Opinion
No. C 01-2158 MJJ (PR)
November 26, 2003
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
INTRODUCTION
Larry Dean Padilla ("Padilla"), a California prisoner, filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After a review of the petition, the court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted on the basis of Padilla's cognizable claims. Respondent filed an answer accompanied by a memorandum and exhibits contending that the petition should be denied. Padilla filed a traverse.
On October 23, 2003, Padilla filed a motion to add Exhibit #1, Document # 1457-1501. The Court grants this motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:
Padilla was convicted of murdering a man named Adolfo Duarte during an argument outside of a liquor store.
Padilla spent the evening of September 5, 1995, at an amusement center with his two young daughters. On the way home, the trio stopped at a liquor store in San Leandro in order to buy beer and soda. As Padilla and the girls were leaving, they heard a loud bang. Padilla turned and saw Duarte. He was a large man, weighing 234 pounds, and he was intoxicated. He had apparently struck appellant's car.
Padilla confronted Duarte and asked why he had struck his car. Padilla was unsatisfied with Duarte's response, so he walked over to Duarte's truck and hit it. Padilla then returned to his own car and started to drive away.
As Padilla was leaving, Duarte yelled something. He removed his belt and began to swing it in a circular motion over his head. Padilla backed up his car, stopped near Duarte, and got out. Padilla then reached back into his car and produced a gun.
What happened next is the subject of dispute. Some witnesses said that Duarte became passive. He did not move toward appellant and he did not continue to swing his belt. Others said Duarte continued to act belligerently, and that he advanced on Padilla. Regardless of this dispute, Padilla's next action is clear. He pointed his gun at Duarte and shot him three times, killing him. Padilla then jumped into his car and fled.
Based on these facts, an information was filed charging Padilla with murder (§ 187), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that Padilla personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5), had two prior strikes (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
The case proceeded to trial where a jury returned a verdict finding Padilla guilty on count two (being a felon in possession of a firearm) and not guilty of first degree murder as alleged in count one. In addition, the jury signed a verdict form finding Padilla not guilty of involuntary manslaughter. However, the court declined to accept that finding. The court then declared a mistrial on the murder count.
In a court trial which followed, the court found the prior strike, prior prison term, and prior serious felony convictions allegations to be true.
A second trial to resolve the outstanding murder count began in January 1998. Padilla testified on his own behalf and he admitted that he shot Duarte. He said Duarte had struck him on the head and was advancing toward him as if he was going to hit him again. Padilla said he pulled the trigger because he was afraid of what Duarte might do to him and his girls.
After considering this and other evidence, the jury convicted Padilla of second degree murder and found that he had personally used a weapon when committing the crime. Subsequently, the court sentenced appellant to 60 years to life (15 years to life for second degree murder on count one, tripled to 45 years to life under the three strikes law; plus four years for firearm use; two consecutive five-year terms for the prior serious felony convictions, and one year for the prior prison term finding.) In addition, the court sentenced Padilla to a concurrent term of 25 years to life for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The California Court of Appeal decision refers to Padilla as "Appellant." This opinion substitutes "Padilla" for "Appellant."
The California Court of Appeal decision refers to Padilla as "Appellant." This opinion substitutes "Padilla" for "Appellant."
Respondent's Exhibit D contains the opinion of the California Court of Appeal (hereinafter, "Slip Op.").
The California Court of Appeal denied the direct appeal and the Supreme Court of California summarily denied the petition for direct review.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).
A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication c the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).
In evaluating whether there has been a violation of § 2254(d)(1), the court should first review the state court decision for error de novo and then determine whether the decision was contrary to 01 an unreasonable application of controlling law. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a "`substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1920 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Legal Claims
1. Double Jeopardy Claim
Padilla claims the retrial on the murder charge was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment since he was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter in the first trial.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. Amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), its protections were held applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The guarantee against double jeopardy protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and (2) multiple punishments for the same offense. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980);North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Staatz v. Dupnik, 789 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1986).
At Padilla's first trial in this case, on March 31, 1997, the trial court reported that the jury had returned a message stating "We are deadlock" [sic] and have been for days." Clerk's Transcript ("CT") at 1211. The foreman reported that the numerical division as to Count 1 was "7,5." However, after polling the jury, the trial court found that there would be a possibility of a verdict or Count 1 given further deliberations. CT at 1226. The trial court supplementally instructed the jury under Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 503 (1982), on utilizing multiple verdict forms for murder CT at 1233-1234.
The jury subsequently returned a verdict of not guilty of murder in the first degree. CT at 1235 et seq. The jury was polled and the verdict was recorded. Once again, the trial court asked the foreman whether any other findings would be forthcoming from the jury. The foreman answered affirmatively. The court returned the jury to deliberate and return any verdict forms reflecting agreement. The jury subsequently returned with a signed form. CT at 1240. The trial court immediately ordered the jury to retire momentarily, and discussed the form with the attorneys present, stating:
We have taken a recess in order to give court and counsel an opportunity to review pertinent authorities relating to the present status of the jury deliberation and the return of verdicts. As the record does reflect, the jury now has returned a verdict of not guilty as to first degree murder, a verdict as to not guilty to involuntary manslaughter, and has returned unsigned verdict forms relating to murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter.
CT at 1242. After requesting comment from both counsel, the trial court summoned the jury, and informed them it could not accept the verdict on manslaughter unless or until the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant was not guilty of murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. CT at 1248-1249. However, given the lateness of the day, the jury was not returned for further deliberations, but rather was excused for the evening, with the usual admonition. CT at 1248-53.
The next morning, after reflection, the trial court stated that it was unsure of the meaning of the involuntary manslaughter verdict:
Without engaging in speculation which none of us has done, and I don't intend to do either, I can't tell if this jury is hopelessly deadlocked between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. I can't tell if it was their intent to acquit the defendant on all charges by virtue of the way they've returned these verdicts. I can't tell of certainty whether or not their [sic] hopelessly deadlocked on any of the offenses at this point. ¶ And as I reflect upon this, I think it's now incumbent on the court to ascertain what they mean to convey by virtue of the verdicts they have returned to the court.
CT at 1529-1530. Rather than allowing the jury to continue deliberations, the trial court formulate two questions for the jury, to clarify their intent with regard to the verdict form on involuntary manslaughter:
It is at this point somewhat unclear to me, to the court, precisely what it is that the jury is seeking to communicate and convey by its return of not guilty verdicts as to murder in the first degree and involuntary manslaughter . . .
I have two questions to ask you. Number one, do you mean to find by your return of the signed not guilty forms as to murder in the first degree and involuntary manslaughter that you are by those verdicts also finding that the defendant is not guilty of all offenses as to count one? All offenses include murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter, that is, is it your intent to resolve the case in its entirety as to count one by the return of those verdicts of not guilty as to murder in the first degree and involuntary manslaughter. Don't answer me yet. That's the first question.
Or number two, is the jury unable to unanimously agree on any verdict as to murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter?
All right. Those are the two questions I have for you. Now, please be mindful that the court in asking these questions is not asking you in any way to reconsider your verdicts but is only asking you to clarify your intentions and the status of your deliberations . . . I am not trying to hasten your judgment or influence your deliberations in any way. I'm only trying to clarify your intent, because as I stated yesterday, you must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder before you can find him guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
Reporter's Transcript ("RT") at 1537-38.
The jury provided written answers to these questions; the answers were, with respect to question no. 1, "No," and with respect to question no. 2 "Yes." CT at 1539. The trial court polled each juror as to each of these questions. Each juror agreed that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked as to murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court found the jury hopelessly deadlocked, declared a mistrial, and discharged the jury. CT at 1548.
Based on the foregoing, Padilla asserts that he was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter. Padilla asserts that this acquittal created a constitutional bar to later prosecution for second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. Respondent asserts that Padilla was not acquitted of involuntary manslaughter in the first trial because that was not the true intent of the jury; since there was no was no acquittal in the first trial, Padilla's second trial was not barred by Double Jeopardy.
Ninth Circuit precedent supports the Respondent's argument that the true intent of the jury controls whether there was an acquittal. InUnited States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990), after the jury was discharged, several jurors informed the court that a verdict form reading not guilty did not represent the jury's true intent, and that the jury intended to convict the defendant on that count. Id. at 511 Based on these representations, the trial court changed the verdict on that count to guilty. Id. Affirming the trial court's decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the controlling inquiry was to determine the jury's true intent.Id. at 513-514. The court reasoned:
There is case law supporting correction of judgments to reflect the intent of jurors. In United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1987), the jury returned a verdict convicting the defendant on all ten counts. After the jury was dismissed, two jurors phoned the judge to tell him that the jury actually voted to acquit on the tenth count. After confirming the jurors' disclosure, the district judge changed the verdict to reflect acquittal on the tenth count. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court's action was a permissible exception to the general prohibition against inquiry into the validity of a jury's verdict found in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1130 . . .
