Pearson v. Indiana High School Athletic Assoc

Full title: JOHN S. PEARSON III, and JENNIFER PEARSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NATURAL…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

Date published: Feb 22, 2000

Cause No. IP99-1857-C-T/G (S.D. Ind. Feb. 22, 2000)

Opinion

Cause No. IP99-1857-C-T/G

February 22, 2000

ENTRY RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

JOHN D. TINDER, Judge

This is yet another case involving a dispute over the rules and enforcement actions of the Defendant Indiana High School Athletic Association. See Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1998) (noting that such disputes "frequently find their way into state and federal court in Indiana"). At issue in this case is the IHSAA's interpretation of and enforcement of what has become known as the 50% Rule. Plaintiffs John S. Pearson, III, Jennifer Pearson, John Pearson, Andy Elder, Marilyn Elder, and Reed Elder challenge the enforcement of the 50% Rule which led to their disqualification of the minors Pearson and Elder during the semi-final match of the Doubles Tournament in the 1999-2000 IHSAA Boys Tennis Tournament Series ("State Finals" or "Doubles Tournament"). Plaintiffs have moved for injunctive relief. This entry constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to that requested relief.¹

1 Any finding of fact which is more appropriately considered a conclusion of law and vice versa, should be deemed such.

I. Findings of Fact

Plaintiffs John Pearson and Reed Elder² are students in their senior year at the Park Tudor School ("Park Tudor") who participated on Park Tudor's boys' varsity tennis team during the fall 1999 season. Park Tudor is a member of the Defendant Indiana High School Athletic Association ("IHSAA" or "Association"). John had surgery on his median nerve of his right arm on June 30, 1999. As a consequence of his surgery, he was able to participate in only one season contest during the week of August 23 and did not play in the following season contests: (a) August 23 — Roncalli vs. Park Tudor, (b) August 24 — Heritage Christian vs. Park Tudor, (c) August 25 — Chatard vs. Park Tudor. In addition, John did not participate in the North Central John Shirley Invitational Tournament on August 28. He also missed three season contests on September 23, September 24, and September 27, in accordance with the orders of his hand surgeon, Dr. Thomas Fischer.

2 Three Pearsons and three Elders are Plaintiffs in this suit. The facts and legal issues revolve around the student-athletes, John Pearson and Reed Elder, and not the other Plaintiffs, their parents. For ease of reference, student-athletes John Pearson and Reed Elder will be referred to as "Pearson" and "Elder," respectively, throughout this entry. If reference is made to their parents, a more detailed listing of their names will be made.

The IHSAA is an Indiana not-for-profit corporation whose voluntary members include public and private high schools in the State of Indiana. (IHSAA 1999-2000 By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation ("IHSAA Manual") at 1-4.) The purpose of the IHSAA is "to encourage, regulate and give direction to wholesome, amateur, interschool athletic competition between the schools who are members of [the IHSAA]." (IHSAA Manual, Article II-Purpose at 3.) To achieve this purpose, the IHSAA shall, inter alia, "provide written communications to establish standards for eligibility, competition and sportsmanship." ( Id.) The IHSAA has adopted rules relative to the interschool athletic competition, including competition rules and eligibility rules.

At the heart of this case is an IHSAA rule known as the "50% Rule" which is set forth in an IHSAA Bulletin, Volume 96, No. 1 issued August 1999 as follows:

B. Tournament Series

. . . .

2. Singles Doubles

a. To qualify for the doubles tournament series, both participants must have played a minimum of 50% of their total matches in the # 1 doubles position.

. . . .

V. QUALIFICATIONS — DOUBLES

A. To qualify for the doubles tournament series, both participants must have played a minimum of 50% of their season contests in the # 1 doubles position.

(Bulletin at 36, 48) (emphasis in original.) The 50% Rule was adopted in 1991, and the minutes of the Board of Directors adopting the Rule state: "Limit the competition of singles players in the doubles state tournament unless they play a certain amount of doubles matches prior to the sectional." (R. at 581.) Another purpose behind the rule is "to ensure that the people who play in the number one doubles tournament are indeed number one doubles players." (R. at 66; see also id. at 73, 512.) The IHSAA has not published its interpretation of the 50% Rule — that season contests means "the total number of the playing opportunities of the number one doubles position" — either in an IHSAA bulletin or publication of any kind.

All IHSAA member schools, which include Park Tudor, have, by accepting membership in the IHSAA, agreed to abide by and be primarily responsible for the enforcement and administration of their interscholastic programs in accordance with the IHSAA eligibility rules. Rule 3-1 of the IHSAA Rules provides:

It is the responsibility of each member school to control its athletic program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the association. It shall be the duty of the member school principals to see that all members of their staff who deal with athletics and all student athletes are made aware of these rules and regulations. Failure to so inform any staff member or student-athlete shall not prevent the Association from enforcing its rules, since the Association presumes that all of its members and their staff as well as the individual participants have read and understand these rules, and by consenting to be members of the Association and by participating in Association sanctioned events, agree to abide by these rules and regulations.

(IHSAA Manual, Rule 3-1 at 13-14.). Thus, principals of member schools such as Park Tudor have the obligation of ensuring that members of their staff who deal with athletics, such as coaches, and all student-athletes are aware of the IHSAA rules and regulations.

Section 5(h) of the IHSAA By-Laws grants the IHSAA Commissioner the authority to "initiate investigations, conduct hearings, collect information, render decisions and fix penalties based on the evidence, and in accordance with the rules and regulations" of the IHSAA. (IHSAA Manual at 9.) Such decisions by the Commissioner are subject to review by the IHSAA Executive Committee (the "Committee") on appeal by the principal of the member school involved. ( Id.) In addition, Rule 17-3³ expressly authorizes the Commissioner or his designee to investigate and decide certain matters. The rule provides in pertinent part:

3 The court notes that the IHSAA Manual designates the rule number as "17.3," but believes that this is a typographical error and the correct designation is "17-3." The latter designation is consistently used for other rules in the manual. Thus, the court refers to this rule as Rule 17-3.

C-17.3

Commissioner Investigation and Decision

17-3.1

Investigation and Initial Review

If it comes to the attention of the Association that a school has failed to enforce a Rule or Association directive, or that a Rule or decision may have been violated . . . the Commissioner or his designee shall investigate and/or review the matter and render a decision.

(IHSAA Manual at 48.)

In tennis, the IHSAA sponsors a season-ending team tournament, a singles tournament and a doubles tournament. The tournaments are conducted simultaneously, except for the finals. Pearson and Elder competed as the Park Tudor # 1 doubles team in the team tournament until Park Tudor was eliminated. On September 17, 1999, Park Tudor had submitted its 1999-2000 IHSAA Boys Tennis Tournament Series official entry form to the IHSAA, listing both John Pearson and Reed Elder as contestants for the Doubles Tournament, upon which was stamped "OK 9-20-99." (R. at 243.)

On Monday, October 18, 1999, the Assistant Athletic Director for Center Grove High School ("Center Grove") called IHSAA Assistant Commissioner Theresia Wynns to inquire whether the Park Tudor Individual Doubles Team was qualified for the Doubles Tournament. Subsequently, Asst. Commissioner Wynns contacted all schools competing in the tournament, including Park Tudor, to confirm the information provided in their entry forms. She left a telephone message on Park Tudor Athletic Director's voice mail, requesting the record of the #1 doubles team and specifically asking whether the #1 doubles team had played 50% in the #1 doubles position and 50% of the team's matches in the #1 doubles position. Park Tudor's Assistant Tennis Coach, John Talbert, responded by providing Wynns the season record, the tournament record, and responded in the affirmative to the question whether the #1 doubles team had played 50% of the team's matches in the #1 doubles position.

On Friday, October 22, 1999, Pearson and Elder participated in the Doubles Tournament, defeating Princeton Community High School's participants, and qualifying Park Tudor for participation in the semi-final round the next morning. Also on that Friday, the Indiana High School Tennis Coaches Association ("TeCA") met to make its All State selections. Pearson's eligibility based on the 50% Rule was raised during the meeting. That evening at about 10:00 p.m., Tim Cleland, TeCA's president, telephoned Dave Heffern, Park Tudor's boys' varsity tennis coach. Cleland told Heffern that a question could be raised the next morning about Pearson's eligibility and suggested that Heffern bring his match book with him to the finals to prove that Pearson and Elder were eligible. Coach Heffern saw to it that his match book was at the tournament the next morning.

On October 23, 1999, Pearson and Elder arrived at the tournament site around 9:45 a.m. and began warming up for a 10:30 a.m. match. They were scheduled to play Lawrence Central High School ("Lawrence Central"). Had they won the match against Lawrence Central, they would have advanced to the finals and played for the state championship against the winner of the other semi-final match.⁴

4 Center Grove's team won that semi-final match; therefore, had Pearson and Elder won their semi-final match, they would have played Center Grove's team for the state title.

At some point that morning, Center Grove's varsity tennis coach Ivan Smith approached IHSAA Asst. Commissioner Wynns, indicated that the Park Tudor doubles team did not meet the eligibility criteria under the 50% Rule and encouraged her to review Park Tudor's season schedule and its players' eligibility. Asst. Commissioner Wynns, Coach Smith, TeCA President Cleland and others met in a boardroom at the tournament site and discussed Pearson's and Elder's eligibility, using a chalkboard displaying the Park Tudor team schedule. Around 10:15 a.m., Coach Heffern entered the boardroom, and Asst. Commissioner Wynns asked him to explain the schedule. A discussion ensued about whether the North Central John Shirley Invitational Tournament ("Shirley Invitational") should have counted as three season contests in reporting to the IHSAA the school's total season contests played.⁵ Sixteen schools were involved in the Shirley Invitational. Park Tudor's #1 doubles team played in 3 matches at the Shirley Invitational.

5 IHSAA Rule 58-4 defines "tennis match" as "A contest between two teams, which consist [sic] of two out of three sets (regulation matches) with twelve point tie breaker at 6-6 for both singles and doubles." (IHSAA Manual at 75.) "Tournament" is defined by Rule 58-4 as "When three or more schools are involved." ( Id.) Rule 58-4 limits the maximum number of allowable contests and tourneys to "12 matches plus three tourneys, or; 14 matches plus two tourneys." ( Id.)

Coach Heffern reported that Park Tudor had participated in fourteen season contests. He argued that the 50% Rule was met because Pearson played 100% of his season contests in the #1 doubles position; the Shirley Invitational was not a season contest/match under the IHSAA rules because it was not a "head to head competition" between two teams and was an exhibition tournament; and Pearson did not violate the purpose and the spirit of the Rule.⁶ Coach Heffern also told Asst. Commissioner Wynns that the only reason Pearson missed any matches was because of his injury. Asst. Commissioner Wynns responded that there was no injury exception to the 50% Rule. She determined that Pearson had played in only 8 of Park Tudor's 17 matches and, therefore, concluded that he was ineligible to compete in the Doubles Tournament because he did not satisfy the 50% Rule.

6 Evidence was presented at the hearing before the Committee which contradicts Coach Heffern's claim not to have known that the three matches played at the Shirley Invitational counted in the 50% Rule calculation. Asst. Commissioner Wynns testified that a similar situation arose in 1998 with the Park Tudor girls' tennis team, of which Coach Heffern was the head coach. Asst. Commissioner Wynns met with the assistant coach and told her that the 3 matches played in a tournament had to be included in the total count for 50% Rule calculation.

At some point during the warm-up for the semi-finals, Asst. Commissioner Wynns told Jason Willie, the IHSAA's coordinator of publications, to tell Linda Hinshaw, the contest official, to delay the warmup five to ten minutes. He did so, and the warm-up period was extended.⁷ As a result, both the semi-final match in which Park Tudor's team played and the other semi-final match were delayed. The two semi-final matches were to begin at the same time so that neither team advancing to the finals would have an advantage over the other because of a longer rest period between their semi-final and the finals. Because she received no further instruction from Asst. Commissioner Wynns and the coaches, including Coach Heffern, told her "we're going to play," Official Hinshaw began the semi-finals.

7 There is a dispute, though not material, over whether Asst. Commissioner Wynns also told him to tell Official Hinshaw not to start the matches. Mr. Willie testified that Wynns did not ask him to tell Ms. Hinshaw not to start the match. (J. Willie Dep. at 19, 23.) Wynns testified, however, that she told Mr. Willie to tell Ms. Hinshaw not to start the match. (R. at 32.) Wynns did not personally tell Ms. Hinshaw not to start the match. (L. Hinshaw Dep. at 22.)

In the meantime, Asst. Commissioner Wynns contacted IHSAA Commissioner Bob Gardner by telephone to ask him about the procedure for disqualifying Park Tudor's doubles team. The Commissioner supported Asst. Commissioner Wynns' determination that Park Tudor's #1 doubles team was ineligible. Together they determined that Park Tudor's #1 doubles team should be disqualified immediately.

By that time, the match was well underway. Pearson and Elder had won the first set 6-1 and were leading in the second set 5-4 and serving, when Asst. Commissioner Wynns stopped the match and disqualified Pearson and Elder. She made no public announcement regarding the default or the reason for the default. A crowd of 150 to 200 spectators were watching when the Park Tudor team was defaulted. The IHSAA's home page on the World Wide Web reports that Pearson and Elder were "defaulted" from the Doubles Tournament. (R. 494-95.)

On October 23, 1999, the same day as the Doubles Tournament, TeCA selected 12 teams as "All State" Boys Doubles tennis teams. TeCA did not select Pearson and Elder for the All State team because they did not satisfy one of the criteria for being an all state candidate, namely they did not meet the 50% Rule.

On Sunday, October 24, 1999, an article appeared in the sports section of The Indianapolis Star discussing the default of Park Tudor's #1 doubles team. The article accurately quoted Assist. Commissioner Wynns as stating: "Based on the information we had early in the week, we felt they were legal. But we learned this morning we didn't have all the information we needed to have." (Pls.' Trial Ex. 4.) At a later date, Asst. Commissioner Wynns contacted the principal of Princeton High School ("Princeton"), James Isaacs, and told him that Park Tudor's record had been misrepresented before the tournament. She did not, however, indicate that the record was intentionally misrepresented. An article appeared on October 27, 1999, in the Evansville Courier Press concerning the State Finals Doubles Tournament. It quoted Princeton's principal as stating in reference to Princeton's doubles team's defeat by Pearson and Elder, "no one likes being beaten by a cheater." (R. at 415.)

On October 25, 1999, a meeting was held at the request of Harry Gonso, an attorney who represents Pearson and Elder, and was attended by IHSAA Commissioner Gardner, Asst. Commissioner Wynns, IHSAA attorney Bob Baker, Reed Elder's father Andy Elder, Park Tudor Athletic Director Brad Lennon, Park Tudor tennis coach Dave Heffern, Park Tudor Assistant Athletic Director Ed Kelly, as well as Mr. Gonso and Mary Nold Larimore, the attorneys for Pearson and Elder. (R. at 387.) During the meeting, Park Tudor and Plaintiffs' attorneys were permitted to inquire as to why the IHSAA had disqualified Pearson and Elder, the IHSAA rules upon which the decision was made, and whether the IHSAA would reconsider the decision. ( Id.)

On October 27, 1999, Commissioner Gardner wrote a letter to James Leffler, Headmaster of Park Tudor, relative to Park Tudor's request that the IHSAA reconsider its disqualification of Pearson and Elder. Commissioner Gardner informed Headmaster Leffler that the IHSAA would not change its decision and that Park Tudor could seek an appeal of the decision to the IHSAA Executive Committee. (R. at 239-241.)

The IHSAA has what has been referred to as its due process rule, Rule 17.⁸ Rule 17-3 expressly provides for an investigation and decision by the Commissioner into a possible violation of the IHSAA's rules or directives: "If it comes to the attention of the Association . . . that a Rule or decision may have been violated . . . the Commissioner or his designee shall investigate and/or review the matter and render a decision." (IHSAA Manual at 48-49, Rule 17-3.1)⁹ Rule 17-4 allows affected parties such as Pearson and Elder to administratively appeal a decision of the Commissioner or his designee to the Committee, comprised of twelve members of the IHSAA Board of Directors. (IHSAA Manual at 49-52, Rule 17-4.)

8 It provides generally that:

"[The IHSAA] . . . will . . . acquaint member schools with its Rules through distribution of By-Laws, posters, leaflets and publications and, in turn, member school administrators shall acquaint staff members, coaches and participants with the [IHSAA] Rules."

(IHSAA Manual at 47, Rule 17-1.)

9 In contrast, Rule 17-2 provides for an investigation and decision by a member school: "[w]hen it comes to a principal's attention that a Rule may have been violated. . . ." (IHSAA Manual at 47-48, Rule 17-2.1)

On October 29, 1999, Headmaster Leffler wrote to Commissioner Gardner asking for an appeal of the decision. (R. at 228-231.) On November 5, 1999, the Committee held a full administrative appeal hearing on the request by Pearson and Elder to reconsider its decision. ( See generally R. at 1 — 483.) At the hearing, the following persons appeared and testified: Asst. Commissioner Wynns; Commissioner Gardner; former TeCA President, Ed Yarbrough; Center Grove Tennis Coach, Ivan Smith; current TeCA President, Tim Cleland; Jenny Pearson; John Pearson; Reed Elder; James Leffler; Brad Lennon; Dave Heffern; and Bruce Galbraith. ( Id. at 4 — 5.) Pearson and Elder were represented at the hearing by attorneys Gonso and Larimore, and the Commissioner was represented by attorney Robert Baker. ( Id. at 3.) Prior to the hearing, Pearson and Elder and their attorneys received and signed a Hearing Statement from the IHSAA which gave an explanation of the procedure followed at the hearing. ( Id. at 9-10, 434.)

At the hearing, Phil Gardner, the Chairman of the Committee and the Hearing Officer for the hearing, explained the procedures again to Pearson, Elder and their counsel. (R. at 10 — 11.) The hearing lasted approximately four hours and included the introduction of over two hundred pages of exhibits. ( Id. at 1 — 483.) Pearson and Elder argued that the IHSAA had incorrectly interpreted the 50% Rule, that they had satisfied the 50% Rule even as allegedly "misinterpreted," and that Pearson was entitled to a hardship exception to the application of the 50% Rule.¹⁰ At the hearing, Coach Heffern admitted that at the time of the semi-finals he had not been familiar with the injury provision under the Hardship Rule. Coach Heffern also testified that when he "did the 50 percent rule," the number of season contests was 14. This was the total number of contests (less the Shirley Invitational) played by Park Tudor's team rather than the number of contests played by Pearson (which was 8).

17-8.1

10
General

The Commissioner or his designee or the [Executive] Committee shall have the authority to set aside the effect of any Rule when, in the opinion of the Commissioner or his designee or the Committee, all of the following conditions are met:

a. Strict enforcement of the Rule in the particular case will not serve to accomplish the purpose of the Rule;

b. The spirit of the Rule has not been violated; and

c. There exists in the particular case circumstances showing an undue hardship which would result from enforcement of the Rule.

Application

. . . [T]he Commissioner or his designee or the Committee may make a determination of hardship without application by the affected party. . . .

Time to Make Application

. . . Under any circumstance, however, the appropriate time for a hardship application is when the hardship situation is discovered. Request for a hardship exception should always be made prior to any action or participation by the student, coach, school or affected party under circumstances which would constitute either ineligibility or a Rule or decision violation.

General Consideration

a. Ordinary cases shall not be considered hardship; rather, the conditions which cause a violation of a Rule, a disregard of a decision or directive made under these Rules, or the failure to meet the eligibility requirements must be beyond the control of the school, the coach, the student, the parents and/or the affected party.

b. Injury, illness or accidents which cause a student to fail to meet a basic requirement are possible causes for a hardship consideration.

On November 15, 1999, the Committee issued a written decision upholding the Commissioner's decision to disqualify Pearson and Elder from participation in the Doubles Tournament. (R. at 467 — 483). The Committee made the following findings:

1. Park Tudor students Reed Elder and John Pearson were members of the Park Tudor tennis team and were listed on Park Tudor's 99-00 IHSAA BOYS TENNIS TOURNAMENT SERIES OFFICIAL ENTRY LIST as doubles players. The Park Tudor Entry form states: "To qualify for the doubles tournament, both participants must have played 50% or more of their season matches on the # 1 doubles team." The form was signed by the assistant athletic director and by head tennis coach Dave Heffern.

2. During the 1999 regular season, the Park Tudor tennis team participated in 14 dual contests or matches.

3. During the 1999 regular season, the Park Tudor tennis team also participated in the North Central John E. Shirley Men's Tennis Invitational on August 28, 1999. The Shirley Invitational information describes it as "one of the premier tennis tournaments in the state." The Shirley Invitational has 16 teams in 2 divisions, with "an individual format with a random draw being made when the coaches arrive at the appropriate site for their matches." All team positions (i.e. 1, 2, 3 singles and 1, 2 doubles) "are guaranteed 3 matches." Matches to determine places 3 through 8 use a tie breaker for the third set. The Park Tudor # 1 doubles team played in 3 matches at the Shirley Invitational: it beat Kokomo in a regular set, lost to Carmel in a regular set, and then lost to Center Grove for fourth place, presumably in a "pro set" (tie breaker for the third game).

4. During the 1999 regular season, Reed Elder played in the # 1 doubles position in 14 dual contests or matches and in all 3 of the # 1 doubles matches at the Shirley Invitational; Reed did not play at any other position during the season.

5. During the 1999 regular season, John Pearson played in the # 1 doubles position in 8 dual contests or matches; John did not play at any other position during the season.

6. John Pearson had right elbow and arm surgery in the summer of 1999 and was recovering from surgery during the 1999 season. He did not play in the first 3 dual matches, did not play in any of the 3 matches at the Shirley Invitational, played in the next 7 dual matches and did not play in the last 3 dual matches of the regular season. The medical records are not clear as to when his doctor released him to play tennis at the beginning of the season; on August 5, his therapist suggested he play a single match the week of August 23, and then on September 2, Dr. Rettig said to increase his play. He last played during the regular season on September 22 and did not play on September 23; on September 24 he was seen by Dr. Fisher who restricted his play until October 1. John stated that when he did not play it was because of his injury.

7. Prior to the state doubles finals, Center Grove tennis coach Ivan Smith did a rough calculation and could not figure out how John Pearson of the Park Tudor # 1 doubles team had enough matches to be eligible. At his request, on October 18, 1999, his assistant athletic director called Assistant Commissioner Wynns to see if the Park Tudor team was qualified. Assistant Commissioner Wynns called to all the competing schools to verify information on the Entry form and to get the playing records. She left a message on the voice mail of Park Tudor athletic director Brad Lennon, asking if the # 1 doubles team had played 50% of its matches in the # 1 doubles position, if the players had played in 50% of the team's matches in the # 1 doubles position, and asked for the # 1 doubles' team record. Park Tudor assistant tennis coach John Talbot responded to the request and gave Assistant Commissioner Wynns the # 1 doubles record, the # 1 doubles tournament record, and with respect to the question of whether they (the # 1 doubles team) had played 50% in the # 1 position of the team's matches, he answered, "yes."

8. On Friday evening, October 22, 1999, the tennis coaches met about All-State selections. Because they had most or all of the Park Tudor season match information, they looked at the # 1 doubles teams' eligibility and, though the information was incomplete, it appeared that John Pearson had not played in 50% of the # 1 doubles season opportunities. Tim Cleland, president of the coaches' association, called Coach Heffern and Assistant Commissioner Wynns late Friday evening to advise both that there was some concern about the qualification of the Park Tudor # 1 doubles team.

9. Park Tudor's # 1 doubles team played Princeton on Friday night and won. On Saturday, October 23, 1999, the Park Tudor team was to have played the Lawrence Central # 1 doubles team. Ivan Smith approached Assistant Commissioner Wynns about the qualification of the Park Tudor # 1 doubles team. In the facilities' board room Assistant Commissioner Wynns met with some of the tennis coaches and Coach Heffern. On the blackboard, the coaches had put the Park Tudor season which showed that John Pearson had played in 8 season contests or matches but that the Park Tudor team had participated in 14 dual matches and participated in the Shirley Invitational. Coach Heffern acknowledged that the information on the board was correct. Assistant Commissioner Wynns advised Coach Heffern that, based upon the information she had, his #1 doubles team did not qualify for the Doubles Tournament because John Pearson had played in less than 50% of the team's #1 doubles opportunities.

10. Coach Heffern stated that he did not consider the Shirley Invitation [sic] a "tournament", because it was early in the season, did not have head-to-head competition (i.e. one team versus another team), and a "pro" set was played in the consolation bracket, and therefore, he did not count it in his 50% calculation. Coach Heffern also stated that since John Pearson played in all his 8 matches in the #1 doubles position, he met the 50% rule (because he had played in 100 % of "his" own matches). Finally, Coach Heffern argued that Pearson had not violated the "spirit" of the rule (since the rule was to keep singles players out of the doubles tournament), and therefore, his players should not be disqualified. Coach Heffern admitted that he was not aware of the hardship rule.

11. Previously, in the spring of 1998, a question was raised about the qualification of the Park Tudor girls #1 doubles team for the 1998 girls tournament; Coach Heffern was also the girls coach. Assistant Commissioner Wynns met with the girls assistant coach, Janice, reviewed the regular season contests the team had played, and explained how to count tournaments; apparently, in counting the season contests, Park Tudor was not including in the count an early season tournament at Warsaw, which was a 3-match competition, but was not head-to-head competition. Ms. Wynns explained that the 3 matches had to be included in the total count for the 50% calculation. The purpose of the meeting was to advise Park Tudor of the manner of counting tournaments under the 50% rule for future reference.

12. A form of the 50% rule has been in existence for 10 years. It is a common understanding, and the tennis community knows that when arriving at a player's percentage, the player's total number of matches at #1 doubles during the season are divided by the total number of playing opportunities of the #1 double position. It is common understanding, and the tennis community knows that when counting the individual matches for a player for the 50% rule calculation, all matches played by the player are counted, whether they were played in a dual match, a tournament or in any other tennis contest. It is common understanding and the tennis community knows that when counting the total number of playing opportunities of the #1 doubles position, all matches played by the #1 doubles position are counted, whether they were played in a dual match, a tournament, or in any other tennis contest.

13. The Shirley Invitational was a tournament and all teams which played in the tournament should have counted all of the matches in which the #1 doubles positions played, which should have been 3, when calculating the total number of playing opportunities of the #1 doubles position. It is common understanding and the tennis community knows that when counting the total number of playing opportunities of the #1 doubles position, the matches played by the #1 doubles position at the Shirley Invitational are counted. The overwhelming majority of Shirley Invitational teams (all but one) counted the 3 tournament matches when calculating the 50% rule. Coaches Cleland, Yarborough and Smith all agreed that they had never heard of any other tennis team or program which did not count tournament matches, such as those in the Shirley Invitational, in the 50% rule calculation and had never heard of any other tennis team or program which calculated the 50% rule by including only the player's matches when establishing "their total matches" or "their season contests."

14. The disqualification occurred during a semi-final match between Park Tudor and Lawrence Central. The match was inappropriately started by the chair umpire over the expressed directive of Assistant Commissioner Wynns. The disqualification was carried out before the end of the match because the IHSAA did not want the team which won the match because of the disqualification, Lawrence Central, to have to play in the finals as a losing team.

15. The Park Tudor #1 doubles team did not get all-state honors. This decision was not one of the IHSAA's. The decision was made because the coaches association did not find the #1 doubles team had qualified under the 50% rule.

(R. at 473-478.) The Committee reached the following conclusions:

1. To qualify for the 1999 State Doubles Tournament, a doubles team has to meet the qualification standard known as the 50% rule. Under the 50% tennis rules, for a doubles team to qualify for the doubles tournament, both players had to have played a minimum of 50% of their total matches or season contests in the #1 doubles position. The 1999 Contest Season ( see definitions) for boys tennis began on August 16 and ended on October 1. (Rule 50; Bulletin, p. 37); the maximum number of Authorized Contests during the 1999 Contest Season was 14, plus 2 tournaments, (Rule 50), or 12 plus, 3 tournaments. (Rule 58-4.) Park Tudor's #1 doubles team did not qualify for the doubles tournament under the 50% rule because John Pearson, having played #1 doubles in only 8 matches or contests, did not play in the #1 doubles position for at least 50% of Park Tudor's season.

2. The Committee acknowledges that, reading the 50% rule out of context could cause the reader to wonder whether the reference to "their total matches" and "their season contests" refers to the participant's individual matches or season contests, or the team's matches or season contests. However, this rule cannot be read out of context, and any member who was confused about the proper interpretation had an obligation to seek clarification. (Rule 3-1.) Here, the IHSAA has consistently interpreted the 50% rule as requiring participation at the #1 doubles position in the 50% of the team's season contests; similarly, the Committee finds that the Indiana high school tennis community has overwhelmingly interpreted the 50% rule as requiring participation at the #1 doubles position in 50% of the team's season contests. Finally, the Committee finds that Coach Heffern was aware or should have been aware of this interpretation of the rule. This is especially true in light of the number of district tennis meetings and workshops Coach Heffern apparently attended when this issue was discussed, in light of the 1998 meeting Coach Heffern's assistant coach had with the IHSAA wherein this interpretation was discussed, and finally, in light of the fact that this interpretation has consistently been understood by the tennis community for the last 10 years. Further, during testimony, Coach Heffern agreed that when he "did the 50 percent rule," his denominator was the team's "maximum number of contests," (Transcript at 152), which further affirms that when Coach Heffern calculated the 50% rule, he was counting the team's #1 doubles opportunities and not just the player's individual opportunities.

3. Individual matches played in a tennis tournament are included in the 50% rule calculation, and the Shirley Invitational matches played by the Park Tudor #1 doubles team should be included in the calculation. A tournament occurs when there are 3 or more schools involved, (Rule 58, QA — 3), and can take many forms, including a multi-event tourney, (Guidebook, p. 12), or an all singles or all doubles tourney. (Rule 58, QA — 4). A player, however, may not play more than 3 individual matches per day, per event. (Guidebook, p. 7.) A team's "season match" or "tennis match" consists of 3 singles and 2 doubles, however there can be different combinations. (Bulletin, p. 36; Guidebook, p. 6.) "Match plan" or the "tennis match" of a player generally is a contest between 2 teams, 2 out of 3 sets and a 12-point tie-breaker. (Rule 58, QA — 1; Bulletin, p. 36). However, any organized athletic contest against athletes from another school will be counted as a game or a contest. (Rule 9-4; QA-14.) Here, there is no ambiguity. All individual matches or contests are included in the calculations, whether they were played in a tournament contest or match or in a dual contest or match. The IHSAA has consistently included all individual matches from all tournaments in the 50% calculation. This is how the tennis community counts tournament matches. Coach Heffern knew or should have know that individual matches in season tournaments, such as the Shirley Invitational, are included in the 50% calculation, especially since there was no real explanation by Coach Heffern as to why he did not count the matches, other than to say that they were not "head-to-head; that however, is not a rationale for excluding the matches under the rule. Again, this is especially true in light of the number of district tennis meetings and workshops. Coach Heffern apparently attended when this issue was discussed, in light of the 1998 meeting Coach Heffern's assistant coach had with the IHSAA wherein Park Tudor was involved in this exact situation (failing to count individual matches from a tournament when making the 50% calculation) and Associate Commissioner Wynns straightened out the mistake, and in light of the fact that the inclusion of individual matches from a tournament event has always been done by the tennis community for the last 10 years. Coach Heffern also admitted that he knew that even a practice against another school's team would be a "contest," and therefore, he would have known that such a formal match at a tournament was a contest, too.

4. Park Tudor and the students also seek qualification for the doubles tournament under the IHSAA Hardship Rule, Rule 17-8. Under the Hardship Rule, the party seeking to establish a hardship must provide reliable, credible and probative evidence that each element of Rule 17-8.1 has been met; the burden of proof is always borne by the hardship applicant and unless the applicant proves, to the satisfaction of and in the opinion of the Committee, that the applicant is entitled to a hardship, then the Committee will not exercise its authority to set aside the effect of a rule or ruling. In addition, a hardship application, to be granted, must be made in accordance with Rule 17-8.

5. The application for a hardship is too late. Rule 17-8.5 requires that "under any circumstance, however, the appropriate time for a hardship application is when the hardship situation is discovered. Request for a hardship exception should always be made prior to any action or participation by the student, coach, school or affected party under circumstances which would constitute either ineligibility or a Rule or decision violation." Here, the Committee finds that Park Tudor, through its coach, was aware or should have been aware that its #1 doubles players did not meet the requirements for qualification for the doubles tournament and these circumstances existed as of October 1, 1999. If a hardship was to be sought, the application should have been made at that time. By failing to timely apply, and instead, by competing in the doubles tournament before the ineligibility was discovered by the IHSAA, Park Tudor has pursued a course which is, itself, cause for a ruling of ineligibility under Rule 3-9.4. Moreover, it is the action of Park Tudor which caused the disqualification of the #1 doubles team to occur at the finals competition.

6. Even if the application were timely, Park Tudor and the students failed to established (sic) that strict enforcement of the doubles qualification rule will not serve to accomplish some purpose of the Rule in this case. The IHSAA, through its member schools, has established uniform playing and eligibility rules for its member schools and their student athletes, as well as for the IHSAA-sponsored tournaments. One rule, the 50% rule for tennis, as originally established, was intended to eliminate the practice of stacking singles players in the doubles tournament. The 50% rule, as implemented, however, also assures that a school's #1 doubles team in the tournament is also the school's #1 doubles team from the season. The 50% rule is an easily administered rule because it is simple to understand and is consistently applied. The 50% rule is an effective rule because it provides an objective, bright-line standard which contains no exceptions. One needs only to count the number of #1 doubles season contests and compare that with the number of contests in which a player played at #1 doubles to determine qualification. Competing coaches may rely on the rule's uniform and evenhanded application when arranging their own lineup. While the student here was not necessarily a singles player, granting an exception here will frustrate the remaining goals of the present rule. The Committee finds that, in its opinion, there has been inadequate proof that in this particular case there are circumstances showing that strict enforcement of the 50% rule will not serve to accomplish some purpose of the rule.

7. Even if the application were timely, Park Tudor and the students have failed to established (sic) that the spirit of the rule has not been violated. The spirit or operation of the 50% rule is that it is a uniform, bright-line eligibility standard which establishes minimum participation requirements and assures that only the season's #1 doubles team of a school plays in the doubles tournament. It works because it is definite and without exceptions. To grant an exception or waive some aspect of the rule violates the operation, and therefore, the spirit of the rule. This is especially true in this case. Ordinary cases do not constitute a hardship and here the basis for the hardship request is an illness or injury. While under certain cases, an illness or injury could be cause for a hardship, generally illness or injuries are a part of athletics, a part of competition, and are the not the basis for a hardship. The testimony from Coach Yarborough at the hearing established that the coaches' association had previously made a presentation to the IHSAA requesting an injury exception to the rule and the request was not adopted. (Transcript, p. 43.) Since the IHSAA has already rejected an injury exception, choosing instead to maintain the no-exception character of the rule, it is clear that to grant an exception here, based on a illness or injury, violates the intent and spirit of the rule. The Committee finds that, in its opinion, there has been inadequate proof of circumstances showing that the spirit of the 50% rule has and will not be violated if the effect of the rule is set aside.

8. Even if the application were timely, there is a failure of proof that there is, in this particular case, circumstances showing that an undue hardship will result, or has resulted, from enforcement of the 50% rule. Other than the disappointment of having to forfeit the match at the tournament, the Committee finds that there has been inadequate proof that an undue hardship would result from the enforcement of the 50% rule.

9. The manner in which the disqualification was carried out was in accordance with the IHSAA rules. (Rule 3-9.)

10. The Committee further concludes that the students, in participating in the doubles tournament, and their families, acted in good faith, and the students' disqualification was not the result of any improper behavior on the part of the students or their families.

Ruling

The Executive Committee of the Indiana High School Athletic Association, Inc. hereby upholds the decision of the Commissioner which found that the Park Tudor #1 doubles team was not qualified for the 1999 State Doubles Tournament.

(R. at 478-483) (emphasis in original decision).

On November 16, 1999, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint For Damages And Equitable Relief And Jury Demand in state court. On December 8, 1999, IHSAA filed its Notice of Removal. The First Amended Complaint For Damages And Equitable Relief And Jury Demand was filed on December 10, 1999. Plaintiffs claim that the IHSAA's decision finding Pearson ineligible based on the 50% Rule was arbitrary and capricious because he played 100% of his season contests in the #1 doubles position. They allege that because of the manner in which Pearson and Elder were disqualified, their good name, reputation, honor and integrity were harmed. Specifically, they allege that Pearson and Elder

have been denied selection for the All State Boys' Doubles Team, have been publicly labeled as "cheaters," will be prevented from clearing their record before the deadline for applying for college, will be prevented from benefitting from All State Selection in the college application process, will continue to endure public humiliation, and will continue to be recorded as "ineligible" in the official record books.

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 100.) The First Amended Complaint contains four counts: Count I is entitled "Claim for Damages for Violation of the Constitution of the State of Indiana"; Count II is entitled "Claim for Damages for Violation of Common Law Right to Due Process of Law"; Count III is entitled "Claim for Damages and Equitable Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Attorney's Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988"; and Count IV is a "Claim for Equitable Relief Under Indiana Law," seeking judicial review of the IHSAA's decision. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, an award of attorney's fees, costs, and equitable relief, including a public apology from IHSAA. They also seek a court order requiring the IHSAA to inform TeCA that Pearson and Elder are eligible for consideration for the All State team and to require the IHSAA to change the record book to reflect they should not have been defaulted. Finally, Plaintiffs request the court to require the IHSAA to declare John and Reed co-state champions with the Center Grove team.

On January 18, 2000, the IHSAA moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss all counts of the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Plaintiffs filed their response on February 2, 2000, and on February 8, 1999, the court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint. Counts III and IV of the First Amended Complaint remain.

On February 11, 2000, trial on the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was held. This trial was advanced on the calendar of the court at the Plaintiffs' request because of their assertion that early relief from the adverse ruling by the Defendant was necessary to allow Pearson and Elder to proceed with their college admissions application process. Counsel for all parties are to be commended for their prompt and diligent efforts in preparing the case for trial on such an abbreviated schedule, and for their efficient and thorough presentation of evidence and arguments at trial.

II. Conclusions of Law A. Standard for Injunctive Relief

When deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the court must consider: (1) whether the Plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether they have an adequate remedy at law or will be irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; (3) whether the threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may inflict on the Defendant; and (4) whether the granting of the injunction will harm the public interest. See Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 579 (1999); Plummer v. American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97 F.3d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction which is a final judgment, the first of these four factors is slightly modified. See Plummer, 97 F.3d at 229. The factor becomes whether the Plaintiffs have in fact succeeded on the merits. See id.

B. Plaintiffs' Due Process Claims

Plaintiffs claim that the IHSAA's enforcement of the 50% Rule violated their rights to procedural due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court previously held that the IHSAA was a state actor when it ruled Pearson and Elder ineligible to participate in the Doubles Tournament. ( See Entry on Def. Ind. H. Sch. Athletic Ass'n's Mot. to Dismiss Counts I, II and III of the First Am. Compl. at 17; see also Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 228, 229, 236 (reaffirming that the IHSAA's enforcement decisions with respect to student-athletes constitute "state action" for purposes of constitutional review). Thus, the issues remaining on this claim are (1) whether the actions of the IHSAA in disqualifying Pearson and Elder implicated a liberty interest protected under the United States Constitution, and (2) if so, whether the procedures allowed to them satisfied their right to procedural due process. See Strasburger v. Board of Educ., Hardin County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 358 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 800 (1999).

1. Whether Pearson and Elder's Were Deprived of a Liberty Interest

"The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997); Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 241. Plaintiffs assert a protectable interest in their good names, reputations, honor and integrity allegedly impugned by the IHSAA's actions in disqualifying Pearson and Elder during the semi-final match.

An individual's good name, reputation, honor or integrity alone is not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976); Klug v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 197 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 1999); Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 915 (7th Cir. 1999); Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 355. Plaintiffs rely on the following language in Roth to support their claim of a liberty interest: "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Roth, 424 U.S. at 708 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized that this language from Constantineau could be read as meaning that defamation by a government official alone could require procedural due process. Id. at 708. The Court, however, rejected that reading because it would significantly broaden the holdings of the cases upon which Constantineau relied and the language was subject to a narrower interpretation. See id. at 708-09. Paul held that injury to reputation alone, apart from a deprivation of "a right previously recognized under state law," id. at 708, is insufficient to trigger the protections of due process. Id. at 708-10. Thus, to establish a protectable liberty interest, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their good names, reputation, honor or integrity were impugned in connection with a deprivation by the Defendant of some other right recognized under state law. Id. at 708-12; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-574 (holding that state deprives employee of protectable liberty interest if in connection with discharging him, it makes a stigmatizing charge against him). This they have not done.

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their good names, reputation, honor or integrity were impugned by any statement by the IHSAA. To prevail on a deprivation of a protected liberty interest, the Plaintiffs must show that the Defendant made a defamatory statement about them and that the statement was a false assertion of fact. See Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 356-57. The evidence establishes three "statements" made by the IHSAA in connection with disqualifying Pearson and Elder. The first is Asst. Commissioner Wynns' statement to the newspaper that: "Based on the information we had early in the week, we felt they were legal. But we learned this morning we didn't have all the information we needed to have." (Pls.' Tr. Ex. 4.) In this context, the word "legal" implies not criminal conduct on behalf of Pearson and Elder, but rather, their eligibility for the State Finals Doubles Tournament. Given the IHSAA's interpretation of the 50% Rule, this is a true statement. A true statement does not support a claim of a deprivation of a liberty interest. See Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 356-57. The second statement proven is Asst. Commissioner Wynns' statement to Princeton's principal that Park Tudor's record had been misrepresented before the tournament. Again, given the IHSAA's interpretation of the 50% Rule, this statement was accurate because Coach Heffern represented that the doubles team played 14 matches, whereas, they played 17 matches. The third "statement" is the recordation on the IHSAA's Web site and official record that Pearson and Elder were defeated in the semi-finals "by default." Pearson and Elder were, in fact, defaulted by the IHSAA; thus, this statement also is a true statement. Because they are true rather than false, these statements do not support Plaintiffs' due process claim.

These three statements fail to support a claimed deprivation of liberty for another reason: None of them is sufficiently stigmatizing. None rises to the level of an accusation of a serious character defect such as dishonesty, immorality or criminality as required by Paul v. Davis. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-08; Pleva, 195 F.3d at 916; Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. Sch. Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding charge of "highly unethical conduct" not sufficiently stigmatizing); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (citing cases exemplifying sufficiently stigmatizing charges). When speaking with Princeton's principal, Asst. Commissioner Wynns did not state or imply that any misrepresentation of Park Tudor's record or the eligibility of Pearson and Elder was intentional. Nor did she say its was done by Pearson or Elder themselves. "Default" in and of itself is an innocuous term and neither default nor ineligibility under the IHSAA rules is akin to a serious character defect. If anything could be inferred from this comment, it would be that Park Tudor, through its coach who submitted the tournament entry form, was responsible for any misrepresentation. Neither Park Tudor nor its coach is a party to this action.

Even if the court were to consider Pearson and Elder's reputations in the "tennis community," as Plaintiffs suggest should be done, it would have to conclude that no liberty interest was impugned. There was some testimony at trial, mainly from the Plaintiffs themselves, that they perceived the term "default" to connote court misbehavior or other failure to attend a scheduled match. Even if default has such a narrow meaning in the tennis community (and the court suspects it does not), there was no showing that such a designation would disqualify the student-athletes from other tournaments or subject them to other sanctions. At worst, by defaulting them, the IHSAA implied misbehavior or misconduct by them during a single tournament. It did not imply criminality, dishonesty or moral turpitude recognized as sufficiently stigmatizing under Paul.

Plaintiffs make much ado about the quote in the Evansville Courier Press which stated that "no one likes being beaten by a cheater." (R. at 415.) To support Plaintiffs' claim, however, the alleged statement must "come from the mouth of a public official." Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 356-57. The reference to "cheater" was not made by any representative of the IHSAA, but by Princeton's principal. Thus, this statement does not support Plaintiffs' claim that the IHSAA impugned their liberty interests.

Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that the manner in which they were declared ineligible — after match play had begun and they were "serving to win" — damaged their reputations and embarrassed them. As unfortunate as it may be that the question of Plaintiffs' eligibility had not been resolved until after play had begun, the fact that Plaintiffs were declared ineligible during the match does not amount to a deprivation of liberty. Though unprecedented, nothing in the manner in which play was halted was sufficiently stigmatizing. True, the crowd was left to guess why match play was ended, and maybe an explanation for the default would have allayed some speculation or rumor. But the IHSAA's failure to explain that Pearson and Elder were disqualified because it ruled Pearson ineligible under the 50% Rule did not deprive Plaintiffs of any liberty interest. The timing and manner of the disqualification ruling was insufficient to impugn Plaintiffs' good names, reputation, honor or integrity.

The court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown the IHSAA made a sufficiently stigmatizing false statement about them.¹¹ They therefore have not proven that the IHSAA deprived them of a protectable liberty interest.

11 To say that the IHSAA has not impugned Pearson and Elder's good names is incomplete. It is observed that in its decision, the Committee expressly concluded that Pearson and Elder and their families acted in "good faith" in participating in the Doubles Tournament and that their disqualification "was not the result of any improper behavior on the part of the students or families." (R. at 483.) At trial, Mr. Elder suggested that this conclusion implied that Park Tudor cheated. This conclusion cannot be reasonably understood to make any such implication. Even if it could, Park Tudor is not a party to this litigation and Plaintiffs' liberty interests are not impugned by an attack on Park Tudor's honesty or integrity.

Even assuming that the evidence proved that the IHSAA impugned Plaintiffs' good names, reputation, honor or integrity, they still could not establish a protectable liberty interest. They have not demonstrated that any statement by the IHSAA accompanied a deprivation of any right or interest recognized by state law as Roth requires. A protected interest is one to which the individual can show "a legitimate claim of entitlement." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Ross Yordy Const. Co. v. Naylor, 55 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). Under Indiana law, student-athletes have no constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletics. See, e.g., Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 242. This court previously held that Pearson and Elder had no protectable interest in completing the semi-final match of the State Finals. ( See Entry on Mot. to Dismiss at 19-20.)¹² Plaintiffs point to no other alleged right of which they were deprived in connection with the IHSAA's disqualification decision. This is yet another reason why Plaintiffs have not proven a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

12 Even Plaintiffs concede that they "have no constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletics or the State Finals tournament." (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. and Permanent Inj. at 30.)

The court holds that the disqualification of Pearson and Elder by the IHSAA, specifically including the statements Asst. Commissioner Wynns made to the media and Princeton's principal as well as the record of default in the IHSAA records and Web page, did not implicate a protectable liberty interest under the United States Constitution.

2. Whether the Process Provided Was Constitutionally Sufficient

Even assuming that the IHSAA's disqualification of Pearson and Elder implicated a protectable liberty interest in their good names, reputation, honor and integrity, their Section 1983 claim would fail because they were not denied the process they were due. The Fourteenth Amendment generally requires some kind of hearing accompanied by notice and an opportunity to be heard before an individual can be deprived of life, liberty, or property by a government official acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). A post-deprivation remedy, however, may be sufficient to satisfy procedural due process requirements under certain circumstances. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132 ("[I]n situations where a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake . . . or where the State is truly unable to anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest, postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process."); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding predeprivation hearing not required if "definitionally impossible"); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (holding no predeprivation hearing required for intentional and unauthorized deprivation with meaningful postdeprivation remedy); Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1996) (post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy may satisfy due process where the state necessarily must act quickly or "where the degree of the deprivation is not serious and the procedures underlying the decision to effect the deprivation are adequate to address the risk of an erroneous deprivation"). To determine what process is due in a particular context, the court must balance (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the burdens that additional procedures would entail. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trustees, 978 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1992).

Upon considering these factors, the court determines that Plaintiffs received all the process which was due them under the circumstances presented. Initially, the court notes that what was at stake here, unlike a right to welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), or a public education in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974), was a tennis match. Granted, it was the state semi-finals, but nevertheless it was just a tennis match.

Moreover, Plaintiffs were afforded sufficient process. The evidence shows that Asst. Commissioner Wynns conducted a brief and informal investigation into Pearson and Elder's eligibility. She reviewed information presented in the boardroom about Park Tudor's season which indicated that Pearson played in 8 season contests but that Park Tudor's #1 doubles team had competed in 14 season matches and 3 matches in the Shirley Invitational. She considered (though ultimately rejected) Coach Heffern's position that Pearson satisfied the 50% Rule because the Shirley Invitational should not count in calculating season matches and because he had played in the #1 doubles position in all 8 of his matches. Asst. Commissioner Wynns also was aware of and could consider the fact that the only reason Pearson missed matches was because of his injury.

Plaintiffs complain that they were given no notice of the challenge to their eligibility, but the record does not bear out their claim. Pearson and Elder personally may not have been given notice before their disqualification, but their coach was. Coach Heffern was advised Friday evening by Tim Cleland that a question could be raised the next morning about Pearson's eligibility and suggested that Heffern bring his match book with him to the finals to prove that Pearson and Elder were eligible. Coach Heffern saw to it that he had his match book at the tournament the next morning.

The Plaintiffs also complain they had no opportunity to be heard before their disqualification. But Coach Heffern, their representative, did. He was present in the boardroom and had the opportunity to and did, in fact, present his position and that of his #1 doubles team, Pearson and Elder, in support of their eligibility to Asst. Commissioner Wynns. He also could have requested Asst. Commissioner Wynns to apply the Hardship Rule but did not. Plaintiffs maintain that Coach Heffern was unaware of the exception for injuries under the Hardship Rule and Asst. Commissioner Wynns did not advise him of that rule, but he is presumed to know the IHSAA Rules. ( See, e.g., IHSAA Manual, Rule 3 at 13 ("[T]he Association presumes that all of its members and their staff as well as the individual participants have read and understand these rules.")). Though Coach Heffern argued his case to Asst. Commissioner Wynns, she determined that Pearson had not satisfied the 50% Rule. Coach Heffern's advocacy as Pearson and Elder's representative served to diminish the risk of an erroneous eligibility decision. Pearson and Elder, through their coach, had an informal pre-disqualification process within which to present their case in support of their eligibility.¹³ See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 ("We also agree with the District Court, however, that the pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial.").

13 Plaintiffs claim that the IHSAA violated its own procedural rules, specifically Rules 16-1, 16-2, 16-3 and 16-5, which they contend supports their claim that they were not afforded procedural due process. Discussion of the alleged violation of these rules is deferred until the part II, C of this entry.

Given the exigency of the circumstances, this pre-disqualification procedure satisfied due process. The IHSAA did not have the luxury of time in which to conduct a formal investigation before making its decision whether Pearson satisfied the 50% Rule. The State Finals already were underway when Pearson and Elder's eligibility was directly challenged Saturday morning.¹⁴ In fact, they had advanced to the semi-final round and the four teams in the semi-finals were already warming-up for competition. Given the nature of this tournament in which a team is eliminated with each match and the finals were scheduled to be played later that same day, a decision had to be made quickly. Any decision regarding Pearson and Elder's eligibility affected not only their interest but also the interests of the other doubles teams competing in the semi-finals. Under these circumstances, Asst. Commissioner Wynns necessarily had to act expeditiously in deciding whether Pearson had satisfied the 50% Rule.

14 There is evidence that Center Grove's Asst. Athletic Director questioned Pearson and Elder's eligibility in a phone call to the IHSAA on the Monday before the tournament. However, the IHSAA generally receives one or two calls each day, more frequently close to tournament time, from the public or member schools concerning an athlete's eligibility. It does not treat such calls as formal protests unless they are supported by substantial information. There is no evidence that this phone call was supported by substantial information so as to prompt an investigation by the IHSAA at the time.

But the pre-disqualification process was not the only process Pearson and Elder received. Rule 17-4 of the IHSAA Rules provides for an appeal of the Commissioner's decision (or that of his designee) to the Committee, a hearing before the Committee with procedural rules to be followed at the hearing, and judicial review of the Committee's decision. Pearson and Elder received a hearing before the Committee at which they were represented by very able counsel, and presented witnesses, many exhibits and argument. At the hearing Pearson and Elder testified on their own behalf and were supported by their parents. In addition, before the hearing, Pearson and Elder, their parents and their counsel met with the Commissioner, Asst. Commissioner Wynns, and Attorney Baker to request a reconsideration of his eligibility decision. Shortly thereafter, Commissioner Gardner informed Headmaster Leffler that the IHSAA would not change its eligibility decision and that an appeal could be taken to the Committee. Finally, Pearson and Elder have availed themselves of the opportunity for judicial review of the Committee's decision. No claim is made that the Committee did not follow its own procedural rules relative to its review of the Commissioner's decision. Pearson and Elder were allowed more than sufficient post-disqualification procedure.

Given that the eligibility of Pearson and Elder was raised during the State Finals, requiring additional pre-disqualification process would be impracticable and unduly burdensome. There simply was no time to engage in the processes envisioned in Rules 3-9 (covering general eligibility), Rule 16 (governing protests), or for that matter Rule 17-2 (school investigation and decision), even if applicable.¹⁵ One hundred fifty to two hundred spectators were waiting to watch the state semi-finals match and anticipated the finals later that afternoon. In addition, the teams were warming up and readying to play. Asst. Commissioner Wynns reviewed the matter of Pearson's compliance with the 50% Rule and rendered a decision as required by Rule 17-3. The IHSAA had a strong interest in making a decision about Pearson and Elder's eligibility that morning and proceeding with the state finals. The court therefore concludes that even if the IHSAA's disqualification of Pearson and Elder implicated a liberty interest protected under the United States Constitution, the procedures given them satisfied due process requirements.

15 Plaintiffs rely on Rule 17-2 which governs investigations and decisions regarding rule violations made by the member schools. Because the investigation and decision were conducted by Asst. Commissioner Wynns, Rule 17-2 is not applicable here. Rather, Rule 17-3, which governs investigations and decisions by the Commissioner or his designee is applicable.

C. Review of the IHSAA's Decision

Count IV of the First Amended Complaint seeks judicial review of the IHSAA's decision that Pearson was ineligible for the State Finals. Under Indiana law, an IHSAA decision with respect to a student-athlete is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 230-31, 233. In Carlberg, the Indiana Supreme Court explained what the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review means:

"Arbitrary and capricious" is a narrow standard of review and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the IHSAA. The rule or decision will be found to be arbitrary and capricious "only where it is willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion."

Id. at 233 (quoting Dep't of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind. 1989) (citation omitted)).

In Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 164 (Ind. 1997), decided the same day as Carlberg, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed the scope of a trial court's review of the factual determinations made by the IHSAA in an eligibility decision. A trial court is limited to reviewing the record of the proceedings before the IHSAA and "may receive new evidence only if such evidence pertains to matters concerning the IHSAA proceedings, or if it pertains to factual determinations made by the IHSAA and the failure to present such evidence to the IHSAA was not attributable to choice or inexcusable neglect." Id. at 253 (expressly adopting and incorporating by reference Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes, 659 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995)); see also Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Avant, 650 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), trans. denied. The court may not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, but instead must "analyze the record as a whole . . . to determine whether the IHSAA's findings were supported by substantial evidence." Id. "Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." City of Indianapolis v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 174 (1999).

The court may not "try the case de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the IHSAA." Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 253; see also Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 231. The court should be mindful, however, that as a voluntary association, the IHSAA's right to interpret its own rules "is as sacred as the right to make them." Crane v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs contend that the IHSAA's decision that Pearson and Elder were ineligible to participate in the Doubles Tournament was arbitrary and capricious because the IHSAA: (1) reinterpreted and misapplied the 50% Rule; (2) defaulted Pearson and Elder without affording them any of the procedural protections provided by IHSAA Rules, namely Rules 16-1, 16-2, 16-3, 16-5 and 3-9; and (3) declined to grant Pearson a waiver under Rule 17-8, the Hardship Rule, in violation of that rule.

1. The IHSAA's Interpretation and Application of 50% Rule

Plaintiffs argue that the IHSAA's conclusion that the 50% Rule was violated is not based on the rule as written and that they did not violate the Rule as "reinterpreted" by the IHSAA. Following the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Crane, if the 50% Rule is "unambiguous or if the IHSAA interpreted and applied the rule consistently," 975 F.2d at 1325, this court cannot interfere with its decision. Id.

Though the IHSAA has acknowledged ambiguity in the 50% Rule, it has interpreted and applied the rule consistently, and neither its interpretation nor application in this case is willful and unreasonable. The IHSAA determined that Park Tudor's #1 doubles team had competed in 17 season matches/contests consisting of 14 dual matches and 3 matches at the Shirley Invitational. Substantial evidence supports this finding. Substantial evidence in the record supports this finding. The IHSAA further determined that Pearson played in the #1 doubles position in only 8 out of the 17, that is less than 50%. Substantial evidence was presented to demonstrate that the IHSAA has consistently interpreted the 50% Rule as requiring a player to compete in the #1 doubles position in 50% of the total number of the team's playing opportunities of the # 1 doubles position. Substantial evidence established that in determining whether a player satisfies the 50% Rule, the IHSAA has consistently counted the total number of playing opportunities of the # 1 doubles position, including all dual matches and tournament matches (such as those played in the Shirley Invitational).

Plaintiffs contend that the IHSAA changed the 50% Rule by interpreting the word "their" in the phrases "their total matches played" and "their season contests" to mean the "team's" rather than the "individual participant's." Plaintiffs' interpretation is a fair and reasonable one.¹⁶ But the issue before the court is not whether the Plaintiffs' interpretation is reasonable, but rather, whether the IHSAA's interpretation is willful and unreasonable. The court cannot find that it is. An interpretation of "their" as referring to the "team's" is not unreasonable.¹⁷ Furthermore, the IHSAA has consistently interpreted "their" to mean the "team's" and applied this interpretation in this case.¹⁸

16 They interpret the term "their" to refer to the subject noun used in the provisions in question, namely "both participants," that is, the student-athletes.

17 Though the court does not apply a "community consensus" test, that the Indiana high school tennis community (at the very least tennis coaches) interprets "their" as meaning "team's," supports the conclusion that the IHSAA's interpretation is not willful and unreasonable.

18 Plaintiffs have pointed to not one example in which the IHSAA gave "their" a different interpretation.

Plaintiffs also contend that the IHSAA arbitrarily interpreted the term "season contest" in the 50% Rule to mean "total number of playing opportunities of the #1 doubles position," that is, all individual matches whether played in season contests or tournaments are included in the 50% calculation. They assert that under the IHSAA rules a tennis "match/season contest" is distinct from a tennis "tournament." In support, Plaintiffs point to Rule 58-4, which sets a maximum number of 12 "season contests" and 3 "tournaments," or 14 "season contests" and 2 "tournaments." (IHSAA Manual at 75.)

The Plaintiffs offer a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of the term "season contest." But that is not the only reasonable interpretation. Though Rule 58-4 differentiates between "season contests" and "tournaments," the IHSAA's interpretation of "season contest" as meaning "total number of playing opportunities," in other words, "all individual matches in season contests or tournaments" is not willful and unreasonable. The terms "match" and "season contest" are used fairly interchangeably in the IHSAA Manual. For example, Rule 58-4 provides in part:

Q.3 What is the maximum number of contests and tourneys for schools and contestants?

A. 12 matches plus three tourneys, or; 14 matches plus two tourneys.

(IHSAA Manual at 75) (emphasis added). Even Commissioner Gardner's letter to Park Tudor's principal used these terms interchangeably. ( See R. at 396-98 ("match or contest")).

Moreover, the term "season contest" is not defined in the August 1999 IHSAA Bulletin establishing regulations for the IHSAA Doubles Tournament Series. Thus, the term was subject to interpretation. The IHSAA has consistently interpreted the 50% Rule to require inclusion of all individual matches from all contests and tournaments in the calculation.¹⁹ IHSAA Rule 50 supports this interpretation. Under that rule, both "season contests" (as defined under Rule 58-4) and "tournaments" are included as "authorized contests" for the season. (IHSAA Manual at 65.) The IHSAA's interpretation of the 50% Rule to include all individual matches whether played in a tournament contest or match or dual contest or match is not unreasonable.

19 Plaintiffs have not pointed to a single example in which the IHSAA gave a different interpretation.

2. The IHSAA Rules 16 and 3

Plaintiffs claim that the IHSAA's decision was arbitrary and capricious because the IHSAA violated Rule 16 relating to protests and Rule 3-9 relating to eligibility. Rule 16 provides in pertinent part:

C-16-1

When an administrative decision is protested, the use of a contested or the use of an official is protested in a season contest, the contest shall be played as scheduled and a formal protest, with evidence, may then be filed with the Commissioner who will determine the action to be taken.

C-16-2

Contest decisions by game officials are considered final and binding.

C-16-3

In cases of disputes or protests involving a student, the principal of the school involved must furnish the Committee all student information as listed in Rule 3-9. Other pertinent information will be requested as needed.

. . . .

C-16-5

If, after receiving a protest, it is determined that information has purposely been withheld until an "advantageous" time, the Committee may, at its discretion, deny the protest.

(IHSAA Manual at 47) (emphasis added). Rule 3-9 provides, in part, that "when it is discovered that an ineligible student has participated, the member school principal shall take the following action." ( Id. at 15.) The remainder of the rule describes the action to be taken by the principal. ( Id.)

Plaintiffs claim that under Rule 16-1 the IHSAA should have allowed Pearson and Elder to play the semi-final match and required a formal protest regarding their eligibility to be filed after the match. They argue that Rule 16-2 required the completion of the match once the game official started the match. Plaintiffs claim Rule 16-3 was violated because Park Tudor's principal was not afforded the opportunity to investigate and provide information under Rule 3-9. Finally, they contend the IHSAA violated Rule 16-5 which "precludes protests made at an `advantageous' time." (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. and Permanent Inj. at 17.)

The IHSAA responds that Rules 16-1, 16-2, 16-3 and 16-5 relate to protests made in "season contests." This interpretation is a reasonable one. Rule 16-1 expressly states that it applies "in a season contest." Furthermore, as IHSAA maintains, application of Rules 16-1 makes sense only in the context of season contests. A season contest can be played under protest and if the protest is sustained, the contest can be forfeited. But application of this rule makes no sense in the context of the IHSAA post-season tournament series which involves single-elimination competition with the winner of each contest advancing to the next level of competition. The IHSAA presents the following scenario which demonstrates that application of Rule 16-1 is not practicable in a post-season tournament:

Team A plays Team B in the semifinal of a single-elimination tournament. Team C plays Team D in the other semi-final. Team A beats Team B and advances to the finals. Team C beats Team D and advances to the finals. Team A beats Team C to win the state championship. After a formal protest, Team A is disqualified. How could this situation be resolved? Team C cannot just be declared the champion, because Team B should have had the chance to play Team C for the state championship, but lost to Team A, which was later disqualified.

(Br. in Opp'n to Pls.' Prayer for Inj. Relief at 18.) Rule 16-1 is neither workable nor applicable in a season end tournament series.

The same can be said about Rule 16-3 when a protest about a student's eligibility is made after a post-season tournament series has begun, as with the Doubles Tournament in this case. It does not appear possible for the principal to comply with Rule 3-9 before completion of the tournament series. Further, Rule 16-3 requires action by the principal of the involved school rather than any affirmative action by the IHSAA.

As for Rule 16-2, it makes "contest decisions" by game officials final and binding. "Contest decisions" is not defined in the IHSAA rules. The IHSAA apparently interprets it to mean decisions about and application of the rules of the sport, in this case tennis, such as foot faults, line calls, etc., instead of decisions regarding an athlete or team's eligibility or qualification to participate in a particular competition. This is a reasonable interpretation of the rule. As Head Referee Linda Hinshaw testified, game officials are not responsible for making such eligibility/qualification decisions, at least in amateur competitions.

Plaintiffs argue that the IHSAA's inconsistently interprets the term "season contest" within its own rules, claiming that "for the purposes of the 50% Rule — season contests really means season contests plus tournaments, [but] for the purposes of Rule C-16-1 — season contests are distinct from tournaments." (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. and Permanent Inj. Pls.' Br. at 15.) (Emphasis in original.) They claim this "inconsistent" interpretation makes this case similar to Crane. There is an important difference between this case and Crane, however. There, the IHSAA inconsistently interpreted and applied an IHSAA rule, the Transfer Rule, to the particular circumstances presented in the case. See Crane, 975 F.2d at 1322 ("[T]he IHSAA has no consistent interpretation of Rule 19-6.1(c)(2)"; "At each opportunity — literally every time Commissioner Craft discussed Rule 19-6.1(c)(2) — the interpretation of the rule and the reason why Ryan was not declared eligible under the rule changed."). The Seventh Circuit held that the IHSAA's ad hoc interpretation and application of the rule was arbitrary and capricious, 975 F.2d at 1325-26, but explained that if the rule "was unambiguous or if the IHSAA interpreted and applied the rule consistently, no court could interfere." Crane, 975 F.2d at 1325 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not claim or demonstrate that the IHSAA inconsistently interprets and applies the meaning of "season contest" in the 50% Rule — the IHSAA has interpreted it to mean "any opportunity to play."²⁰ In other words, there has been no evidence that the IHSAA has inconsistently interpreted or applied the denominator in calculating whether a tennis player has satisfied the 50% Rule. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the IHSAA's interpretation of the meaning of "season contest" within the 50% Rule is inconsistent with its interpretation of that term in Rule 16. "Season contest" is not defined in connection with either the 50% Rule or Rule 16, and there has been no showing that the IHSAA has inconsistently interpreted the meaning of "season contest" in the context of Rule 16, or for that matter, the 50% Rule. Thus, this case is unlike Crane. In fact, following Crane's reasoning, because the IHSAA has interpreted and applied the meaning of "season contest" and "their" in the 50% Rule consistently, the court cannot interfere with its decision.

20 In arguing that the IHSAA inconsistently interprets the 50% Rule, the Plaintiffs rely heavily on the IHSAA's decision in 1997 involving New Haven High School which turned on an interpretation of the 50% Rule. In that case, however, it was undisputed that both players played a minimum of 50% of their team's season contests in the #1 doubles position. The issue in New Haven was whether the players satisfied the rule because they had not played 50% of the contests "together." There is no dispute that when Pearson and Elder played doubles tennis, they played together. Thus, the IHSAA's interpretation of "together" in the 50% Rule in the New Haven case does not serve to demonstrate an inconsistent interpretation of the meaning of "their" or "season contests" within the rule. Though the New Haven case and the Park Tudor case both involved the 50% Rule, they required the IHSAA to interpret very different aspects of that rule. Another distinction between the New Haven case and this is that the players' eligibility was raised at a time which allowed the students to appeal the Commissioner's decision and allowed the Committee to hear and decide the appeal before the next round in the tournament had begun.

As for Rule 16-5, the Plaintiffs contend that the IHSAA "violated" this rule which they maintain "precludes protests made at an `advantageous' time." (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. and Permanent Inj. at 17.) Though Center Grove first inquired as to the eligibility of Park Tudor's doubles team on the Monday preceding the State Finals, there has been no evidence that information was "purposefully withheld" until an advantageous time — thirty minutes before the semi-final match was to begin. Even assuming that Coach Smith purposefully waited until thirty minutes before the semi-final match was to begin before protesting Pearson's eligibility under the 50% Rule, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that application of Rule 16-5 is within the IHSAA's discretion. The Rule is written in terms of "may" rather than "must" or "shall." The Rule does not require the denial of any or all protests made at an advantageous time. Thus, Plaintiffs err in claiming that the Rule "precludes" protests made at an advantageous time. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the IHSAA has inconsistently applied Rule 16-5 in situations such as that presented in this case — when a player's eligibility has been challenged when a post-season IHSAA tournament is already in progress and shortly before the player was to compete in the semi-final match.

Plaintiffs next contend that the IHSAA erroneously relies on Rule 3-9 as authority for the Commissioner's decision that Pearson and Elder were ineligible to compete in the State Finals. (Rule 3-9 refers to actions to be taken by the member school principal not the IHSAA or the Commissioner.) Even if they are correct, it really doesn't matter.²¹ If the Commissioner is granted certain authority under either the By-laws or a specific rule, mere citation to the wrong rule does not divest him of that authority. The By-Laws grant the Commissioner the authority "to initiate investigations, conduct hearings, collect information, render decisions and fix penalties based upon the evidence, and in accordance with the rules and regulations of [the IHSAA]." (IHSAA Manual at 9.) Furthermore, Rule 17-3, entitled "Commissioner Investigation and Decision" gives the Commissioner or his designee the authority to investigate and decide rules violations. (IHSAA Manual at 48.) Rule 17-3 does not require the Commissioner to give notice to the affected student-athlete.²² Rule 3-8 states that "[w]hen eligibility is in question, students shall not be permitted to participate in interschool contests." (IHSAA Manual at 14.) Rule 17-3 gives the Commissioner or his designee the authority to investigate and make decisions regarding rules violations, including Rule 3-8, pursuant to which students may not participate in IHSAA contests when their eligibility is in question. Commissioner Gardner's failure to cite either the By-Laws or Rule 17-3 during his deposition does not render the IHSAA's decision arbitrary and capricious.

21 Plaintiffs also claim entitlement to certain information set forth in Rule 17-2.1. That rule, however, applies to school investigations and decisions. It is undisputed that no school investigation or decision was made in this case. The rule does not apply.

22 The procedure provided under Rule 17-3 is different than that provided under Rule 17-2. The latter rule states that when a member school principal becomes aware that a rule may have been violated, he shall conduct an investigation, and if time and circumstances permit, and as part of the investigation, shall notify the party or parties being investigated. (IHSAA Manual at 47.)

Plaintiffs have not proven that the IHSAA's interpretation of Rules 16-1, 16-2, 16-3, 16-5 as inapplicable to the instant case to be arbitrary and capricious. Nor have they shown that the IHSAA's reliance on Rule 3-9 rendered its decision in this case arbitrary and capricious.

3. The Hardship Rule

Plaintiffs contend that the IHSAA's eligibility decision was arbitrary and capricious because the IHSAA did not grant Pearson and Elder an exception to the 50% Rule in violation of the Hardship Rule. They also argue that the IHSAA's decision was arbitrary and capricious in concluding that they failed to request a hardship waiver in a timely manner.

The Committee concluded that Pearson and Elder's application for a hardship was "too late" because "Park Tudor, through its coach, was aware or should have been aware that its #1 doubles players did not meet the requirements for qualification for the doubles tournament and these circumstances existed as of October 1, 1999. If a hardship was to be sought, the application should have been made at that time." (R. at 481.)

Substantial evidence supports the IHSAA's decision that Plaintiffs' request for a hardship exception to the 50% Rule was untimely. Rule 17-8.3 states that:

the appropriate time for a hardship application is when the hardship situation is discovered. Request for a hardship exception should always be made prior to any action or participation by the student . . . under circumstances which would constitute ineligibility or a Rule or decision violation.

(IHSAA Manual at 52.) Evidence presented at the hearing before the Committee established that Coach Heffern knew that Pearson had competed in only eight of seventeen matches and had not competed in more matches because of his injury. There also was evidence that before the Doubles Tournament began, Coach Heffern knew or should have known of the IHSAA's interpretation of the 50% Rule as requiring an individual to have participated at the #1 doubles position in 50% of the team's season contests and, therefore, knew or should have known that his #1 doubles team would not qualify for the State Finals under the IHSAA's interpretation of the Rule. In particular, Asst. Commissioner Wynns testified at the hearing before the Committee that a similar situation arose in 1998 with the Park Tudor girls' tennis team, of which Coach Heffern was the head coach. If the assistant coach shared with Coach Heffren the information from Asst. Commissioner Wynns about the IHSAA's interpretation of the 50% Rule, then Heffren would have known this to have been the IHSAA's interpretation of the Rule. Even if Coach Heffren did not know that this was how the IHSAA interpreted the rule, he should have known it based on Wynns' communications with the assistant coach of the girls' tennis team.

Furthermore, Coach Heffern testified at the hearing before the Committee that when he "did the 50 percent rule," the number of season contests was 14. This was the number of contests (less the Shirley Invitational) played by Park Tudor's team rather than the number of contests played by Pearson. Thus, the evidence supports the IHSAA's finding that Coach Heffern did not make a hardship application when the hardship situation became known or should have become known to him on October 1, 1999 (which is the date on which the 1999 boys' tennis contest season ended). In addition, it is undisputed that Coach Heffern did not request a hardship exception before Pearson participated in the State Finals, which the Hardship Rule requires. Under IHSAA Rule 3-1, Park Tudor's principal had a duty to make Coach Heffern aware of the IHSAA Rules, and Coach Heffern was presumed to know the Rules, including the Hardship Rule. Any claim that he was not aware of the Hardship Rule does not justify his failure to make a timely request for a hardship exception.

Plaintiffs argue that "[it] stretches credulity to on the one hand contend that the after-the-fact hearing before the Executive Committee satisfies the IHSAA's obligations to the students, and then argue on the other hand that the students cannot present eligibility arguments at the only after-the-fact hearing they were afforded." (Pls.' Mem. at 23.) The Committee, however, permitted the Plaintiffs to present their arguments in full in favor of their eligibility and considered their arguments in reaching its final decision. The Committee found that the information which would support an application for a hardship exception to the 50% Rule — information about Pearson's injury and the fact he could not and did not play in the #1 doubles position in over 50% of the team's contests — was available to Park Tudor before the Doubles Tournament even began. The Committee therefore concluded that Park Tudor should have requested a hardship exception before competing in the Doubles Tournament. Because Park Tudor did not, its request for a hardship exception, made after Pearson and Elder's ineligibility was discovered and after they were disqualified, was deemed untimely by the Committee.

The court cannot conclude that the IHSAA's refusal to grant a hardship "was willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion." That Pearson was injured is not disputed. That Coach Heffern advised Asst. Commissioner Wynns that the only reason Pearson did not play in every opportunity to play was because of his injury is not disputed either. Nor is it disputed that the Hardship Rule specifically lists injury as "a possible cause for a hardship consideration" and allows the Commissioner or his designee to make a hardship determination in the absence of an application by the affected party. But as Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Hardship Rule is permissive rather than mandatory. ( See, e.g., Pls.' Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Prelim. and Perm. Inj. at 21 ("The IHSAA has a `Hardship Rule' which permits suspension of the application of any rule as long as certain conditions are met.") (Emphasis added)). The IHSAA was not required to grant a hardship even if Plaintiffs established that they satisfied the three conditions set forth in Rule 17-8.1.

But the Committee concluded that they had not established all three conditions. This conclusion is not without some bases which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion.²³ Though the original purpose of the 50% Rule was to ensure that the # 1 doubles teams consisted of doubles players rather than singles players, evidence was presented that the rule had a secondary purpose through its operation which was to ensure that a school's number # 1 doubles team in the tournament is the school's # 1 doubles team.²⁴ No one claims that Pearson was a singles player during the 1999 tennis season, but the IHSAA's conclusion that Park Tudor and Pearson and Elder failed to prove that strict enforcement of the 50% Rule would not serve to accomplish some purpose of the rule is not unreasonable.²⁵

23 Some reasonable people might disagree with the Committee's decision that Park Tudor and the students failed to prove that: (1) the spirit of the 50% Rule had not been violated or (2) an undue hardship did or would result from enforcement of the 50% Rule. However, the court need not determine whether no reasonable person could agree with the Committee's decision in this regard. Having determined that the Committee's conclusion with respect to the first condition set forth in Rule 17-8.1 is reasonable, the court need not decide whether its decision as to the second and third conditions also is reasonable. This is because a hardship exception may be granted only if all three of the conditions are met.

24 Though not articulated by the IHSAA, this secondary purpose could ensure a certain level of competition in the IHSAA post-season doubles tournament much like the rule requiring a player to have 10 organized practices before he may participate in interschool tennis contests ensures a certain level of preparedness in the athletes competing in interschool tennis contests. ( See IHSAA Manual at 75, Rule 58-2.)

25 Of course, there is no evidence that the purpose of the 50% Rule was to penalize student-athletes who were or had been injured during the tennis season, and no one could reasonably suggest that this is a purpose for the rule.

Plaintiffs contend that the IHSAA through Asst. Commissioner Wynns acted arbitrarily and capriciously in telling Coach Heffern that there was no injury exception to the 50% Rule. Her statement to Coach Heffern that there was no injury exception supports two reasonable inferences. The first is that she meant there was no injury exception written in the 50% Rule itself, which is technically correct. The 50% Rule itself contains no "injury exception." The second inference is that Asst. Commissioner Wynns meant that Park Tudor was not going to be granted an injury exception, that is a hardship exception, to the 50% Rule. Both inferences are fairly supported by the facts and are reasonable. Thus, Asst. Commissioner Wynns' statement to Coach Heffern that there was no injury exception was not wrong and was not arbitrary and capricious.

Plaintiffs complain that Asst. Commissioner Wynns was aware of all the facts needed to invoke the Hardship Rule, but never brought them to Commissioner Gardner's attention. Plaintiffs imply that only Commissioner Gardner could make a hardship determination, but that is not the case. The Hardship Rule grants authority to make a hardship determination to the Commissioner, his designee, and the Committee. In this case, the Commissioner's designee Asst. Commissioner Wynns was presented with Coach Heffern's arguments that Pearson did not play in more matches because of his injury and that the purpose and spirit of the 50% Rule were satisfied. A fair inference is that Asst. Commissioner Wynns considered this information and then decided that Pearson would not be granted a hardship waiver. Commissioner Gardner testified that the decision to declare Pearson and Elder ineligible had been made before Asst. Commissioner Wynns conferred with him on the telephone and that the purpose of the call was to discuss how to proceed given their disqualification. Plaintiffs cite no authority to support that which they imply: that Asst. Commissioner Wynns had to bring facts supporting a hardship waiver to the Commissioner's attention.

The court holds that the IHSAA's decision that Pearson and Reed were ineligible to compete in the Doubles Tournament was not arbitrary and capricious under the narrow standard of scrutiny permitted in reviewing that decision. Because the IHSAA's decision is not arbitrary and capricious, the timing of the announcement by Asst. Commissioner Wynns of that decision during the semi-final match is irrelevant.

III. Conclusion

Pearson and Elder have not established a protectable liberty interest implicated by the IHSAA's actions in this case. Even if they had a protectable liberty interest which was impugned, the process which they received comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Further, the IHSAA's decision that Pearson was not eligible to participate in the State Finals was not "willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion." Plaintiffs, therefore, have not succeeded on the merits of their claims under Counts III and IV, and their request for injunctive relief is DENIED.

As this entry concludes, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 due process claims are not sustainable and the IHSAA's decision passes muster under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Because Plaintiffs' have not prevailed on the merits of these claims tried for injunctive relief, there appears to be nothing left for trial on the merits of the monetary damage part of their claims. In light of these findings, Plaintiffs are ALLOWED thirty (30) days from today's date within which to indicate whether they seek a trial on their claims for monetary damages, and if so, to show cause why they would still be entitled to such a trial. If they do not seek a trial on monetary damages or do not show cause why they are entitled to a trial on monetary damages, judgment on all claims will be entered in favor of the Defendant.

ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED.