Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SA042750, Robert J. Perry, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall & Associates and Marilee Marshall, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee and Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, ACTING P. J.
Antonio Barba appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder. We reject his contentions that the prosecutor improperly challenged a prospective juror due to his race and that the court erred by admitting certain evidence on DNA findings and evidence on some of Barba’s jailhouse conversations, and therefore affirm the judgment.
In November 2007, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Barba (Nov. 21, 2007, B185940) [nonpub. opn.] (Barba I).) On June 29, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted Barba’s petition for certiorari, vacated our earlier decision, and remanded the case to us with directions to reconsider our decision in light of its holding four days earlier in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 2527] (Melendez-Diaz). Melendez-Diaz concerned a defendant’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses where the results of scientific tests were involved, and is therefore applicable to only part of the DNA admissibility issue. Although the United States Supreme Court has directed us to reconsider our decision only in light of Melendez-Diaz, because it vacated our decision in Barba I, we restate our analysis and holding from Barba I as to the issues not implicated by Melendez-Diaz.
The statement of facts is taken in large part from our previous decision in Barba I.
Cab driver Keum Kim was robbed and stabbed to death by a fare he had driven from Santa Monica to Venice in the early morning hours of July 8, 2001. Kim was dispatched in response to a phone call from a man identifying himself as Sergio who said he needed a ride to Brooks Street in Venice and wondered whether the driver might have change for a $50 bill. The murder was witnessed by a man who had stopped his car behind Kim’s parked cab at the 800 block of Brooks Street. The witness saw Kim and the passenger struggle and then saw the passenger run from the cab into some nearby bushes. The passenger’s blue, hooded sweatshirt was covered with blood. However, the witness did not see the passenger clearly and was therefore unable to identify him. A search of the area by the police turned up a bloody kitchen knife and a dark sweatshirt covered with blood. DNA testing of blood samples from those two items showed the blood was Kim’s.
On July 25, 2001, Los Angeles Police Detective Paul Inabu received an anonymous phone call from a woman who claimed Antonio Barba had killed Kim. After getting a search warrant, Inabu searched Barba’s apartment, which was right near the spot where “Sergio” asked the taxi dispatcher to have Kim pick him up. The search turned up a knife that was identical to the murder weapon, but no evidence linking Barba to the crime.
A police criminalist removed some hairs from the bloody sweatshirt and sent them to Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), a DNA testing lab. A November 2001 test by Cellmark analyst Linda Wong produced no interpretable results from the hair samples. In February 2002, a police criminalist retrieved more hairs from the sweatshirt. Although they were not initially considered suitable samples for DNA testing, the hair was eventually sent on to Cellmark for a testing process that involved combining the hairs. When that was accomplished, there was only enough DNA to analyze nine genetic locations, not the 13 typically examined by Cellmark. Six of them were consistent with Barba’s DNA profile.
We state the facts concerning the DNA evidence in more detail in part 3.A. of our Discussion, post.
Barba was charged with murder and robbery, but a hung jury led to a mistrial in February 2004. Barba was retried starting in August 2004. Cellmark’s lab director, Dr. Jennifer Reynolds, testified for the prosecution about DNA evidence in general and about the results of the tests performed by Wong, who no longer worked for Cellmark. Reynolds acknowledged that hair samples sent for testing could, in the abstract, have become contaminated from saliva, skin, blood, mishandling by the lab, and the failure to wash samples. Such contamination was always a possibility, she testified. Wong’s notes did not indicate that she had washed the hairs that yielded the positive test results for Barba’s DNA. The defense introduced evidence of several unrelated instances of lab contamination by police criminalists, along with evidence of 53 reported control discrepancies at Cellmark between March 2001 and December 2002.
The jury convicted Barba of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), but deadlocked on the robbery count (Pen. Code, § 211), which was then dismissed. Barba was given a sentence of life without possibility of parole, plus one year.
In Barba I, Barba contended: (1) the court committed error by denying his motion which charged that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an African-American prospective juror because of his race; (2) the court erred by allowing in evidence the anonymous phone tip and portions of Barba’s jailhouse conversations that were recorded by the police; and (3) the DNA evidence was inadmissible because the test results were hearsay and because allowing Reynolds to testify about Wong’s test results violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. We affirmed as to the DNA evidence in part based on the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555 (Geier). As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has directed us to reconsider the latter portion of our decision in light of Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. 2527.
DISCUSSION
Claimed Jury Selection Error Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Group bias is bias against members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. When a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors because of group bias, she violates a criminal defendant’s right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596 (Bell).) The federal constitutional right was established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and the California counterpart was recognized by People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). (Bell, supra, at p. 596.) The right applies not only to racial and ethnic minorities, but to gender discrimination as well. (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104.) The defendant need not be a member of the targeted group. (Bell, supra, at p. 597.)
When a Batson-Wheeler motion is made, the trial court conducts a three-part inquiry. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the circumstances gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, if the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the prosecution to adequately explain its peremptory challenges by offering group bias-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, if such an explanation has been given, the trial court must decide whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. (Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 596.)
At the time of trial in August 2004, California’s courts had interpreted Batson’s requirement of an inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie case to mean a showing of a strong likelihood of discrimination. (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1188, fn. 7; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281.) In June 2003, our Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the two terms by holding that a prima facie case under Batson-Wheeler required a showing that it was more likely than not that group bias had motivated a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges. (People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 (Johnson I).) In Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 (Johnson II), however, the United States Supreme Court reversed Johnson I and held that a prima facie case required no more than evidence or circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
Because the trial occurred before Johnson II was decided, and because nothing in the trial court’s comments indicates that it applied the correct standard, Barba contends, and respondent does not dispute, that we must review the matter de novo, examining the entire record of voir dire to determine the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror due to prohibited group bias. (Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597.) We agree.
B. The Wheeler Motion
Barba’s Wheeler motion came in response to the prosecutor’s 18th peremptory challenge, to prospective Juror No. 61, who was an African-American. Voir dire was initially conducted by the court, with counsel then permitted to ask questions if they wished. The court began its voir dire of Juror No. 61 by greeting him, to which Juror No. 61 replied, “What’s up?” Juror No. 61 lived in Hollywood and had worked for Home Depot for five years. He did not know his job title, but was “supposed to do customer service.” Juror No. 61 was single, had never been on a jury, and had one year of college education. The prosecutor asked Juror No. 61 no questions, and initially accepted the jury with him on it. After defense counsel exercised her 13th peremptory challenge, however, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged Juror No. 61.
Defense counsel then made her Wheeler motion, stating her belief that the prosecutor had earlier challenged another African-American juror and that juror 61 had said nothing to justify a peremptory challenge. When defense counsel claimed that three of the jurors who had voted not guilty at Barba’s first trial had been African-American, the court said it did not think that was a factor for it to consider. Defense counsel argued that it “demonstrates that the reason, the only reason she’s asked to excuse juror number 61 is because he’s African-American male. Also, I would note that there are no African-American males seated on the jury panel right now, seated in the box right now.” The court replied, “All right,” and asked defense counsel if she had any other arguments to make. Defense counsel pointed out that a White juror, No. 57, had a background similar to Juror No. 61 but had not been excused by the prosecutor. The court said: “Yeah, I don’t find a prima facie case. The prosecution has exercised 17 peremptory challenges. I felt that she has been kicking off people that are both sexes and all races. I don’t feel that there is a prima facie case of exclusion of one particular race. I felt that this particular juror whose [sic] being challenged now as to whether or not they were excused, says he’s been working at Home Depot for five years. He seemed a little, I don’t know, casual in his approach. He greeted the court with a ‘what’s up.’ [¶] Were I trying the case, I don’t think I would have kept him, but that’s – I don’t know. That’s not an appropriate consideration for the court, but I just don’t see that there is a prima facie case.”
Later, during jury deliberations, the court provided counsel with a summary of the racial composition of all prospective jurors who had been peremptorily challenged by both sides, and of the jury that was finally selected to hear the case. The court noted that Juror No. 7, who was the prosecutor’s third peremptory challenge, was a dark-skinned man from Honduras that the court perceived was Hispanic and not African-American. Even so, for purposes of its Wheeler prima facie analysis, the court considered Juror No. 7 to have been African-American. Of the prosecutor’s 17 other peremptory challenges, nine were Hispanic, seven were White, and one was Asian. Two African-Americans were eventually selected to sit on the jury.
We found this summary very helpful and appreciate the trial judge’s effort in making a complete record.
C. No Wheeler Error Occurred
In determining whether the trial court erred in finding that no prima facie of group bias had been made, we examine the totality of all the relevant circumstances, including the entire record of voir dire of the challenged jurors. However, the other relevant circumstances must do more than indicate that the record would support neutral reasons for the questioned challenges. (Williams v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2006) 432 F.3d 1102, 1108.) The defense may show that the prosecutor struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire or used a disproportionate number of her peremptories against the group. The defendant may also show that the challenged jurors share only one common characteristic their group membership and in all other respects are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. The showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the prosecutor’s failure to ask the jurors anything other than desultory questions on voir dire, or the failure to ask them any questions at all. (Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597.)
Barba contends that a prima facie case exists because: (1) the prosecutor had a motive to exclude African-American jurors based on the results of the first trial; (2) jurors with backgrounds similar to Juror No. 61 were allowed to remain; and (3) the prosecutor asked Juror No. 61 no questions. We find no prima facie case.
First, whether the prosecutor might have had a motive does not by itself establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Barba cites no authority for such a proposition and the existence of such a potential motive does not relieve Barba of showing at least some of the permissible factors set forth above when reviewing the trial court’s finding that no prima facie case existed. Second, Barba’s defense counsel compared Juror No. 61 to just one other juror with a supposedly similar background Juror No. 57, who was White. (See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 71 [appellate court may consider comparative analysis argument only if it were first raised in the trial court].) Although jurors 57 and 61 were both single, they were otherwise dissimilar. Juror No. 61 worked at Home Depot in customer service and had one year of college education, while Juror No. 57 had an AA degree and some postgraduate education and worked as a teaching assistant at a community college. Third, although the prosecutor asked Juror No. 61 no questions after the trial court’s initial voir dire, the prosecutor did not question several other prospective White and Hispanic prospective jurors who were peremptorily challenged. We take this to mean that it was the prosecutor’s practice not to question many of the jurors she planned to challenge regardless of their racial or ethnic identities, and it is therefore not indicative of group bias. Fourth, the prosecutor did not use a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against African-Americans. Instead, Juror No. 61 was the first and only African-American juror she excused. Finally, the prosecutor agreed to a jury that eventually included two African-American members, which is a factor we may consider. (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 203.) On this record, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that there was no prima facie showing of a Wheeler violation.
These were prospective juror Nos. 17, 28, 34, 45, 49, 58, and 63.
The trial court decided for purposes of its analysis that it would consider Juror No. 7 – the subject of the prosecutor’s third peremptory challenge – to have been African-American, and the parties have argued the issue on that basis. However, the trial court believed that Juror No. 7, who said he was from the Honduras, was in fact Hispanic. Because we review the trial court’s order de novo, the trial court’s analysis is not binding. Its factual findings concerning a prospective juror’s true racial identity are relevant. Regardless, Barba did not contend below and does not contend on appeal that Juror No. 7 was improperly challenged. In short, we are dealing with a Wheeler claim as to only one prospective juror.
2. The Phone Tip and Jailhouse Conversation Evidence
A. The Disputed Evidence and the Parties’ Appellate Arguments
After obtaining a warrant, the police recorded Barba’s jailhouse conversations with various visitors. Portions of those recordings were introduced in evidence. The first was a conversation with his sister where she tells Barba that his godfather, David, “got a report.” Barba answers, “I know, I know,” then said the report had been shown to “Gordy” and “Abel.” When the sister says she has not seen the report, she asks to see it. Barba then asks whether his godfather talked to her “about that?” When she says yes, Barba says, “The person that... when I was at the house the person he came in with.” When the sister agrees, Barba says, “Had to be. Had to be.” The following exchange then took place:
“[The sister]: Yeah. I went I went over there because I needed brakes. I went over there, and I saw him.
“[Barba]: It had to be. No other no there was nobody else.
“[The sister]: I know, but Steve [Barba’s defense counsel] said that it shouldn’t
“[Barba]: Oh, I know because it’s it’s
“[The sister]: anonymous.
“[Barba]: Yeah, yeah.
“[The sister]: So
“[Barba]: But still, though, that that that that
“[The sister]: He’s upset Gordy is upset about that.
Gordy is Barba’s brother.
“[Barba]: That... just jumps, you know?
“[The sister]: Gordy is upset about that.
“[Barba]: It gave him a green light pretty much.
“[The sister]: Not really because you didn’t tell him. As long as I don’t know, but Gordy - -
“[Barba]: The way it went down.
“[The sister]: Way after.
“[Barba]: I told him.
“[The sister]: Way after.”
The second was a conversation between Barba and his aunt where she said: “When when you want to do tell them something, write it down and show it to him or he writes and it to you here. And that’s it. Don’t about anything, okay.” Barba replied, “No, well, about that, no one.” The third was a conversation with a woman named Karla where Barba said, “I know I got everybody behind me, you know? I know that already. I just feel like, damn, I fucked up. It’s like I let everybody down.”
These conversations were admitted on the theory that they were adoptive admissions by Barba. (Evid. Code, § 1221.) In connection with this evidence, the court allowed a police detective to testify about the anonymous phone tipster who identified Barba as Kim’s killer. The court instructed the jury that the phone tip evidence was not to be considered for the truth of the tipster’s statement, but was to be used solely in order to explain subsequent actions by the police and to explain the context of Barba’s jailhouse conversations.
All further undesignated section references are to the Evidence Code.
In his opening appellate brief, Barba contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the anonymous phone tip because it was inadmissible to explain subsequent conduct by the police in response to the tip. (People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907.) He contends the jailhouse conversations were not admissible as adoptive admissions because there was no showing that he knew of the contents of the anonymous call when his conversations were recorded. (People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 712.) The conversation where he told his sister he had “fucked up” and “let everybody down” was not admissible, Barba contends, because it is not a clear admission of anything and bears no relationship to the anonymous phone tip. Respondent conceded in its brief that the phone tip was not admissible to explain later actions by the police and that the three jailhouse conversations did not qualify as adoptive admissions. According to respondent, evidence of the phone tip was admissible for a nonhearsay purpose on the alternate ground that it explained the jailhouse conversation concerning an anonymous report, and that all three conversations were admissible on a ground not raised at trial: they qualified as hearsay exceptions because they were statements of a party. (§ 1220.)
In his reply brief, Barba renews his attack on the admissibility of the phone tip to explain police conduct, but does not address respondent’s contention that the evidence was properly admitted to give context to at least one of his jailhouse conversations. He does, however, renew his contention that there was no showing he knew of the phone tip when his conversations were recorded. He also contends that respondent cannot attempt to justify admission of the jailhouse conversations under section 1220 because that issue was not raised below, and that allowing the jailhouse conversations and phone tip into evidence violated his constitutional witness confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.
B. The Phone Tip Evidence Was Properly Admitted
The anonymous phone tip evidence was admitted in part for a nonhearsay purpose: to give context to Barba’s jailhouse conversations. It was therefore admissible on that basis and did not violate his constitutional witness confrontation rights. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 189-190, overruled on another ground by People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 747.) Because Barba referred to an anonymous report in his conversation with his sister, as well as to some other person he talked to about “[t]he way it went down,” we reject his contention that the prosecution failed to show he knew about the anonymous phone tip at the time of that conversation. In any event, if error occurred at the time the evidence was admitted because the prosecution failed to make that foundational showing, it was rendered harmless because the jury was instructed that in order to consider the jailhouse conversations as adoptive admissions, it first had to find that Barba knew about the phone tip.
C. The Jailhouse Conversations Were Properly Admitted
Even if the trial court erred by admitting the jailhouse conversations in evidence as adoptive admissions, we will find no error if the evidence was admissible under section 1220. (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898.) Under that section, “[e]vidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party....” In order to qualify under section 1220, the statement does not have to be an admission, and the section covers all statements by a party. (Horning, supra, at p. 898.) If a party has made an out-of-court statement that is relevant and not excludable as unduly prejudicial under section 352, the statement is admissible under section 1220. (People v. Castille (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 863, 875.) All three jailhouse conversations meet this standard. To the extent those statements might be considered ambiguous, that affected only the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its admissibility. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1122, disapproved on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.App.4th 76, 151, which was disapproved on another ground in People v Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.App.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Barba’s trial counsel objected that the anonymous phone tip evidence was unduly prejudicial under section 352, but did not make the same objection as to the jailhouse conversations. On appeal, Barba did not renew the section 352 objection.
The statement that Barba knew he “fucked up” and “let everybody down” could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of wrongdoing. We have some concerns about the conversation where Barba indicates he will write down things he wants to say, rather than speak them out loud. The prosecution contended this showed a consciousness of guilt, while the defense contended it was ambiguous and might have reflected nothing more than defense counsel’s instructions to say nothing about the case. If error occurred in admitting this one statement, it is frankly so ambiguous that its admission was harmless.
3. The DNA Evidence Did Not Violate the Confrontation Clause
As discussed below, this is the only issue implicated by Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. 2527.
A. The DNA Evidence
Hairs from the blood-soaked sweatshirt discarded by Kim’s killer were sent to Cellmark for DNA analysis. Three hair samples taken by the LAPD in September 2001 matched Kim’s DNA, not Barba’s. More hair samples taken from the sweatshirt in March 2002 also matched Kim’s DNA, not Barba’s.
The hair samples that implicated Barba were removed from the sweatshirt on February 21, 2002, by LAPD criminalist Michael Mastrocovo. He found 14 hairs and gave them to LAPD criminalist Susan Brockbank, who examined them and concluded they had telogen roots, which were not suitable for DNA analysis. In May 2002, Mastrocovo told the prosecutor those hairs could be combined to produce a testable sample, but that doing so would destroy the sample, thereby precluding any further testing. The prosecutor said to perform the test, and Mastrocovo sent the 14 hairs to Cellmark with instructions to consume the samples if necessary. The LAPD’s lab procedure manual recommended that before DNA testing was performed on hair samples, the hairs should be washed to reduce the presence of any contaminants. Mastrocovo did not wash these hair samples because he did not extract them.
In June 2002, Cellmark DNA analyst Linda Wong tested the 14 hairs sent by Mastrocovo. Wong had performed the previous DNA tests but, unlike those tests, her notes did not reflect that she performed the Chelex procedure, which involves washing the hairs to remove any contaminants that were deposited on the hairs. Wong cut and combined the hair shafts and was able to locate only nine genetic locations instead of the 13 that were usually present. Of those nine, six were consistent with Barba’s DNA.
Wong no longer worked at Cellmark and did not testify at trial. Instead, Dr. Jennifer Reynolds, the director of Cellmark’s Maryland laboratory testified. Reynolds’s duties included performing technical reviews of case folders created by the lab’s test analysts, independently drawing conclusions from the test results based on her own expertise and training, and either cosigning the reports or testifying about them in court. According to Reynolds, the case file for the June 2002 testing included correspondence from the LAPD, test data and results, Wong’s worksheets and handwritten notes, and reports of the test’s conclusions. Analysts complete their lab notes and other documents at or near the time of the events. The materials in the file were detailed enough to allow any qualified scientist to look at the file and determine what procedures had been used. Those records were kept and maintained in the normal course of Cellmark’s business.
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The essence of a confrontation clause violation is the use of a hearsay declarant’s testimonial or quasi-testimonial statements. Testimonial statements are those that in purpose, form, and setting, are akin to testimony given by a witness at trial. (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984-987.) Barba objected that having Reynolds testify instead of Wong violated his confrontation rights. Defense counsel said she believed the incriminating hair samples had been contaminated while in the LAPD’s custody before being sent to Cellmark for testing, but that Wong’s testimony was required because there was evidence she had not washed the hair samples, which would have eliminated any contamination. Without Wong’s testimony, there would be no explanation of why that happened. The trial court overruled the objection because it believed Wong’s reports qualified as business records. However, Reynolds was allowed to testify only as to procedures that Wong’s notes showed were actually conducted, or as to what the lab’s standard protocols were. Reynolds was not allowed to speculate as to any procedures not reflected in Wong’s notes, or why they might not have been performed. Reynolds testified that, in accord with her job duties, she was in court to give her own independent conclusions based on the contents of Wong’s case file. According to Reynolds, only one in six million people would have the same six genetic markers as those that matched Barba.
Reynolds was vigorously cross-examined about Wong’s testing procedures. Reynolds said that because the notes did not state that Wong had washed the hair samples before testing, Wong probably had not done so. Reynolds also testified that even though the test results were accurate as to the DNA found on the hair shafts, that did not mean the DNA had not been deposited there before testing. Nor could she rule out whether such contamination had occurred.
A. The Geier Decision
The defendant in Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555, was convicted of murder and rape based in part on DNA evidence tested by Cellmark. The analyst who performed the testing did not testify at trial. Instead, a lab director who co-signed the report did, and, based on the results and her review of the case file, testified that in her expert opinion the incriminating DNA matched that of the defendant. Geier contended his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses was violated because the lab analyst did not testify. Our Supreme Court disagreed.
After examining disparate state and federal authority on the issue of whether scientific test reports were testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause, the Geier court concluded a statement was testimonial only if three requirements were all met: (1) it was made to a law enforcement officer or by a law enforcement officer or agent; (2) it describes a past fact related to criminal activity; and (3) it will possibly be used at a later trial. (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 605.) The Geier court found the second point determinative. Even though the analyst was working for the police and could reasonably anticipate the use of her test results at trial, those results “constitute[d] a contemporaneous recordation of observable events rather than the documentation of past events.” (Id. at p. 605.) As a result, when the analyst recorded the results, she was not acting as a witness and was not testifying. (Id. at pp. 605-606.)
Ultimately, it was the circumstances under which the analyst’s reports and notes were made that led the Geier court to conclude they were not testimonial and therefore did not violate Geier’s confrontation rights. First, they were generated as part of a standardized scientific protocol conducted pursuant to her employment at Cellmark. Even though the prosecutor hoped to obtain evidence against Geier, the analyst’s work product was part of her job, and was not intended to incriminate him. Second, to the extent the analyst’s notes and reports recount the procedures used, they were not accusatory because DNA analysis can lead to either incriminatory or exculpatory results. Finally, the accusatory opinions that the DNA evidence matched Geier “were reached and conveyed not through the nontestifying technician’s laboratory notes and report, but by the testifying witness, [the lab director].” (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 607.)
B. The Melendez-Diaz Decision
The defendant in Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. 2527, was convicted in Massachusetts state court of selling cocaine. A substance in the defendant’s possession that was believed to be cocaine was sent to a lab for analysis, and the lab test confirmed it was cocaine. At trial, as permitted by Massachusetts law, a sworn affidavit known as a certificate of analysis was allowed in evidence in order to prove that the substance tested positive as cocaine. The analyst who performed the test did not testify at trial. The certificate said nothing more than that the substance was found to contain cocaine. At the time of trial, the defendant did not know what tests the analyst performed, whether those tests were routine, or whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or skills the analyst did not possess.
The Melendez-Diaz court held that the affidavits fell within the core class of testimonial statements – such as depositions, prior testimony, declarations, and affidavits – whose admission violates the confrontation clause. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 2531-2532.) Therefore, the analysts were witnesses and their affidavits were testimonial, meaning that the defendant had a right to “confront” them at his trial unless the analysts were unavailable for trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross-examine them. (Id. at p. 2532.) In short, “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of such evidence... was error.” (Id. at p. 2542, fn. Omitted.)
C. Geier, Not Melendez-Diaz, Applies to this Case
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the parties frame the issue as whether Melendez-Diaz has overruled Geier, either in whole or in part. According to Barba, Melendez-Diaz applies to Wong’s notes and test results and required the prosecution to produce her as a trial witness, not Reynolds. Respondent contends Melendez-Diaz is limited to the use of affidavits to prove the results of scientific lab tests, permitting Reynolds to testify under Geier. We agree with respondent.
The California Supreme Court recently granted review in four Court of Appeal decisions that took divergent views on this issue. (People v. Rutterschmidt, review granted Dec. 2, 2009, S176213; People v. Gutierrez, review granted Dec. 2, 2009, S176620; People v. Dungo, review granted Dec. 2, 2009, S176886; and People v. Lopez, review granted Dec. 2, 2009, S177046.) The parties discuss these cases, but they are no longer citable authority.
We are bound to follow Melendez-Diaz in cases involving similar facts. (Austin v. Wilkinson (N.D.Ohio 2006) 502 F.Supp.2d 660, 671; People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 688, 703.) At issue in Melendez-Diaz was the prosecution’s ability to prove a substance was cocaine by way of an ex parte affidavit devoid of any details apart from the unsupported conclusion that unspecified test results showed it was cocaine. The court held that for purposes of the confrontation clause, the affidavits were the same as depositions, declarations and other testimonial statements. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 2531-2532.) It did not reach the issue decided in Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555 and raised here – whether the director of a lab that conducted DNA tests can render an opinion based on the results of lab tests conducted by an analyst employed at the lab, subject to full cross-examination by the defendant.
Nor did the Melendez-Diaz court hint, much less suggest, that its reasoning would extend to these circumstances. Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, framed the question before the court as “whether those [drug analysis] affidavits are ‘testimonial,’ rendering the affiants ‘witnesses’ subject to the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.” (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2530.) Its holding was limited to a determination that the “Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits....” (Id. at p. 2542, fn. omitted.) Even though Justice Thomas joined in the 5-4 majority vote, he wrote a separate concurring opinion stating his belief that the confrontation clause extended to only core testimonial statements, while clarifying that he joined the majority solely because the affidavits at issue fell within that class. (Id. at p. 2543 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)
We observe that the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Geier just four days after deciding Melendez-Diaz. (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555, cert. den. Jun. 29, 2009, No. 07-77770, sub nom.Geier v. California (2009) ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 2856].)