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: `[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the Court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.'
The district court did not alter the jury's verdict itself; it simply corrected the verdict form to reflect the jury's true intent. Clearly, decreasing the impact of a judgment is less problematic to a defendant than expanding its impact. Still, this Court is convinced that no possible unfairness can be found in a judgment that reflects the jury's true intent. Despite Stauffer's admirable effort to persuade this Court that his right to be free from double jeopardy has been violated, the facts do not support a conclusion that the double jeopardy clause has been compromised in this case.Id. at 513-514 (emphasis added).
Here, as in Stauffer, Padilla's retrial was not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Padilla was never acquitted of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. In response to a query from the judge, the jury indicated it was not their intent to acquit Padilla of all charges (first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter). The jury also indicated that it could not reach a verdict on second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter even after being reminded that their failure to reach a verdict on these counts precluded an acquittal on involuntary manslaughter. Under these circumstances, the trial court appropriately concluded that the verdict form did not reflect the jury's true intent to acquit Padilla of involuntary manslaughter. Rather, a reasonable interpretation of the jury's intent was that Padilla's appropriate level of guilt was either second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, and neither first degree murder nor involuntary manslaughter. The trial court's effectuation of that intent and Padilla's subsequent retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy clause. Because there was no double jeopardy violation, the state court's ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law.
Confronting a similar factual record where the jury was unable to agree on the greater offense the Eighth Circuit stated,
jeopardy did not terminate on the greater offense because the jury could not agree as to that offense and the district court therefore declared a mistrial . . . The jury's express statement that it could not agree on a verdict as to the greater offense obviously precludes the inference that there was an implied acquittal.U.S. v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187, 1192 (8th Cir. 1997). Similarly, in our case, the jury's express statement that it could not agree on a verdict as to the greater offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter precludes the inference that there was an implied acquittal. Thus, in the firs trial, jeopardy did not terminate on the offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter Here, just as in Bordeax, retrial was not a double jeopardy violation.
2. Jury Instructions on Malice
Petitioner claims that an error in the jury instruction issued pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.50 violated his constitutional rights. To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Cupp v. Naughter 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973).
The trial court explained the differences between murder and manslaughter using CALJIC No. 8.50 as follows, "[t]he distinction between Murder and Manslaughter is that Murder requires malice while Manslaughter does not. [¶] When the act causing the death, though unlawful, is done ii the heat of passion or is excited by a sudden quarrel that amounts to adequate provocation, in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, the offense is Manslaughter." RT at 2845.
Padilla complains this instruction omitted the word "or" between the phrases "adequate provocation" and "in the actual but unreasonable belief. . . ." According to Padilla, this omission improperly eliminated unreasonable self-defense as a separate defense to murder, instead making it an additional requirement to the heat of passion/sudden quarrel defense. Padilla argues that the instruction thereby misinformed the jury that malice was negated only where the evidence established both "heat of passion on adequate provocation" and "honest but unreasonable belief in the right to defend."
The given version of CALJIC No. 8.50, judged on its own, might have created the problem petitioner suggests. However, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the Court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Here, the other instructions made it clear that unreasonable self defense was a separate defense, and cured any confusion created by CALJIC 8.50.
Specifically, the jurors were instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.40 that there is "no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself . . ." RT at 2841 (emphasis added). The jurors also received separate instructions on unreasonable self-defense and heat of passion, each of which explained that they are each, on their own, a sufficient defense to murder. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.17 as follows, "[a] person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of Murder." RT at 2836. The jurors were also instructed pursuant to CALJIC No 8.42 as follows, "[t]o reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of Murder to Manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion." RT at 2841. These instructions by the court were buttressed by the arguments of counsel, both of whom told the jurors that heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense were separate theories of voluntary manslaughter.
In light of the other instructions and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that any error in CALJIC No. 8.50 did not so infect the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. As a result, the state court's rejection of Padilla's claim of instructional error was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law.
3. Judy Corrie's Fear of Padilla
Padilla claims that it was error to admit evidence that Judy Corrie ("Corrie"), Padilla's girlfriend, told the police she feared that Padilla would "kill" her for having gone to the police. This evidence was admitted for the purpose of evaluating whether Corrie was biased. Corrie provided testimony on several important issues at trial, including whether Padilla knew there was a gun in the car at the time of the incident, which goes to the intentional nature of the homicide, and whether Duarte's belt really hit and cut Padilla's head, which relates to Padilla's claim for self-defense.
The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). But note that only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (admission of evidence that defendant carried large sums of cash in trunk of car is not type of evidence which necessarily prevents fair trial; jury could draw rational inference that is not constitutionally impermissible).
Here, the trial court told the jurors that the evidence of Corrie's fear was admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating whether Corrie was biased:
You heard evidence that Judy Corrie was fearful of the Defendant at the time she spoke to the police on September 7th, 1995. That evidence was admitted solely for the purpose of showing her state of mind at the time she gave the statement, as well as showing any bias that she may have had when the statement was given and during testimony.
RT at 2825. Evidence showing a witness is afraid is relevant to the witness's bias. United States v. Abel 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). In Abel the court stated
The jury is presumed to have followed the judge's limiting instruction with respect to the purposes for which evidence is admitted.See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997).
Bias is a term used in the `common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony.Id. at 52. From the evidence that Corrie feared Padilla, the jury could draw permissible inferences that Corrie's statements to the police and her testimony at trial were biased in favor of Padilla. Thu the admission of the evidence does not violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d 919-920.
Padilla also argues that if the trial court was willing to admit evidence which tended to show Corrie was afraid of Padilla at trial, it should have also admitted evidence that Padilla had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in his first trial. Padilla argues this evidence would have shown that Corrie's fear of retaliation was unfounded because, with two prior strikes, Padilla would be in prison for the next 25 years.
The Due Process Clause does not guarantee the right to introduce all relevant evidence. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). The exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."Id. at 43 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)) (internal quotations omitted). One of the fundamental rules that may be violated by the erroneous exclusion of critical, corroborative defense evidence is the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967)). The right to present evidence in support of a defense, however, is not unlimited. When deciding whether the exclusion of evidence violates the Due Process right to a fair trial or the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, the court balances the following five factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Chia v. Cambra, 281 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002); Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2000).
Here, evidence that Corrie knew when she testified that Padilla's ex-felon-in-possession conviction would keep him in prison for decades was excluded. After weighing the five factors listed above, this Court concludes the exclusion of this evidence did not violate Padilla's Due Process right to a fair trial or the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Padilla's potential sentence had no probative value on the central issue of Padilla's level of culpability for the homicide Furthermore, the excluded evidence was unreliable because it was speculative: while appellant had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, he had not yet been sentenced, and there was no way to know what sentence the court might impose. A California trial court has the discretion to strike prior conviction findings, People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (1996), and it was possible that if the jury were to acquit Padilla on the various homicide charges, the trial court might have exercised that discretion in Padilla's favor. Moreover, although the evidence was presumably capable of evaluation by the trier of fact, there was other evidence available to impeach Corrie's testimony that she feared petitioner would kill her, including Corrie's testimony that Padilla did not seem angry when she told him she was going to the police, RT at 1767-68, and Corrie's testimony that she was "frightened of the situation, not of Larry." RT at 1771. Finally, the excluded evidence did not constitute a major part of the attempted defense, but was simply intended to impeach Come, and possibly to improperly affect the jury's verdict as to the substantive offense based solely on the jury's view of possible sentencing options. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579-580 (1994) (providing jurors sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion). On balance, the five factors weigh against a finding that the exclusion of evidence violated petitioner's right to due process or to present a defense. Accordingly, habeas relief is not available on this claim.
4. Padilla's Possession of a Gun as an Ex-Felon
Padilla argues that the admission of evidence that he knew, as an ex-felon, that he should not possess a gun, and an instruction allowing the jury to consider this evidence to show his state of mind, violated his right to due process.
As explained in part B.3. above, only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. The jury could draw permissible inferences from Padilla's testimony that, as an ex-felon, he knew that he should not possess a gun. Specifically, this evidence was relevant to whether Padilla knew that the gun was in his car on the night of the homicide, a central issue in the case with respect to whether Padilla shot Duarte intentionally or in the heat of passion.
Padilla claimed that at the time he drove backward toward the victim in the parking lot, he was unaware that the gun was in the car. Padilla testified that he had placed the gun in his car in order to have protection on a recent trip to Oregon, and that after the trip, he forgot the gun was under the car seat, thinking that he had put it in a tackle box. Padilla claimed that he only became aware of the presence of the gun after he was hit by the belt of the victim, and saw the gun appear on the back seat of the car. The prosecution attempted to show that Padilla was fully aware of the presence of the gun at all times, that Padilla intended to use the gun when he drove backward in the car towards the victim, and that Padilla intentionally shot the victim. To prove its version of the story, the prosecutor needed to show it was unlikely that Padilla was unaware that the gun was in the car at the time of the shooting. The prosecutor questioned Padilla about whether he would have placed a weapon in his car and then "forgotten about it" given his status as a convicted felon. Padilla admitted that, as a convicted felon, he knew he should not possess a weapon. The prosecution was attempting to show that Padilla, as an ex-felon, would not be cavalier about the whereabouts of a gun, when the presence of that gun during so much as a traffic stop held a real possibility of sending him back to prison for the rest of his life. As this was a permissible inference that the jury could draw from evidence that, as an ex-felon, he knew he should not have a gun, the admission of this evidence did not violate due process.
Padilla also contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider evidence that petitioner was an ex-felon who knew he should not possess a gun "for the limited purpose of showing his state of mind at the time of the shooting and subsequently, including during testimony." The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
You . . . heard evidence that the Defendant is an ex-felon who knew he should not possess a gun . . . That evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of showing his state of mind at the time of shooting and subsequently, including during testimony. [¶] This evidence, if believed by you, may not be considered by you to prove that the Defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. [¶] Do not consider this, or any other evidence admitted for a limited purpose, for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
RT at 2825-2826 (Italics added).
Padilla contends that his knowledge that it was illegal to possess a weapon was not probative on his state of mind at the time of the shooting or during testimony. However, as explained above, the fact that Padilla knew, that as an ex-felon, he would be in serious trouble for having a gun made it less likely that he would leave a gun in his car without knowing it. In this manner, the evidence that Padilla was an ex-felon who knew he should not possess a gun was relevant to his state of mind at the time of the shooting. It was also relevant to his credibility when he testified that he was not aware of the gun in his car prior to the shooting. Consequently, the trial court's instruction to this effect was proper and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair so as to violate due process. Accordingly, habeas relief is not available on this claim.
5. Corrie's Testimony About Padilla's Possession of the Gun
Padilla argues that admitting Corrie's testimony about his possession of a gun as an ex-felon violates due process. As explained in part B.3. above, only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d al 920.
Corrie testified that she strongly disapproved of the gun's being in the car with her two children, but that Padilla had insisted on bringing it as protection for a recent family trip to Oregon. She also stated that it was extremely dangerous for Padilla to have a gun, given that his status as an ex-felon essentially ensured his imprisonment should he be found with the gun. She further testified that she trusted Padilla to remove the gun from the car after the trip, but she assumed without asking him that he had done so, and that she never saw the gun again.
Corrie's admission that she allowed the gun in the car with her children and Padilla on their trip to Oregon was relevant to Corrie's credibility. This admission is inconsistent with Corrie's claim that she cared about being a good parent and about keeping Padilla out of jail. Given her concern for her children and for petitioner, Come would have argued strongly for removing the gun from the car. Come must have known that the gun was still in the car after the trip, as she would not have been so casual about the gun's location given its impact on Padilla's freedom and her children's safety. Thus, the evidence tended to show Come was lying on the stand about her lack of knowledge (and Padilla's lack of knowledge) of the gun's location.
Corre's credibility was important because her testimony was relevant to several critical issues, including Padilla's knowledge of whether there was a gun in the car (which relates to the intentional nature of the homicide) and the dispute over whether Duarte's belt really hit and cut Padilla's head (which supports Padilla's claim for self-defense). Because the jury could draw permissible inferences about Corrie's credibility from Corrie's testimony about Padilla's possession of a gun as an ex-felon, the admission of this evidence does not violate due process.See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Accordingly, habeas relief is not available on this claim.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.