Opinion
No. 332008
03-21-2017
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HAFEZ ALI ALMASMARI, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 15-000047-01-FH Before: MARKEY, P.J., and WILDER and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions and sentence of third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer (fleeing and eluding), MCL 257.602a(3), and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (operating while intoxicated), MCL 257.625(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 to 60 months' imprisonment for the fleeing and eluding conviction and 93 days' jail time for the operating while intoxicated conviction, with credit for 226 days for time served. We affirm.
On the evening of December 17, 2014, defendant drove his vehicle into a car and gas pump at a gas station. He fled from the accident scene with a nearby police car in pursuit. During the pursuit defendant collided with an unmarked Wayne County Sheriff's vehicle. Police eventually identified open containers of alcohol within defendant's vehicle. Defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.116%.
Before trial, defendant underwent two competency determinations; however, defense counsel stipulated that defendant was competent to stand trial in subsequent competency hearings. Additionally, pretrial, defendant was offered a plea agreement: if defendant pleaded no contest to fleeing and eluding, the prosecution would dismiss the charge of operating while intoxicated, and defendant would serve one year in jail. Defendant twice rejected the prosecution's offered plea agreement.
On July 2, 2015, after defense counsel stipulated to defendant's competency for a second time, defendant indicated he planned on accepting the prosecution's offered plea agreement with a guilty plea. The trial court then proceeded with defendant's plea colloquy without incident. But after the prosecutor expressed satisfaction that defendant had admitted to the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding, defendant equivocated about his guilt and confusion ensued. Ultimately, the trial court refused to accept defendant's plea.
A jury convicted defendant, and the trial court sentenced him as noted already. On May 5, 2016, defendant filed a motion for resentencing. Defendant argued that he was entitled to resentencing because the trial court erroneously believed that defendant was feigning mental illness and "playing games" during various plea proceedings and that defendant's sentence was based at least in part on this inaccurate fact. Defendant also provided a report completed after his trial by a psychologist who concluded after interviewing defendant and reviewing the transcript of defendant's plea colloquy, that defendant's behavior during his plea colloquy was consistent with his mental illness. The trial court denied defendant's motion for resentencing on September 20, 2016, because it found that it had not relied on inaccurate information when it sentenced defendant because its conclusion that defendant was "playing games" was predicated on the fact that defendant made unclear and confusing assertions during each plea hearing despite the fact that defendant was found to be competent on two occasions. Additionally, the trial court noted that defendant's admissions of guilt and culpability were called into question by defendant's own statements; consequently, the trial court had to refuse defendant's plea.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it refused to accept his guilty plea. We disagree.
Generally, an issue is preserved for appellate review when it is raised before, addressed, and decided by a trial court. People v Metamora Water Service, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). Defendant did not argue below that the trial court lacked discretion to reject his guilty plea; therefore, this issue has not been preserved.
This Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, the defendant must demonstrate that an error occurred, the error was plain, and the plain error affected substantial rights. Id. "The third prong requires a showing of prejudice, which occurs when the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." People v Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 243; 870 NW2d 593 (2015). "A trial judge's decision to accept or reject a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion." People v Plumaj, 284 Mich App 645, 648; 773 NW2d 763, 765 (2009), citing People v Grove, 455 Mich 439, 460; 566 NW2d 547 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Franklin, 491 Mich 916 (2012). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). "Questions of law, including interpretation of court rules, are reviewed de novo on appeal." Plumaj, 284 Mich App at 648.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to accept defendant's plea. In light of the confusion surrounding defendant's plea, the trial court's rejection of defendant's plea was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Under MCR 6.302(A), a trial court "may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate." If a defendant pleads guilty, then the trial court must inquire whether there is "support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which the defendant is pleading." MCR 6.302(D)(1). If "a plea agreement and its terms provide for the defendant's plea to be made in exchange for a sentence to a specified term or within a specified range or a prosecutorial sentence recommendation," a trial court may "reject the agreement," "accept the agreement after having considered the presentence report," "accept the agreement without having considered the presentence report," or "take the plea agreement under advisement." MCR 6.302(C)(3). Further, " '[t]here is . . . no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted . . . . A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.' " Grove, 455 Mich at 461, quoting Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971).
The trial court provided defendant with three opportunities to enter a plea. During a pretrial hearing held on May 5, 2015, defendant first rejected the plea agreement offered by the prosecution because he contended that "[t]his whole story is made up." At the subsequent pretrial hearing on May 21, 2015, defense counsel expressed at the outset of the hearing that defendant planned on accepting the prosecution's offered plea agreement. The trial court then asked defendant if he wanted to enter a plea. Defendant replied by asking the trial court for advice, and he then provided a confused narrative account that supported his innocence. The hearing culminated in the trial court's granting defense counsel's motion that defendant be referred for a competency and criminal responsibility assessment.