In short, Melendez-Diaz did not overrule Geier and its holding has no application here. Accordingly, we deem Geier to be controlling authority on this issue and, as in Barba I, we hold that under Geier, having Reynolds testify instead of Wong – subject to vigorous cross-examination – did not violate Barba’s confrontation rights.
Apart from Reynolds’s testimony, Barba contends that admitting in evidence Wong’s reports also violated his confrontation rights. Assuming for discussion’s sake only that he is correct, we will affirm if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 608.) Even if the reports had not come into evidence, under Geier, Reynolds properly testified to her opinions based on the reports. Although the report was admitted in evidence as exhibit 29, it was not among those the jury asked to see during deliberations. Nor was it the focus of the parties’ jury arguments. Therefore, had the report itself been excluded, Reynolds’s opinions would have still been before the jury, meaning that a different result was not reasonably probable. Any error, therefore, was harmless.
D. Business Record Foundational Challenges
Barba also contends the trial court erred by admitting the DNA test results themselves under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (§ 1270) because those results reflected Wong’s opinions and were not recording an “act, condition, or event.” (People v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.) He also challenges the admissibility of Reynolds’s testimony because the prosecution failed to establish two of the statutory predicates under the business records exception: (1) that Reynolds was Cellmark’s custodian of records or was otherwise qualified to testify to the report’s identity and method of preparation (§ 1271, subd. (c)); and (2) because there was evidence that Wong did not follow the proper testing protocols, the evidence was not sufficiently trustworthy (id., subd. (d)). As to the first, no such objection was raised below and the issue is therefore waived. (§ 353, subd. (a); People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153.)
At oral argument upon remand to this court, Barba’s counsel said objections about the report were made as “to everything,” suggesting to us that an objection had been made under section 1271, subdivision (c). We have reviewed the record and determined that no such objection was made. Were we to reach that issue we would find no error. Reynolds testified that she had a doctoral degree in human genetics, that part of her job duties included performing technical reviews of the lab analysts’ case files and independently drawing her own conclusions about the results, that the file Wong prepared was kept in the normal course of business, and that Wong’s notes and other records were made at or near the time of the events and were sufficiently detailed that any qualified scientist could interpret them. Accordingly, she did testify to the identity and mode of preparation of the report.
Regardless of whether the reports were independently admissible, however, Reynolds was still free to offer an expert opinion based on those reports if they were the proper basis for such testimony. (§ 804, subd. (d); Geier, supra,41 Cal.4th at p. 608, fn. 13 [DNA expert witness was free to rely on the analyst’s report to form her own opinions about the DNA match]; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618.) Because Reynolds could rely on (and be examined about the basis of) those reports, and because Reynolds’s independent opinions were the lynchpin of the incriminating DNA evidence, any error in admitting the reports as business records was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Division Four of this court has also recently addressed the issue. (People v. Vargas (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 647 (Vargas).) Vargas was convicted of rape. At trial, a nurse who conducted a sexual assault exam of the victim testified about the victim’s statements during the exam that described the assault. The victim, a minor, did not testify. The Vargas court questioned whether Geier had any continued viability in light of Melendez-Diaz, but noted that Justice Thomas’s concurrence cast doubt on whether its reasoning might be extended to items that were not in the core class of testimonial statements, such as affidavits. (Vargas, at pp. 659-660.)
Analyzing the case under pre-Melendez-Diaz authority such as Geier, the Vargas court concluded that the victim’s statements to the examining nurse were testimonial because they were made as part of the evidence gathering process for possible use at trial, instead of as part of a medical examination designed to diagnose an injury and render treatment. (Vargas, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 660-662.) The confrontation clause violation was held harmless as to Vargas’s conviction of forcible rape, but was not harmless, and therefore required reversal of, his conviction for rape by penetration with a foreign object, because the only evidence to support that charge came from the nurse’s testimony. (Id. at pp. 662-664.)
Because Vargas concerned an entirely different factual setting, while our facts are nearly identical to those in Geier, we deem Vargas inapplicable to our analysis.