Summary
holding that appellant's appellate challenge to summary judgment as to claim appellant had not pleaded and that was not tried by consent did not show that trial court had erred in granting summary judgment
Summary of this case from Optimum Bonus Tex., Inc. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLCOpinion
No. 14-08-00020-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed March 24, 2009.
On Appeal from the 157th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2006-45407.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, GUZMAN, and SULLIVAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jasminet C. Pathak ("Pathak"), sued the Harris County Hospital District ("the District") asserting wrongful termination of employment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, Pathak claims the trial court erred in granting the District's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
The Honorable Randy Wilson of the 157th District Court of Harris County.
BACKGROUND
Jasminet Pathak was hired by the District in 2001 as a health educator. In 2005, she apparently sustained a back injury while moving some boxes at work. As a result, she took a leave of absence for several weeks and ultimately filed a claim under the District's worker's compensation policy. After returning to work, she made various complaints about paperwork delays in the District's worker's compensation process and a lack of adequate accommodation of her physical limitations. She resigned in July of 2006.
Pathak filed suit against the District, her former employer, on July 24, 2006. In her original petition, she asserted causes of action for constructive discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim (the "retaliation claim") and a related claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. On October 3, 2007, the District filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment on the claims raised in the petition.
Pathak responded to the District's motion in two principal ways. First, in her summary judgment response, she raised new and unpleaded causes of action including claims for national origin, gender and disability discrimination (sometimes collectively referred to as the "discrimination claims"). Second, she separately filed some 150 pages of documents, including several affidavits, although largely without explanation.
The District objected to Pathak's unpleaded causes of action, and the trial court otherwise granted summary judgment as to all claims. On appeal, Pathak essentially contends that her response was sufficient to preclude summary judgment on behalf of the District.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo. Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). When a party moves for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds and the trial court does not specify which it granted, we may uphold the summary judgment on either ground. See Taylor v. Carley, 158 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.App. 2004, pet. denied).
Pathak does not appeal the summary judgment as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. She appeals only the dismissal of the retaliation claim and the unpleaded discrimination claims. We, therefore, limit our discussion only to those issues properly presented for review. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-10 (Tex. 1990).
Although she does not identify specific issues presented for review other than in a narrative discussion, Pathak does claim that she "offered evidence" or "offered prima facie evidence" adequately supporting her claims in response to the summary judgment motion. We will assume, without deciding, that these statements are adequate to present issues for review as to whether Pathak's response raised a genuine issue as to any material fact in the face of the District's hybrid motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9 (requiring liberal construction of briefing requirements).
It is noteworthy that Pathak does not take issue with the adequacy of the District's traditional or no-evidence motions and, in her brief, implicitly concedes that she is properly subject to summary judgment in the absence of an adequate response supported by competent summary judgment evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
The Discrimination Claims
In her summary judgment response, Pathak alleged, for the first time, claims for national origin discrimination, gender discrimination, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, the record indicates that Pathak made no attempt to amend her pleadings to include the new claims. Because Pathak was limited to the theory of recovery stated in her pleadings, the claims raised only by way of the summary judgment response were not properly before the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; Wilson v. McCracken, 713 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex.App. 1986, no writ).
The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that unpleaded claims or defenses may be tried by express or implied consent of the parties. See Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 n. 1 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Roark v. Stallworth Oil Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991)). Claims that are tried by consent are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 67. When new claims are asserted in a non-movant's summary judgment response, the movant has two options: (1) object that the claims have not been pleaded; or (2) respond on the merits and try the issue by consent. See Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006) (holding applicability of the discovery rule properly before the court when it was raised in the summary judgment response and not included in the pleadings).
In its written reply, the District expressly objected to the claims asserted in Pathak's response. Thus, we conclude these claims were not tried by consent. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on these unpleaded claims. See Pickelner v. Adler, 229 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tex.App. 2007, pet. denied).
The Retaliation Claim
Pathak also argues the trial court improperly granted summary judgment for the District because she produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Workers' Compensation Act. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 2006); Cont'l Coffee Prod. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450-51 (Tex. 1996). The Act prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against an employee because the employee has filed a workers' compensation claim in good faith. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 451.001(1).
To prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim under section 451.001(1), the employee has a threshold burden of demonstrating a causal link between the discharge and the filing of the claim for workers' compensation benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 451.002(c); Cont'l Coffee Prod. Co., 937 S.W.2d at 450. In other words, the employee must show that absent her protected conduct, the discharge would not have occurred when it did. Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. 2005).
While the District's motion is somewhat opaque, it does raise a no-evidence issue at least as to the causation element of Pathak's retaliation claim.
Accordingly, in response to the District's no-evidence summary judgment motion, Pathak had the burden of producing more than a scintilla of probative evidence in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Alaniz v. Rebello Food Beverage, L.L.C., 165 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Tex.App. 2005, no pet.). In determining whether Pathak has raised more than a scintilla of evidence in support of her claim, we are limited to the summary judgment proof produced in the response. See DeGrate v. Executive Imprints, Inc., 261 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.). When presenting summary judgment evidence in response to a no-evidence motion, a party must specifically identify the supporting proof that it seeks to have considered by the trial court. See id.; San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex.App. 2005, no pet.)
Pathak's response merely raised new causes of action and did not materially discuss the retaliation claim. While she filed over 150 pages of documents, apparently to support her response, she failed to direct the court's attention in any meaningful way to specific and competent evidence that would defeat the District's entitlement to summary judgment. Neither this court nor the trial court is required to wade through a voluminous record to marshal a respondent's proof for her. Arredondo v. Rodriguez, 198 S.W.3d 236, 238 (Tex.App. 2006, no pet.) (citing Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. 1989)).
Because Pathak's summary judgment response failed to identify specific and competent summary judgment evidence supporting the retaliation claim, she did not raise a fact issue sufficient to defeat the District's no-evidence motion. See id. at 239. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the District as to the retaliatory discharge claim.
Because we conclude that the trial court could properly grant the District's no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claim, we need not more specifically address its traditional motion for summary judgment. See Taylor, 158 S.W.3d at 8.
CONCLUSION
Finding no error in the appellate record, we affirm.