiling, for the protection of individual liberties. Thus, the states are free to enact greater protections than those required by the federal Constitution. (See Mills v. Rogers (1982) 457 U.S. 291, 300 ["Within our federal system the substantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution. [Citations.] If so, the broader state protections would define the actual substantive rights possessed by a person living within that State."].) Nevertheless, California has generally adopted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for interpreting analogous provisions of the California Constitution. (See People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 685-686; Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673 [interpreting probable cause for purposes of arrest and reasonable suspicion for purposes of detention]; see also People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830 [application of exclusionary rule]; Cal. Const., art I, § 13.) Our courts, therefore, apply federal legal standards when analyzing the reasonableness of a search or seizure under California constitutional law.
Probable Cause to Arrest
An officer is permitted to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a felony, "whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed." (§ 836, subd. (a)(2) & (3).) Barrera contends he was arrested without a warrant and contends his arrest was unlawful because deputies did not have probable cause. The People contend Barrera was not arrested despite being handcuffed and transported to the sheriff's station; instead, he was detained.
We commence with an analysis of whether there was probable cause to arrest Barrera, because if there was probable cause, we need not address whether Barrera was detained rather than arrested.
The Supreme Court has explained probable cause to arrest "exists when the facts known to the arresting officer 'would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person [arrested] is guilty of a crime.' " (People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 389.) " '[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts ....' [Citation.] It is incapable of precise definition. [Citation.] ' "The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," ' and that belief must be 'particularized with respect to the person to be ... seized.' " (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673.) " '[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.' " (Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87.)
The parties stipulated that there was no warrant for Barrera's arrest. The trial court found that the circumstances surrounding Barrera being placed in handcuffs, in the back of a patrol car, and then transported to the sheriff's station had all "the hallmarks of an arrest." The trial court further found "there was sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest for at least being an accessory to the shooting, if not an active participant in a criminal street gang."
At the suppression hearing, Sohal testified that he was called to the scene of a shooting on April 3, 2014. The shooting was in Delhi. Sohal spoke with a witness to the shooting who gave a description of the vehicle driven by the suspects. The witness described the vehicle as a gray or silver four-door Honda with damage to the driver's side and a plastic bag over a passenger window.
On May 4, 2014, Sohal saw a vehicle that closely resembled the description of the suspects' vehicle. The vehicle Sohal noticed was a silver, two-door Honda, with damage to the driver's side and plastic over the driver's side window. The license plate of the vehicle was noted.
Sanchez also testified. After locating an address for the vehicle that Sohal had spotted, Sanchez went to the address in Winton to compare the vehicle to video surveillance footage of the shooting. The Honda spotted by Sohal on May 4, 2014, matched the vehicle in the video surveillance footage at the scene of the shooting on April 3, 2014. Distinctive markings on what was determined to be Barrera's vehicle matched the vehicle at the scene of the shooting.
Sanchez testified that based upon Barrera's vehicle matching the vehicle at the scene of the shooting, deputies obtained a "GPS tracker warrant for [Barrera's] vehicle." They tracked the vehicle for several days. Eventually, an investigative stop of the vehicle was made. A woman was driving; she identified herself as Barrera's wife.
Deputies determined that Barrera was employed in Denair. Deputies spoke with Barrera's supervisor, who provided information about Barrera's workday, specifically his scheduled lunchtime breaks. The supervisor told deputies that Barrera regularly traveled to Delhi on his lunch breaks and his lunch breaks were between 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on workdays. Deputies reviewed Barrera's Facebook posts and found information that he was a Ghost Town Sureno gang member.
Based on the totality of information, deputies determined that Barrera's car was at the scene of the shooting and Barrera could have been at the scene of the shooting, which occurred at 12:30 p.m. Ruiz testified that several search warrants were obtained in regards to the shooting investigation, including a search warrant for Barrera's residence.
When Ruiz and others showed up at Barrera's residence around 6:00 a.m. to execute the search warrant, he was not at home. Ruiz and Orozco drove to Barrera's place of work to try and locate Barrera. When they located Barrera, Ruiz placed him in handcuffs, searched him, and placed him in the back of the patrol vehicle.
Barrera was transported to the sheriff's station, about 10 minutes away. Orozco provided Miranda advisements to Barrera. Barrera agreed to speak with Ruiz and Orozco and at one point in their conversation, Barrera admitted being the driver of the vehicle at the time of the shooting in Delhi.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
The information available to deputies at the time Barrera was placed in handcuffs disclosed that it was Barrera's car that was at the scene of the shooting at the time of the shooting. "One means of establishing probable cause is by matching the description of vehicles. [Citations.] The description need not match the vehicle in every detail." (People v. Jones (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 308, 314.)
In addition, deputies had information about Barrera's lunchtime breaks. Specifically, that he was away from work between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on weekdays and that he regularly went to Delhi during his lunch breaks. The shooting occurred in Delhi during Barrera's lunch break, which made it likely Barrera was in his vehicle at the time of the shooting. Facebook postings showed Barrera to be a member of the Ghost Town Sureno gang. Drive-by shootings are often gang related. (See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1100.)
There was a reasonable probability that Barrera was in his vehicle at the time of the shooting, in which case he was potentially liable at a minimum as an accomplice to the shooting (§ 1111), an attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), which is a felony, or for permitting the discharge of a firearm from his motor vehicle in violation of section 26100, subdivision (b), which can be prosecuted as a felony or misdemeanor. Drivers and owners of vehicles have a duty to prevent the discharge of firearms from their vehicles. (See People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1467.)
Under these circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Barrera. (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673.) Consequently, statements he made after he was in custody and advised of his Miranda rights were admissible in evidence.
The trial court did not err in denying Barrera's motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.