On July 2, 2015, defense counsel and the prosecutor stipulated that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel then asserted that defendant again intended to accept the prosecution's offered plea agreement, and defendant confirmed he intended to enter a guilty plea. But once again, after the prosecutor expressed satisfaction that that defendant had admitted to conduct that satisfied the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding, defendant made statements that called the veracity of his admissions into question. Specifically, defendant stated, "[u]m, I just want to ask you know I don't want to give up my um I don't want come up for trial. I'm doing this because I have to say the right things I'm fighting my case," and, "I'll go with it yes I'll go with what the lawyer says."
We note that many parts of the transcripts for this case are poor, making them difficult to follow. --------
The trial court expressed frustration with defendant because it perceived him as "playing games with the Court" and ultimately refused to accept defendant's plea. Under MCR 6.302(A), the trial court was bound to refuse any guilty plea that it was convinced was not understanding, voluntary, or accurate. Considering defendant's equivocation about the truth of his admissions during the plea colloquy, the trial court's decision to refuse defendant's guilty plea was within the range of principled outcomes. Additionally, defendant's statements also implied that his plea may have been involuntary, as defendant stated he was "fighting my case" and that he was just "go[ing] with what the lawyer says."
On appeal, defendant contends that our Supreme Court has only recognized two contexts in which a trial court may refuse a guilty plea: where the trial court disagrees with a sentence agreement that is a condition of the plea, and when the plea is offered after a judicially-imposed deadline for plea-taking. See Grove, 455 Mich at 456, 469-470. Defendant ignores MCR 6.302, which requires a trial court to refuse a guilty plea that is not understanding, voluntary, and accurate. Additionally, the Grove Court stated that its holding concerning the discretion of a trial court to reject a plea was "consistent with federal authorities under FR Crim P 11, which provides for a similar procedure to that of MCR 6.302." Grove, 455 Mich at 461. The Court also quoted multiple authorities with approval, including a decision holding that a district court did not have a duty to consider a negotiated plea agreement and that the rejection of a proposed guilty plea—even without articulating reasons—was within the court's broad discretion. Grove, 455 Mich at 462, citing United States v Moore, 637 F2d 1194, 1196 (CA 8, 1981).
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for resentencing because it relied on inaccurate facts when it sentenced him. We disagree.
Generally, this Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for resentencing for an abuse of discretion. People v Divietri, 206 Mich App 61, 66; 520 NW2d 643 (1994). "We review for clear error a court's finding of facts at sentencing." People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111; 748 NW2d 799 (2008). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." People v McDade, 301 Mich App 343, 356; 836 NW2d 266 (2013).
" '[A] sentence is invalid if it is based on inaccurate information.' " People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89; 711 NW2d 44 (2006), quoting People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). But our Supreme Court's decision in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 365, 399; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), holding the statutory sentencing guidelines advisory only, "did not alter or diminish MCL 769.34(10), which provides, in pertinent part, 'If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant's sentence.' " People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 196 n 1; 886 NW2d 173 (2016). Moreover, a guidelines scoring error is harmless when it does not alter the appropriate guidelines range or the trial court indicates "it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error and the sentence falls within the appropriate guidelines range." Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8.
During sentencing, defendant did not object to how the trial court calculated his sentencing guidelines range. And, defendant does not argue on appeal that the trial court relied on inaccurate information when it determined sentencing guidelines variables, nor does defendant argue that his Presentence Information Report was inaccurate. Rather, defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because during defendant's failed plea colloquy, the trial court expressed that it felt defendant was "playing games with the court." Thus, defendant infers that the trial court found that defendant was feigning confusion and mental illness. Defendant contends that this purported finding of fact was inaccurate, that the trial court improperly sentenced him while relying on this fact, and improperly denied his motion for resentencing on similar grounds.
Defendant's argument is without merit. In its order denying resentencing, the trial court found that it did not err when it concluded that defendant was "playing games." Specifically, the trial court stated its finding was supported by the fact that defendant was found to be competent on two occasions. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that defendant was "playing games" during his plea hearing because defendant thus failed to show that the trial court made a mistake. Defendant fails to demonstrate how the trial court's impressions of defendant's behavior during his failed plea colloquy impacted his recommended guidelines range or his sentence. Absent this evidence, we must conclude that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for resentencing was within the range of principled outcomes. During defendant's sentencing the trial court recounted defendant's extensive criminal history and defendant's previous failure to report for probation before it sentenced defendant to 30 to 60 months' imprisonment. Thirty months' imprisonment was the high end of defendant's recommended minimum sentence range. The trial court made no direct reference to defendant's failed plea colloquy during sentencing, but the trial court stated, "I hope you also get mental health treatment during this time that you are incarcerated." In light of such a recommendation, there is no reason to believe the trial court relied on a finding that defendant had been feigning mental illness when it sentenced defendant and therefore rendered an invalid sentence. As defendant correctly notes in his brief, a defendant may be competent to stand trial and still suffer from mental illness. See Indiana v Edwards, 554 US 164, 178; 128 S Ct 2379; 171 L Ed 2d 345 (2008).
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle