Opinion
12-cv-706-wmc
01-13-2014
JEFF PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. TURINA BAKKEN, MELISSA BRAINERD, and CYNTHIA PECKENPAUGH, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil rights action, plaintiff Jeff Patterson alleges that three employees of Madison Area Technical College discriminated against him on the basis of his race and/or sex in failing to hire him as a Salon Manager. Before the court is plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a finding that he has established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas (or indirect) method of proof. (Dkt. #44.) Without reaching its merits, the court will deny plaintiff's motion as moot.
In a typical discrimination case, a defendant might move for summary judgment, putting plaintiff to his or her proof of intentional discrimination under the direct or indirect method. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the "direct method," plaintiff must put forth "evidence leading directly to the conclusion that an employer was illegally motivated, without reliance on speculation." Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). Under the "indirect method" of proving race or gender discrimination, the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies, Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2010), which requires plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrating:
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
1) he is a member of a protected class;Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).
2) he applied for, and was qualified for, an open position;
3) he was rejected; and
4) the employer filled the position with a person not in the plaintiff's protected class, or the position remained open.
In his brief in support of an award of partial summary judgment, plaintiff states that he can "prevail on his race or sex discrimination claims under either the direct or indirect methods of proof." (Pl.'s Br. (dkt. #45) 9 (quoting Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). Not true. At least under the indirect method, plaintiff may successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, but this just gets him to trial.
At the trial, the question for the jury will solely be defendants discriminated against Patterson in not hiring him as MATC's Salon Manager because of his race and/or sex. The jury will not be asked to consider (1) whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case; (2) whether defendants have rebutted that case by pointing to a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for their hiring decision; nor (3) whether plaintiff has proven that defendants' proffered reason is simply a pretext for discrimination. "The McDonnell Douglas framework is designed to help plaintiffs raise an inference of discrimination during pretrial proceedings." Filipovich v. K & R Exp. Sys., Inc., 391 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Diettrich v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 168 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing the purpose of McDonnell Douglas as "outlin[ing] a series of steps that, if satisfied, would support a plaintiff's right to reach the trier of fact"). This "burden-shifting" device is, however, " appropriate only for purposes of summary judgment; after the evidence has been presented at trial, the question is simply whether that evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the plaintiff." Brown v. Snow, No. 03-2181, 94 Fed. Appx. 369, 372, 2004 WL 764129, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004) (citing Staples v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 312 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 2002); Hall v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 298 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002)).
If the parties pursue a mixed motive theory, then the jury could be asked whether Patterson's race and/or sex was a motivating factor in defendants' decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003). This, of course, is a different issue than that posed by plaintiff in his motion for summary judgment.
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While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) permits a district court to enter summary judgment as to a particular fact, the facts plaintiff seeks to establish as part of his motion do not bear on the ultimate question of whether Patterson has demonstrated that his race and/or sex were a motivating factor in defendants' decision not to hire him as Salon Manager. As such, the court declines plaintiff's invitation -- and defendants' own request in their opposition brief -- to enter partial summary judgment in this case.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Jeff Patterson's motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. #44) is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
__________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge