PAPA v. STATE

Full title: George Papa and Debra Jo Papa, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. State of…

Court: United States District Court, D. Arizona

Date published: Jul 5, 2007

No. CIV 06-3060-PHX-MHM (D. Ariz. Jul. 5, 2007)

Opinion

No. CIV 06-3060-PHX-MHM.

July 5, 2007

ORDER

MARY MURGUIA, District Judge

Currently before the Court is Defendants' State of Arizona; Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; Arizona Supreme Court; Ruth V. McGregor; John C. Gemmill and the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct (the "State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #10) and Plaintiff George and Debra Jo Papas' ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #13); Motion for Judgment to be in Form of Published Opinion (Dkt. #22-1), and Request to Expedite Judgment (Dkt. #22-2); and Motion for Entry of Default (Dkt. #23). After reviewing the papers, the Court issues the following Order.

I. Background

On December 21, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint against the State Defendants asserting that Plaintiffs were deprived of property without due process as well as that Plaintiffs' civil rights were violated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. (Dkt. #1). Plaintiffs' allegations take issue with three prior state court judgments and the Arizona appellate courts handling of Plaintiffs' appeals. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that on June 16, 1987, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, issued a Memorandum decision in Papa v. Roberts, 1 CA-CV 8998 ("Roberts") that "was false because it did not conform to the evidence, or the law, or the facts of the case." (Complaint, Dkt. #1, § XV). Plaintiffs assert that the "civil case was for the recovery of a large real estate sales commission and . . . had been decided by mere Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs in Apache County Superior Court." Id. § XVI. Plaintiffs allege that the Arizona Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Superior Court's decision by "disregard[ing] the true law and evidence that fully favored Plaintiffs. The Appeals Court also put forth false law and false evidence into its Memorandum Decision that was contrary to the true facts of th[e] case." Id. § XVII. Plaintiffs contend that as a result "Plaintiffs were injured with false judgment . . ." Id.

Plaintiffs further assert that they were injured by the Arizona Court of Appeals handling of another civil case in which the Plaintiffs were involved; Papa v. Spurlock, 1 CA-CV 88-278 ("Spurlock"), which also involved a real estate sales commission allegedly earned by the Plaintiffs. Id. § XVIII. Plaintiffs allege that the Arizona Court of Appeals ruling against them "likewise did not conform to the law or the evidence of the case. Instead, the [Arizona Court of Appeals] wrongfully ruled that Plaintiffs had accepted a pittance ($15,000) out-of-court settlement to end the case," which is contrary to the Plaintiffs $388,400.00 fee allegedly earned on the deal. Id. Plaintiffs allege that the Arizona Court of Appeals "should have first ruled that Plaintiffs had in fact earned the full real estate sales fee and that to enforce a non-existent out-of-town settlement was unjust." Id. § XIX. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that "the [Arizona Court of Appeals] should have immediately ruled the first Roberts case to be in Plaintiff's favor, which would have precluded the Spurlock case from being ruined with a false Roberts Memorandum Decision." Id. § XX. In sum, with respect to the Spurlock case, Plaintiffs allege:

The Appeals Court did not conform to the true law or evidence of the Spurlock case, as to the earned real estate sales commission. Opposing counsel cheated and broke the law to deceive the court and to steal judgment from Plaintiffs, and the court was so advised, yet the Appeals Court failed to do its duty to reverse its false Memorandum Decision in this Spurlock case. This judicial failure by the Appeals Court obstructed justice; violated due process, and caused property (commission) loss for Plaintiffs.

Id. § XXVII.

Plaintiffs further raise error with the Arizona Court of Appeals decision and handling in Papa v. State, 1 CA-CV 02-0629 ("State"), which according to Plaintiffs "was false because it likewise did not conform to the evidence, or the law, or the facts of the case." Id. § XXVIII. According to Plaintiffs, this case derived out of "a Court Order that allowed the Arizona Corporation Commission to take over the Papa Water Utility Company on the pretext of putting the system into compliance with the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, then return the system to Papa." Id. § XXIX. Plaintiffs contend that they "were defrauded of their property since the [Arizona Corporation Commission] did not maintain and return Plaintiff's property as the Court Order required the [Arizona Corporation Commission] to do." Id. Plaintiffs assert that the Arizona Court of Appeals committed error in affirming two prior dismissals or rulings of the Superior Court's handling of Plaintiffs' claims. Id. § XXXV.

Plaintiffs allege that they filed motions for reconsideration of the prior erroneous Arizona Court of Appeals' decisions inRoberts, Spurlock and State (Complaint, Exhibits A-C) and that the motions "[are] more than sufficient to show that the Arizona Judicial System was negligent, derelict and incompetent to provide adequate judicial service to Plaintiffs . . ." Id. § XXXVII. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that "[s]ince there was `good cause' shown for reversal to false judgment, the [Arizona Court of Appeals] and the Supreme Court [of Arizona] failed their duty to process these `good cause' Motions for Reconsideration, which injured Plaintiffs by causing their property loss contrary to law." Id. § XXXVIII. Plaintiffs cite Lindus v. Northern Insur. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311 (1968) in support of their argument that they were permitted to file multiple motions for reconsideration "to . . . gain reversal from false judgments and the injury thereto." Id. § XLII. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Arizona Supreme Court Advisory Opinion 92-10 also supports such motions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. § XLIV. As such, Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he appellate court(s) and judges thereto acted outside of their normal duties, scope of employment, and jurisdiction, when they refused to process required review of Plaintiffs' petitions which demonstrated `good cause' to reverse prior false judgments." Id. § XLVII. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that "[s]ince fraud/collusion resulted in 3 false judgments in Roberts, Spurlock and State . . . then these false judgments are not conclusive or closed. False judgments are required by the `furtherance of justice' to be reversed by law." Id. § LIV.

Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct has also engaged in misconduct based upon Plaintiffs' Complaint to the Commission regarding the conduct of Judge John C. Gemmill "for his violation of duty for failure to process Plaintiffs' `good cause' motions for reconsideration." Id. § LXI. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Chief Justice Ruth V. McGregor "completely failed her constitutional duty to correct injustice, once it was brought to her attention that such injustice prevailed in the court(s) below. Id. § LXX.

Based upon the above allegations and the violations of Plaintiffs' due process and civil rights, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against all Defendants in the amount of $229,280,736.00, to be paid by the state of Arizona, plus actual damages of $19,106,728.00, and attorneys' fees.

On January 9, 2007, the State Defendants filed the instant Motion to dismiss (Dkt. #10) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asserting that: (1) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Justice McGregor and Judge Gemmill possess judicial immunity; (3) Plaintiffs cannot assert claims under § 1983; (4) Plaintiffs cannot assert claims against non-jural entities; and (5) Plaintiffs cannot assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Plaintiffs responded on January 18, 2007 (Dkt. #11) as well as submitted a sur-reply to the State Defendants' reply on February 26, 2007. (Dkt. #18). As such, the motion to dismiss is ripe for the Court's consideration.

II. Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs cite 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction as the basis of this Court's jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' suit. The State Defendants, in arguing that dismissal is appropriate, do not contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' suit due to the significance of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which, as discussed below, bars federal courts from reviewing the merits of prior state court judgments. However, notably, the Plaintiffs in an attempt to distinguish this case from the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, argue in their Complaint that the doctrine does not apply to this case. (Complaint, LXXIV — LXXXVII (pp. 26-30)). In light of the fact that the Plaintiffs raise issue with prior state court decisions and judgments in their Complaint, this Court finds that it is appropriate to address this Court's subject matter jurisdiction and the significance of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine sua sponte. See Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. v. Fox Entertainment, 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9^th Cir. 2003) (noting that district court has the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction).

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Under what has become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review the judgments and decisions of state courts. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923). InFeldman, 460 U.S. at 486, the Supreme Court stated that district courts do not have jurisdiction "over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional." Rather, the court added, "[r]eview of those decisions may be had only in the [the Supreme] Court" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Id. The Ninth Circuit has recently provided additional instruction in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9^th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit provided this formulation: "[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court." In such an instance, that federal plaintiff seeks a forbidden de facto appeal. See id. at 1163. In Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9^th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "applies even when the challenge to the state court decision[s] involves federal constitutional issues," such as challenges anchored to alleged deprivations of federally protected due process and equal protection rights.

In the instant case, based upon a plain review of Plaintiffs' Complaint, outlined above, there can be no doubt that Plaintiffs seek this Court to act as an appellate court of the state court decisions and judgments rendered against them. Essentially, Plaintiffs would have this Court perform a collateral review of the adverse judgments of the Arizona state courts in the Roberts,Spurlock and State litigations. Plaintiffs' entire complaint appears to be based upon the premise that the Superior Courts, the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court erroneously decided Plaintiffs' suits and erroneously determined Plaintiffs' appeals. This Court does not have the authority to review such issues. Similarly, Plaintiffs' claims against Justice McGregor and Judge Gemmill are premised on the notion that they improperly decided or handled Plaintiffs' appeals and motions for reconsideration. Such requests by Plaintiffs would require this Court "to conduct a direct review of the state court's judgment and to scrutinize the state court's application of various rules and procedures pertaining to [the] case," which this Court simply cannot do under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887, 891 (9^th Cir. 1989). Despite Plaintiffs apparent attempt to frame the allegations involving the prior state court judgments as collateral or incidental to the claims in this case, it is wholly apparent that the prior state court decisions and judgments are at the center of this suit and would require this Court to evaluate the merits and handling of the state court judgments and appeals. For instance, in support of Plaintiffs' due process and civil rights claims, Plaintiffs repeatedly contend that the judgments in the Roberts, Spurlock and State matters "did not conform to the evidence, or the law, or the facts of the case." Complaint §§ XV, XVIII, XXVIII. This Court lacks the authority to act as a court of collateral review regarding the Plaintiffs' argument in opposition to the decisions and handling of such cases. Rather, only the United States Supreme Court would have the jurisdiction to review the prior state court judgments.¹ Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Complaint and this matter must be dismissed.²

1 In Plaintiffs' Complaint, they state that "[i]t is appropriate that this federal court repudiate, if necessary, the unjust, oppressive, and misguided Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, in the event it is itself an obstruction of justice." Complaint § LXXXV. This Court; however, is bound by the well settled precedent that establishes that collateral attacks on state court judgments, such as this one, do not properly invoke a federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction. In light of such precedent, this Court will not depart based upon Plaintiffs' request.

2 Because the Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it will not address the other arguments in support of dismissal advanced by the Defendants.

III. Conclusion

The Court, upon sua sponte review, finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs' action constitutes a collateral attack on prior state court decisions and judgments that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear. Because the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate, the Court will deny as moot the remaining pending motions such as Plaintiffs' Motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. #13). To the extent Plaintiffs seek this Court's order to be in the form of a published opinion, the Court finds no reason to direct such.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting the State Defendants' Motion to dismiss to the extent they seek dismissal of the instant suit. (Dkt. #10). This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and thus, Plaintiffs' Complaint and action are dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #13); Request to Expedite Judgment (Dkt. #22-2); and Motion for Entry of Default as to Defendants. (Dkt. #23).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment to be in Form of Published Opinion. (Dkt. #22-1). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.